Under the Patronage of the University of Bombay

HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Volume Two

THE CREATIVE PERIOD

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अणुः पन्था विततः पुराणः
—*Bṛih.* IV. iv. 8

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In place of the transliteration system of the learned societies, we have followed in this work the more popular system, which, following the order of the Devanāgarī alphabet, is as under

a	ā	i	ī	u	ū	ṛi	ṛī
ḷi	e	ai	o	au	ṁ *or* ñ		ḥ

ka	kha	ga	gha	ṅa
cha	chha	ja	jha	ña
ṭa	ṭha	ḍa	ḍha	ṇa
ta	tha	da	dha	na
pa	pha	ba	bha	ma
ya	ra	la	va	
śa	sha	sa		
ha	ḷa			

Material inaccuracies and omissions are rectified in the Notes (pp. 467 ff.). For misprints, see Corrigenda at the end.

PREFACE

IN THOSE hopeful, blissful, Undergraduate days of ours we all of us indulge more or less in dreams about our future The dreams indeed are for the most part cut to the same pattern, and very few of them are really of a kind that can be taken seriously ; but of these very few there normally is some one or other that haunts us all our life. One such, to the lure of which the joint authors of the present undertaking fell victims—each independently, and after his own fashion—was that of writing a monumental History of Indian Philosophy. We both of us can yet recall—vividly as though it happened just the other day—the occasion when the fascination first caught hold of us. Dr. Belvalkar upon whom the idea dawned when he was making his first acquaintance with Śaṅkarāchārya's immortal Bhāshya on the Brahmasūtras placed himself immediately under the direction of the late Dr. F. G. Selby, who, in his days, did so much for the promotion of philosophical studies in the Deccan, and who advised him not to take up the project before he had thoroughly familiarised himself with Greek and Modern European Philosophy, as also with the political and the cultural History of Europe. This meant an arduous preparation of five years and two extra University examinations. Professor Ranade was led—by circumstances which need not be here detailed—to make a living acquaintance with Mysticism and religious thought before he came to have an academic acquaintance with European and Indian Philosophy. The joint authors, although more or less contemporaries at the Deccan College and so sufficiently known to each other, never had any occasion to exchange views as to what each of them had set before himself as his life's task. But certain domestic calamities which befell them

both in the span of a couple of fortnights spent under a common roof helped to draw the bonds of their earlier friendship still closer, and in a communication of hearts each discovered that the other had been entertaining the selfsame literary ambition, and had been assiduously preparing himself for it all those years. What more natural under the circumstances than that the two should agree to collaborate on a joint project, for the adumbration of which the authors remember having spent much midnight oil for weeks? A sacred fervour seemed to inspire the work, and it is that same fervour of piety that is trusted, *Deo volente*, to bring the undertaking to an eventual conclusion.

2. It will thus be seen that several years of apprenticeship intervened before our original dream of the History of Indian Philosophy was concretely formulated into the "Outline Scheme" for the same, published by us in 1919 for private circulation. Our scheme had the good fortune of receiving the commendation and blessings of the late Sir Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar, whose "Foreword" (dated 5th December 1918) to the scheme—along with the scheme itself—is reproduced at the end of this Volume. Practically everybody to whom we wrote about the scheme asking for advice and assistance—such as H. E. Lord Ronaldshay, sometime Governor of Bengal, the late Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Calcutta, the late Lokamānya Bal Gangadhar Tilak, and Shrimant Narayanrao Babasaheb Ghorpade, the Chiefsaheb of Ichalkaranji—welcomed it as a monumental task, the first of its kind, and capable of filling a sore need of our Oriental studies. And it was in consequence of such favourable reception of the scheme that, upon the recommendation of Sir George Lloyd, the late Governor of this Presidency, the University of Bombay agreed, in 1920, under certain conditions, to advance by way of preparation money a sum of Rs. six thousand per volume for three out of the projected series of eight volumes, the original conditions being, in 1923, modified whereby it was stipulated that the joint authors were to return to the Univer-

sity Rs. four thousand per volume within a year of the date of its publication. It is thus that the present Volume is being issued under the patronage of the University of Bombay.

3. When originally formulated in 1908 ours was the first and the only scheme for a systematic History of Indian Philosophy in the field. But between 1918 and 1928 much water has flowed under the bridge. Thus Das Gupta published in 1922 the first volume of his projected History of Indian Philosophy in two Volumes, and Radhakrishnan has completed his History in two volumes, the first of which appeared in 1923 and the second in 1927. There have also been issued smaller epitomes such as the "Esquisse d'une Historie de la Philosophie Indienne" by Paul Masson Oursel (Paris, 1923), and the "Indische Philosophie" by Otto Strauss (München, 1925), and other still shorter monographs by Oldenberg in the "Kultur der Gegenwart" and by Jacobi in the "Licht des Ostens." Also, on the special subject covered by the Volume now published, there appeared Oldenberg's "Die Weltanschauung der Brāhmaṇa-Texte" (Göttingen, 1919), Hertel's "Die Weisheit der Upanishaden" (München, 1921), besides his several publications in the series entitled "Indo-Iranische Quellen und Forschungen," and a large number of contributions by several European *savants* to the various learned publications of Europe to which, we hope, adequate references have been given in our notes.—Keith's two volumes on "The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads" in the Harvard Oriental Series came too late into our hands for any specific reference in our Volume. This plethora of writings on the subject of Indian Philosophy in the course of the last half a dozen years (several others there are to which we do not think it necessary to refer here) simply proves to our mind that the scheme as we formulated it in 1918 was none too late in the field; and if the results of our scheme have not been actually the first on the market, the joint authors venture all the same to hope that their present work has not been in any essential respects anticipated or rendered nugatory by any of the above publications.

4. As is well known, the extremely unsettled chronology of the literary monuments of Ancient India offers the most formidable obstacle to a critical and historical appraisal of their contents. The most glaring example of this is the Mahābhārata, and the Bhagavadgītā as the most famous and typical part of the Mahābhārata. The historian of Indian Philosophy will present one account of the position and purpose of the Bhagavadgītā if he regards it as pre-Buddhistic, another and a different account if he assigns it to the post-Buddhistic period, and quite a third again if the poem is supposed to have had an earlier (sectarian) form which may be pre-Buddhistic, and a later and an elaborated form dating from about the beginning of the Christian era. It is here obvious that until the basic textual and chronological issues are settled, no definitive superstructure can advantageously be erected. Hence, it is not enough that the historian of Indian Philosophy be merely a philosopher: he has to be a philologist and an antiquarian as well, who must be equipped with the necessary discipline for the task and be in a position to go straight to the sources and re-interpret them for himself after a careful consideration of what may have been already written on the specific point at issue, not only by Indian commentators, but by English, French, and German scholars to boot. It was therefore fortunate that the joint authors, who knew and acknowledged the fact that while they possessed a more or less common intellectual ideal, they were endowed with a more or less different literary equipment which was capable of becoming complementary to each other, should have fixed upon an arrangement whereby they agreed to let each one try his hand at what he was better qualified to do. Thus to the Volume now published Dr. Belvalkar contributed the portions dealing with Early Vedic, Brāhmaṇic and post-Upanishadic speculation, Upanishadic stratification, and the general evaluation of Upanishadic philosophy, while Professor Ranade contributed the critical expositions of most of the individual Upanishadic texts. Of course, before these contributions took their final shape, they were discussed

with their help to determine the exact line of thought-evolution warranted by such a stratification. In this task we hope we have achieved a fair measure of success, because, after we had fixed our stratification on independent grounds, we were ourselves agreeably surprised to discover that the texts thus sequentially arranged by us for the first time exhibited a fair progression in thought-evolution, which *a priori* we little anticipated to find therein.—It is thus that chronology and logic have joined hands, and Hegel's dictum to that extent realised.—The majority of our predecessors in the field, as is well known, have taken Deussen's grouping of the Upanishadic texts as their guide, and they are therefore compelled for the most part to repeat in substance the conclusions of Deussen himself. Our procedure in this respect, we hope, will be regarded as a distinct advance. It does for the Upanishads what Lutoslawski and others have done for Plato's *Dialogues.*—Secondly, we have attempted in this book to bring the Upanishadic thought quite in a line with that of the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas, and have accordingly treated as Upanishads some of the Brāhmaṇa and Āraṇyaka texts that happened not to have been designated "Upanishads." We have also proved fortunate in being enabled to include within our treatment an account of the four new and important Upanishads which Dr. Belvalkar published and translated for the first time. The texts were long known by name and were included amongst those translated into Persian for Prince Dārā Shukōh, but their Sanskrit originals were hitherto unknown and unpublished. Also, in the case of the other more familiar texts, we have given our own interpretations of many passages, criticising those already in the field.* And the very fact that we had to divide such a text as the Śvetāśvatara into certain chronologically

* Compare our treatment of the Paryaṅka-vidyā text from the Kaushītakī (p. 271 ff.) ; of Īśa, stanzas 9–14 (p. 174); of Kaṭha I. i. 5 (p. 261), I. iii. 10–11 (p. 264), and II. iii. 5 (p. 270); of Chhāndogya vi. 13 (p. 382), vi. 14 (p. 383), vi. 16 (p. 383), and vii. 26. 2 (p. 108) ; of Bṛihadāraṇyaka iii. 9. 26 (p. 381), iii. 28 (p. 435), and iv. 3. 15 (p.374); and of the Kena and the Muṇḍaka generally (p. 176 and 278 respectively).

disparate strata has naturally made all the difference in the eventual historical and philosophical appraisal of the doctrine contained in that text. All this may appear more philology than philosophy; but except upon the solid foundation of philology all philosophical superstructure is likely to tumble down like a castle of cards. Hence we need offer no apology if certain portions of our treatment repel the mere philosopher, or at certain others the mere philologist feels inclined to chafe. — Thirdly, we have made it a special feature of our work to report, on any complicated problem like the origin of Sāṁkhya philosophy, the differing views held especially by scholars whose writings, being for the most part in German and French, were not readily accessible to those unacquainted with these languages. It follows as a consequence that we had to quote extensively; and where the literature surveyed and the writings utilised have been so very vast, we can only hope that it is not too often that we have forgotten to give exact references to our original sources. — Lastly, it may be just as well to point out here that as regards Vedic chronology we have not accepted the extreme views on either side, but have expressed our adherence to the middle view to which responsible opinion now-a-days seems on the whole to gravitate. For our Brāhmaṇa chronology we are mostly indebted to predecessors like Keith, and our treatment of the Post-Upanishadic thought-ferment is on the lines of F. Otto Schrader's Inaugural Dissertation "Ueber den Stand der Indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahāvīras and Buddhas" (Strassburg, 1902), from which however we have drawn our own conclusion as regards the place of the Mahābhārata in the religious and philosophical history of Ancient India.* As the whole subject is going to fully occupy us in the subsequent Volumes of this History, it is sufficient here to merely repeat the authors' conviction that to assign the Great Epic of India (pruned of course of its patent

* See page 465. In 1919 Dr. Belvalkar presented a paper on the subject, the main arguments and conclusions of which were fully endorsed by the late Sir R. G. Bhandarkar who presided on the occasion.

excrescences) to the pre-Buddhistic age involves no "uncritical" assumption or conclusion of any kind.—So too if our treatment of the Vedic speculation in Chapter One appears somewhat sketchy and incomplete, as ignoring the data from the Minor Vedas, we beg to remind the readers of the fact that in our scheme the present volume is to be preceded by another dealing with "The Origins."

7. It is perhaps due to us that we should explain here the delay that has occurred in the publication of the present Volume the first out of the three so far subsidised by the University of Bombay. In less than about twelve months from the communication of the University's offer of patronage we submitted the typed press-copy of the whole of the present Volume with the exception of Chapter Nine; and with the zealous co-operation of Mr. C. R. Naidu, the Monotype operator, whose name must not here be passed over, the printing of the first 300 pages of the Volume was actually over in less than six months. It was at this stage that there occurred a delay of some months due to our anxiety to read and profit by some of the latest European books on the subject of this Volume, the early publication of which was announced. When it is told that some of the writers for whose latest word on the subject we deemed it worth the while to wait were such eminent scholars as Oldenberg, Jacobi, Keith, and Hertel, we would be probably excused our weakness. But, in the mean time, the press to which our work was entrusted for printing was involved into some financial difficulties, which at one time threatened to lead to extreme consequences. Suffice here to say that we had to pay off all the press bills and arrange to release the printed forms and seek the help of some other press to complete the Volume. The only reliable and competent local press to which we had access was the Aryabhushan press, which, however, owing to the disastrous fire to which it fell a prey in May, 1926 took some months to recover its normal efficiency and take up our work. We are grateful indeed to the Manager of the Press, Mr. A. V. Patwardhan, B. A., as also to Mr. K. M. Bal and the competent

staff under him, for having exerted their best to complete the work to our satisfaction as early as possible. This unexpected incident has caused a slight difference in the typography of the work, for which we beseech the indulgence of our readers. The authors from the very first had to do duty not only as the proof-correctors but also, partly, as foremen in the Press, supervising all the details by giving minute instructions, seeing that we found it impossible to secure a publishing agency which would relieve the authors of these and many other highly irksome details, and take the responsibility of meeting, as against sale-proceeds, the full costs of bringing out the Volume and paying the dues of the University of Bombay. Dr. Belvalkar has thus to figure, for the purposes of the present undertaking at any rate, as the Proprietor of the "Bilvakuñja Publishing House." These were additional circumstances that might extenuate the delay, which, nevertheless, from another point of view, came to us as a God-send. Because we sincerely feel that in the absence of the material that was published during the intervening period, our Ninth Chapter on the evaluation of the Upanishadic Philosophy could not have been written the way we have actually written it. This Chapter, which is the largest in the book, and in a sense the natural culmination of the treatment, as embodying our final appraisal of the value of the Upanishadic Philosophy, and also as offering material for testing the plausibility of our new attempt at distributing the Upanishadic texts into stratified groups, will probably come to be *the* Chapter by which our book will eventually be judged. We have spared no pains in making it complete and up-to-date; and if in our conclusions we have in places ventured to differ from such acknowledged masters as Garbe, Jacobi, Hertel, Oldenberg, Hopkins and others, it was not without some hesitation and a deal of careful consideration. We trust that the subsequent Volumes of this History will not take so long in publication.

8. It only remains to thank those that have helped us in the preparation of this Volume. The Orientalists whose writings have been of considerable service to us have been

already mentioned. It is a great pity that persons like Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, Dr. F. G. Selby, or Lokamānya B. G. Tilak who gave the authors considerable encouragement and assistance, or like Oldenberg and Garbe, who would have been amongst the most competent critics of this work, are no longer with us. But there are others whose judgment the joint authors respectfully solicit and hopefully look up to. Philosophical studies—especially the historical investigations into the Indian Philosophy—are somewhat at a discount in our part of India; and the joint authors cannot be adequately grateful to their *Alma Mater* whose financial assistance at the right moment made it at all possible for them to enter upon this venturesome undertaking, wherein, as will be evident, there is "all work and no pay." Of the assistants who have loyally helped us throughout mention is due to Mr. S. K. Dharmadhikari and Mr. K. V. Gajendragadkar M. A., and particularly to Mr. R. D. Vadekar, M. A., whose acquaintance with Sanskrit, Pāli, German and French and whose familiarity with the technical side of printing were so very serviceable in the compilation of the text and the correction of proofs. The Index at the end of the Volume is mainly due to him. — And now this Volume, with all its imperfections, which has been on our hands for years and has caused us much anxiousth ought; this Volume which, if it has raised the expectations of some, has also, we are afraid, tried the patience of many; this Volume which marks the beginning of the realisation of our youthful dream, and which, upon its conclusion, leaves us wiser and soberer but nonetheless determined to fulfil our ideal : this Volume, our first joint offering of piety and friendship at the altar of the Nameless and the Formless, it is with no small relief and gratitude that we find ourselves to-day in a position to give out to the world for its judgment and appraisal. *Om Tat Sat.*

Poona,
20th November 1927.

S. K. BELVALKAR
R. D. RANADE

ABBREVIATIONS

Ait. Āraṇ.—Aitareya Āraṇyaka.

A. B.; *Ait. B.*—Aitareya Brāhmaṇa.

Ait. Up.—Aitareya Upanishad.

Bṛih.; *Brihad.*; *Brihad. Up.*—Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad.

Chh.; *Chhā.*; *Chhān.*—Chhāndogya Upanishad.

ERE—Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics.

Göttin. Geleh. Anz.—Göttingen'sche Gelehrte Anzeigen.

J. B.—Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa.

J. U. B.; *Jaim. Up. Br.*; *Jaiminīya Up. Br.*—Jaiminīya Upanishad Brāhmaṇa.

Kaush.; *Kaushī. Up.*—Kaushītaki Upanishad.

Mait.; *Maitrā*; *Maitrī.*—Maitrāyaṇīya Upanishad.

Mbh.—Mahābhārata [Kumbhakonam Edition].

NGGW.; *Nach. G. G. W.*—Nachrichten von der königlichen Gesellchaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen.

Rv.—Rigveda.

Ś. B; *Śat. Brāh.*—Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa.

Tait. Saṁ.—Taittirīya Saṁhitā.

Taittir.; *Tait Up.*—Taittirīya Upanishad.

T. B.; *Tait. Brāh.*—Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa.

V. S.—Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā.

ZDMG—Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft [Journal of the German Oriental Society].

History of Indian Philosophy

VOLUME TWO

The Creative Period

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CHAPTER FIRST

TRANSITION FROM THE LATER VEDIC TO THE BRĀHMAṆA PERIOD

1. THE POSITION OF VEDA IN INDIAN LITERATURE AND LIFE.—The Veda has always stood as the distant and unchanging back-ground and as the ultimate source of inspiration for all Indian achievements in any field of life ; and a genetic and historical study of any one of these achievements has to begin at the very dimmest beginnings such as are reflected or presupposed in the hymns of the Rigveda : those simple outpourings of the Holy Seers of old, the exact nature and motives of which, after over a century of interpretation and controversy, remain as unsettled as ever. And the need of finding out and duly appraising the ultimate beginnings of things is particularly imperative in a history of Indian Philosophy, because, Indian achievement in the domain of philosophical speculation is admitted to have reached an all-round eminence very early in its career, and to have maintained it thereafter throughout its checkered and fruitful life of at least thrice the duration of historical Greek Philosophy. But, strange as it may seem, the task of tracing the early awakenings of philosophic thought in the Veda is rendered highly intricate, and therefore incapable of securing an all-round assent, for the very reasons that have made it possible for the Veda to be the spring and fountain-head of everything Indian. For, the Veda—even if we limit the expression to the oldest of them, the Rigveda—is not one single book composed by one author, nor even a volume of songs and prayers from a number of contemporary authors ; it is a series of such volumes put together by generations of

poets—in fact, a library that was in the making for years—and between its oldest portions and the newest lies a distance of more than at least half a dozen of centuries. As a consequence we find in the Veda thoughts, beliefs, and practices that one is prone to associate with the most primitive grades of society, side by side with advanced metaphysical speculations and an elaborate sacrificial technique which marks a highly developed but at the same time a highly artificial phase in its evolution. And our problem is rendered still more complicated by circumstances such as, (1) the almost total lack of definite chronological data either in the old or in the new Veda; (2) the possibility, nay the probability, of an early and prolonged contact leading to reciprocal influence between the Indian (Aryan) and some non-Indian (non-Aryan) civilisation; and (3) if it must be owned, the impossibility of getting even two scholars to agree on such basic questions as the home of the undivided Aryans and the conditions of their life, the age and geographical back-ground of the older parts of the Veda, the chronological stratification of the Rigveda and its relation to the Atharva-veda; and finally, the state of culture and civilisation attained in the Vedic times as a whole.

2. THE NEED FOR A STARTING POINT FOR THIS VOLUME.—The task of tracing the outlines of philosophic speculations in the hazy dawn of Vedic times, and consequently the task of examining the several hypotheses and counter-hypotheses in elucidation of some of the problems above recited, is going to engage us in the first volume of this History.* That volume, however, is to appear much later than the present volume which is intended to take up the history of philosophical speculation in India at the point reached towards the end of the "Vedic" period, and thence to trace its later progress through the vast mass of the Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas, and Upanishads to the threshold of what we have called the post-Upanishadic thought-ferment. We are therefore going to plunge, so to say, *in medias res*, and with a view to obtain a correct starting point it becomes necessary for us at the very outset to determine the relation of the Brāhmaṇa literature as a whole to the "Veda"

* See the Outline Scheme for our History of Indian Philosophy published at the end of this Volume.

properly so called: to ascertain in other words, the stage of philosophical speculation (and incidentally of material civilisation) reached in Rigvedic times in order to gauge the value of the contributions to it made in the Brāhmaṇa period. This would naturally involve some inevitable anticipation and repetition, which we shall confine to the narrowest possible limits.

3. INADEQUATE ATTEMPTS TO DISTINGUISH THE OLD AND THE NEW IN THE RIGVEDA.—When Max Müller characterised the Rigveda as the "babbling of child-humanity" he was just as much arguing from part to the whole as another American scholar who sees in the Veda nothing but priest-craft and a greed for guerdon. And to the very obvious charge that the Rigveda itself bears ample direct testimony to the existence of an old, a middle, and a new hymnology, and that therefore no such single characterisation can be true of the Rigveda as a whole, the same American scholar has replied in recent years by a most elaborate presentation of the evidence to be derived from a consideration of the repeated stanzas in the Rigveda, which, it must be confessed, has a tendency to obliterate the distinction between the "old" and the "new" and to considerably weaken the force of the time-honoured tests (lexical, grammatical, metrical, and so forth) for determining the relative age of the several portions of the Rigveda without offering other more decisive tests as substitutes. But it will not do in consequence merely to rest content with the conclusion that the bulk of the Rigveda, such as we have it, is epigonal and represents "the mixed final precipitate of a later time" informed and inspired by a love of power and priestly reward. For, while the discredited stylometric tests had at least one good point in them—their objectivity—the determination of the superior or inferior quality of repetitions, it will be admitted, is largely subjective; and so at the end of a long journey and after a most heroic wading through complicated statistics we seem to be at no very great distance from our starting-point.

4. A NEW METHOD ADOPTED.—An old and unimpeachable evidence for the lateness of certain hymns of the Rigveda has been before scholars for more than sixty years but seems as yet to have

totally escaped their attention, which is rather a pity, because the evidence is definitely datable, belonging as it does to a time much earlier than the seventh century before Christ. The fourth Adhyāya of the lists of Vedic words called Nighaṇṭus, upon which Yāska wrote his commentary called the Nirukta, is styled the *Aika-padika*, because in it are listed together 278 single words of unknown or doubtful meaning and derivation as put together by some ancient but anonymous author or authors. These words—with very few exceptions—are given here not as nominative singulars or present third person singulars, as in the other chapters of the Nighaṇṭus, but in the very form in which we actually meet them in our present Rigveda; and seeing that some of these *Aikapadika* words (e. g. *Kúliśaḥ*, Nigh. iv. 3. 81=ii. 20. 12) occur in the earlier chapters of the Nighaṇṭus as well-known synonyms in a particular sense, the reason for their reappearance in the *Aikapadika*—and in fact, the whole *rationale* of this chapter, the reason why just these words should have been chosen and not others,—needs to be adequately explained. Inasmuch as it is *a priori* impossible to find out just what words a certain generation of readers ought to find difficult and so in need of explanation, it is on the one hand possible to maintain that these 278 words of the *Aikapadika* represent in their totality *all* the words in our existing Rigveda that were deemed abstruse by a certain "secondary generation of students" and here listed to facilitate their own quick comprehension (*bilma-grahaṇāya*, Nir. i. 20). This presumably has been the tacit assumption of even professed Orientalists: nobody, so far as we are aware, has actually verified it. We have, however, gone into the matter in a systematic fashion, and although the results in their full statistical presentation cannot properly be included here, it seems necessary, owing to the important nature of the conclusions reached or rendered probable, to outline the method followed and the deductions made.

5. ITS FEATURES DESCRIBED.—Of the 278 words in the *Aikapadika* just 77 words are such as appear only once in the whole of our present Rigveda. Consequently the passages referred to are easily ascertainable. Now it is rather surprising to discover that of the

77 passages nearly 50 are from the first, eighth, and tenth Maṇḍalas together. The passages further include as many as 7 *dānastutis*, or 'gift-praises' and give certain late sacrificial technicalities, ritualistic riddles, liturgical formularies or *nivids*, elements of occult cosmogony and some other late thought-obscurities, besides containing the only actual reference to the Aśvamedha or Horse-sacrifice in the Rigveda. Moreover, we find amongst these passages the famous ṛik in hatred of sage Vasishṭha (iii. 53. 23), as also an application of the word Asura to demons, besides an instance or two of invocations to disease goblins. Some of the hymns referred to violate the usual descending order of the Maṇḍalas, and actually proclaim themselves as 'new songs' in contradistinction from those of 'ancient singers'. Others contain here and there a Prākritic word like *titaü*, or a word of peculiar social significance like *vijāmātṛi*, or finally a bit of a very free popular love-song, besides offering certain rhetorical construction-features or a free handling of metres. Quite a few of these passages narrate the circumstances attending Agni's mysterious birth or young Indra's familiar and far-famed exploits in a brief allusive fashion. Lastly we might mention the circumstance that specific and somewhat unfamiliar proper names such as the river Śiphā or the un-Aryan country of the Kīkaṭas, the prince Kuliśa and his wife (?) Kuliśī, are often met with in these passages,—quite apart from the names of the liberal patrons in the *dānastutis* proper, some of which, it might be noted in passing, have an un-Sanskritic ring about them. Grassmann, it might be observed, has treated a good many of these passages as Anhang or Appendix and Arnold's stylometric tests yield the following result—

A	B1	B2	C1	C2	Total.
29	6	27	10		77

Bloomfield's new test as to the frequency and the quality of the repeated pādas yields a result not discordant on the whole; and

we feel fully justified in asserting that the words of the *Aikapadika* section under consideration are most probably taken from a mass of new accretion made at a specific time to previously existing hymnology.*

6. THE CONCLUSION FURTHER STRENGTHENED.—This conclu-clusion is further strengthened by a consideration of the remaining lexical material of the *Aikapadika* section which exhibits also analogous features. According to our calculation 23 of these words occur each only twice in the whole Rigveda, while 18 more words occur three times each. Now if a word of uncertain meaning and derivation is to be presumed to constitute a late addition to the vocabulary, it is clear that *all* the passages where that word occurs, compounded or uncompounded and in the same or different grammatical form, must be pronounced equally late. Have we evidence to warrant such a conclusion ? On a careful review of not only two or three occurrence words but of words occurring up to eight times, we are glad to announce that we have been able to gather ample converging evidence. To take a typical case, the word *ishmiṇaḥ* (Nigh. iv. 1. 25) occurs three times in the Rigveda, *viz.*—i. 87. 6 (B1), v. 87. 5 (A) and vii. 56. 11 (A), while the form *ishmiṇam*, not listed in the Nighaṇṭus, occurs once in v. 52. 16 (A). The word does not occur associated with any other word in a compound. Now hymn v. 87 is regarded as an Anhang both by Grassmann and H. Oldenberg, it being the very last hymn of the Maṇḍala. Hymn v. 52 ends with a *dānastuti* in the last ṛik, no. 17, and it is not improbable that the two preceding ṛiks, as marking a transition to the ' gift-praise ', are also of the same age as the last, unless the whole hymn is late. The points of lateness in i. 87 are : the use of the word *virapśinaḥ* [assuming the correctness

* One would suppose that the difficult words should be the older and the more archaic ones. But new or loan words could also be difficult words. Further, the difficult words of the older canon were already dealt with in the first three chapters of the Nighaṇṭu, the *Aikapadika* being the 4th chapter and of different authorship. For a full discussion of the problem see Dr. Belvalkar's paper on the *Literary Strata in the Rigveda* read before the Second Oriental Conference at Calcutta.

of Bloomfield's latest theory as to its original formation from *vīra*+*paśu* (Avestic *fṣu*)+possessive termination], the reference in ṛik 5 to the 'holy names' of the Maruts, and to the 'pious descent from worthy forefathers' of which the poet boasts in the same stanza. As to vii. 56. 11, our last case, we may note that in a hymn of 25 ṛiks Grassmann has put down just the 11th (and the last) as Anhang.

7. AN OBJECTION TO THE NEW METHOD ANTICIPATED AND ANSWERED.—Of the total number of words in the *Aikapadika* a little less than just a third occur more than 8 or 10 times each in the Rigveda; and some of these words—such as *áchchha* (Nigh. iv. 2. 78, *ándhaḥ* (Nigh. iv. 2. 6), *duritám* (Nigh. iv. 3. 47), or *vā́śī* (Nigh. iv. 1. 44)—are of such frequent occurrence in the Rigveda that it is impossible to imagine that the words are new and belong to the later portions of the Veda. This circumstance might seem to militate against our conclusion, but on careful reflection we are in most cases able to find out an adequate reason for the introduction of these words in the *Aikapadika*. It is not that the word as such is new, but that its accent or sense or use in specific passages is unusual. Thus the word *áchchha* (with the unlengthened final vowel) occurs in the Saṁhitā only at the end of a pāda or metrical unit. There are only two exceptions: Rv. i. 31. 17 (B2) and ix. 106. 1, and in the first of them it is without any noun in the accusative case governed by it. The adjective *andháḥ* (=blind) occurs thrice in this form and over a dozen times in other case-forms while the noun *ándhaḥ* (=food) occurs nearly a hundred times in the Rigveda all told. But it is only in one passage, *viz.*, Rigveda vii. 88. 2—that famous hymn where Vasishṭha speaks of his sailing in a boat in Varuṇa's company to the God's house—that its interpretation offers anything like a problem. The word *duritám*, which is normally oxytone or *antodātta*, is accented on the first syllable only in Rigveda i. 125. 7 (B2). The word *vā́śī* occurs 14 times in the Rigveda, and in just half the number of passages it is some weapon belonging to the Maruts or Storm-gods. In six other passages the context leaves no doubt that some kind of weapon is probably meant by the word. In the only remaining passage,

Rigveda viii. 12. 12,—which is admittedly a *dhītir návīyasī* : a newer song,—its meaning is somewhat uncertain, different scholars proposing for it such diverse senses as an axe, a sword, a knife, a hymn, or the pressing stones. If in this way we are able to discover a reason for the inclusion in our Nighaṇṭu lists, of certain words of frequent occurrence, and to identify the specific passage (or passages) intended, these passages are generally found to exhibit the same features as before, and—a few stubborn remnants apart—the conclusion already rendered highly probable is thereby placed almost beyond the reach of doubt. The passages to the relative lateness of which the *Aikapadika* section thus bears testimony come from some 350 hymns, or a little over a third part of our present Rigveda, more than half the new material belonging to the first, the eighth, and the tenth Maṇḍalas.

8. THE BEARING OF THE CONCLUSION ON THE PROBLEM BEFORE US.—Very little related to philosophy, as this philological disquisition might appear at first sight, it gives us definitely a starting point for this Volume. The features characteristic of these new Vedic accretions, such as have been described above (§ 5), are generally absent in the earlier portions of the Rigveda. This takes the edge off the not-too-flattering picture of the Vedic bards and the source of their poetic inspiration which most European and American accounts of the religion of the Veda invariably offer for the delectation of their readers. The characteristics which these *savants* discover in the Veda are certainly there ; but they rather belong to the latest portions of it—portions which, as we shall presently see, are nearer to the times of the Brāhmaṇas. But there was a primitive Vedic religion wherein feeling was not overlaid, was not outraged, by form ; where the joy in existence was not marred by a too frequent necessity to propitiate some malignant lesser spirits or to seek the intervention of the all-too-knowing and all-too-grabbing priest-hood. The first generation of Vedic scholars might have allowed their enthusiasm to get the better of their judgment in delineating an all too idyllic picture of the primitive Vedic Aryan in his bucolic surroundings, but he certainly was not, from start on, the wild ruffian rough-ridden by the priest or

kept in check by the dread of disease goblins and spectres of dead forefathers that some would have us believe him to be. At any rate the attempt to turn the whole Rigveda into pure priest-poetry through and through can no longer be accepted without a grain of salt.*

9. THE CHRONOLOGICAL LIMITS OF THE LATE VEDIC PERIOD.—Leaving the earlier phases of Vedic religion for a detailed treatment in another volume of this series, we take up here, at first, the consideration of the distance that separates the latest phase of the Vedic religion, as evidenced amongest others by these accretions, from the beginning of what we might call the Brāhmaṇa period. Yāska here gives us the necessary chronological starting point. To him the Nighaṇṭus are a *samāmnāya* or a 'holy collection,' the work of ancient sages, and he knows of many recensions of it. Yāska, further, is not the earliest expositor of the Nighaṇṭus : he probably was not even in possession of all the exact Vedic passages from which the words were chosen by the author or authors of the lists. On the other hand Yāska quotes from a large number of Brāhmaṇa texts—including probably the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa and the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka—and to these two texts, as also to Yāska himself, the Rigveda is already a Daśatayī : divided into ten Maṇḍalas and possessing a definitely tabulated content. Yāska speaks of the Brāhmaṇas as "given to too large an indulgence in metaphors : *bahu-bhakti-vādīni* (Nir. vii. 24)," and he seems to have lived nearer the time of the Brāhmaṇas than to that of the authors of the Nighaṇṭu lists. And the accretions to the Rigveda of which the *Aikapadika* section of the Nighaṇṭus takes count evidently belong to a period still earlier. Now Yāska is admitted on all hands to be a predecessor of Pāṇini;

* As against the remarks of Bloomfield aneant Rv. i. 92. 5. (*Religion of the Veda*, p. 66) be it noted that the hymn is a late accretion. It is composite in character and is, as such, assigned by Arnold to three different periods. Bloomfield himself notes that three out of its twelve repeated pādas are demonstrably inferior. The hymn contains the word *Śvaghnin* from the *Aikapadika* section. It is of course unfair to regard such a hymn as the norm of Vedic poetry.

and Pāṇini, even the most conservative or critical European scholars are prepared to assign to cir. 500 B. C., while Goldstücker, R. G. Bhandarkar, and V. A. Smith see no objection in placing Pāṇini in the 7th century before Christ. Working our way backwards from Pāṇini, who, be it noted, speaks of 'ancient' and 'late' Brāhmaṇa texts, if full justice is to be done to the large mass of literary and scientific activity of the pre-Pāṇinīya and the Brāhmaṇa periods, we cannot reasonably postulate for the latest accretions to the Rigveda any date subsequent to B. C. 1000 or 1200. In fact, they might have been made much earlier, the mass of already existing Vedic hymns to which these additions were made belonging to a period earlier still by many a century. The stage reached by this 'late' Veda is the point at which the first volume of this History would naturally end, and the present take its start. It would be convenient, therefore, to afford here a somewhat detailed picture of the conditions of life, the state of general culture, and the level of religio-philosophic speculation reached during this last phase of 'Vedic' society.

10. A PROBABLE SHIFTING OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND BETWEEN THE EARLY AND THE LATE VEDIC PERIOD.—The geographical horizon for the late Vedic period was the Panjab, especially the north-western part of it as watered by the Indus and its tributaries on both sides,—all of which find a mention in the Rigveda. We need not, however, conclude that this had always been the back-ground even for the earliest portions of the Rigveda. There is evidence to prove that portions of our present Rigveda were composed beyond the Hindukush, to the west and north of it.* Brunnhofer has collected a mass of facts which, even after large deductions are made for his tendency to theorise on insufficient data, make it very probable that some part of the Rigveda at any rate is the work of poets inhabiting the North Iran from the Caspian Sea to the Panjab. We may further add that Ptolemy speaks of the '*seven* tributaries' of the Oxus (with which some scholars identify the Vedic Sarasvatī and the Vedic Rasā) and there is even now a

* See Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, i. 83-116; Ludwig, *Der Rigveda*, iii, 196f.

portion of Chinese Turkestan called Semiretchenski-krai or "Land of the Seven Rivers", which, curiously enough, answers more truly to Alberuni's description of the Sapta-sindhu as the land of the rivers flowing *northwards of the Hindukush* and uniting their waters near Turmuz (Tarmes) and forming the river Oxus; while our knowledge of pre-historic Aryan migrations and colonies in Central Asia is yet too much in its infancy to permit a mere acquiescence in the time-honoured orthodox conclusions, which seem to be now thrown into the melting-pot by the discoveries actual and impending that we owe to Assyriology. Be it noted here for our immediate purpose that the names of a number of the patron-princes of the 'gift-praises,' and of the priestly composers of them as recorded in the traditional *Anukramaṇīs*, as also the few specific geographical names belonging to the later Vedic accretions have an un-Sanskritic ring about them, and seem to hail from beyond India and the Indus.

11. EVIDENCE FOR A RACE-MIXTURE IN THE VEDA.—The people to whom we owe the Veda belonged to the race of the fair-skinned Aryans who call the un-Aryan tribes with whom they came into contact by the appellation of *Dāsas* or *Dasyus* and sometimes even of *Asuras*, and describe them as misfeatured or noseless, godless, non-sacrificing people who speak in a barbarous tongue and are given to strange practices (such as Phallus-worship, and the worship of Female Energy). It is usual to identify the Dāsas with the Δάσαι or Dahæ of the Caspian Steppes, and the Asuras with the Assyrians. If these be the original connotations of the terms their association, in the late Vedic period, with the tribes already in possession of India whom the Aryans subdued as they entered the country can be explained as a transfer by reminiscence of identical names from the old to the new opponents of Aryan advance: a transfer which would be materially helped if, as we have reason to suppose, the new enemies exhibited characteristics and practices which the old enemies also possessed. That the dark-skinned people whom the advancing Aryans encountered in India were themselves not indigenous to the country but were, like the Aryans, invaders from without is now generally admitted; and

that they must therefore have stretched once as far west as the Caspian Sea and Mesopotamia, or must in any case have come under the influence of the civilisation of the Dahæ and Assyrians, is an hypothesis not in itself improbable.

12. THE EFFECT OF THIS RACE-FUSION ON THE RELIGION OF THE PEOPLE.—The question now to determine is to ascertain the share which these non-Aryan Dāsas and Asuras had in the shaping of the religious beliefs and practices of the Aryans, a question which gains additional cogency from the circumstance that the conquering Aryans did not exterminate but did largely assimilate the culture of the subdued races. Fierce and bitter as the struggle might have been at times, the pioneers of Indo-Aryan civilisation, as representing the culture of a race of warrior-poets and philosophers, won their way even more effectively by their superior intellectual qualities than by their fighting strength. The Aryan immigrants who formed a minority probably made in the end a virtue of necessity by adopting the primitive non-Aryan communal village-system as the basis for their economic superstructure. Hence probably, at this period, we find a transfer, in the field of religion, of a host of lesser gods and spirits (together with certain superstitious beliefs and practices) to the earlier Aryan system of religious rites which were in their essentials based upon an adoration of natural phenomena. For we believe that the prevalence of magic and witchcraft and tree and animal worship in the Aryan religious system is best explained not as deterioration, under the machinations of the priesthood, of the original free nature-worship of the Aryans; nor again as the contemporary but popular phase of the Aryan religion coeval with the 'hieratic' portion of it, if not actually a still earlier phase of it; but rather as due to the fusion and assimilation of the beliefs and practices of a nature-worshipping race with the demonolatrous cult of another distinct race. Already before the commencement of the late Vedic period the fusion was well-nigh completed, and the peculiar features of the lower elements in the Vedic pantheon had even begun to modify the character of the older Vedic gods and the mode and the motive of their worship in ways more than one.

13. ITS BEARING ON THE FORMULATION OF THE CASTES.—The Vedic society also exhibits in its latest stage a definite tendency towards the formulation of castes. The rigidity and exclusiveness of the castes as we now know them is of course the product of the conditions of a much later age. In its inception the phenomenon was only the inevitable result produced by the fusion of two incompatible cultures. The real sore point in the system was naturally the fourth or the Śūdra class. A people that have to fight their way for any length of time naturally divide themselves into fighters and non-fighters; and as befits a pious and god-fearing people, their successes and defeats in warfare actual and anticipated call forth an effusion of gratitude or contrition which finds an outward expression in collective sacrifices and prayers; and these in course of time become elaborate and demand the services of special experts. This is the origin of the class of professional priests. The formulation of the first three castes is thus originally based upon a difference of function—upon *guṇakarmavibhāga* : and there are at first no disabilities and consequently no grievances in the system. But with the amalgamation of the patriarchal form of the Aryan society with the matriarchal form of the non-Aryan society there arose problems which demanded peculiar treatment. The Aryan invaders had behind them the heritage of a long and not-inglorious past which it was a point of honour with them to preserve and transmit intact to succeeding generations; and as the Dāsas were admittedly people with a defective articulation (*mṛidhravāchaḥ*) the knowledge of the Scriptures was denied to them, and was by common consent entrusted to the custody of a class specially selected and trained for the purpose. As Havell observes: caste laws were laws of spiritual eugenics, designed to promote the evolution of a higher race. That the priests, once placed in the peculiar position of the guardians of the holy treasure, and now armed with the power which their mastery over the mystic charms and incantations gave them, should have arrogated to themselves more and more of the same power is what was to be expected. In the later Veda the apotheosis of priesthood had just commenced: its real bloom was in the subsequent period.

14. Its Bearing on the Form of Government.—The same conditions which led to the rise in the social status of the priest also contributed to the increase in the dignity and power of the prince or tribal head. When the Aryans alone formed the bulk of the Viśaḥ or people, the voice of the people made itself heard in all tribal deliberations either directly or through their representatives. But when the non-Aryans formed the bulk of the populace, hereditary kingship supplanted the elected tribal chieftainship, a formal consent of the townsmen and countrymen—the *Paurajānapadāḥ*—being sought and rarely withheld on occasions like the accession of a new king. The peculiar conditions attending this fusion of races thus accounts for the fact that, unlike the sister branches of the Aryan race in Greece and elsewhere, the Indian Aryans, speaking generally, failed to develop a sense of civic consciousness on a large scale and contribute their own share to the evolution of the Polity.

15. Growth of Legends about Gods and Deified Sages.—The gods of the older Veda were for the most part transparent personifications of the mighty forces and phenomena of Nature such as the Sun, the Moon, the Dawn, the Fire, the Thunder, and the Sky-father. They were conceived of as all equally mighty and equally potent distributors of favours and frowns amongst supplicant or rebellent mortals. There was so to say a republic of equals amongst them with some one of them regarded in turn as the Asura or the Sovran Lord, according as the particular fancy or bias of the sage-poet for the time being might direct. As long as the specific nature-phenomenon for which a god stood was within living memory and readily recognisable, there was little chance for any pronounced growth of anthropomorphic myths (such as those connected with Greek gods) concerning their origin, career, and relations to particular human worshippers. But towards the end of the Vedic period we notice the existence of a considerable mass of legends growing about certain well-remembered acts of divine help and rescue believed to have been induced by the intercession of specific priests and specific acts of worship. And as particular priestly families got intimately connected with

particular gods there arose stories about the heavenly parentage or miraculous powers and godly ties of a Vasishṭha or a Vāmadeva. Some noted priests of yore were at the same time believed to have even assisted the gods themselves in their exploits like the breaking of un-Aryan Dragon-fortresses or the liberating of the divine milch-cows, and admitted to a fellowship with the other members of the pantheon. Another tendency of the late Vedic period to be mentioned here is the deification of certain abstract conceptions such as the mystic power of prayer, the efficacy of certain modes of address and worship and of the benevolent mood of the gods induced by it, as also of the divine law and order believed to be immanent in the Universe. Personified abstractions such as Bṛihaspati or Brahmaṇaspati, Aramati, Aditi, Ṛita, Śraddhā, etc. are some of the instances in point.

16. MIXTURE OF GOD-TYPES.—But a more profound change in the early ideas about the older gods was the result of a contact o these gods with gods of another type belonging to another race. Oldenberg has given it as his opinion that Mitra, Varuṇa and the seven Ādityas of the Vedic pantheon (standing according to him, for the Sun, the Moon, and the seven Planets), were borrowed by the Aryans from Semitic religion. And if he be right in another view of his which regards the 'Apāṁ Napāt' as originally a distinct god—a water-dragon—who later got identified with Agni because of Agni's relations to the water (*i.e.* cloud-water) in his form of lightning, that would be another proof of a mixture of god-types which took place about this time. In any case Taimāta, the Chaldean Water-dragon whom Indra vanquishes, actually figures in the Atharvaveda under that very name; and amongst the goddesses and lesser gods, as also amongst certain epithets or exploits of the established gods like Indra or the Aśvins, some other traces of borrowing from without it is not very difficult to detect.

17. CHANGE IN THE SPIRIT OF WORSHIP.—Now the borrowed gods belonged to a system which was probably nurtured under a different conception of god-head from that underlying the Aryan Nature gods. These other gods were more to be dreaded than ap-

proached in confidence. They were terrific—not to say malicious —and their propitiatory ritual was more weird and mystic; but when once propitiated they could form a very formidable weapon against the worshippers' mortal enemies open or hidden. As we approach from the older to the newer Veda, we notice a change of spirit in the invocations to the gods. While originally the poet-priest was content to invite the gods, in the fulness of his heart, to partake of his offering, now he becomes more anxious to secure a monopoly of the god to himself and to his patron, to avert him and his grace from his rival worshippers, and even to pronounce imprecations on them and urge the god of his worship to burn, to destroy, to annihilate "those that hate us and whom we hate." And in order that this might be the more effectively accomplished the sacrifice was now elaborated and its numberless details fixed with dogmatic precision, with the result that the sacrifice itself came to be regarded as the magic fishing-net which even the gods themselves could not always elude.

18. SACRIFICE AS SYMPATHETIC MAGIC.—This elaboration of the technical part of the worship, facilitated no doubt by the recognition of an order of priesthood, brought in however a fundamental modification of the original idea of sacrifice. Some scholars are of opinion that the root-idea of every primitive sacrifice is sympathetic magic. Thus the Soma sacrifice is according to them a sympathetic rain-charm: as the pressed Soma lets down drops of juice so should Indra, the Lord of the rain-cloud, pour down showers of heavenly water. And attention is directed in this connection to the order of gods invoked for it at the three *savanas*: Prajāpati the most prominent god of sacrifice in the Brāhmaṇas appearing therein only in a minor rôle. But this idea of the sacrifice as sympathetic magic cannot, we think, be applied universally. There are different kinds of sacrifices: sacrifices as thanks-offerings, as expiatory rites, as propitiatory or preventive practices, as supplications for personal gifts or as imprecations of divine wrath on the offenders; and the *motifs* underlying these are, some of them, so natural and elementary that it is perhaps unncessary to seek for them a mystic or magical origin. In a sense of course it is true

that an element of magic is present in all those cases where man imagines that he is able, by word or deed, to make a god directly serviceable to him. But for a sacrifice to be truly called an act of magic it must in its several details be a conscious reproduction on a small scale of what the god is required to do or give. We cannot say that this was the case in the ordinary pouring of the Soma libations by the head of the family. At the same time it must be freely admitted that once the sacrifice has become more than a mere family concern and, as a consequence, the idea of magic and incantation is consciously introduced into the religious dogma of a people, it has a tendency to invade and permeate all through its highways and byways. Be that as it may, the inclusion of the lesser gods in the Vedic pantheon must at any rate have effected not only a change in the original conception about the older gods, but a material modification of the spirit of their cult also, the modification being deliberately regulated, along a specific line, at the time of the Brāhmaṇas. The technique of the sacrifice as so elaborated was shrouded in deep mystery and was very jealously guarded, symbols and suggestions, as was to be expected, playing an extensive rôle in all its stages.

19. ELABORATION OF THE SACRIFICE AND ITS ELEVATION INTO THE WORLD-PRINCIPLE.—A further step in the same direction was the elevation of the sacrifice into a world-principle. The whole world is a sacrifice ; the gods perform their functions through sacrifice : Prajāpati the Lord of Creation himself typifies sacrifice in his cosmogenic activity. And it was not only the sacrifice as a whole but even the several stages of it—its preliminary rites and ceremonies, the Dīkshā, the fasts, the baths, and even the place and the period of worship, the number of priests and potsherds and *puroḍāśas*—all came to be invested with cosmic significance. This elaboration had just commenced in the late Vedic period, its culmination falling within the period of the Brāhmaṇas proper.

20. MODIFICATIONS OF THE GṚIHYA SAṀSKĀRAS : (i) FUNERAL RITES.—We notice the same change of front if from these Śrauta or Vedic sacrifices we turn to the Gṛihya-saṁskāras or Domestic rites. This is a subject which in its fulness will have to be treated

in another place. Here we select a few typical cases to show whither the wind was blowing. In the earlier part of the Vedic period it is now generally admitted that burial was at least just as common a mode of disposal of the dead as burning. Rigveda x. 15. 14—one of the hymns belonging to the 'later' Veda—speaks of both the modes of disposal jointly. The Gṛihya manuals, however, recognise burning as the only correct mode of disposal of the adult dead; and we notice that towards the close of the Vedic period burning had largely supplanted burial. Now, according to primitive folk-psychology, the adage that the dead never return is true less of the buried dead than of the burnt dead; for, whatever precautions one might take to bury along with the corpse the objects that the dear departed might have been much addicted to during his life-time, there remained the possibility, while the bones stood intact, of the spirit of the dead re-inhabiting the skeleton and causing distress and even disaster to the surviving relatives. For, as long as the body lasts, the soul is bound to it; it enjoys no rest itself and allows none to the survivors, whom it terrifies by manifold appearances. Now, nothing can destroy the visible counterpart of the soul more quickly and effectively than fire. By burning the body we serve the interests of the dead, who no longer roam about restlessly, and still more those of the living, whom the ghost of the dead can never meet again thereafter. The change from burial to cremation, involving as it does a corresponding change in the funeral rites and obsequies, is a revolution in practice which can only be adequately explained by a complete change in the ideas about life and death. It involves a belief in ghosts and evil spirits possessing a capacity more to harm men than to protect them; and such a belief is in a line with the other ideas that we know to be characteristic of the late Vedic period.

21. (ii) UPANAYANA.—As another example of a different order but pointing ultimately to the same conclusion let us consider the Upanayana-saṁskāra or the rite of Initiation. There is no reference to this rite in the Rigveda, although it is not quite unlikely that this rite (which in fact has an Indo-Iranian analogue in what

is now called the Navajot ceremony amongst the Parsis) did exist amongst the Aryans from the earliest times. All primitive people in fact possess some kind of a ceremony connected with the formal receiving of an adult youth as a regular member of the tribe ; but the form in which this Saṁskāra is presupposed in the Brāhmaṇas and presented in the Gṛihya Sūtras clearly shows the preponderence of the priestly interest in the formulation of its details. It is in effect a long period of rigorous apprenticeship calculated to preserve the monopoly of the knowledge of the holy Scriptures from being invaded by unworthy hands. The Upanayana is conceived as a new birth : even the name of the candidate for initiation is changed; and stories such as that of Satyakāma Jābāla (Chhā. Up. iv. 4) show how jealously the right was guarded. The late Vedic period might then be presumed to have been the time when an originally non-Vedic rite, calculated to confer on the adolscent the rights and obligations of an active member of the society, was taken up and transformed so as to serve the interests of the higher order. The elaboration in the details of the other Saṁskāras tells a similar tale. We are everywhere conscious of a deliberate attempt to preserve, to change and to organise in a specific direction and for an identical purpose.

22. ETHICAL IDEAS OF THE EARLY VEDIC PERIOD.—The Ethical ideas of the late Vedic period show a similar transitional stage. Of course, throughout the course of Indian speculation, ethics has never been completely divorced from religion : the relations between man and man generally form a by-issue of the larger problem of the relation between man and God. We find, for instance, in Vedic times that if one wanted to be happy and desired that his rival should be miserable, all that he had to do was to prove by words and deeds that he himself was a pious worshipper who never missed his daily oblations to the gods, whereas the other fellow was a niggardly patron who knew not sacrifice ; and then Indra or Varuṇa was expected to do the needful. With the Vedic Aryans therefore virtue was knowledge : knowledge as to the time, form, and prescription attending an offering for the gods ; while vice was ignorance in these respects. With the elaboration of the technical

part of the sacrifice and the growth of a special class of experts who made a monopoly of the art, this intellectualistic trend of the moral doctrine would have reached an undesirable extreme and rendered virtue a by-word for finesse and fusiness over little things, but for two elements of safety, one original to the system and the other borrowed from without. We have ample evidence in the earliest parts of the Veda to prove that the several hymns to gods were not all of them estranged from true poetry and moral fervour. It does the Vedic poet great wrong to think of him always as a greedy beggar trafficking with the gods for the goods of the world. At times he rose above the earth and conceived of the god-head with the piety and almost the spirituality of a mystic.

23. THEIR MODIFICATION IN THE LATE VEDIC PERIOD.—This latent religious feeling, we have reasons to suppose, gained a new lease of life by the fusion of the Aryan and non-Aryan cultures which we have been considering here from different stand-points. Havell is of opinion—and has adduced a number of facts in support of the opinion—that the non-Aryan civilisation which, towards the end of the Vedic period, was absorbed into the Aryan system of belief and practice was based upon a matriarchal form of society. We have already seen that it exhibited a tendency towards magic, divination, and propitiation of a number of small, local, often malignant spirits and totems. Such a primitive faith is universally swayed by large feelings and emotions, gross but sincere and unsophisticated. These emotions refuse to be crowded out or permanently suppressed by elaborations in ceremonial, by priestly formularies, and high-sounding philosophies. We will have occasion to note later that it is these healthy agitations of the soul of the common people that break through the overdrawn intellectualism or formalism of the Brāhmaṇa period and usher in what might be styled the "revolt" of the Upanishads.

24. VEDIC ÆSTHETICS.—Even in Æsthetics or the Science of the Beautiful we notice the working of the same factors. A systematic study of this branch of philosophy for the Vedic as well as the post-Vedic period is yet a desideratum. As far as Vedic poetry is concerned, the various terms used in it to express the idea of the

Beautiful in the several shades and phases in which it made its appeal, according to Oldenberg, were: Kalyāṇa, Chāru, Chitra, Peśas, Bhadra, Bhandishṭha, Raṇva, Surūpa, Lakshmī, Vapus, Valgu, Vāma, Śubha, Śrī, Śreyas, Sudriś, Svādu, etc. On a careful consideration of the several passages where these words are used it becomes clear that the words express splendour or brilliance, opulence, outstanding energy especially for doing good, and the possession of some hidden or mystic qualities calculated to please and to subdue. The Vedic poets delight in describing the Dawn; but they speak more of her rays, of her chariot and horses, of her gifts, of her power to stir and set to work, of the general effect of her appearance, rather than of her face or cheecks or eyes as a Greek poet would have done. "Handsome is that handsome does" was their motto. The pomp and glitter, and going below the surface, the utilitarian significance of a thing is what attracted them: is what they delight to discover and describe. Later, Śrī becomes the goddess of wealth and plenty, Kalyāṇa and Lakshaṇa acquire an astrological significance; Vapus in the Veda means an abnormal appearance involving some Māyā or magic; and speaking generally, the purely æsthetic connotation of the expressions is tinged by ethico-theological considerations based upon the dogma of Karma and Rebirth, as indicated by the latter-day adage: *Yatrākṛitis tatra guṇā vasanti*—a fair form is a pass-port for virtue.

25. THE PROBABLE TRANSFORMATION OF IT IN THE BRĀHMAṆA PERIOD.—Now it is easily imaginable that the ratiocination of the Brāhmaṇas should have left no scope for the development of Æsthetics. There was an inherent incompatability between the two. Consequently the idea of the Beautiful becomes invaded on the one hand by gross materialism, so that the most expensive or the most elaborate became synonymous with the most beautiful; and on the other, by a craving for the weird and the magical, so that a thing became beautiful because it was abnormal, or because it was the result of some hidden forces at work. Such a change of feeling could very well have taken place under the influence of the ideas dominating the Late Vedic period, though the only actual evidence adducible for the fact is the Śrīsūkta, which is a relatively late

Pariśishṭa of the Rigveda,* and the history of the connotation of the words *vapus* and *yaksha*.

26. THE COSMOGONY AND THEOGONY OF THE EARLIER VEDA.—Turn we next to the Vedic notions about cosmogony and theogony: about the origination of the world and the birth of the gods. The earliest speculations on the question are, as natural, mainly poetic or mythological with hardly an attempt at system-building. They name some one god or gods—Indra, Varuṇa, Savitṛi, or Dyāvā-Pṛithivī—and credit him or them with the work of creating the world, its rivers, mountains, trees, the sun, the moon, and the twinkling stars, simultaneously or in succession. The creative process is often compared to the art of the carpenter, or the smith, but is more often described as a procreative process. Thus we find Kavasha Ailūsha posing the problem (Rv. x. 31. 7)—

What was the wood, and what the tree
Wherefrom they have fashioned the Heaven and the Earth:
The two that stand fast and age not and help us,
While days and morns unnumbered pass away?

And in accordance with this sentiment we find *vana* (wood) raised to the dignity of a first principle (Cp. the Greek word ὕλη) and later, when water came to be regarded as such, we find the word *vana* listed in the Nighaṇṭus (i. 12. 9) as a synonym for water. In Rv. x. 72. 2 the creative process is likened to the art of the smith who smelts the metal; but the favourite metaphor of the Late Vedic period introduces words like *jan* to beget or *sṛij* to pour out, *aṇḍa* or the egg, *garbha* or embryo, and *retas* or semen virile. This led to the conception of some one specific god as the Father, or the Sovran Ruler (*Asuraḥ pitā naḥ*) who creates the world and rules over it. There are passages in Rigveda (i. 96. 4, i. 160. 4, iv. 56. 3, viii. 36. 4, ix. 90. 1, x. 66. 9, etc.) where the Heaven and the Earth are spoken of as created beings. Elsewhere these two become themselves the Original Parents.

27. THE FORM ASSUMED BY THEM IN THE LATER VEDA.—As a direct result of this conflicting speculation the problem takes on the aspect of a riddle in which the poets of the Later Veda delight

* Known however to the Bṛihaddevatā.

to introduce still further complications, regarding the creation as the Māyā of the Gods which, as such, is beyond human comprehension. We find for instance Indra credited with the miracle of generating from his own body his own father and mother (x. 54. 3); or Aditi spoken of as producing Daksha, and being herself in turn produced by him (x. 72. 4), this dogma being later received into regular philosophy under the guise of the *bījāṅkura-nyāya* or the maxim of the seed and the sprout.

28. PROGRESS TOWARDS MONOTHEISM.—A further advance in these metaphysical speculations consisted, first, in the gradual progress towards the idea of One God. This process was facilitated by the tendency of Vedic poetry towards the so-called "Henotheism" or the readiness to regard, for the time, some one god—Indra, Agni, Varuṇa, Savitṛi, etc.—as the All-highest and transfer to him all the powers and attributes of the other gods. The oft-quoted stanza (i. 164. 46)—

Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa, Agni, they style him ;
He is also the Heavenly Bird, the Winged Garutman ;
Being One, the poets many-wise name him :
They call him Agni, Yama, or Mātariśvan.—

by no means stands alone. Compare sentiments like (iii. 54. 8)—

What moves and what moves not, all that, the One rules ;
Also what walks and what flies : all this multiform creation.—

or like the following, which is the last but one of the Vālakhilya sūktas (viii. 58. 2)—

Agni is One only kindled in many places ;
One is the Sun mightily overspreading the world.
One alone is the Dawn beaming over all this :
It is the One that has severally become all this.

This "One" which belongs to the last phase of Vedic cosmogony was not considered as a person, nor was He endowed with definite characteristics. On the other hand, the Vedic poets delight to leave Him in a nebulous condition, assigning Him contradictory qualities and uncertain functions. Sometimes the One becomes not an individuality but a principle : a something which is both Being and Not-being, Life and Death, Active and Acted-upon. The best

illustration of this is the famous Nāsadīya Sūkta (x. 129), but the Viśvakarman (x. 82) and the Hiraṇyagarbha (x. 121) Sūktas form also instructive reading in this connection.

29. VEDIC CONCEPTION OF THE CREATIVE PROCESS.—Another line taken by the cosmogenic speculations of the period was to attempt a narrower characterisation of the creative process as distinguished from the personality of the Creator. Primitive poetry, as we have seen, considered the function as akin to that of the carpenter or the smith or the pot-maker, and so depending upon the nature of the material and the skill of the operator. The omniscience of the Creator is an oft-expressed idea, but equal if not more credit goes naturally to the supernatural material which He finds ready to hand. This conception as well as the other of the world-genesis as an act of procreation involves a dualistic assumption which Indian Philosophy has all through its career attempted to transcend. In the Nāsadīya Sūkta, for example, the creative process appears to start automatically, i.e., without the intervention of a *deux ex machina*, and in the description of how things stood before creation we there get perhaps the earliest germ of what later developed into the Pariṇāma-vāda or the doctrine of evolution. At the same time the referring back of the whole organic and non-organic creation to a first principle which was both being and not-being, both life and death, involved the assumption of a generic relation between all the objects of creation ; and this afforded in time a philosophic justification for the doctrine of transmigration which believed all objects in the world to be inhabited by a soul.

30. LITURGICAL ABSTRACTIONS AS CREATIVE FORCES.—What concerns us here more directly to note, especially in view of the turn that the philosophy of creation took in the period of the Brāhmaṇas, are the liturgical abstractions like Ṛita, Tapas, or Śraddhā, and even Sacrifice, which are conceived in the latest portions of the Rigveda as cosmogenic principles. Compare x. 190—

From Tapas mightily kindled Law and Truth were born
Thence the Night was born and the Billowy Ocean.
From the Billowy Ocean the Year was produced :

And the Lord of the Winking World fashioned Days and Nights-
The Sun and the Moon, as of old, the Creator formed,
The Heaven, the Earth, the Mid-World and the Light.

But it is in the Purusha Sūkta (x. 90) that we come across the most thorough-going elevation of the Sacrifice into a world-principle. The only advance beyond this made by the Brāhmaṇas was the substitution of Prajāpati in place of the Virāṭ Purusha. This topic will be treated more at length in the subsequent chapter.

31. VEDIC CONCEPTION OF LIFE AND DEATH.—The last problem that we take up here for discussion is the conception of man's life and death and destiny that prevailed in the Late Vedic period. Here also, it will be seen, is noticeable a change from the earlier notions, and an advance in the direction of the ideas characteristic of Brāhmaṇa speculations; and the same general causes dominating the period that we have been hitherto considering seem to afford an adequate explanation of this change of front. The Vedic notions of the life after death naturally depend upon the ideas current at the time concerning life or soul. That the soul does not perish with the body, that there is something of man that survives the dissolution of his physical envelope is at the basis of all funeral observances and gifts in honour of the Manes. The human body is a conglomeration of various Elements, and we find accordingly a late Vedic passage thus addressing the dead (x. 16. 3)—

> Let thy eye go unto the Sun and unto the Wind the breath (Ātman): Repair unto the Heaven or unto the Earth in accordance with the Law; or go unto the Water if that be beneficial to thee, (or) stand firm with (thy) limbs within the Plants.

But the inner soul apparently is something distinct from these. The Vedic expression for it (Cp. Rv. i. 113. 16, i. 140. 8, x. 15. 1. etc.) is either the *asu*, breath, or the energising principle in man; or, in other passages, it is the *manas*, mind, or the thinking and feeling principle in him, which is located, according to the Rigveda (viii. 100. 5; Cp. x. 50) within his heart. That this inner self of man, after death, has some kind of a body is

apparent from a passage like Rigveda x. 16. 5—'May he be united with his body, O Jātavedas!' Compare also the Śatapatha xii. 2. 2. 5f.

32. FATE OF THE PIOUS AFTER DEATH.—After death the Soul of the good or pious man went to the Realm of the Blessed where Yama, or Yama and Varuṇa, ruled as Kings. A tolerably full picture of this realm is to be found in Rigveda ix. 113. 7ff.—

> Wherein is everlasting lustre, wherein is the Sun; in that eternal undecaying world......where Vaivasvata (Yama) is King, wherein is the Heaven's enclosed space (shrine); where are these vigorous waters......where is wandering as one lists in the third sphere of the inmost Heaven; where the worlds are full of light......where are eager wishes and strong desires, wherein is the seat of the Radiant One; where is food and full delight......wherein are joys and transports and happiness and felicity and where the longings of desire are fulfilled—there make me immortal.

Elsewhere (Rv. i. 154) we read of Vishṇu's Realm where are "fleet and many-horned kine and where is a spring of unfailing meath," and of Varuṇa's brilliant and hundred-portalled house (vii. 88. 5). This realm of the pious dead is said to be 'in the highest Heaven,' or "in the midst of Heaven by the side of the ruddy morn (Rv. x. 14. 8, x. 15. 7, etc.)." It is a region where all imperfections of the world are at an end and where one lives in the companionship of the gods, drinking celestial drink with them (either Soma or Ghṛita or honey—Rv. x. 154. 1) and listening to heavenly songs. This is of course the lot of the righteous dead who in Heaven receive regularly the food-offerings bestowed by their successors, and who have themselves performed *ishṭāpūrtas* (benevolent gifts and pious adorations) with the fruits of which they become united after death.

33. FATE OF THE SINNERS.—The Vedic Aryans have not preserved to us an equally detailed picture of Hell or the realm of the unblessed sinners. This is probably because the people were a

hopeful and cheerful race who had no relish for depicting in gruesome colours the horrors of the Hell. The impious enemies they called upon the gods to burn, to smash, to annihilate: they no longer cared to inquire after their subsequent fate. The later doctrine of the impermanence of heavenly joys—*Kshīṇe puṇye martya-lokaṁ viśanti*: when merit is exhausted they enter the world of mortals—was not yet formulated; so that the pious worshipper, once admitted to the Realm of the Blessed, remained there for ever.

34. MODE OF DIVINE PUNISHMENT.—The gods of course were jealous gods; and they did punish the offenders even amongst the believing Aryans. But the punishment took the form of disease, poverty or suffering on earth in this very life, and not any frightful suffering after death. Yet occasionally, and in some late passages of the Rigveda, we find a few features of the realm of the unblessed described in sure accents. Thus in Rigveda vii. 104 we read—

> Burn, slay and pierce and hurl down the malefactors into bottomless darkness and let them boil like a caldron on flames. Punish them with your deadly thunderbolt, with your scorching darts. Give them over to the Dragon: consign them to the lap of Nirṛiti: sweep them away with all their offspring. Let them sink without a sound underneath the weight of the three worlds.

The punishment in Hell, one might imagine, was just as unending as the reward in Heaven; and both were frankly and unmitigatedly sensuous. As to the belief in metempsychosis, its traces are very rare even in the latest Veda; but we reserve the whole problem for a subsequent treatment.

35. DIVINE HONOURS FOR MEN.—The highest fate of man was accordingly an admission into the Realm of the Blessed to the companionship of the gods. Yama himself is believed to have been the first mortal to exercise the privilege of dying; and the younger Vedic poetry speaks of many more deified ancestors like Manu, Nahusha, the Aṅgirasas, etc. Once admitted into the rank of the gods, they could be worshipped like other gods; and

they possessed also the power of influencing the life of their descendants on earth for good or evil. Hence we find passionate appeals to the Manes to help their sons and grandsons on earth and not to injure them in any way. And just as we have a large mass of myths and legends regarding the assistance rendered by gods like Indra, Varuṇa, or Aśvins to their pious devotees, so we can very well imagine that in the Late Vedic period there were in popular vogue a number of stories regarding the communion on specific occasions between the living and the dead. Compare in this connection the story of king Uchchaiśśravas Kaupayeya narrated in the Jaiminīya Upanishad Brāhmaṇa iii. 29f. The belief in ghosts and possession by spirits or Gandharvas is clearly presupposed in the Brāhmaṇas; and its beginnings can be traced in the Late Vedic texts.

36. SUMMARY.—To sum up. The Late Vedic period which preceded the period of the Brāhmaṇas by a few centuries and which prepared the ground for it, itself came at the end of a long past with its own history of belief and practice which is to form the subject of our First Volume. The burden of this past kept continually influencing the course of the subsequent evolution of the Vedic Society ; but the point at which the present volume takes its start marks a rift in the belief of the people and a struggle to regain the balance. It formed the meeting point of two conflicting cultures, a fusion of them, involving considerable inner and outer re-adjustment. This we have seen illustrated in the social and economic rearrangement, in theology and the mode of worship, in daily *āchāra*, in ethics, æsthetics and metaphysics. It was a time when older gods were appearing in a newer light ; when there was in evidence in every walk of life the need for forming newer basic ideas ; when the old had to be preserved and made stronger by the incorporation of the new. Indra, as Oldenberg observes, had long laid down his bolt, as there were no longer for him any fresh iron citadels of the dark Dragons to be smashed. But the gods of the period, and the human legislators who arrogated to themselves the power of the gods, had to face the still more difficult task of social and religious reconstruction. And for one successful attempt

at reconstruction there must have been made many a previous attempt along similar lines that failed. The attempt that did succeed went to the credit of the Brāhmaṇas; and while we are wading our way patiently through the so-called "priestly twaddle," gleaning a few grains of corn from out of a heap of husk, we must not lose sight of the important conservative work of the Brāhmaṇas, a work which, in spite of their tireless repetition and verbosity, gained for them a ready recognition amongst the Revealed Scriptures of India.

CHAPTER SECOND

A SURVEY OF BRĀHMAṆA SPECULATIONS.

1. THE PROBLEM OF CHRONOLOGICAL STRATIFICATION IN THE BRĀHMAṆAS.—The great texts of Vedic exegesis known as the Brāhmaṇas, together with their supplements called the Āraṇyakas, constitute in their entirety a mass of literary productions (comprising some two dozen of our extant tracts small and large and perhaps about as many others that survive only by their names) which might very well have taken some five or six if not more centuries for their composition, the older portions of them, as compared with those belonging to a later period, exhibiting certain well-marked differences not only in their mythology and theology, their metaphysics and ethics, but also in their style, grammar, and syntax. The problem of chronological stratification in the Brāhmaṇas (and by this term we are to understand also the Brāhmaṇa portions in the Younger Vedas, especially the Black Yajurveda) is in fact exactly analogous to that of Rigvedic stratification discussed in the preceding chapter. We have, on the one hand, certain lexical and grammatical tests (e.g. the use of the Narrative Perfect in preference to the Imperfect of earlier usage) and other internal evidence, such as the mention of specific teachers, kings, countries, and advanced religio-philosophic ideas and sacrificial technique ; while there are, on the other hand, a number of rather considerable repetitions, elaborations, abridgments, adaptations, and cross-references betwixt one Brāhmaṇa text and another, which mark certain sections of them as relatively original or borrowed,

primitive or advanced. These several tests, if applied in a thoroughly systematic fashion, are likely to result in a distribution of the whole mass of the Brāhmaṇas and allied texts into specific chronological groups through which it would be possible to trace an ideological development extending over probably a number of centuries, although it has to be at the same time borne in mind that the older and the newer portions in these texts are placed so near to each other and are at times so inextricably mixed up that, in a few cases, it would be legitimate to suspect and even possible to detect a later hand working over older Brāhmaṇa material so as to make it more closely accord with the ideas and the idiom of his own time—the operation being at least as often a necessary and unconscious result of the method of preserving and transmitting the texts orally from teacher to pupil as it might have been deliberate and fore-intended. Now Pāṇini (iv. 3. 105), as is well known, distinguishes between Brāhmaṇas and Kalpas which were in his days looked upon as *purāṇa* or ancient in relation to texts nearer his own time. And in view of the conclusions recited above (Chap. I, §9) it is therefore not inconceivable that while on the one hand some of the oldest Brāhmaṇa texts are contemporary with—if not even earlier than—some of the latest portions of the Saṁhitā proper, some of the latest productions of the Brāhmaṇa period, on the other hand, are coeval with certain works of the succeeding or the Sūtra period. An account of the philosophy in the Brāhmaṇas, to be accurate and acceptable, must necessarily follow—as far as the inherent difficulties and limitations of the problem permit it—the probable historical sequence of the texts with a view to discover a corresponding inner development in their thought.

2. CLASSIFIED LIST OF THE EXTANT BRĀHMAṆAS—A large number of the Brāhmaṇa texts have been lost to us. The extant texts together with the Branch of Śākhā of the Veda to which they are traditionally attached are shown in the following table, which includes also the Āraṇyakas and the more important of the Upanishads, but excludes the Pariśishṭas or Supplements professedly so called, which are quite miscellaneous in their contents and of which a large number claim to belong to the Atharva-veda.

ŚRUTI TEXTS ACCORDING TO THE ŚĀKHĀS

Veda	*Śākhās*	*Brāhmaṇas*	*Āraṇyakas*	*Upanishads*
RIGVEDA	1. Śākala*	Aitareya Brāhmaṇa	Aitareya Āraṇyaka	Aitareya Upanishad [=Āraṇyaka II. 4-6]
	2. Bāshkala†	Kaushītaki Brāhmaṇa (also called Śāṅkhāyana-Br.)	Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇyaka	i—Kaushītaki Upanishad [=Āraṇyaka iii-vi]; ii—Bāshkalamantropanishad
SĀMAVEDA	1. Kauthuma*	1. Pañchaviṁśa (=Prauḍha =Tāṇḍya Mahā) Brāhmaṇa	....	......
		2. Shaḍviṁśa Brāhmaṇa (including the Adbhuta Br. = the last Prapāṭhaka)	....	......
		3. Sāmavidhāna Brāhmaṇa	....	......
		4. Ārsheya Brāhmaṇa	....	......
		5. Mantra(=Upanishad)Brāhmaṇa	....	Chhāndogya Upanishad [=last eight Prapāṭhakas of the Brāhmaṇa]
		6. Devatādhyāya Brāhmaṇa	....	......
		7. Vaṁśa Brāhmaṇa	....	......
		8. Saṁhitopanishad Brāh.	....	......

ŚRUTI TEXTS ACCORDING TO THE ŚĀKHĀS—(*contd.*)

Veda	*Śākhās*	*Brāhmaṇas*	*Āraṇyakas*	*Upanishads*
SĀMAVEDA	2. Rāṇāyanīya† ..	*Extant only in some Sūtras*		
	3. Jaiminīya*	1. Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa ..	....	......
		2. Jaiminīyopanishad(=Talavakāra)Brāhmaṇa	....	Kenopanishad [=Brāhmaṇa iv. 18-21]
		3. Ārsheya Brāhmaṇa (?)	....	......
BLACK YAJUS	1. Taittirīya*	1A. Taittirīya Saṁhitā, Brāhmaṇa portions from	Taittirīya Āraṇyaka	i—Taittirīya Upanishad [=Āraṇyaka vii-ix]
		1B. Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, excluding the Saṁhitā portions	....	ii—Mahānārāyaṇa Upanishad [=Āraṇyaka x]
	2. Maitrāyaṇī* ..	Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā, Brāhmaṇa portions from	....	Maitrāyaṇī(ya) Upanishad [=Maitrī Up.]
	3. Kaṭha* ..	Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā, Brāhmaṇa portions from	....	Kāṭhakopanishad
	4. Kāpishṭhala-Kaṭha‡	Kāpishṭhala-Kaṭha Saṁhitā, Brāhmaṇa portions from	....	......
	5. Śvetāśvatara	....	....	Śvetāśvataropanishad

ŚRUTI TEXTS ACCORDING TO THE ŚĀKHĀS—(*concld.*)

Veda	*Śākhās*	*Brāhmaṇas*	*Āraṇyakas*	*Upanishads*
WHITE YAJUS	1. Kāṇva*	.. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa	.. Bṛihadāraṇyaka [=Brāhmaṇa Kāṇḍa xvii]	i—Īśāvāsyopanishad [=Saṁhitā, Chap. 40] ii—Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad [=Āraṇyaka chap. 3-8]
	2. Mādhyaṁdina*	Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa	.. Bṛihadāraṇyaka [=Brāhmaṇa Kāṇḍa xiv]	i—Īśāvāsyopanishad [=Saṁhitā, Chap. 40] ii—Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad [=Āraṇyaka chap. 4-9]
ATHARVA-VEDA	1. Paippalāda* ..	......	....	Praśnopanishad (?)
	2. Śaunaka*	.. Gopatha Brāhmaṇa ..	.. ....	i—Muṇḍakopanishad (?) ii—Māṇḍūkyopanishad (?) And numerous other late Upanishads.

* Completely preserved. † No longer extant. ‡ Preserved in parts.

3. TENTATIVE CHRONOLOGICAL GROUPING OF THESE TEXTS.—As has been just indicated a large number of the texts above listed are composite in nature: contain in them portions belonging to different times and authorship ; and we must be on our guard in making general statements about any one of them as a whole which are true only of certain parts of them. The Kaṭha Upanishad, the Aitareya Āraṇyaka, and the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa are the most glaring instances of such composite texts. The main arguments to prove the composite nature of the Śatapatha, for instance, are these: (1) Patañjali on Pāṇini iv. 2. 60 quotes a Ślokavārtika which refers to a Brāhmaṇa text called Shashṭipatha, and this can refer only to the Śatapatha, Kāṇḍas i-ix, which contain exactly sixty chapters. (2) Śatapatha Kāṇḍa xii is called *madhyama* or middle ; and this is explicable only if the latter part of the Śatapatha, *i.e.*, Kāṇḍas x-xiv, were once regarded as a distinct work, with Kāṇḍa xii in the centre. (3) Kāṇḍas i-v often quote the views of Yājñavalkya as an authority and he appears in that capacity also in Kāṇḍas xi-xiv; but Kāṇḍas vi-x ignore him altogether, his place being here taken by Śāṇḍilya. (4) The Śāṇḍilya portion ends with a Vaṁśa or geneological list of teachers thus indicating difference of tradition. It also has unity of subject, all its five Kāṇḍas dealing with Agnichayana. (5) The second Yājñavalkya portion is itself composite, its concluding part (=Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad, Chapters 5 and 6) being admittedly a Khila or a Supplement. There are also minor interpolations in it. (6) Finally, we have the linguistic tests such as the use of the Narrative Perfect, the ratio of the Perfects to the Imperfects rising from about 10 per cent for the Śāṇḍilya portions to about 135 per cent for the 11th and the 14th Kāṇḍas. It would be advantageous under the circumstances to afford here, for purposes of ready reference, a tentative chronological grouping of the several Brāhmaṇa and Āraṇyaka texts—the Upanishads we reserve entire for detailed treatment in a later chapter—framed after a careful consideration of the language, style, contents, repetitions, cross-references, and other internal and external tests. The table, we repeat, is tentative in its nature and ignores the smaller interpolations within the several sections of a work.

CHRONOLOGICAL GROUPING OF THE BRĀHMAṆA TEXTS

First Group	Second Group	Third Group	Fourth Group	Fifth Group	Sixth Group	Seventh Group
Pañchaviṁśa Brāhmaṇa	Br. portions from Taittirīya Saṁ.	Aitareya Brāh. vi-viii.	Śatapatha Br. vi-ix.	Śatapatha Br. x-xiv (including the Up.)	Gopatha Br.	Aitareya Āraṇ. iv-v.
Aitareya Br. i-v.	Same from Maitrāyaṇī Saṁ.	Aitareya Āraṇ. i-iii (including the Up.)	Śatapatha Br. i-v.	Mantra Brāh. (including the Up.)	Saṁhitop. Br.	Adbhuta Brāh. (from the Shaḍviṁśa)
	Same from Kāṭhaka Saṁ.	Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇ. (excluding the Up.)	Shaḍviṁśa Br. (excluding the Adbhuta Brāh. at the end)	Jaiminīya Br.	Devatādhyāya Brāhmaṇa	The Pariśishṭas professedly so called as also several sub-sections in the regular Brāhmaṇas which can be treated as such.
	Same from Kāpishṭhala-Kaṭha Saṁ.	Taittirīya Āraṇ. (excluding both the Up.)		Jaiminīya-Upa. Br. (including the Up.)	Ārsheya Brāh.	
	Br. portions in Taittirīya Br.				Sāmavidhāna Brāhmaṇa	
	Kaushītaki Br.				Vaṁśa Brāh.	

4. THE CHRONOLOGICAL LIMITS OF THE BRĀHMAṆA PERIOD.—Now, to afford an approximation as to the probable period of the composition of these theological tracts it will perhaps be sufficient to state that one of the latest of them—the Gopatha Brāhmaṇa which itself quotes freely from a number of earlier Brāhmaṇa texts—is generally admitted to have been known to Yāska (Nirukta, especially viii. 22) ; and Yāska's date cannot have been later than B.C. 700. And if we have to assume in the evolution of the theology of the Brāhmaṇas some four or five well-marked literary stages prior to the Gopatha, it is obvious that the oldest Brāhmaṇas will have to be placed at least as far back as B.C. 1200 or even 1500 ; and there is nothing inherently impossible in this view. There have been no satisfactory reasons advanced for regading any portions of these Brāhmaṇas—apart from an isolated word or idiom in a passage or two of dubious authenticity—as post-Buddhistic. The authentic literary tradition as actually recorded in the Brāhmaṇas (like the Śatapatha) covers at least forty *human* generations of teachers and taught. And—except on the gratuitous assumption of a very rapid evolution of thought and ideas for the early period of Indian History—there is, between the oldest and the latest productions of the Brāhmaṇa period, a sufficient progress perceptible not only in grammar, vocabulary, metre and usage, but also in the geographical and social outlook, in the conceptions of god, cult, creation and human destiny, and finally, in the acquisition of fresher facts and the foundation of newer scientific branches of study, to require for its working out the six and more centuries that we have postulated for that truly extensive and remarkable literary output of the whole period.

5. MAX MÜLLER'S ESTIMATE OF THE BRĀHMAṆAS.—Max Müller, one of the most discerning and sympathetic of early European critics, gives the following literary estimate of the Brāhmaṇas (ASL, p. 389)—" The Brāhmaṇas represent no doubt a most interesting phase in the history of the Indian mind, but judged by themselves, as literary productions, they are most disappointing. No one would have supposed that at so early a period, and in so primitive a state of society, there could have risen up a literature which for pedantry

and down-right absurdity can hardly be matched anywhere. There is no lack of striking thoughts, of bold expressions, of sound reasoning, and curious traditions in these collections. But these are only like the fragments of a torso, like precious gems set in brass and lead. The general character of these works is marked by shallow and insipid grandiloquence, by priestly conceit, and antiquarian pedantry. It is most important to the historian that he should know how soon the fresh and healthy growth of a nation can be blighted by priestcraft and superstition. It is most important that we should know that nations are liable to these epidemics in their youth as well as in their dotage. These works deserve to be studied as the physician studies the twaddle of idiots, and the raving of madmen." Subsequent estimates are for the major part tuned to the same key, the only thing original offered being perhaps a more happy and clap-trap phrase or a deepening in colour. This has had a very deterrent effect on the study of the Brāhmaṇas; and it is perhaps advisable therefore to afford here, by concrete illustrations, an insight into the specific range of topics treated in these works and the general method and motive of their disquisitions before attempting to rear up a philosophy on those foundations.

6. THE NATURE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE MANTRAS.—As constituting primarily a discursive exegesis on the Saṁhitā, a Brāhmaṇa text is expected to deal with the same topics as the Mantras. Yāska—no doubt from his own point of view—has the following brief statement as to the contents of the Mantras (Nir. vii. 1-3)—

> A Mantra belongs to that deity or deities longing for which a sage, seeking mastery over (specific) objects, addresses a praise to the same. There are three kinds of Mantras: addresses (in the third person) to the absent, those (in the second person) to the present, and those (in the first person) put in the deity's own mouth. ....A large number of Mantras belong to the first two categories, very few to the third. Sometimes the Mantras merely praise without seeking a boon......sometimes they merely ask for a boon but contain no praise: this latter is fre-

quently the case in the Yajurveda, and in those Mantras that are used in the sacrifice. Sometimes they contain even sweaing or cursing. ....Elsewhere we find a mere desire to narrate a fact. ....In other places of the Mantras again there is a lament for some reason or other....as also occasionally a censure (as of gambling) or a glorification (as of farming): thus motives high and low have led the sages to "see" the Mantras.

It will be seen from this passage that Yāska does not recognise the later Mīmāñsā view that the Veda in its entirety is meant for being used in a sacrifice, is *kriyārtha*. Even the authors of the Anukramaṇīs were not in fact able to find a ritualistic use—a *viniyoga*—for every Mantra, Sāyaṇa being reduced in all such cases to declare the *viniyoga* as *laiṅgika*, as a matter of inference.

7. THE NATURE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE BRĀHMAṆAS.—The Brāhmaṇas, however, were *kriyārtha*: their declared object it was to set forth the details of a sacrifice in all its sub-divisions: to prescribe the place, time, priests, fires, offerings, mantras, deities, utensils, movements, gifts, and expiations in connection with every part of the ritual; to bring out the propriety of the prescriptions by a recourse to etymology, history, mythology, or—failing other ætiological devices—by the assumption of some sort of a mystic correspondence between things; and, finally, to combat the prescriptions of opposing schools by a reference to tradition as preserved in the stories of the Devas and the Asuras or of some of the ancient deified sages like Manu, Bharadvāja, and the Aṅgirasas.

8. A FEW ILLUSTRATIONS.—The few typical passages given below would familiarise us with Brāhmaṇa method of argumentation and at the same time disclose the rich speculative stuff contained in them which formed the basis of the philosophy of the next period. (1) Why is the Yūpa (the sacrificial post) called by that name? The Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (ii. 1) explains—

Through sacrifice the gods went upwards to the world of heaven; they feared: "seeing this (ascent) of us, men and sages will follow our track;" and so effaced the sacrifice by the post. In that they effaced (*ayopayan*) it by the Yūpa that is why the Yūpa is so called.

(2) While the sacrificial portions of the immolated victim are being cut into the respective spoons the Hotṛi is to recite Rv. vi. 1, beginning with the words—*Tvám hy Agne prathamó Manótā*, and addressed to Agni here designated 'Manotā' (thinker). Why should Agni be given this name? The Śatapatha iii. 8. 3. 14 explains—

> All the deities draw nigh to the victim while it is being immolated thinking, 'My name he will choose, my name he will choose'—for, the animal victim can be oblation to all deities. So the minds (*manāṁsi*) of all those deities are locked within—are fixed upon (*otāni*)—that victim. These minds he thus satisfies, so that the minds of the deities do not hereby become drawn nigh in vain. For this reason he calls upon (the priest) for recitation on the oblation to the Manotā deity.

(3) In the Mahāvrata rite the Hotṛi priest has to mount a swing, and the question is, how he should mount it. The Aitareya Āraṇyaka gives the following prescription (i. 2. 4)—

> Let him mount the swing from the east to west (*i.e.*, front to back) like the sun here who shines; for he mounts these worlds from east to west.—But this is not to be accepted. They say let him mount side-ways; for men mount a horse side-ways thinking thereby to win all their desires.—But this is not to be accepted. They say let him mount from behind; men indeed mount a ship from behind: and the swing is a heaven-faring ship. Therefore let him mount from behind.

(4) The proper *Nakshatra* or Lunar Mansion for the ceremonious establishing of the holy fire for sacrifice is a common subject of most Brāhmaṇas. Various alternatives are proposed and discussed. Here is a specimen discussion from the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa (I. i. 2) about the Chitrā Mansion—

> There were Asuras by name Kālakañjas. They piled up the fire to attain the world of heaven: one person piled up one brick, another person another brick. At that, Indra, calling himself a Brahmin, piled up a brick (saying), this is mine by name Chitrā. The Asuras ascended the world of heaven. Anon Indra pulled away his brick. They tumbled down. Those that tumbled down became spiders. Two, however, jumped up.

They became the celestial dogs. He who might have enemies, he should establish the fire on the Chitrā. He scatters away his enemies and secures lustre and power and vigour within himself.

(5) For the Agnishṭoma, at a certain stage of it, the Adhvaryu priest has to fetch a bunch of sacrificeal grass (*prastara*) and deposit it on the ground. Before doing so he is required to shake it a little. The reason for this procedure is thus explained in the Prauḍha Brāhmaṇa (vi. 7. 19)—

The Creator created the beasts. Being created they went away from him hungering for food, For them he offered a bunch of grass (*prastara*) as food. The beasts came back to him. Hence the Adhvaryu is to slightly shake the bunch of grass as it were; for, the beasts approach grass (slightly) shaken.

(6) The necessity of giving gifts to the priests at the conclusion of each sacrifice is thus brought out by the Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā (xxxvii. 12)—

The Gods and the Asuras both did everything in the sacrifice the same way: what the Gods did that did the Asuras. The Gods thereupon "saw" the Mantras called Rāshṭrabhṛit, and by means of them won from the Asuras fire and plants by the first Mantra, the sun and the minds by the second; the moon and the stars by the third; and the sacrifice and the gifts by the fourth. The Asuras being now deprived of sacrifice, gifts, stars,—whatsoever they practised became *kṛityā* (destructive magic) only. Hence one ought not to offer oblation in the house without gifts. If he does so, he only practises *kṛityā*.

(7) We might now quote the following from Śatapatha ii. 2. 2. 20, which beautifully brings out the sacrificer's duty of leading a pious and truthful life—

Now unto Aruṇa son of Upaveśa his kinsmen spake: "Thou art advanced in years: establish thou the two fires." He replied: "Speak not thus, but rather tell me, 'Do thou become speechless'; for, he who has established the fires is not to speak an untruth. But as long as one is speaking, one

may not always speak what is not an untruth, even knowing that truth alone is the proper course."

(8) The same topic is treated in a mythological garb in the following passage from the same Brāhmaṇa (ix. 5. 1. 12ff.)—

The Gods and Asuras, both sprung from Prajāpati, entered upon their paternal inheritance ; to wit, Speech, true and untrue and both true and untrue. They both of them spake the truth, and they both spake untruth ; and indeed, speaking alike, they were alike. The gods relinquished untruth, and held fast to truth ; and the Asuras relinquished truth, and held fast to untruth. ....The gods spake nothing but truth, and the Asuras nothing but untruth. And the gods, speaking the truth diligently, were very contemptible, and very poor : whence he who speaks the truth diligently, becomes indeed very contemptible, and very poor ; but in the end he assuredly prospers, for the Gods indeed prospered.

(9) In an animal sacrifice the procession leading in the victim is headed by fire. Here is an interesting explanation of it from the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (ii. 6)—

The victim as it was being borne along saw death before it, and was not willing to go to the Gods. The Gods said to it, "Come : we shall make you go to the world of heaven." It replied, " So be it ; but let one of you go before me." " Be it so " [the Gods replied]. Before it went Agni ; it followed after Agni. Therefore they say : " Every animal is connected with Agni, for after Agni it followed." Therefore also they bear Agni before it.

(10) As a last illustration we give the following from Śatapatha (vi. 2. 2. 8ff.), where an attempt is made to explain why, for a certain animal sacrifice, seventeen Mantras are to be recited at the time of the kindling of the fire—

For this there are 17 Kindling-verses (Sāmidhenīs) ; for, the year is seventeen-fold—there are 12 months and 5 seasons—Prajāpati is the year, and Prajāpati is Agni : as great as Agni is, as great as is his measure, by so much he thus kindles him. And again, why they are seventeen: man is seventeen-fold,—

there are ten vital airs, four limbs, the body the fifteenth, the neck-joints the sixteenth, and the head the seventeeth,—Prajāpati is the Person (or man), and Prajāpati is Agni : as great as Agni is, as great as is his measure, by so much he thus kindles him.

9. OTHER GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BRĀHMAṆAS: (i) METAPHORS.—The illustrations given above should suffice to afford at least a partial idea of the wealth and variety of the contents of the Brāhmaṇas. The Brāhmaṇas give us, besides, several beautiful and well drawn-out metaphors such as that of Agni and Saṁvatsara (T. B. iii. 11. 10), Sacrifice and the Celestial Car (J. B., Extract 27), Purusha and Yajña (J. U. B., iv. 2. 1), or the Human Body and the Heavenly Lute. We make room here for a few of them in order to show what grade of poetic feeling and fervour the Brāhmaṇas were sometimes capable of reaching. Thus we read in the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa (i. 5. 12)—

> Then spake Prajāpati : "Metres, be ye my chariot ; with your help will I traverse this road." Of it Gāyatrī and Jagatī became the two flanks (or wheels) ; Ushṇik and Trishṭubh the poles ; Anushṭubh and Paṅktī the yoke-animals ; and Bṛihatī alone the driver's seat. He (the Prajāpati) mounting upon this Metre-chariot traversed this road.

And the same Brāhmaṇa (iii. 11. 10) has established the following equation between Agni-Nachiketas and the Saṁvatsara (year)—

> The Year verily is Agni-Nachiketas. Of it the Spring is the head, the Summer the right side, Rainy-season the tail, Early-autumn the upper side, and Autumn-end the middle ; the first fortnights are its brick-layers, the latter fortnights the filling-mortar, the day-and-nights the bricks.

The Śatapatha (iv. 2. 5. 10) tells us—

> The Bahishpavamāna-chant is indeed a ship bound Heavenwards : the priests are its spars and oars, the means of reaching the Heavenly World. Of it one alone can be a cause of sinking, *viz*, he who is blameworthy. He makes it sink even as one who ascends a ship that is full would make it sink. And indeed every sacrifice is a ship bound Heaven-wards. Hence one

should seek to keep a blameworthy person away from every sacrifice.

But the most interesting metaphor by far is the following from the Aitareya Āraṇyaka iii. 2-5—

And so this (Human Body) is indeed the Heavenly Lute, the lute familiar to mortals being an imitation of it. As the former has a head so likewise has the latter a head; as the former has a belly so likewise has the latter the sounding box (*ambhanam*); as the former has the tongue so likewise has the latter the nail-piece (*vādanam*); as the latter has the strings so likewise has the former the fingers; as the latter has tunes so likewise has the former the tones; as the latter has frets so likewise has the former the tactile-sensations; just as the latter has sounds and openings so likewise has the former sounds and openings and as the former is covered up with a hairy skin so likewise is the latter covered up with a hairy skin: for, indeed, formerly they used to cover the lute by a hairy skin.

10. (ii) LONGER STORIES AND LEGENDS.—The Brāhmaṇas also have preserved for us many a sustained narrative about the doings of the gods amongst themselves, about their relation to the human worshippers, as also specific biographical and historical incidents concerning their own contemporaries and forefathers. Stories such as that of Śunaśśepa (A. B. vii. 13-18) or of Manu and the Fish (Ś. B. i. 8. 1. 1-11) are probably familiar to all; but even some of the less familiar stories are no less interesting. The following is from the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa ii. 19—

The sages once performed a sacrificial session on the Sarasvatī; and they barred Kavasha Ailūsha from drinking the Soma saying, "He is the child of a slave-girl, a knave and not a Brahmin: how has he been consecrated in our midst?" They drove him out into a desert (saying): "there let thirst kill him: let him not drink Sarasvatī's water." He, driven upon the desert and oppressed by thirst, "saw" the Aponaptrīya hymn (Rv. x. 30)......and by that he went to the Dear Abode of the Waters. Waters below welled up for him, and Sarasvatī

hastened up to him from all sides. ....The sages said, "The gods do know him: let us call him back." They called him back and sang the Aponaptrīya hymn....and attained the Dear Abode of the Waters.

The Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā (xi. 3) narrates—

Prajāpati gave his daughters, the Constellations, to king Soma (Moon). He dwelt with Rohiṇī alone, and so they (the Constellations) not being visited returned home.—Hence it is that a woman not visited returns home.—He (Soma) went after them and asked for them. But he (Prajāpati) did not give them again. Said he, "Stay with all equally, then I shall give them again." He however dwelt with Rohiṇī alone; and at that unrighteousness consumption took hold of him. ...He withered like a blade and begged favour of Prajāpati. He said, "Dwell with all for an equal period and then I shall release you." Hence it is that the Moon dwells with all the Constellations (lunar mansions) equally.

Finally we extract the following story about the fetching down of the Soma from Heaven (Śatapatha, iii. 2. 4. 1-7)—

In Heaven was the Soma and the Gods were on earth. The Gods desired, "Let Soma come to us: we would sacrifice with it when come." ....Gāyatrī flew up to Soma on their behalf. While she was fetching it Viśvāvasu the Gandharva stole it from her. The Gods became aware of it: 'Soma was indeed removed from yonder, but it has not come to us; for, the Gandharvas have stolen it'. They said, "The Gandharvas are fond of women: let us send Vāch (Speech) to them, and she will return to us with the Soma." They sent Vāch to them and she returned with the Soma. The Gandharvas came after her and said, "Let yours be Soma and Vāch ours." "So be it" said the Gods; "but if she would rather come hither, do not carry her away by force. Let us call her each our own way." They accordingly called her separately. The Gandharvas just recited the Vedas to her, saying, "We know this much, we know that much." The Gods on the other hand fashioned the lute and sat playing and singing, saying, "Thus we will

sing to thee, thus amuse thee." She turned to the gods. But in truth she turned to them vainly, since from those who were praying and chanting she turned to dance and song. Wherefore even to this day women are given to vain things.... and hence it is that they most readily take a fancy to him who dances and sings.

The long and detailed Creation-myths contained in the several Brāhmaṇas (which some of them are, philosophically, at least as important as some of the corresponding passages in the Upanishads themselves) we must reserve for treatment on a subsequent occasion.

11. THE SACRIFICIAL SYSTEM OF THE BRĀHMAṆAS : (i) THE NITYA AND THE KĀMYA SACRIFICES.—According to the orthodox view (which is already expressed in a late hymn of the Rigveda x. 71. 11 ; see Nirukta I. 8) the Rigveda is the Veda of the Hotṛi priest, the Yajurveda, that of the Adhvaryu, the Sāmaveda, that of the Udgātṛi, and the Atharvaveda, that of the Brahmā. It is accordingly generally the case that the Brāhmaṇa texts belonging to a Veda discuss primarily the duties of its own priest in connection with one or other of the sacrifices which form the subject of the Brāhmaṇa. Now the sacrifices that usually come within the range of a Brāhmaṇa are—besides the (1) Agnyādhāna, or the formal establishment of the Fire or Fires, and the (2) Punarādheya, or the renewal of the same in case of accidents,—the (3) Agnihotra or the day-to-day worship of the Fire at morning, mid-day, and evening ; (4 and 5) the Darśa and the Paurṇamāsa Ishṭis, or the New and the Full Moon sacrifices, the latter a one-day and the former a two-days function ; (6) the Piṇḍapitṛiyajña or an offering for the Manes undertaken on the afternoon of the New-moon day of each month ; (7-9) the Chāturmāsya or the fourth-monthly offerings, there being three such in a year marking the changes in the seasons, and called respectively the Vaiśvadeva, (where Puroḍāśas are offered to the Maruts and Payasyā to the Viśve Devas), the Varuṇa-praghāsa (the distinctive feature of which is the offering of *kārīra* fruits to the Maruts and a she-goat for Varuṇa), and the Sākamedha (in connection with which there takes place an annual Mahā-pitṛiyajña for the Manes,

as also a Traiyambaka-homa for Rudra); and finally (10) a Śunāsīrīya offer for the genii of the field and the plough, given usually at the end of the twelve months or during the thirteenth intercalary month. Some of the schools performed the fourth-monthly offerings all together at the end of the year in a six-days session known as Pṛishṭhya Shaḍaha. Amongst these Nitya or the obligatory offerings of the year can also be included the Āgrāyaṇa or the first-fruit offering ; the Mahāvrata or the Winter-solstice offering which appears to have been in origin a symbolic ritual directed against the Demon of Darkness ; and the Paśvālambha or the goat-offering taking place either annually or six-monthly, and without performing which the sacrificer was forbidden to partake of any animal food. The Kāmyeshṭis or the offerings on specific occassions and for specific ends, such as the Putrakāmyeshṭi or the offering for securing male progeny, and the Sautrāmaṇī or the wine-offering prescribed for an exile king or for any one who cannot stand Soma (Soma-vāmin), need not be here particularly gone into.

12. (ii) THE SOMA SACRIFICES.—By far the most important of the Vedic sacrifices, however, are the Soma-yāgas. They are divided into three classes, the Ekāhas or those of one day's duration, the Ahīnas or those lasting from two to twelve days, and the Sattras or those of more than twelve days' duration. The Agnishṭoma is regarded as the norm for all the Soma sacrifices. It is technically an Ekāha but it generally extends over five days, the first four days being devoted to introductory ceremonies like the Dīkshā or initiation, Soma-kraya or the purchase of Soma (which appears to have been a short ritualistic drama probably symbolical of the original winning of the heavenly Soma by the bird-shaped Gāyatrī), the Pravargya (for which see below), the Agnipraṇayana, etc. The squeezing, offering, and the drinking of the Soma at the morning, mid-day, and evening libations take place on the last or the fifth day, the ceremonies of which end with an *avabhṛitha* or ablutionary bath. The original significance of the Agnishṭoma has been variously explained. It is supposed by some to be a Spring or a New-year festival symbolical of the drinking of the nectar in

the moon (Soma means both the moon and the plant) by the Gods ; or a rain-charm to induce the falling of the rain by means of the straining of the Soma through the sieve (which works as a sympathetic magic); or—seeing that the God Soma is himself killed in the act and partaken by the worshipper—as a totem ritual in the shape of a formal sacrifice of communion with a view to renew the kinship between the God and his votaries as well as that of the votaries amongst themselves. The point is however debatable. The other Soma sacrifices are : the Pravargya, which, although included amongst the introductory ceremonial of the Agnishṭoma, was originally very probably an independent Yāga. Its principal feature is the libation of milk and ghee heated together in a pot called the Mahāvīra, the pot with its covering golden plate being explained as an emblem of the Sun, while the whole ceremony forms a symbolic renewal of the Sun's heat and the restoring of the sacrificer's own energy and vigour. Then comes the Ekādaśīna-kratupaśu, the Atyagnishṭoma, the Ukthya, the Shoḍaśin, the Vājapeya, the Atirātra, and the Aptoryāma,—all of which vary from the norm only in unessential particulars. Deserving of special mention amongst these, however, is the Vājapeya which, according to the Śatapatha (v. 1), is more important than the Rājasūya, though earlier texts do not show this indication of its pre-eminence. The Yāga includes several popular features (interpreted as sympathetic magic for securing vigour and eminence), such as a race of seventeen chariots in which the sacrificer is the victor, the victory being announced by making the sacrificer and his wife mount on a chariot-wheel placed upon the top of a long pole ; and thereafter by anointing them both with a mixture of several spices as a sort of a fertility-magic; or the use of seventeen Surā cups in addition to the ordinary Soma cups, the number seventeen being—as always—symbolic of Prajāpati. The rite seems to have been originally intended for a person of the first three castes desirous of regaining his lost status or power, though the sacerdotalizing of the rite by the priests has served to obliterate several of its original features. Finally, the Rājasūya is a coronation and consecration ritual which seems to have been a symbolic reproduction of the attainment of

divine kingship by Indra (or by Varuṇa). In the ritualistic elaborations the ceremony is made to extend over two years, amongst its several symbolic features being the king's mimic raid in a chariot and a game of dice. The story of Śunaśśepa is narrated after the anointment, and in this circumstance some see an indication of a possible human sacrifice being offered at that stage, although this view is not generally accepted.

13. (iii) THE AŚVAMEDHA AND OTHER SACRIFICES.—Amongst the Ahīnas the ritual texts enumerate the sacrifices known as Prāyaṇīya, Udayanīya, Chāturviṁśa, Abhiplava, Pṛishṭhya, Abhijit, the Svarasāmans, Vishuvat, Viśvajit, the Chhandomas, etc.,—none of which call for any special comment. Far more important than these is the Aśvamedha, which has been subjected to an extreme degree of elaboration and in which, after its successful roaming for one year all through the country, the horse is offered as a sacrifice, the sacrificing king thereby attaining to the dignity of a sovereign ruler. The queen's share in the ritual, and—following upon the *brahmodya* or the enigmatic catechism between the Hotṛi and the other priests—the obscene dialogue between her and the Hotṛi (where Rv. x. 95, the Purūravas-Urvaśī hymn is repeated) are interpreted as parts of an original fertility magic. At the time of the concluding *avabhṛitha* or ablutionary bath, a misfeatured person is driven into the water and an offering made upon his head to Jumbaka, the man subsequently making his escape along with all the sins of the village, evil-doers plunging into the same stream being also freed at once from all their sin. Purusha-medha or human sacrifice which is next enumerated is usually regarded as a priestly invention for filling an apparent gap in the sacrificial system. For the late Saṁhitā and the Brāhmaṇa periods, at any rate, human sacrifice was an unspeakable horror. The Sarvamedha or All-offer was a still higher form of sacrifice, after performing which the sacrificer was expected to abandon everything and repair to the forests.

14. (iv) LONGER SACRIFICIAL SESSIONS.—The Dvādaśāha (twelve-days' session) forms the norm of all longer Sattras, which are formed by a welding together of the rituals prescribed for the

several shorter or longer Ahīnas. Thus a Dvādaśāha can be made to extend over twenty-two days in the following manner—

Prāyaṇīya	First day;
Jyotis, Go, and Āyus (the Trikadrukas) ..	days 2-4;
Abhiplava-Shaḍaha	days 5-10;
Daśarātra	days 11-20;
Mahāvrata	21st day;
and Udayanīya	22nd day.

The Sattra known as Gavām-Ayana lasts for twelve months, as also those known as Ādityānām-Ayana, Aṅgirasām-Ayana, Kuṇḍa-pāyinām-Ayana, Sarpa-Sattra, and several others, the details of which it is needless to follow in this place.

15. (v) THE AGNICHAYANA.—In close relation with the Soma sacrifices is the ceremony known as Agnichayana or the piling of bricks for the altar, though it is obligatory only in some specific forms of the Soma-yāga. Indeed, we have reasons to believe that this solemn ceremony was originally independent of the ordinary sacrificial system, and was only in the later texts incorporated with the ritual, evidently with the object of finding room, in the external rites and ceremonies of the sacrificial cult, for the prevailing cosmogonic and theosophic speculations of the time. The ceremony which is spread over full twelve months consists in the piling up, in five layers, of a total of 10,800 bricks of various sizes so as to construct an altar resembling the form of a bird flying towards the East, the Gate of Heaven. The bricks and the process of piling them up is in fact intended to symbolise Prajāpati's cosmic creation. Prajāpati's cosmogonic activity, the texts are never tired of telling us, is a sacrifice; and with the symbolic identification of the sacrificer with Prajāpati and the Agnichayana with world-emanation, it follows that as Prajāpati, exhausted in the act of cosmogenesis, found renewed life and vigour through the *Tapas* or the *Yajña*, even so does the sacrificer win his own self (Ātman and Prāṇa) in the world to come. The ceremony thus opened out a wide field for the hair-splitting and mystery-mongering activities of the period which have always been so very dear to priests of all lands and religions.

16. THE YAJÑAKRATUS.—We have hitherto enumerated only the principal forms of Vedic sacrifices. Many more varieties of them are known by name; but it is extremely doubtful if all of them were ever in vogue. Some may owe their origin merely to the system-building propensity of the theorisers. In the case of the Ekāha known as Gosava, the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa (Extract 135) is frank enough to tell us that, owing to the impossible nature of the initiation rites demanded (they include all manner of incests !) nobody had ever dared to perform it. There are also the Yajñakratus known as the Chatur-, Pañcha-, Shaḍ-, Sapta-, and Daśa-hotṛis, which can be said to be outside the purview of the normal ritual, seeing that they generally consisted of a mere recitation in forest, and in the presence of another learned Śrotriya, of specific mantras required for sacrifices, without the corresponding oblations or offerings, but with elabororate symbolic identifications of the various elements in the sacrifice with the phenomena of the physical and the intellectual worlds. Compare the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa v. 25—

> Thought was their ladle, intelligence the ghee, speech the altar, study the grass (*barhis*), insight the fire, knowledge the priest-who-kindles, breath the oblation, chanting the Adhvaryu-priest, Vāchaspati the Hotṛi, and mind the Upavaktṛi.

This means that the Brāhmaṇa ritual is here already opening out the path for the symbolic Kratus and Upāsanas of the Āraṇyakas and the Upanishads proper.

17. CONSPECTUS OF THE VARIOUS SACRIFICES IN THE BRĀHMAṆAS.—The several Brāhmaṇa texts treat in their own peculiar way of only a few of the sacrifices above described. It is to the Śrauta-sūtras that one generally turns for a systematic description of them, along with the necessary prescriptions. For purposes of reference it would be convenient if we give below a conspectus of the various sacrifices treated in the more important Brāhmaṇas, with a view to enable us to compare the accounts of the same ritual as given in the several texts so as to establish definite mutual relations between them. The conspectus naturally takes cognisance of only the more important passages.

TABLE OF SACRIFICES TREATED IN THE BRĀHMAṆA TEXTS

TEXTS	Darśa and Paurṇamāsa	Punarādheya	Chāturmāsyāni	Somayāga	Agnishṭoma	Rājasūya	Vājapeya	Sautrāmaṇī	Aśvamedha	Agnichayana	Kāmya ishṭayaḥ	Ahīnas	Gavām Ayana	Other Sattras
Aitareya Br. ..	..	..	..	I-V	I-III. 3	VII. 4—VIII	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Kaushītaki Br. .	III	..	V	VII-XIV	XIV—XVI	..	..	XVI	..	..	IV	..	XXVI	..
Aitareya Ār. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	I	..
Śāṅkhāyana Ār. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Tāṇḍya Br. ..	..	..	..	..	VI	XVII	XVIII	..	..	..	..	..	IV	XXI—XXV
Jaiminīya Br. ..	Preserved only in fragments				..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Jaiminīya-Up. Br. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Vājasaneyī Saṁ. ..	I-II	..	IV. 8	..	..	IX. 34—X	IX. 34	XI. 19f.	XI 22-5	XI. 18	..	..	..	..
Śatapatha Br. ..	I. i, XI	II. 2-3	II. 5f. XI. 5	III-IV	..	V. 2f.	V. 1	V. 5. XII. 7	XIII	VII-VIII	..	..	..	..
Maitrāyaṇī Saṁ. ..	I. 1	I. 7	I. 10	..	..	II. 6, IV. 3f.	I. 11	III. 11	III. 12-16	II. 7f.—III. 1f.	..	..	..	..
Kāthaka Saṁ. ..	I	VIII. 14-7 IX. 1f.	II. 5f, XI. 5	..	..	XV. 1-8	XIV	XXXVIII	XXXV	XVI—XXI	IX-XII	..	..	XXVIII
Taittirīya Saṁ. ..	I-II	I. 5	VII. 5	I, 1, II, and V	VII. 1	I. 8	I. 7	I. 8	IV, V, and VII	IV-V	II. 1f.	VII	VII	VII
Taittirīya Br. ..	III. 2f.	..	I. 4f.	..	..	I. 6f.	I. 3	I. 4-8, II. 6.	III. 8f.	I. 5f.	..	..	I. 2	..
Taittirīya Ār. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Gopatha Br. ..	..	..	II. 1	..	..	..	II. 5-8	..	..	..	..	II. 6	..	..

18. ANTAGONISM OF THE DEVAS AND THE ASURAS IN THE BRĀHMAṆAS.—Hitherto we have given, although necessarily in a brief and condensed form, all the essential information about the number, nature and the general character of the contents of the Brāhmaṇas, as also about the ritual which they presuppose and elucidate. But before we proceed to a critical study of the attitude of the Brāhmaṇas towards life and its problems it is necessary to describe one peculiar feature of these texts that stands out most prominently in all their speculations regarding the large as well as small points of detail in the ritual which they deemed of consequence enough to raise and settle : *viz*, the constant mention that we meet therein of the conflict between the Devas and the Asuras and the deductions that they make from that circumstance. Now and again the texts aver in tireless repetition that the modes and practices of worship for which they give the weight of their sanction and authority are or were those of the Devas. The Asura methods are the reverse of these ; they bring disaster and deserve to be condemned and discarded. Compare, for instance, the following from the Kaṭha Saṁhitā (xxii. 9)—

> The Gods and the Asuras performed the Yajña just exactly alike : what the Gods did that did the Asuras. The Asuras were many and happier ; the Gods were juniors, more wretched, and very much in the plight of younger brothers. The Gods thereupon "saw" this Āgrāyaṇa and accepted it. By its means they ascended the top : and because they went (*paryāyāṁs*) to the top (*agra*), that is why the Āgrāyaṇa is called Āgrāyaṇa.

Or, Taittirīya Saṁhitā (v. 3. 3)—

> Whatever the Gods did at the sacrifice that did the Asuras. The Gods then "saw" these Akshṇayāstomīya (bricks) and they put them down on one place after reciting (their mantras) in another ; the Asuras could not follow it : and so the Gods prospered and the Asuras were defeated.

Or, lastly, the Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa (xviii. 1. 2)—

> The Gods and the Asuras were two sets of Prajāpati's sons. Of these the Asuras were many and more strong ; the Gods

younger. The Gods repaired for help unto Prajāpati. He thereupon "discovered" this Upahavya offering, etc.

It is evident that this assiduity to lay down the proper ritual, *à la mode de* Devas, of which almost every page of the several Brāhmaṇa texts affords more than one instance, can be explained only on the assumption that that ritual (supposing it to have been once existing and current) had subsequently gone out of vogue, and another usurped its place. The Brāhmaṇas must evidently have regarded themselves as the fathers of newer traditions in ritual, or in any case as the first renovators of the older (and the purer) forms of them, in opposition to the more debased forms current at the time. The battle was real and earnest; and so strong was their desire to wean all true worshippers away from the methods of the Asuras, that in a number of cases the only reason assigned for adopting a particular method was that the one discarded was that of the Asuras. Nor are the methods of victory very difficult and intricate: Compare Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa xxxi. 13. 2—

The Gods and the Asuras were in rivalry, and neither party was able to win. They then said, let us win by pairing the speech: those of us that would not find a cognate couple, they would be considered vanquished. The Gods said *ekaḥ*, (one, m.) the Asuras paired it by *ekā* (one, f.). The Gods said *dvau* (two, m.), the Asuras paired it by *dve* (two, f.). The Gods said *trayaḥ* (three, m.), the Asuras paired it with *tisraḥ* (three, f.). The Gods said *chatvāraḥ* (four, m.), the Asuras paired it with *chatasraḥ* (four, f.). The Gods said *pañcha* (five); the Asuras found no pair for it. And so the Gods won and the Asuras were vanquished.

This is much too cheap a victory. But we need not therefore conclude that the battle never took place. Unless the Asuras were firmly established in the popular mind they could not have been used in this manner so freely and frequently.

19. WHO WERE THE ASURAS?—The repeated statements of the several Brāhmaṇa texts about the Asuras leave no doubts as to the fact that they were of the same race and religion as the Devas. *Devāś cha vā Asurāś cha Prajāpater dvayāḥ putrā āsan*; or *Dvayā vai Prājāpatyāḥ*: *Devāś cha Asurāś cha*—is a stock phrase;

and the texts go on to tell us that in the beginning all glory, all wealth, all power was with the Asuras, whose mode and objects of worship did not originally differ from those of the Devas. The Devas for long continued to be vanquished. The Asuras accordingly appear to have been in possession of ancient ritualistic traditions and the knowledge of the Scriptures, while the Devas evidently were a small minority seceding from the common stock and intent upon carving out a new sphere or kingdom for themselves, and establish therein newer traditions in worship for the guidance of posterity. That the Asuras were real human beings and that the Deva-Asura battle was not consequently a mere myth is confirmed, amongst other things, by that curious passage in the Chhāndogya Upanishad at the end of the Indra-Virochana story (viii. 8. 5)—

> Therefore also even now on earth they say of one who believes not and gives not, 'Oh ! He is an Asura !' For such is the dogma of the Asuras. They adorn in this wise, (even) by begging, the body of the deceased with dress and ornament, and think that thereby they will win yonder world.

A suggestion has been recently thrown out that these Asuras *originally* denoted the Assyrians, and that may not be very improbable in itself. This is a problem, however, that we have reserved for a fuller treatment in all its manifold bearings in our First Volume. As far as the data of the Brāhmaṇas go, it would meet all the requirements of the case if the Asuras are supposed to be a branch of the same stock of people as the Devas, and, if not actually residing for the time in Assyria, at least possessing a religion and a mode of worship largely patterned after and influenced by that of the Assyrians. And the Avestic traditions point to a similar conclusion.

20. THE INNER DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DEVA AND THE ASURA RITUALS.—The Brāhmaṇa texts generally characterise the Asura mode of worship as *yātu, māyā,* or black magic. Compare for instance Tāṇḍya B. xix. 19. 1—" The ungodly *māyās*, captured Indra" ; or Maitrāyaṇī Saṁ. iii. 1. 9—" It was the *māyā* of the Asuras, which the Gods dispelled by this Yajus formula." In Kāṭhaka Saṁ. xxxvii. 14 what is called Brahma-yātu or Deva-

yātu is distinguished from Asura-yātu. Now magic works by identifying objects with their symbols and postulating all sorts of hidden and mysterious bonds between things high and low, and we can well imagine that the Brāhmaṇa sacrifice was ultimately based upon a view of the world not essentially different from this. The sacrificer used prayers (*bráhman*) and practised penance (*tapas*) ; the magician probably used spells such as those recorded in the Atharva-veda, and his object might have been more reprehensible morally than that of the sacrificer. Further, while in a normal case of magic, as well as of sacrificial ritual, the Mantras uttered, the will-power exerted, the symbols and other materials used, and the sympathetic movements practised, would generally be all equally emphasised, subsequently there would be a tendency for the magician—specially where the object sought by him was beyond ordinary human powers or was weird and unholy—to lay greater store by his materials and movements, making them as dreadful and imposing as possible ; whereas the sacrificer would depend more upon the passionate earnestness of his appeal and a faith in the omnipotence of the object of his worship. This at any rate was what the Brāhmaṇas appear to have aimed at—though, at times, the sacrificer might have possibly proved himself more of a magician and the magician more of a sacrificer. On ultimate analysis therefore it turns out to be a difference in degree : the Brāhmaṇa prescriptions for worship were orthodoxy because they were *my* doxy the Asura arts and practices were heterodoxy because they were *thy* doxy. And the Asuras could have retorted—and probably did retort—in the same spirit.

21. THE ATTITUDE OF THE BRĀHMAṆAS TOWARDS THE MANTRAS.—We can now easily understand how it was that the Brāhmaṇas came to invest the Mantras with the character of divine revelation. They are at times spoken of as eternally self-subsistent and coeval with God-head—if not actually prior to Him. At other times—and especially in the newer Brāhmaṇa texts—they are described as creations of Prajāpati the head of their whole pantheon. And all through one notices the presence of the belief that the scriptures belonged to a hoary past between which and the Brāhmaṇas

there must have intervened a gap in the continuity of tradition, as evidenced, for instance, in the Brāhmaṇa treatment of the Śunaśśepa legend (Ait. B. vii. 13ff.), or in their familiar attempt at the apotheosis of "*Ka*" the interrogative pronoun. But the Brāhmaṇas were not content merely to revere the scriptures: in a spirit of pious heroism they devoted themselves wholly to an assiduous cultivation of their study and interpretation; for it was these texts that were to give them—when properly interpreted—the ultimate sanction for their newer non-Asura methods. And lest others might interpret the holy texts differently–and that was just possible —they wanted to keep their knowledge confined to a special class of experts prepared to devote their whole life-time to the task. Compare in this connection sentiments like the following (Aitareya Āraṇyaka, v. 33)—

> One should not teach it in open day, nor to one not a regular pupil......for a year,......nor to one who is not a Brahmachārin and does not belong to the same school, etc.

Or, the more familiar verses from Yāska's Nirukta, ii. 4, which are also found in the Saṁhitopanishad Brāhmaṇa. Yāska's assertion —*Nityaṁ hy avijñātur vijñāne 'sūyā bhavati* can be compared with injunctions such as "One should not insult a Brahmin, nor beat him, etc." from the Taittirīya Saṁhitā ii. 6. 10. Compare also Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa xi. 5. 7. 1. Hence the rigour of the caste-system and the apotheosis of the priesthood. The Brāhmaṇas actually declare (Śatapatha Br. ii. 2. 2. 6 and elsewhere)—

> Verily there are two kinds of Gods. For indeed the Gods are Gods; and the Brahmins who have studied and teach the sacred lore are the *human* Gods.

And the same Brāhmaṇa later (xi. 5. 6. 3) assures us—

> And, verily, however great the world he gains by giving away (to the priests) this earth replete with wealth, thrice that and more—an imperishable world—does he gain whosoever, knowing this, studies the Vedas day by day.

Of interest also is the story recorded in the Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa (xiii. 3. 24) of a learned son who used to address his father and elders as "my boys." They said, "it is an unrighteous

conduct you are exhibiting since you address us your parents as *my boys.*" He replied, "Nay, I am myself the father as I am the author of Mantras." And on an appeal the Gods also decided in favour of the son. We can now well appreciate the keen zest that was evinced by the priestly fathers of theology in the several intellectual tourneys that were held at the courts of kings like Janaka in the Videhas or Pravāhaṇa Jaivali in the Pāñchālas on the occassion and during the intervals of great sacrificial sessions, where gifts were given, but where also fames were made and unmade. Traversing the country in search of disputants seems to have formed the necessary complement to a youth's education in Veda and theology. Compare Śatapatha xi. 4. 1. 1ff., and Gopatha 1. 3. 6, where a story is told of Uddālaka Āruṇi who, chosen as the priest (that being a very high honour for a student), traversed the Northern country, a gold coin (or chain, *nishka*) in hand, which he was to lose should any one vanquish him in a disputation :

> Fear then seized the Brahmins of the Northern people : "This fellow is a Kurupāñchāla Brahmin, and son of a Brahmin ; let us take care lest he should deprive us of our domain."

They then challenge him to a disputation on spiritual matters and vanquish him with the help of Svaidāyana of the Śaunaka clan and force him to forfeit the golden *nishka*. Uddālaka then becomes a pupil of Svaidāyana.—Whatever opinion we might have about the Brāhmaṇas as exegetical texts, it has to be admitted that they did achieve the goal that they had deliberately set before themselves, *viz.*, that of preserving the Vedas and of combatting opposite traditions in ritualistic practice.

22. THE GODS AS THEY FARE IN THE BRĀHMAṆAS.—The ritual for which the Brāhmaṇas framed regulations was in the main the older ritual of the Vedas, probably elaborated and perfected in parts. But the older Vedic Nature-gods as we find them reflected in these exegetic texts have lost most of their individuality as well as their hold on the people. This process of their de-naturalisation (if we may so express it) had already commenced in the late Vedic period, partly by reason of the introduction of the newer (lesser)

gods and partly by reason of the tendency towards the so-called "henotheism;" and it was now quite completed, so that even for the oldest Brāhmaṇa texts gods like Indra and the Aśvins have lost their whilom majesty and touch of nature, and become merely appanages to the sacrifice. Commandeered by the priest they have to attend the *savanas* regularly, partake of the drinks and the oblations, and then depart in peace. Every small movement of the priest required the attendance and assistance of the gods. If he has to lift any sacrificial utensil or the like it is always—

> with the impulse of god Savitṛi, the arms of the Aśvins, the hands of Pūshan, the brilliance of Agni, the radiance of the Sun, and the power of Indra.

The formula is found repeated on almost every page of every Brāhmaṇa text. This to be sure was not the attitude of a "God-intoxicated" mystic for whom all happenings in the world were possible only through the grace of God. It was the attitude of the priest who believed in the omnipotence of the sacrifice so that unto the gods he was prepared to assign only as much—or as little—real power for good or evil as unto the specific pots out of which they quaffed their potions, the *samidhs* which were thrown into the fire for them, or the metres of the mantras used in inviting them. The myths and legends connected with these gods no longer interest the Brāhmaṇas. They retain just a few (like those of Indra and Namuchi or of Dadhyach and the Aśvins) that lend themselves readily to preach some ritualistic moral or an object-lesson of some sort. The others are probably ignored altogether or relegated for elaboration to the Ākhyānavids or popular bardic poets. The position of these older gods in this system was in fact quite secondary: it was no better than what they later enjoyed in Buddhism. This same fate was also shared—with one or two notable exceptions—such as Vishṇu and Rudra—by the newer entrants into the Vedic pantheon: the local, lesser, non-Aryan gods and spirits. They were not denied a place in the ritual: for instance, we have Śaṇḍāmarkau, the two Asura ministers, regularly honoured by naming two libation-pots after them; and, in the *avabhṛitha* at the conclusion of a horse-sacrifice, we have a spirit of un-Aryan name

and features like Jumbaka introduced for a specific purpose. The Brāhmaṇa pantheon was in fact thrown wide open for all. The liturgical and other abstractions that were accorded divine honours in the late Vedic period also got their number inordinately multiplied so as to include various plants and animals ; the pots, potsherds, and utensils small and large that figured in the sacrifice ; the names, seasons, days, nights, and *nakshatras* ; the place, the pillars, and the portals ; the word-symbols (*om, hiṅ, bhūr, svāhā, vashaṭ*, etc.), the metres, and the tunes. These and many more impersonal potences were believed, by their presence or absence, to bring on specific blessings or evils to the sacrificer, the priests and their families : sometimes indeed to the whole country. Nay, even a small departure from the number or order of the mantras prescribed for recitation, an unconscious reversal of position of some of the infinite minutæ of the sacrifice, was believed—unless atoned for by a proper *prāyaśchitta* or expiatory rite—to lead to certain calamity in this world and unspeakable suffering in the next. We have an instance of this recorded in the Śatapatha (i. 2. 5. 24), where omission to wash the hands before touching the altar and the oblations is said to have vitiated the entire sacrifice ; and the priests, ignorant of the real cause of their failure to secure the fruit of the sacrifice despairingly ask : " To what end shall we perform the sacrifice ? Those performing it are in adversity those not performing it are in prosperity." And just as in Mediæval Church a priest was believed to have been able, if he out of spite so wished it, to turn the service of God into the service of the Devil by performing portions of the holy prayer or ritual in a reverse order, even so the Aitereya Brāhmaṇa (iii. 7) tells us that by his manner of uttering the call *vashaṭ* the priest can have power to bring prosperity or ruin upon the sacrificer—

Should the priest desire ' Let the sacrificer be worse off,' then, having recited the *ṛik* for him in a higher tone, he should utter the (concluding) *vashaṭ* call in a lower tone. ....Should he desire ' Let him be better off,' he should recite the *ṛik* for him in a lower tone and then utter the *vashaṭ* call in a more raised tone.

Compare also Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa ii. 1. 4—

> The Gods offered a gradually increasing oblation, the Asuras a decreasing oblation. Hence the Gods triumphed and the Asuras were defeated. If one desires that the sacrificer should become better off, for him the priest should offer a smaller oblation first and then a larger one subsequently. ......If one desires that the sacrificer should become worse off, for him the priest should offer a larger oblation first and then a smaller one subsequently.

The whole system, we might almost say, became polytheistic with a vengeance; and at the head of this motley assemblage of gods, spirits, and potences personal and impersonal was placed the nebulous figure of Prajāpati, 'Lord of Creatures,' himself an upstart with no very high ancestry or power and no distinctive individuality or intimate relations with the daily joys and sorrows of man, such as the mighty Varuṇa or Indra once possessed.

23. THE "BANDHUS" OF THE GODS.—This realm of deities headed by Prajāpati was not a mere warring republic aimless, soulless, and self-sufficient—like a colony of some Epicurean gods; it was—or was at least intended to be—a kingdom of ends with a graduated order of power and precedence, each member of the pantheon being assigned a definite function and a specified paraphernalia of number, metre, psalm, season, hour, place, priest, consort, oblations, gifts, cups and companions. Indra, for instance, was associated with the number 11, the metre Trishṭubh, the season Grīshma (summer), the mid-day oblation, and so forth, with Indrāṇī for his wife and Agni, Soma, Varuṇa, Pūshan, Bṛihaspati, Brahmaṇaspati, Parvata, Kutsa, Vishṇu, and Vāyu as his companions. And wherever the number 11 or the metre Trishṭubh and the rest appeared, the power of Indra was believed to be present there to help or to punish. Prajāpati, the head of the pantheon, was treated and apportioned in the same manner. We are even told that most of the divinities had acquired their paraphernalia—their *bandhus,* to give it the proper technical name—after a regular race or fight or as a reward demanded and acquired for services rendered. Thus the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa narrates (ii. 25)—

> The gods did not agree as to which one of them should drink first of king Soma: They desired each of them: 'Let me drink first, let me drink first.' They, coming to an agreement, said: "Come: let us run a race. Whichever of us wins he shall drink Soma first." "All right." They ran a race. As they started forward, in the course of the race, Vāyu got ahead and took the lead. ....Now Indra perceived of Vāyu, 'He is winning.' He ran up to his side saying, "Let us share together, and so let us both win." Vāyu answered, "No: I alone shall win." "A third for me: so let us win together," said Indra. "No," he replied: "I alone shall win." "A fourth for me: so let us win together," persisted Indra. "Be it so," replied Vāyu. ....Hence Indra has a quarter as his portion, Vāyu three-quarters.

The Taittirīya Saṁhitā v. 4. 9 similarly tells us—

> Agni went away from the Gods desirous of a portion for himself. Him the Gods said, "Come unto us: bring oblation for us." He said, "I beseech a boon: they should offer Vājaprasavīya oblation for me alone."

Prajāpati the head of the pantheon was not himself above asking a return. The Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā reports (I. 8. 4)—

> These plants the Rudras infected with poison: the beasts would not have them. The Gods ran unto Prajāpati himself. Prajāpati said, "I ask a boon: let me have a portion." "Choose," said they. He said, "let the *samidh* have me alone for its deity."

24. THE GROUNDS OF "BANDHUTĀ" MAGICAL NOT LOGICAL.—Now, through what causes or circumstances can things have a relation of *bandhutā* between them subsequently leading to an asserion of their downright identity? To the Brāhmaṇa seer this does not appear to have been a very great problem. One thing is quite clear. It was not a case of mere symbolism. This latter idea is for the most part foreign to Hindu religious philosophy. Even the images worshipped in later Hindu temples are not to be viewed as mere symbols or representatives. They are permeated by actual divine presence; and there is a regular ceremony (the

Prāṇapratishṭhā) for invoking the spirit of God to abide within it. The Brāhmaṇas at any rate show clear indications of a belief in the presence of some subtle, secret, and mystic bond connecting a thing and its *bandhus*, and the *bandhus* amongst themselves. The bond is subtle, and none but priestly wisdom could discover it ; and it is hidden, for, *Parokshapriyā hi Devāḥ* : the Gods love what is hidden. But all things said and done, the priestly wisdom was content to call in the help of no principles higher than (1) a fancy-etymology such as the following (Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa i. 3. 6)—" The gods ran a race for the plants. Bṛihaspati won them. He selected (*niravṛiṇīta*) the Nīvāras (wild rice). Hence the Nīvāras are so named." (2) A myth invented *ad hoc*, as when the equation between Agni and gold is explained by the story of Agni's dropping his seed into the waters (Ś. B. ii. 1. 1. 5). (3) Some obvious similarity or correspondence in the nature of the things, as when the stars (lunar mansions) are equated with fried corn (*lājā*) in Ś. B. xiii. 11. 10. 5. (4) A cosmogonic legend like the following (Tāṇḍya B. vi. 1. 6)—" He desired, ' Let me create the sacrifice.' He created the Trivṛit from his very mouth, and thereafter was created the metre Gāyatrī, the deity Agni, a man of the Brahmin caste, and the season Vasanta. ......Hence the Brahmin performs exploits by his mouth, as he is created from the mouth." And finally (5) the current tradition and practice, possibly having its root in the distant, prehistoric past, with its confused reminiscences of animism, magic and mysticism, for which no adequate explanation was forthcoming : as, for instance, in the assignment of particular animal victims to particular gods and then identifying the victims with those gods. The relation in all these cases cannot, it is clear, be called natural or even logical : it is at best magical. It is suggestive of the relation between form and matter, between reality and appearance ; it even might have paved the way for the introduction of these concepts into the Vedānta ; but it would be premature to bring in these precise philosophic concepts to elucidate what has been well styled " pre-philosophic philosophy. "

25. THE BANDHUS REPRESENT AND YET SUPPLANT THE GODS.—Pāṇini is credited with the immortal attempt (vi. 4. 133) to weave a

dog, a young man, and Indra together into one Sūtra. The Brāhmaṇa texts have achieved greater wonders. They have, as we saw, placed Indra in a far more motley company. They go even further: they do actually identify Indra with his *bandhus* one and all, severally and collectively. For the word *bandhu* the texts use more or less synonymously, the words *rūpa, tanu,* and *nāma.* Let us consider a few illustrative passages. The Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (vii. 24) tells us—

> Now the Kshatriya when consecrated has Agni for his deity, the Gāyatrī for his metre, the Trivṛit for his Stoma, and the Brahmin as his inner essence (*bandhu*).

Similarly, the Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā viii. 4—

> "I establish you with the holy power (*vrata*) of those amongst the Gods that are the Aṅgirasas"—thus should a Brahmin establish (the holy fire). For those amongst the Gods that are Aṅgirasas are the correlates (*pratyenasaḥ*) of a Brahmin, *viz.*, Agni, Vāyu, Vāch, and Bṛihaspati; and through them is the sacrifice his *bandhu*, from thence it comes to him.

For the use of the term *rūpa* compare the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, iii. 8. 14—

> Ghee is indeed the [real] form (*rūpa*) of Agni, and when he offers with ghee he thereby gratifies Agni himself.

Also, Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā i. 6. 7—

> A full ladle is indeed Prajāpati in his [real] form (*rūpa*); and when he pours out a full ladle he thereby secures Prajāpati himself.

A reference might also be suggested here to Jaiminīya-Upanishad Brāhmaṇa iii. 6. 4 and to Śatapatha Br. vi. 2. 1. 1ff. The last passage (Eggeling, Translation, part iii, pp. 161-162) is particularly illuminating. A cognate passage to that, but using the word *tanu* instead of *rūpa* is Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā viii. 9—

> Agni forsooth did not care for this world, since they cook in him raw flesh, they burn a corpse, and cook what might have been stolen property. ......Now, that form (*tanu*) of him which was Pavamāna, with that he entered the beasts; with that form which was Pāvaka, the waters; and with that

> form which was Śuchi, the Sun above. ....Now Prāṇa is Pavamāna, and the beasts are kept together by Prāṇa ; etc.

For the use of the word *nāma* we have, once more, a passage from the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (v. 23)—

> And when the Hotṛi recites the Chatur-Hotṛis (see above, page 51), verily he reproduces the song in his recitation. For that which is Chatur-Hotṛis is the sacrificial and secret name (*nāma*) of the gods.

A more advanced passage is Śatapatha Br. i. 2. 3. 1 to 5, where *nāma* and *rūpa* appear almost in the same sense in which the Vedānta uses them. Other words rarely used in these contexts are *pratimā* (image), *ātman* (soul), *manas* (mind), *nidāna* (root-cause), *vīrya* (vigour), etc. When Kālidāsa speaks of the eight *tanus* (forms of manifestation) of God Śiva (Śākuntala i. 1), when the Gītā in chapter x enumerates the different *vibhūtis* (eminences) of Śrīkṛishṇa, it is now clear that the same old Brāhmaṇa idea is being given here a more precise content; and the *avatāra* idea of a later date is just one further step in the same direction. The direct identification of a thing with its *bandhu*, *rūpa*, or *vibhūti* is thereafter almost inevitable. And the famous "*Tat tvam asi*" formula of the Upanishadic period would gain a new meaning when viewed in the light of its predecessors in the Brāhmaṇas.

26. SACRIFICE AS AN OMNIPOTENT WORLD-PRINCIPLE.—The central theme that called forth the idea of the *bandhus* was of course the sacrifice. To the Brāhmaṇas the Gods as well as their *bandhus* exist only as functionaries in the all-embracing sacrifice. It is not only the Yajamāna (sacrificer) and the priests alone who take an intelligent part in the sacrifice and have their wishes fulfilled through them ; the cow, the goat, and all animate and inanimate creation can be benefited by the sacrifice : they all, in fact, derive their very position from the might of the sacrifice. The Gods themselves owe their triumph over the Asuras to the successful performance of the sacrifice. Countless passages in the Brāhmaṇas beginning with the stereotyped "*Devāś cha vā Asurāś chā 'spardhanta* (The Gods and the Asuras fought in rivalry)," or "*Devāsurās saṁyattā āsan* (The Gods and the Asuras were in combat)," tell us

how, while the Asuras themselves were not unaware of the value of sacrifice and had been practising it all along, the gods ultimately succeed in vanquishing their rivals by inventing—or more properly, by having revealed to them—certain new psalms, methods, materials, utensils, or certain other "tricks of the trade". The life-activity of the great Prajāpati himself is a continuous process of sacrifice which exhausts him, takes the juice out of him (*ririchānaḥ*), and of the subsequent recuperation of his lost vigour through his own *tapas* or penance and through the sympathetic recuperative ritual of some God or a believing worshipper. Thus we read in the Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa (iv. 10. 1)—

> Prajāpati created the creatures. He became exhausted and laid down. Him the Gods approached. They said, "let us prepare for him a great ritual (*vrata*) which might restore him." They offered unto him all food which is cooked the whole year through. He swallowed it, and it revived him. Great (*mahat*), O mortals, was the ritual (*vrata*) which was able to restore him. Here is why the Mahāvrata is called Mahāvrata.

The creative process is sometimes conceived as a *mithuna*; *e.g.*, Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā, xxvii. 1—"Speech was as a second to him. They formed a couple: etc." but more often as a sacrifice, as a self-immolation. Thus the Taittirīya Saṁhitā (ii. 1. 1.) tells us—

> Prajāpati, indeed, was here alone. He desired, 'I should create creatures (men) and beasts.' He took out the omentum from his body and offered it into the fire. Thence was produced a hornless goat. That he offered as victim unto its own divinity. Then he created men and beasts.

And after completing the creative process should any calamity befall the creatures, the remedy again was a sacrifice of some sort. Thus the Tāṇḍya again narrates (xxiv. 11. 2)—

> Prajāpati created the creatures. These, unrestrained (*avidhṛitāḥ*) and disunited, began eating one another. At that Prajāpati was grieved. He then 'saw' these (six nights called Vidhṛitīs, forming part of a Sattra of 49 nights); and thereupon it stopped. The cows thereafter became cows, the horses horses, men men, beasts beasts.

27. BRĀHMAṆA THEORIES OF CREATION.—We must describe in this connection one or two more elaborate cosmogonical attempts of the Brāhmaṇa texts which are essentially based upon the same conception. Thus Ait. Br. (v. 32) narrates—

> Prajāpati desired, 'may I be propagated: may I be multiplied.' He practised *tapas* (penance, fervour). Having practised penance he created the three worlds: the earth, the atmosphere, and the sky. He brooded over these worlds. From these worlds when brooded over three luminaries were born: Agni was born from the earth, Vāyu from the atmosphere, and Āditya from the sky. He brooded over these luminaries. From these brooded over the three Vedas were born. The Rigveda was born from Agni, the Yajurveda from Vāyu, and the Sāmaveda from Āditya. He brooded over these Vedas. From these when brooded over three pure [sounds] were born: *bhuḥ* was born from the Rigveda, *bhuvaḥ* form the Yajurveda, *svar* from the Sāmaveda. He brooded over these Pure Ones. From these when brooded over three sounds (*varṇas*) were born: *a*, *u*, and *m*. These he brought together: that made the (word) *Om*.

The next passage is from Taitt. Br. ii. 2. 9—

> This (world) was not at all existing in the beginning. There was not the sky, nor the earth, nor the atmosphere. Non-existing as it was, it had the desire 'May I be.' It practised *tapas* (fervour). From it practising fervour smoke was produced. It practised more fervour. From it practising fervour Agni (fire) was produced. It practised more fervour. From it practising fervour a glow was produced. It practised more fervour. From it practising fervour a flame was produced. It practised more fervour. From it practising fervour rays were produced. It practised more fervour. From it practising fervour up-rising vapours (*udārāḥ*) were produced. It practised more fervour. Then it condensed like a cloud. That burst open the urinary bladder (of Prajāpati). That produced the ocean. ....Those waters were at that time a streaming fluid. He, the Prajāpati, wept: 'wherefore am

> I begetting since this is without a stay?' What (hot tears) fell into the waters, the same became this (solid) earth. And as he wiped the earth side-ways that became the atmosphere. And as he wiped it upwards that became the sky.

We finally quote the following from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (vi. 1. 1. 8ff.)—

> Now Prajāpati the Purusha (person) desired, 'May I be more, may I be reproduced.' He toiled. He practised fervour (*tapas*). Being worn out with toil and fervour he created at first *bráhman*, the triple science (*trayī vidyā*). It was this that became to him a support. Hence they say, 'The *bráhman* (Veda) is the support of everything here.' ... Resting on that support he practised fervour. He produced the waters. ......He desired, 'May I be reproduced from these waters.' He entered the waters with that triple science. Thence arose an egg. He touched it. "Let it exist, let it exist, and multiply," so he said. From it, *bráhman*, was first created the triple science. Now the embryo which was inside was created as the foremost (*agri*): inasmuch as it was created foremost of all this, therefore it is Agri. Agri indeed is he whom they mystically call Agni; for the gods love the mystic (*paroksha*). ......He desired may I generate this (earth) from these waters. ....He toiled and practised fervour; and worn with toil and fervour he created foam. .... He created clay, mud, saline soil and sand, gravel, rock, ore, gold, plants, and trees. Therewith he clothed this earth.

Subsequently, the impersonal Brahman takes the place of the personal and more or less ritualistic figure of Prajāpati, as in passages like the following (Śatapatha Br. xi. 2. 3. 1ff.)—

> Verily in the beginning all this was Brahman. It created the gods; and having created the gods it made them ascend these worlds: Agni this (terrestrial) world, Vāyu the atmosphere, and Sūrya the sky. And the deities who are above these he made ascend the worlds which are above these; and indeed just as these (three) worlds and these (three) deities are manifest, so are those (higher) worlds and those (higher) deities

manifest—(the worlds) which he made those deities ascend. Then the Brahman itself went up to the sphere beyond. Having gone up to the sphere beyond, it reflected, 'How can I descend again into these worlds?' It then descended again by means of these two: Name and Form. ....These indeed are the two great forces of Brahman.

28. THE SACRIFICE A BATTLE-GROUND OF WARRING POTENCES AND PRESCRIPTIONS.—In all these attempts they made to raise the sacrifice into a world-principle the fathers of Brāhmaṇa theology must no doubt have thought of the sacrifice as an artistic whole with all its innumerable parts forming a well-knit system of harmony. Unfortunately for the theorisers, however, the process of elaboration was carried far too much beyond their control. When every one of the infinite minutæ of the sacrifice claimed attention and importance for itself, the sacrifice was sure to become a battle-field for warring potences. The prescriptions conflicted, the priests wrangled, and the practices took each its own way: no amount of *prāyaśchitta* was capable of evoking unity out of arbitrary and persistent differences. The texts have preserved for us a very curious anecdote about Yājñavalkya (Śatapatha iii. 6. 3. 24)—

> Having made the offering, they should baste first the omentum and then the clotted-ghee. Now the Charaka-Adhvaryus baste first the clotted-ghee, alleging that clotted-ghee is the Prāṇa (life-breath); and a Charaka-Adhvaryu forsooth cursed Yājñavalkya as he was doing it (*i. e.*, basting first the omentum), saying, "That Adhvaryu has shut out Prāṇa: Prāṇa shall depart from him!" But he (Yājñavalkya) looked at his arms and said, "Here are my arms hoary (with age). (In other words, Here am I practising this all my life with impunity). What in the world has become of this Brahmin's words?"

And many indeed besides Yājñavalkya might have felt at times that all was not well with the Brāhmaṇa prescriptions. Something must have been inherently wrong with the system in which one small mistake of omission or commission in a subsidiary rite connected with the sacrifice was believed to have been capable of rendering the whole sacrifice fruitless. There was

evidently no due proportion in things, and the normal course of causation was frequently and arbitrarily interfered with.

29. PSYCHOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS IN THE BRĀHMAṆAS.—It must be however granted that the Brāhmaṇas were all along anxious to go underneath the surface of things and to probe the heart of the sacrifice in order to speculate upon the real deity of the sacrifice as a whole, or that of the specific portions of its ritual. Again and again we find in the several controversies of the Brāhmaṇa teachers issues framed after the fashion of the following raised by the famishing sage, Ushasti Chākrāyaṇa (Chhāndogya Upanishad, i. 10. 11)—

> Prastotar! Should you sing the Prastāva (introductory chant) without knowing the divinity that is connected with the Prastāva, your head will fall off.

A true knowledge of the deity sought to be worshipped was the most necessary condition of the success of the ritual; and Yāska has told us (Nirukta ii. 8) how very difficult it sometimes might be to determine the exact deity of a ritual or a chant. There was also in evidence, along with this, the desire to understand the inner workings of the human mind; and we find in our texts some remarkable passages of psychological interest such as the following (Taitt. Saṁ., ii. 5. 11)—

> Speech and Mind disputed ; " I will bear the offering to the Gods," Speech said ; "I to the Gods," Mind said. They went to question Prajāpati. He, Prajāpati, said to her ; " Thou art the messenger of Mind, for what one thinks of in the mind, one utters in speech."— " Then assuredly they will not sacrifice to you with speech," said Speech. Therefore they make offerings to Prajāpati in mind without words.

In an analogous context rom the more developed version of the Śatapatha (i. 4. 1. 8ff.) the Mind is made to say—

> It is I who am better than thee ; for thou dost not utter what is not known to me : your way is merely that of doing in-imitation-of what is being done by me.

The Jaiminīya-Upanishad Brāhmaṇa (i. 13. 1) gives a somewhat new turn to the same. It says—

> Of this same speech mind is a quarter, sight is a quarter, hearing is a quarter, speech itself is the fourth quarter. What he thinks with the mind that he speaks with the speech ; etc.

More developed in terminology is the following from the Śatapatha, x. 5. 2. 15—

> And when he is asleep, he does not, by means of them, know of anything whatsoever, nor does he form any resolution with his mind, or distinguish the taste of food with (the channel of) his speech, or distinguish any smell with (the channel of) his breath, neither does he see with his eye, nor hear with his ear, for those (vital airs) have taken possession of him.

The several Upanishadic versions of the Prāṇa-saṁvāda or the "Disputation amonst the Faculties" will engage us in another chapter. Meditation or self-introspection, it is easy to assume, was the necessary condition for all psychological reflections of this sort.

30. THE REAL PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY MOOTED, BUT INADEQUATELY SOLVED.—While trying to discover and set forth, after their own fashion, the workings of secret causes underneath the surface of things and of the mystic correspondences that knit together the multiform personal and impersonal, animate and inanimate, small and great potencies in Nature, so that everything in the universe could be viewed *pañchasv adhikaraṇeshu* : *Adhilokam* (=*Adhibhūtam*), *Adhijyotisham* (=*Adhidaivatam*), *Adhividyam*, (=*Adhiyajñam*), *Adhiprajam*, *Adhyātmam* ; or in accordance with its relations to the sphere of the physical world, the gods, the sacrifice, the society, and the inner self, the Brāhmaṇas were taking a great step in philosophy the full significance of which was understood and developed only in the subsequent period. By widening the scope of their polytheism they were, in other words, making a tentative approach to pantheism, which requires two conditions : that *everything* in the world be permeated by some divine principle, and that that principle be *uniform*. Both these ideas can be said to have been implicit in Brāhmaṇa speculations. Also, in their attempt to see correspondences where they would

not appear to the profane eye and through them to bridge over the gulf that there was between the positive, traditional, inexplicable datum or prescription of the ritual on the one hand, and the requirements of a rational or systematic view of the world and its appearances on the other, the thinkers of the period were, however dimly and hesitatingly, making an approach to a conception of the Absolute which harmonises the data of sense: an Absolute which includes and transcends all difference. From this it is just a step, on one side, to the *Neti-Neti* doctrine of the Upanishads and on the other to the self-evolving Prakṛiti of the Sāṁkhyas. It is but fair to the thinkers of the day to point out here that what they discovered they themselves fully believed. It was no attempt to deliberately mislead the people. The sacrifice *à la mode de* Brāhmaṇas was a living presence with power to bless or curse; and scores of accredited stories were current and have been recorded describing how certain priests, Yajamānas, or kings came to power or to grief by following or ignoring the Brāhmaṇa prescriptions. The Brāhmaṇas, it is true, claimed a monopoly in the science of interpretation. They delighted to weave together a thick net of riddles and obscurities around the dogma of the sacrifice with a view to keep profane eyes away from it. But when we consider the heroic troubles that they took--by cultivating their powers of memory to a degree which is without a parallel in the whole history of the world—to preserve the holy scriptures and traditions intact, subordinating every other thing in life to the Svādhyāya (the study of the Vedas), we ought to be charitable to them, if not actually grateful, for their single-minded devotion to a cause. We might even go further. The Brāhmaṇa teachers rarely claimed to lay down prescriptions on the basis of mere reason. They "saw" things and their relations, and merely reported them. Śrautarshi Devabhāga, the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa goes on to tell us, (vii. 1)—

> had alone "found out" the (proper) way to divide the beast-victims (as portions for the Gods). But he departed from this world without declaring it to any one. Subsequently it was a super-human being who proclaimed it to Girija Bābhravya.

And from him the method continues to be learnt by the following generations.

30. EXTRA-PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES FRAMED AND ANSWERED.—The inordinate desire to know and the impulse to question which was already in evidence in the hymns of the Rigveda and of which Atharva-veda x. 2 is perhaps as good an example as we could get anywhere in the Veda, and which later we find beautifully illustrated in the famous dialogue between Yama and Nachiketas (Kaṭhopanishad, I. 1. 21-29), is also shared in no small measure by our Brāhmaṇa seers; but it was confined by them to the limited sphere of the sacrifice and its environments and not extended to embrace all possible questions under the sun. And whatever we might say to the framing of questions such as: (1) How can the raw and red cow yield hot, white milk? (2) How can the bone-less semen produce creatures with bones? (3) How is it that the same sacrifice supports creatures with one row of teeth (*e.g.*, cows) and those with two (*e.g.*, horses)? Or, (4) How many vessels conduct the sacrifice, who created them and with what material?—and to the solutions offered for them, such as: (1) Because, the bright Agni has entered the cow. (2) Because, they drop gold-pieces into the ghee and offer both into the fire. (3) Because, some oblations are thrown into the fire with a Ṛik in the beginning as *Yājyā*, but only a Yajus formula afterwards, as *Anuvākyā* (and these secure the cows), while other oblations are accompanied by the Ṛik recitation in the beginning as well as at the end (and these secure the horses) yet one thing is undeniable: It is this ratiocination that immediately led to the formulation of the sciences of grammar, metrics, phonetics, geometry, anatomy, astronomy, and mathematics, as also to the broader generalisations about plant and animal life or about the working of man's body and mind and emotions, which we find recorded in these texts with a child-like *naïveté*. There is in them, to be sure, neither the patient observation nor the careful experimentation of the rigorous scientist. It was all a matter of poetic or inspired imagination; and if our modern science has proved the correctness of some of their findings, the credit for that should hardly be claimed for the theologue of the days gone by, for whom his

world was swayed more by magic and mystery than by any unfailing 'Law of Nature' as we now understand the term.

31. THE EMOTIONAL AND THE MORAL SIDE OF THE SACRIFICE.—To perform some one of the larger Yāgas correct to the smallest detail was a feat both for the patron who paid as also for the priests who officiated. And the same was true, *mutatis mutandi*, of the lesser daily offerings. The sacrificer, in performing the prescribed rites, fully believed that he was doing his own little bit for the regulation of the cosmos, which was in his conception an embodiment or an illustration on a larger scale of the principle of sacrifice. It is easy to believe also that, in addition to the satisfaction the sacrificer might have felt in thus forming an essential part of a complicated world-system, he obtained as a reward for a punctilious discharge of his *nitya* or *naimittika* rites, that glow of piety that generally comes from a believing performance of the ritual. The vows prescribed prior to the Dīkshā, during the continuance of the sacrifice, and even after its conclusion, and which embraced most of the elementary moral duties, also, no doubt, helped to accentuate this glow; and for one who understood the significance of the rites performed by or for him, and who believed in their efficacy, there were sure to occur, during the progress of the ceremony, several occasions when, face to face with the mighty powers above, below, and around him, the sacrificer's emotions were really awakened to the highest pitch and he felt himself 'in tune with the Infinite'. Popular emotion is also evoked by the presence of mere pomp and system and mystery, and we can well assume that some of the more elaborate forms of sacrifice, whenever and wherever performed, might have occasioned healthy and wide-spread emotions, leaving the people all the better for them. And yet, when all is said and done, we do not think that, with the possible exception of Varuṇa, any of the gods that took part in the sacrifice were consciously realised by the sacrificer or the priests or the people in general as high moral functionaries. Even the dread Varuṇa was dreaded because he would not forgive us our ignorance of the true modes of worship or our unconscious failings in it. In spite of the emotional side of Brāhmaṇa sacrifice, it cannot

therefore be said that its moral side was strung to an equally higher pitch.

32. THE SUMMUM BONUM OF THE BRĀHMAṆAS.—What is the reward that the Brāhmaṇas hold out to the pious sacrificer? There is, in the first place, the attainment of the definite desires for wealth, cattle, progeny, victory, fame, or pre-eminence, that the sacrificer had especially entertained. A sacrifice, properly performed, was never known to fail : the Brāhmaṇas record numerous instances of success, but none of failure. Failures, when they came, were always due to some defects which could be remedied by *prāyaśchittas* (and the very large number of these *prāyaśchittas* or expiatory rites prescribed would lead one to the none-too-shrewd guess as to the existence of several failures and disappointments) ; but the defects had better not be allowed at all : *ergo*, the priest must be well trained, and well rewarded. In the next place, in view of the cosmic significance of the sacrifice, the individual sacrificer, felt himself as more than an ordinary mortal : as in fact an ally of Prajāpati, as constituting one community with the gods and the pious heroes of antiquity,—this communal partnership being indicated by the Ṛishi-name or Gotra which the Yajamāna professed, and symbolised by the partaking, in company, of the holy food and drink after the gods had had their share. Community in food was believed to be productive of community in nature, and hence one had to be particular with whom he sat together for the meal. The sacrificer's alliance with the gods, once firmly established here below, continued unabated even after his departure from this life, be it by the Archirādi (=Devayāna) or by the Dhūmādi (=Pitṛiyāṇa) path. The Scriptures, we might say, deal in fact more confidently and more liberally with the rewards of the next world which, in their conception, did not differ, except in quantity and duration, from the joys and pleasures of the world below. The Brāhmaṇas—at any rate the more ancient of them—show no trace of dissatisfaction with the present, no tinge of pessimism. For the blessed, the hereafter was a continuation of one long life of enjoyment in the company of the Gods and the Manes, there being, according to the amount of the new entrant's good Karman, a

gradation in the companionship: it being either *Sāyujyatā* or unity in friendship, *Salokatā* or identity of residence, and *Sātmatā* or perfect oneness of essence. The doctrine of *punarmṛityu* or second death—the doctrine of metempsychosis—is not clearly enunciated in the older texts, but occurs in Śatapatha, ii. 3. 3. 8, and x. 4. 3. 12, or Jaiminīya-Up. Br. iii. 28. 4. And it is in these newer texts alone that we meet with sentiments which seemed to disturb the smooth complacency of their life, such as the passage quoted by Śaṅkarāchārya in his Bhāshya to Vedānta-sūtra iii. 4. 9—

> Knowing this very thing indeed the sages Kāvasheyas said: "For what purpose should we study (the scriptures), for what purpose should we sacrifice ?" — With this very knowledge the learned ancients did not offer the Agnihotra.

Compare also Bṛihadāraṇyaka iv. 4. 22—

> Knowing this very thing the people of old did not wish for off-spring saying "What shall we do with off-spring, we who have this Self as our world ?".

But by the time these ideas came in, the real impulse for the existence of the Brāhmaṇas had ebbed out, and their life-purpose practically accomplished. The Brāhmaṇas were now face to face with a new development of thought: the Way of Knowledge was opening out, alluring men away from the Way of Works, and the transition to the Upanishadic Philosophy was thereby already being effected.

CHAPTER THIRD

TRANSITION FROM THE BRĀHMAṆA TO THE UPANISHAD PERIOD.

1. THE LIMITATIONS OF BRĀHMAṆA SPECULATIONS.—Underlying all the lucubrations of the Brāhmaṇas subtle or simple, wise or otherwise, on the several points of ritual and practice discussed therein one cannot help detecting the presence of a feeling of uncertainty or arbitrariness and an effort at special pleading which, although capable perhaps of successfully hoodwinking the eyes of " those that came to pray," need to be adequately accounted for. The Brāhmaṇas, to be sure, claimed to be the proclaimers of newer—or at any rate purer—traditions in worship, and they might have felt at times diffident of securing ready and unquestioned assent to their ratiocinations, which, as we saw, were not particularly noted for any rigour of logic; and their effort to turn the Vedic sacrifice into a world-principle on the basis of " Bandhutā " philosophy was not by its nature destined to win enduring allegiance of the people. Further, one must not lose sight of the fact that the Brāhmaṇas essayed to give a picture of only a section of the Aryan society and of that section too of only a fragment of their religious, moral and intellectual life. The Śrauta, Gṛihya and Dharma Sūtras of a later date, as also some of the Ākhyānas or stories and legends of the day that happen to be preserved in the regular epics as well as in works like the Bṛihaddevatā, may—if used with caution—furnish additional light on certain other aspects of life during the Brāhmaṇa period. But the routine, day-to-day, domestic, economic, and political life of the people is not adequately reflected in these texts and has left no other reliable records behind. Consequently there was every chance of these Brāhmaṇa

speculations remaining for the major part unaffected by waves of popular opinion or lurking under-currents in thought, as also by those inevitable questionings, agitations and aspirations of the soul which were bound, in time, to disturb the harmony of life in ways more than one. The priestly ratiocinations, just because they had a very limited scope and did not go far and deep enough, were not accordingly capable any longer of fully satisfying that thirst for knowledge which they themselves had engendered. And as free metaphysical speculations could not, like the knowledge of the sacrificial technique, be kept for ever the monopoly of a class or a caste, it was not very long before the need was felt of recognising and perchance of effecting a compromise with the earnest, vigorous, and soul-stirring teachers outside the pale of orthodox Brāhmaṇism, who now took to denouncing ritualism with unmitigated emphasis. Scoffers and unbelievers, non-worshippers and desperate hedonists (Śisnadevāḥ, literally, phallic worshippers) were of course not unknown to the pre-Brāhmaṇa period; and, as the Aryan invaders of the late Vedic period got more and more into the interior of India, vanquishing the original or earlier occupants of the country and incorporating them, in course of time, within the fold of Aryanism, such a root-and-branch opposition from a section of them to the Brāhmaṇa cult of sacrifice was not inconceivable. And as we approach towards the threshold of the Upanishadic period this opposition naturally gains in volume, leaving its distinct mark upon the sacerdotal and theological speculations of the day.

2. THE NEW IDEAS: (i) BHAKTI OR DEVOTION.—Some of these "heretic" or "heterodox" views the Brāhmaṇas, it would seem, were themselves most anxious to incorporate into their own sacrificial system by reason, it is clear, of their growing value and vogue. One of the most important of these is the idea of Bhakti or devotion as centering round some specific god or gods, and finding expression not so much in the manifold elaborateness of the ritual of worship as in the psychological mood with which the same is offered. We cannot of course say that this was a thing entirely unknown to the Vedic times, particularly in connection

with god Varuṇa; but Varuṇa no longer figured in the Brāhmaṇas with his once august and serene majesty, while the other gods of the Brāhmaṇa period were too much weighed down by over-weening ritualism. In contrast to them stands out the figure of the terrific Rudra, euphemistically called Śiva (beneficent), who is generally regarded as being an Aryanised form of some local godling worshipped by the (non-Aryan) predecessors of the Aryans in India, his worship having probably once extended far beyond the limits of India proper. The younger Vedas and the Brāhmaṇas in particular already raise him to very nearly, though not quite, the position that he enjoys at a later period. Some of the later Brāhmaṇas even draw him into the all-embracing net of their sacrifice; but originally his cult must have been a menace to the Brāhmaṇa ritualism. The same remark applies with some modifications to the case of God Vishṇu. Here then, we might say, was the earliest and crudest beginning of that doctrine of Bhakti or single-minded devotion to a specific object of worship, which is in evidence, in no small measure, in the later Upanishads and particularly in the Epics. Its eventual tendency was against the cult of the sacrifice, though there is a danger in over-emphasising this inherent incompatibility. We must not look for too much of logical consistency in the beliefs of a people. The attitude of the earlier Brāhmaṇa texts towards these gods was for the most part halting and their compromise with them a patch-work, which was not in this its present form destined to produce any enduring results. But the presence in these texts of an infusion of Rudra or Śiva worship is significant as indicating the anxiety of the Brāhmaṇas to admit into, and assimilate with, their own system such of the newer gods and cults as were important and capable of assimilation.

3. (ii) PENANCE AND ASCETICISM.—Prior to each act of creation Prajāpati was believed to have practised penance (*tapas*), and the gods, face to face with some obstacle or difficulty, we are told, "*archantaś śrāmyanaś cheruḥ*—went on worshipping and toiling." Again, prior to and during the continuance of the sacrifice a disciplinary life more or less exacting was always enjoined upon the sacrificer; and during the stage of studenthood,

the pupil who lived with his preceptor for a number of years was expected to do menial work of all kinds and to undergo a rigorous training both of body and of mind. Yet the idea of a whole-hearted life of mere penance, or of meditation in the recesses of some mountain away from the haunts of the people was, we might say, essentially foreign to the religious code of the Brāhmaṇas, who, on the contrary, call upon the pious householder to perform the Agnihotra to the very end of his days. However, in the later Brāhmaṇa texts we do find a life of penance in the forest recognised and recommended, and we have texts—called the Āraṇyakas or forest-portions—that seem to have been specially designed for the purpose. Yet all this could not have been merely a natural development from the premises inherent in Brāhmaṇism. To abjure all interests in life, to turn our back upon the world and its associations, and to step out of the house into a life of houselessness with a view to meditate upon the highest reality underlying worldly appearances, presupposes not only a dissatisfaction with the prevailing code of ethics and religion, but a positive, external and irresistible impulse for that life in the shape of verified testimony and example of crowds of monks and ascetics leading such wandering life. This seems to have been the case actually at this period. Compare passages like Bṛihad. Up., iv. 4. 22—

> Desirous of regarding their very Ātman as a (self-sufficient) world in itself, the mendicants step out into the life of houselessness. The ancients knowing this very fact desired not offspring, saying "What shall we do with offspring—we who have in this Ātman our world (*loka*)?" They, verily, rising above the desire for son, the desire for wealth, and the desire for worlds, lived a mendicant life.

Also, Muṇḍaka i. 2. 11—

> They who practise austerity and faith in the forests, the peaceful knowers who live a beggar's life, etc.

The story of Yājñavalkya renouncing his two wives and all the worldly interests, saying, "I am about to wander forth from this (Āśrama), My dear," is quite familiar; and other instances of people, well-situated in life, deliberately turning their back upon

their homes in the pure interest of the knowledge of highest reality are not very far to seek. Subsequently the Buddhistic texts describe and enumerate different orders of ascetics affecting all manner of strange practices and modes of worship or *tapas*; and it is too much to believe that the sudden appearance of these wandering swarms of ascetics was normal and a mere outgrowth of the life of sacrifice enjoined in the Brāhmaṇas. It is more natural to suppose that we have here to do with a contact of the Aryans of the Brāhmaṇa period with peoples of a different culture whom they encountered in the course of their march into the interior of India. These people might have been reduced to homelessness by the conquering Aryans, or—and this is just as likely—they might not have reached a stage beyond that of a nomad, mountaineering life. Such people are not extinct in India even up to the present day. And it is surely not too much to credit these people with strange practices and modes of worship which, when taken over into the fold of Aryanism, might have, in the fullness of time, evolved into what came to be known as the "Yoga." The Brāhmaṇas show an inordinate thirst for knowledge and had a capacity to assimilate almost everything into their system and to assign to it its own place and period,—in due subordination always to the all-important doctrine of sacrifice. And when the bulk of the people became forcibly impressed by the strange and mysterious ways and practices of these wandering ascetics, the Brāhmaṇas could not have long remained unaffected by the Zeit-geist.

4. (iii) TRANSMIGRATION OF THE SOUL.—There also took place, towards the end of the Brāhmaṇa period, an evolution in the doctrine of transmigration. The ultimate origins of this doctrine continue to be yet a matter of controversy. Boyer has maintained that the doctrine already existed in the Rigveda and the older Brāhmaṇa texts. And apart from the question of the correct interpretation of the specific passages from the Rigveda adduced in support, we could say this much that, if men are seen to pray for immortality in the world of the Gods, that presupposes a possible shorter stay in that world and then a return. And further if the dead need food and other offerings, and feel hunger and thirst,

there is no reason why they should be exempt from death, and consequently from a return to this life. That the father is born again in his own son is an ancient idea ; and if there is a gradation in the Karmas and Yāgas performed in this life, it is only reasonable to suppose that there is a corresponding gradation in the fruits of them enjoyable in the next world : all should not be assigned an equally enduring life of happiness and felicity in the World of the Blessed. Then, in the next place, that there is a soul in man and similar spirits in trees, plants, birds, animals, etc., and that they are all capable of remaining dissociated from their outward trappings, is an old prevailing belief of the Vedic period. And while there were the tribal totems suggesting the habitation of a man's spirit in specific trees or animals, subsequently, with the elaboration of the magico-sacerdotal theory of the innumerable inward correspondences in things, and with the facile identifications like that of the Yajamāna with the *paśu* (beast) or with the *prastara* (grass), it is not very unreasonable to imagine that the doctrine of metempsychosis could not have delayed very long in the coming. With the given premises the step was easy enough to take, was the most natural that could have been taken. And yet how common it is to find in the history of human civilisation that, with the premises all complete, just the *ergo* has been very long in the coming, and sometimes does not come at all ! Consequently, after it has been made very probable that a doctrine like that of the transmigration of the soul was implicit in the Vedic or at any rate in the early Brāhmaṇa speculation, the possibility of its being at this period placed on a distinctive basis by an acquaintance with the customs of some other peoples is not or need be ruled out absolutely. The essential Aryan contribution to the full-fledged dogma of transmigration came, however, first from their belief in pantheism or panpsychism, which made it possible for the soul to inhabit not some specific totems only, but almost everything in the animate and inanimate creation ; and secondly, from their theory of Karma which regulated the soul's wanderings and gave the dogma a moral back-ground. The doctrine of the Five Fires given in Brāhmaṇa passages like Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa iii. 14. 1 ff. and also

the allied dogma of the two paths or *sṛitis*, the *Devayāna* and the *Pitṛiyāṇa*, which we find already alluded to in a late Rigveda passage (X. 88. 15) and also in several varied versions in the later Brāhmaṇas and the Upanishads—are no more than mere incidental elaborations of the same central doctrine in smaller details.

5. (iv) SEARCH FOR LIBERATION.—With the doctrine of transmigration is generally associated a tinge of pessimism expressing itself in the desire to escape the unending succession of births and rebirths, and a longing for a repose that is ever the same. This is not however a necessary corollary from that doctrine. No sensible man could object to the punishment—may be, by an endless succession of births on the lower plane—of the non-worshipping sinners. But if a pious believer is satisfied with his present lot, and is told that, by virtue of his Karma, he is to have another lease of a similar or even a better life, there is no reason why he should seek liberation or *mukti* from his *Saṁsāra* or round of existence. But we have indications that at this time men's faith in the efficacy of the sacrifice was being gradually undermined, and that all was not well with the old religious system. For, once the prescriptions for correct modes of worship had been laid down and the hated Asura ritual chased out of the Aryan fold, there no longer remained, strictly speaking, any *raison d' êtrê* for the further continuation of the Brāhmaṇa activity. And it was inevitable that there should creep in, with the lapse of time, abuses, bitter school-rivalries, greed, and disbelief. Sacerdotalism was certain, under the circumstances, to have been weighed and found wanting: it was not any longer expected to hold its own when faced with the attractive world-theories and the strange and new-fangled dogmas enunciated by the Aryan as well as non-Aryan "heretics" of the day. There was something grand and inspiring in their search for "Brahman" or the ultimate cause and goal of existence, something to attract and ensnare the imagination, which no profound prescriptions—backed by equally profound reasonings *à la mode de* Brāhmaṇas—were capable of accomplishing. A struggle between the two was inevitable.

6. THE COMPROMISE OF THE ĀRAṆYAKAS BETWEEN THE OLD AND THE NEW THOUGHT.—However, the actual course of the struggle between the older and the newer views of life is for the most part hidden from us. What we do have is a full picture of Brāhmaṇism before the struggle and of the same Brāhmaṇism after the struggle, when it succeeded in inducing a large number of the exponents of the newer dogmas into making a compromise. Brāhmaṇism even went to the length of incorporating the newer doctrines into the Scriptures, giving them a place on a par with the older texts on condition that these newer doctrines would not impugn the authoritativeness of the older canon and of the philosophy of sacrifice. This was effected by formulating the theory of the "Āśramas" or stages of life, of which there seem to have been only three at first—student, householder, and forester—the fourth, the recluse, being added subsequently. If the newer philosophy was willing to allow full scope to the cult of the Vedic sacrifice during the first two stages, then Brāhmaṇism was prepared to give, in the case of those duly qualified for the task, full scope for abstract meditation on *Brahman* and on the other problems of life as propounded by the new school. This compromise, so far as it went, was largely successful, because the new ideas for the most part fell in a line with those already to a certain extent developed by Brāhmaṇism. In fact, it can be safely asserted that amongst the new ideas occurring in the Upanishads there is hardly one that is not implicit in, and logically deducible from, the ideas present in the different portions of the Brāhmaṇas. Thus the continuity of tradition was maintained; and this circumstance was given an outward expression inasmuch as the Brāhmaṇas, the Āraṇyakas, and the Upanishads were made to constitute parts of one whole revealed text. The same end was likewise accomplished by laying a renewed emphasis upon what the Bhagavadgītā (iv. 28ff.) aptly calls *Svādhyāya*– and *Jñāna*– and *Dhyāna Yajñas*, or scriptural and contemplative sacrifices (compare what was said above, p. 51, about *Yajñakratus*) in place of the actual *Dravyamaya* sacrifices of the texts: compare, for this aspect of the matter, passages like the following (Chhāndogya Up., iii. 17. 1ff.)—

> When a man (who is a sacrificer) hungers, thirsts, and abstains from pleasures, that is the *Dīkshā* (or initiatory rite). ...Penance, liberality, righteousness, kindness, and truthfulness: these form the *dakshiṇās* (gifts to the priests); etc.

The same view is inculcated also in the Vasishṭha Dharmaśāstra, xxx. 8, where we are told that by performing—

> a mental sacrifice at which meditation is the fire, truthfulness the fuel, patience the oblation, modesty the sacrifical spoon, abstention from injuring life the sacrifical cake, contentment the sacrificial post, and [a promise of] safety to all beings which is hard to keep the reward given to the priests, a wise man goes to heaven.

This, to be sure, is not exactly a new thought of the Āraṇyakas or the Upanishads, seeing that we already have many passages of a like import in the Brāhmaṇas. For instance, compare Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa xi. 3. 1. 1 ff.—

> Now as to this Janaka of Videha once asked Yājñavalkya, "Knowest thou the Agnihotra, Yājñavalkya?" "I know it, O King," he said. — "What is it?" "Milk indeed." — "If there were no milk, wherewith wouldst thou sacrifice?" "With rice and barley." — "If there were no rice and barley, wherewith wouldst thou sacrifice?" "With what other herbs there are." — "If there were no other herbs, wherewith wouldst thou sacrifice?" "With fruit of trees." — "If there were no fruit of trees wherewith wouldst thou sacrifice?" "With water." — "If there were no water, wherewith wouldst thou sacrifice?' He spoke, "Then, indeed, there would be nothing whatsoever here; and yet there would be offered—the truth in faith." "Thou dost know the Agnihotra, Yājñavalkya: I give thee one hundred cows," said Janaka.

Yet the Āraṇyakas might have emphasised this tendency and to that extent freed men, for a part of their life, from too absolute a bondage to sacrificial worship. Finally, the Āraṇyakas laid stress upon the necessity of penance and meditation as a pre-requisite for the realisation of the Brahman or the highest reality, prescribing for the purpose several *Upāsanās* or courses of concentered medi-

tation upon specific symbols as representing and impersonating the Highest Absolute. And as some of these symbols, at any rate, came directly from the sacrifices in the Brāhmaṇas, the opposition between the dogma of Karma and the dogma of Jñāna was to that extent somewhat palliated. The Āraṇyakas (of which there are, ignoring the Brihadāraṇyaka, only three extant: the Aitareya, the Kaushītaki, and the Taittirīya) are generally believed to have been instrumental in bringing about this result; and although the actual chronological relation implied herein can no longer be maintained, it has nevertheless to be admitted that the Āraṇyakas, taken as a whole, do place a special emphasis upon the different ideas leading to the compromise that we have above enumerated.

7. THE BRĀHMAṆAS, THE ĀRAṆYAKAS, AND THE UPANISHADS.—The work which the Āraṇyakas partly accomplished was taken over by the Upanishads. The Brāhmaṇas had insisted already upon the Way of Works as constituting the *summum bonum* of man. Then came the revolt of the "heretics" which set the post-Brāhmaṇa world a-thinking as to the exact relations that ought to subsist between Karma and Jñāna. The Āraṇyakas, in the spirit of true reform, tried to reconcile the two in such a manner that the Way of Works might be maintained and yet subordinated to the Way of Knowledge—an attempt which found its fulfilment in the Upanishads. Although therefore the Āraṇyakas and the Upanishads may be said, in a sense, to constitute a "revolt" against the old Brāhmaṇa way of belief and practice, still when we consider that neither the Āraṇyakas nor the Upanishads entirely negated the way of ritualism but only subsumed it under the Way of Knowledge, we cannot say that either of them, in the form in which we have them before us, aimed at the destruction of the hypothesis put forth by the Brāhmaṇas. Nor can we entirely separate from one another the Brāhmaṇa, the Āraṇyaka, or the Upanishad texts in such a way as to prove that the lines of cleavage between them were absolute or fore-intended. In fact, from the Brāhmaṇas through the Āraṇyakas to the Upanishads we find that there is a natural carrying out of an Idea the germs of which were already present in the Brāhmaṇas themselves. It

is thus necessary, when we come to treat of the full significance of the Upanishads for philosophy, to take the Upanishadic passages which bear upon particular problems along with analogous passages from the Brāhmaṇas or the Āraṇyakas so as to set the Upanishadic texts in a proper perspective and environment. All these tests it will be necessary for us to distribute chronologically into such convenient groups as may be made possible by the help of tests similar to those already utilised in the case of the Veda and the Brāhmaṇas, after which we may give a brief characterisation of the style and method of Upanishadic argumentation as well as their *motif* and life-purpose. An investigation such as this would form the necessary preliminary to an analytico-critical and, later, to a synthetico-historical, presentation of Upanishadic philosophy.

8. CHRONOLOGY OF THE UPANISHADS.—Between two to three hundred texts calling themselves "Upanishads" have been handed down to us. Their number is by no means fixed and is even being added to with each Search for Mss. The Muktikopanishad gives a list of 108 Upanishads; Dārā Shukōh, the eldest son of the Emperor Shāh Jahān, got some 50 Upanishads translated into Persian at Delhi between the years 1656-57; Nārāyaṇa, a few centuries earlier, wrote Dīpikās on an equal number; Śaṅkarānanda (*cir.* 1300) in his Ātmapurāṇa draws upon some 24 leading upanishads for giving his summary of Vedānta teaching; Śaṅkarāchārya, in the eighth century, in his Bhāshya on the Vedānta Sūtras, quotes 13 Upanishads that can be definitely identified; while the Upanishad texts which the Vedānta Sūtras discuss, according to the concurrent testimony of the several Bhāshyakāras, come from at least 8 Upanishads. The texts common to these groups and possessing a fair claim to antiquity are: Chhāndogya, Bṛihadāraṇyaka, Kaṭha, Īśa, Aitareya, Taittirīya, Muṇḍaka, Kaushītaki, Kena, and Praśna, with Śvetāśvatara, Māṇḍūkya and Maitrāyaṇī (Maitrī) forming a second list, and the recently discovered Sanskrit originals of the Bāshkala, Chhāgaleya, Ārsheya, and Śaunaka perhaps forming a third. It is also necessary that we should discuss in this place, along with the Upanishad texts just mentioned, such passages from the Brāhmaṇas and Āraṇyakas as hap-

pen not to be styled " Upanishads " but as have, in their style and contents, a fair claim to be ranked with the Upanishads proper. Now the question is, how are we to arrange these twenty-odd texts in historical sequence ? The usually accepted tests for a relative chronology of the Upanishads are these: (1) The name of the Upanishad and the Veda to which it belongs, the older texts being named after some Śākhā of the Rig, Sāma, and Yajur Vedas and the newer ones from either the initial word of the Upanishad or the teacher or the theme, or from a (fictitious) Śākhā of the Atharva-veda. (2) The style, language and form of the Upanishad, the older ones occasionally preserving the inflection, vocabulary, and syntax of the Brāhmaṇa texts while the newer approach the Classical usage. (3) The same holds true of the similes, symbols, and illustrations, those in the older texts being tinged with ritualism and possessing the old Brāhmaṇa *penchant* for fancy etymologies, mystic enigmas, and indentifications on the basis of *Bandhutā*. (4) In the same way the older texts assign priority to the sacrificial gods Indra and Agni, enter into exegesis *à la mode de* Brāhmaṇas of Vedic passages introduced formally as such, and in internal arrangement they form a congeries of short discursive speculations on detached topics void of a definite plan, unity and consistency. (5) According to Deussen the older Upanishads are written in prose in the fashion of the Brāhmaṇas, which, later, was dropped for verse, the metre being at first more archaic and irregular. (6) According to Oldenberg the older Upanishads exhibit the influence of the Brāhmaṇa idea of the sacrifice as sympathetic magic in that they introduce, in places the most unexpected, now a magical charm or even imprecation, now some *vrata* or disciplinary code as a probationary qualification, now a mystic phrase or symbol under which the Supreme Deity or the Highest Reality should be correctly conceived and worshipped (*up+ās*), and at all places a *phalaśruti* or a reward of the most profuse kind to the believing disciple—*ya evaṁ veda*. (7) The specific mention of countries, rivers, mountains, peoples, cities, social customs and the like, where they are capable of being used for relative or absolute chronology. (8) Inter-quotations, cross-references,

and analogies of words and ideas in the different Upanishad texts or sections of them. (9) And finally, ideological development, this last test being admittedly subjective and therefore unreliable if used by itself in contradiction to the previous tests.

9. DEUSSEN'S FOUR PERIODS.—As is well known Deussen has arranged the Upanishads into four chronological groups as under :—

I. ANCIENT PROSE UPANISHADS
1. Bṛihadāraṇyaka
2. Chhāndogya
3. Taittirīya
4. Aitareya
5. Kaushītaki
6. Kena or Talavakāra

II. EARLY METRICAL UPANISHADS
7. Kāṭhaka or Kaṭha
8. Īśa or Īśāvāsya
9. Śvetāśvatara
10. Mahānārāyaṇa

III. LATER PROSE UPANISHADS
11. Praśna
12. Maitrāyaṇī(ya) or Maitri
13. Māṇḍūkya

IV. ĀTHARVAṆA UPANISHADS
A. Saṁnyāsa Upanishads
B. Yoga Upanishads
C. Sāmānya-Vedānta Up.
D. Śaiva Upanishads
E. Vaishṇava Upanishads
F. Śākta & minor sectarian Up.

These conclusions of Deussen cannot now be accepted in their entirety. His evaluation of Mahānārayaṇa and Kaushītaki is frequently challenged, as also his predilection for the Māyāvāda which he interprets in the sense of Kantian philosophy and which makes him trace a line of ideological development which " beginnt mit einem kühnen und schroffen Idealismus, und von diesem durch die Stufen des Pantheismus, Kosmogonismus, und Theismus schliesslich zum Atheismus des späteren Śāṁkhyam, und endlich zum Apsychismus des jüngeren Buddhismus, führt." Moreover, Deussen admits that even the Bṛihadāraṇyaka contains interpolated passages (as in iv. 4) which belong to the second period, while he concedes the possibility of shorter Upanishad texts having preceded the Bṛihadāraṇyaka, although they may no longer be extant. Recently, F. O. Schrader to whom we owe the discovery of the lost Sanskrit originals of the four Upanishads above mentioned (p. 87), accepting Deussen's periods, has claimed that the new Upanishads discovered by him are to be placed within " that doubtlessly long period of time which separates the ancient prose from the first

metrical Upanishads." Finally, the merely external difference between the four periods, *viz.* prose or verse, unless used in conjunction with other more vital differences, does not in our opinion deserve that exaggerated importance which Deussen assigns to it. It becomes in any case necessary to attempt a fresh chronological grouping of the texts before us after distributing the longer and the composite texts amongst them into units, the relative chronology of each such unit, where possible, being arrived at independently.

10. STRUCTURAL AND CRITICAL NOTES ON THE UPANISHADIC TEXTS.—The various texts that have supplied the material for the rearing up of the Upanishadic philosophy we intend in what follows to distribute into self-sufficient sub-units, bringing out in passing the relation of each such unit with the others in the light of the tests above enumerated—and especially the last two of them. Thereafter we will attempt a tabular statement of the same in more or less tentative chronological groups, as was attempted—with a lesser array of detail—in the case of the Brāhmaṇas. It is only then that we could advantageously enter upon a critical study of the contents of the Upanishads. The order in which the Upanishads will be treated below is that of the traditional Muktika canon, which, as being the most familiar one, is best to begin with.

(1) ĪŚA UPANISHAD: The Upanishad is too small for being subdivided into yet smaller units. It is extant in two recensions, the Kāṇva and the Mādhyaṁdina, the former giving precedence to the Vidyā-Avidyā triplet and the latter to the Sambhūti-Asambhūti triplet, from which circumstance it is an easy inference that the Kāṇva recension originally gave only the Vidyā-Avidyā triplet and the Mādhyaṁdina only the Sambhūti-Asambhūti triplet; and it is probably for this reason that in the present blend-reading we find that the extra triplet taken over in each case occupies a secondary position. The last four verses of the Upanishad recur in Bṛihadāraṇyaka v. 15, but it is impossible to say to which text they originally belonged. Stanzas 4 and 8 seem to be quotations, not introduced as such, from some unidentifiable source. Bṛihadāraṇyaka iv. 4. 10 and 11 appear to be later than

Īśa 9 and 3 respectively. — As an appendix to the Saṁhitā its metrical form was inevitable and need not be an argument against its antiquity as compared with the Bṛihadāraṇyaka, which forms part of a Brāhmaṇic exegesis on the same Saṁhitā. As its theme is a compromise between the path of sacrifice followed by orthodox Brāhmaṇism and the path of renunciation and meditation on Ātman professed by the newer school, it can well be assigned to a somewhat earlier phase of the struggle than is commonly supposed. As heading the Muktika canon it can even be one of our earliest of Upanishads.

(2) KENA UPANISHAD : The first two sections of this Upanishad which are metrical in form make up a unit distinct from the second unit consisting of the last two sections which are in prose. The first unit sets forth Brahman as the basis and agent of all inner or functional activity, while the second sets forth the same Brahman as the basis and agent of all outward or physical manifestations of power—both well-known modes of the Upanishadic approach to the problem of the Real, the former being peculiar to the " new " philosophy, while the latter was the legitimate deduction from the premises of the older "Bandhutā" philosophy ; and it is likely that when the two units were welded together a transition from the one to the other was provided for by the last stanza of section 2. Form and idiom vouch for the priority of unit 2 over unit 1. The thought in Kena i. 2 is more developed than that in Chhāndogya viii. 12. 4, but as compared with Bṛihadāraṇyaka iv. 4. 14 and iv. 4. 18 Kena i. 13 and i. 2 seem to be more original and primitive.

(3) KAṬHA UPANISHAD : The two Adhyāyas of this Upanishad form two distinct units, each consisting of three Vallis. This follows from (1) the inner contradictions between the two Adhyāyas [e.g. the series in I. 3. 10-11 as against that in II. 3. 7-8] ; (2) the frequency of quotations in the second Adhyāya, some of them actually from the earlier Vallis of the same Upanishad ; (3) the developed Yoga and eschatology of the second Adhyāya as compared with the first ; (4) the absence of plan or unity in the contents of the second Adhyāya as contrasted with the orderly

presentation of material in the first, as may be evident from the all-to disconnected philosophical problems mooted in the various parts of the same and its equally disconnected answers ; and (5) the concluding winding up and *phalaśruti* at the end of the earlier chapter. Besides there may have been shorter additions here and there (as of II. 3. 16-17 or II. 3. 18 or I. 16-18) made still later. The first unit can further be thrown into two sub-units : (a) I. 1 and 2 ; (b) I. 3 ; and there seems to have intervened a greater gap between these two sub-units than between units 1 and 2, the latter of these being merely of the nature of an inconsequential appendix belonging to a time when, as Deussen observes, "men had already begun to coin the gold of Upanishadic thought into isolated metrical maxims." The Nachiketas story as given in the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa (III. 11. 8. 1 ff.) speaks of three boons, but its second and third questions and their corresponding replies refer to the same Nāchiketa Fire with a play upon the name Na-chiketas. As contrasted with this ritualistic tone typical of Brāhmaṇa speculation is the predominently philosophic turn given to the same story in our Upanishad, though it is not necessary on that account to suppose that the philosophical part of the story had an independent earlier existence as compared with the ritualistic part. A passage like II. 2. 6 where Yama seems about to commence his answer to the query of Nachiketas in I. 1. 20 about the state of the soul after death at times suggests the possibility of the last three Vallis, prefaced with an appropriate prologue, constituting another independent version of the Upanishad ; but we must ultimately concede that the philosophical value of the poem cannot be seriously disturbed by the attempts of the antiquarian or the literary critic to probe into the authenticity, the relevancy, and the interrelation of the passages in the received text.—The Upanishad contains many quotations apparently taken from a source from which the Bṛihadāraṇyaka also quotes. The metre of the Śvetāśvatara is more developed than that of the Kaṭha in common or analogous passages. For the rest, a minute comparison of the passages would reveal the following relations :—

Kaṭha I. 2. 5 earlier than Muṇḍaka I. 2. 8;
———I. 2. 20 (philosophical reading) earlier than Śvetāśvatara iii. 20 (theological reading);
———II. 2. 13 earlier than Śvetāśvatara vi. 13;
———II. 2. 15 earlier than Śvetāśvatara vi. 14; and
———II. 3. 9 earlier than Śvetāśvatara iii. 13, iv. 17 and 20.

Also—

Kaṭha I. 1. 3 later than Īśa 3;
———I. 2. 23-24 later than Muṇḍaka III. 2. 3;
———II. 1. 5 later than Bṛihadāraṇyaka ii. 5;
———II. 2. 15 later than Muṇḍaka II. 2. 10;
———II. 3. 3 later than Taittirīya ii. 8;
———II. 3. 14 later than Bṛihadāraṇyaka iv. 4. 7; and
———II. 3. 16 later than Chhāndogya viii. 6. 6.

(4) PRAŚNA UPANISHAD: Deussen has assigned this Upanishad to a distinctly late period; but the large admixture of Vedic quotations and ritualistic images and identifications (see espepecially Praśna iv) and the more or less inconsequential—if not actually inconsistent—eschatological and other ideas found in the different portions of the Upanishad (e.g. Praśnas i and v) are perhaps an indication of a somewhat relatively higher antiquity. The six Praśnas form a philosophic unity: they are not disconnected as one would be inclined to think at first sight; and the change in the sequence of the questions, so that the person last named asks the first question and the one first named the last question, seems to be intentional so as to gradually lead the learner from the highest entity in the outer world to the supreme essence within one's self, after he has qualified himself for it duly by meditation. The Upanishad therefore does not admit of a distribution into sub-units. The nucleus for most of the Praśnas is the concluding metrical summary or verse-quotation, probably traditionally ascribed to the sage Pippalāda. Śaṅkarāchārya's remark at the commencement of his Bhāshya on the Upanishad—*Mantroktasyārthasya vistarānuvādīdam Brāhmaṇam* probably refers to this circumstance. Compare in this connection the last two stanzas of Praśna iv with the re-

dundant relative in the repeated pāda in iv. 10—*vedayate* **yas** *tu saumya* ; as also how the *ayati* of iii. 12 has been changed into *āyāti* in iii. 1. The enumeration of the ***indriyas*** or faculties and their objects in iv. 2 and of elements and their subtle ***mātrās*** and of the functions of the mind in iv. 8 is quite elaborate ; while the allegory of the supremacy of Prāṇa in Praśna ii, as compared with the versions in Chhāndogya i. 2 and v. 1, Bṛihadāraṇyaka i. 3 and vi. 1, Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇyaka ix. 2-7, Aitareya Āraṇyaka II. 1. 4, and Kaushītaki Up. ii. 14, is rather bald and inartistic, which can mean that it is early ; but does probably mean that it is rather late. The function assigned in iii. 9 to Udāna, the fruit claimed for Praṇavopāsanā in v. 5, and the statements about the two Paths made in i. 9 ff. are somewhat at variance with the usual Vedāntic ideas. The cosmology of the first Praśna is peculiar to the Upanishad, and its whole line of speculation seems to have been evolved outside the normal philosophic circle. A comparison of individual passages gives the following results—

Praśna vi. 4 later than Muṇḍaka II. 1. 3 ; and
——— iii. 9 later than Kaṭha I. 3. 13.

(5) MUṆḌAKA UPANISHAD : The loose metrical structure of this Upanishad with its several rhythmic prose passages and passages that can be called neither prose nor poetry are a fitting external expression for that inconsistent freedom of thought and that halting, hesitating fulfilment of a half-preconceived unity of plan and purpose, which all have agreed to find in the Upanishad. The entire text partakes of an epigonal character as would be evident from the contradictory cosmogonic theories it puts forth (I. 1. 6-9, I. 2. 1, I. 2. 3ff., etc.), from the enumeration of the Parā and Aparā Vidyās, or from the use of a word like Vedānta in III. 2. 6. Consequently it would be in vain to seek to discover inner strata in it. Deussen regards I. 1. 8 to I. 2. 13 as an interpolation or, at any rate, as a parallel recension of the introduction to the Upanishad, but that is perhaps going too far. The probable interpolated passages are I. 2. 4. (*eteshu* in I. 2. 5 referring to *lokāḥ* in I. 2. 3), and III. 2. 3-4 (which disturb the context). Otherwise the whole Upanishad belongs to one period.

That period is however distinctly secondary. The Upanishad as a whole is later than Chhāndogya as would be plain by a critical examination of the following passages —

Muṇḍaka I. 2. 10 and Chhāndogya v. 10. 1ff ;
————II. 1. 5 and Chhāndogya v. 3-10 (Pañchāgni-Vidyā);
————II. 2. 7 and Chhāndogya iii. 14. 2 and viii. 1. 1 ;
————II. 2. 11 and Chhāndogya vii. 25. 1 ;
————III. 1. 3 and Chhāndogya vii. 26. 2 ;
————III. 1. 4 and Chhāndogya vii. 15. 4 ;
————III. 1. 4 and Chhāndogya vii. 25 ; and
————III. 1. 10 and Chhāndogya viii. 2.

The Upanishad stands midway between the first and second Adhyāyas of the Kaṭha, a critical comparison of allied passages yielding the following results :—

Muṇḍaka I. 2. 8 later than Kaṭha I. 2. 5 ;
————III. 1. 1 later than Kaṭha I. 3. 1 ;
————III. 2. 3-4 later than Kaṭha II. 2. 23 ; while
————II. 2. 10* earlier than Kaṭha II. 2. 15f.

The Upanishad as a whole is earlier than Mahānārāyaṇa and Maitrāyaṇī, its relation to other Upanishads being as under :—

Muṇḍaka I. 1. 7 later than Bṛihadāraṇyaka ii. 1. 20 ;
————II. 2. 5† and 9 later than Bṛih. iii. 8. 7 and iv. 4. 16 ;
————II. 1. 3 earlier than Praśna vi. 4 ;
————III. 2. 8 perhaps later than Praśna vi. 5 ;
————II. 2. 10 earlier than Śvetāśvatara vi. 14 ; and
————III. 1. 1 f.=Śvetāśvatara iv. 6-7.

(6) MĀṆḌŪKYA UPANISHAD : This Upanishad, although bearing the name of a Śākhā of the Rigveda, is generally recognised as belonging to the Atharvaveda. Whether the Upanishad has supplanted an earlier Upanishad of the same Śākhā it is impossible to say. In form and contents it appears to be almost the last of the great Upanishads of the older canon. It is extremely laconic in style and cryptic in the formulation of its thought, therein resembling more a product of the Sūtra period than any-

* Probably the source of both Kaṭha and Śvetāśvatara.

† "Otaṁ cha protaṁ cha" idea.

thing else. The fact that the three moræ as well as a mora-less part of "Om" are mentioned for the first time in the Māṇḍūkyopanishad, while even in such a late Upanishad as the Maitrāyaṇī only three moræ of that syllable are mentioned (vi. 3), combined with the consideration that the four kinds of Soul—Vaiśvānara, Taijasa, Prājña and Turīya—are mentioned here for the first time in the whole range of Upanishadic thought, in spite of the fact that a slight reference has been made, in an addendum to the Maitrāyaṇī (vi. 19), to the fourth under the title of Turīya, are arguments enough to prove the posteriority of the Māṇḍūkya even to the Maitrāyaṇī, which itself is a fairly late product. A comparison of the Māṇḍūkya passages with those in other Upanishadic texts leads to following conclusions :—

Māṇḍūkya 3 later than Chhāndogya v. 18. 2 ;
———— 5 later than Bṛih. iii. 7, iv. 4. 22, and iv. 3. 19 ;
————12 later than Maitrāyaṇī vi. 3 and vi. 19.

A verse summary of the teaching of this Upanishad seems to have been made quite early ; and although the summary is generally known as the first or Āgama pāda of the Gauḍapādīya Kārikās, still, inasmuch as that pāda has been commented upon even by non-Advaita commentators, it seems to have had once an independent existence as distinguished from the other three pādas. Further, seeing that even the author of the Naishkarmyasiddhi, Sureśvarāchārya, refers to these Kārikās as expressing the views of the Gauḍas as contrasted with the views of the Drāviḍas (Naish. iv. 41 ff.), a doubt can be, and has been, legitimately expressed as to the authenticity of the tradition which makes an author by name Gauḍapāda (the pupil of Śuka and the teacher's teacher of the great Śaṅkarāchārya) responsible for these so called " Māṇḍūkya Kārikās ". The Kārikās have been actually quoted by several early Buddhistic commentators of the Mādhyamika school, and dates make it impossible that they should have been produced by a teacher's teacher of a writer of the eighth century, as Śaṅkarāchārya is usually taken to be. The fouth pāda of the Kārikās in particular seems to have been largely indebted for its words, argu-

ments, and images to Buddhistic writers on the Śūnyavāda. The question therefore as to how far the Kārikās can lay claim to being the earliest work on *systematic* Vedānta and a carrying-out of the philosophical position of the Māṇḍūkya Upanishad is bound to arise, but it need not detain us in this place. Nor need we be concerned to discuss what justification there is in the Māṇḍūkyopanishad itself for the absolutely monistic deduction that the author of the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās makes from it. We cannot however forbear remarking that the Upanishad along with the Kārikās almost challenges the statement of one's own philosophical position; but we must resist the temptation, for our business here is not an attempt at construction but only a critical exposition of the material that is present before us.

(7) TAITTIRĪYA UPANISHAD: The Śākhā of the Veda to which this Upanishad belongs happens to be preserved in the Saṁhitā, Brāhmaṇa, as well as the Āraṇyaka portions. The Upanishad is divided into three Vallīs, the first of which, the Śikshā, is more an Āraṇyaka than an Upanishad. Portions of this Vallī are remarkably similar to Ait. Āraṇyaka iii, to Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇ. vii-viii, and to the Saṁhitopanishad Brāhmaṇa, and only the text last named is not optionally designated as an Upanishad. The Ātreyī Śākhā seems to have reckoned the last two Vallīs alone as together constituting one Upanishad, the Vāruṇī Upanishad. —The first Vallī is called the Śikshā-vallī or Chapter on Enunciation inasmuch as it begins with a succinct enumeration of six grammatico-philological elements: letter, accent, quantity, effort, modulation, and combination; but from the fact that the chapter as a whole contains some very curious teachings on other cosmological, physiological, and ethical matters, it can in a wider sense be designated the Śikshā-vallī or Chapter of Instructions generally, its motely character being what one always finds in Brāhmaṇa works. The chapter therefore constitutes just one unit, and chronologically it comes after Aitareya Āraṇyaka iii, but earlier than Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇyaka vii-viii and the Saṁhitopanishad Brāhmaṇa. It may be further noted that Chapter i, sect. 7 is later than Bṛih. i. 4. 17, of which it is an amplification.

—The second Chapter of the Upanishad is called Ānanda- or Brahmānanda- vallī or the chapter of Beatific Joy from the circumstance that its last but one section gives a discussion of the nature and mode of calculation of Infinite Joy; but the major part of it contains an important discussion of the Kośas or Sheaths of the Human Body, and it would be therefore more fittingly designated Kośa-vallī. Each section of the chapter treats of one Sheath, the succeeding section beginning with a stanza in glorification of the Sheath mentioned in the preceding section. This regular feature is lacking in the fourth section, which should have opened with a stanza in praise of the Manas or the Mind, but gives instead a stanza which is identical with the one occurring at the beginning of section nine and which happens to contain the word *manas* in a secondary context. Deussen suggests that the identity of the stanza serves to bring out the inadequacy of the Mind and the Vedas (which are the limbs of the "Sheath of the Mind") to comprehend the highest Brahman which is Bliss, and in glorification of which alone the stanza in question is properly employed. This is "in zartfühlender Weise nur versteckt angedeutet" with a vengeance! Śaṅkarāchārya does not explain the stanza though he says that it is *manomayātmakaprakāśaka,* or meant to bring out the all-pervasive nature of the Mind. We have to suppose therefore that the original stanza in glorification of the Mind got lost and the present later put in its place for the reason that it somehow brought in the word *manas*. As to the rest of the chapter we believe that sections 6-8 constitute a later addition, the original Upanishad going on straight from section 5 to section 9. The portion interpolated suddenly thrusts upon us certain metaphysical or eschatological questions which it does not stop straightway to answer; then a cosmological fragment leading to the unity of Brahman and the non-difference of the universe from it; and finally a Hierarchy of Bliss patterned after that in the Bṛihadāraṇyaka iv. 3. 33 with a larger array of detail. The stanza which opens this Hierarchy seems earlier than Kaṭha II. iii. 3. —The third vallī gets its name after Bhṛigu the son of Varuṇa,

the father's instruction to the son being its theme. The chapter serves merely to give a historical or narrative setting to the doctrine of the Five Sheaths, the only difference being that the second chapter gives what we might call a psychological discussion of the Sheaths whereas the third gives a discussion of their metaphysical import. The chapter contains ten sections and falls into two sub-units of five sections each, the first sub-unit dealing with the Kośa-vidyā or the Sheaths-doctrine and the second affording a course of discipline for the candidate about to be initiated into the mystery, the same disciplinary course *automatically* continuing even after he has attained perfection. So understood the chapter is saved from a bathetic conclusion. The text of the chapter calls for no specific comment except this that the line—*Annam, Prāṇaṁ, Chaksuḥ, Śrotram, Mano, Vācham iti* occurring in section 1 and differently explained as the words of Varuṇa (who recounts unto the bewildered son a number of possible aspirants to the Highest Reality), or of the son (who, along with the customary *samidhs*, offers also a string of current opinions for the teacher's approval), is better explained as a misplaced residuum of the "Chain of Section-openings" which it was the fashion to commit to memory to assist the recitation of a Vedic text. Compare Kaushītaki Upanishad iv. 2, where certain Mss. preserve a similar Chain.

(8) AITAREYA UPANISHAD : The name Aitareya Upanishad is given more usually to that portion of the Aitareya Āraṇyaka which begins with *Ātmā vā idam eka evāgra āsīt*, (ii. 4. 1) and goes to the end of the second Āraṇyaka; and this is the portion that has been frequently studied and commented upon. But the first three adhyāyas of the second Āraṇyaka as well as the whole of the third Āraṇyaka are at times included within the Upanishad, which is then named the Bahvṛicha-Brāhmaṇa Upanishad or Mahā-Aitareya Upanishad, while the third Āraṇyaka has its own title, viz. the Saṁhitopanishad. As all the three portions (sub-Upanishads as we may appropriately designate them) have a value of their own we include them all in our treatment. —The first sub-Upanishad details, for meditation, certain mystic

or symbolic identifications of the Uktha* with various cosmic, terrestrial, and psychic phenomena, and above all with Prāṇa—the treatment being similar to that of the Udgītha in the early sections of the Chhāndogya Upanishad or of the Aśvamedha at the commencement of the Bṛihadāraṇyaka (Kāṇva recension). The three adhyāyas into which this sub-Upanishad is divided form a continuous topic, with this difference that in the first adhyāya, after the identification of the Uktha with Prāṇa or life-breath as being the most important factor in the human body (just as the Uktha is the most important element of the Mahāvrata), the interest centres almost exclusively upon the physiology and psychology of the human body; in the second adhyāya the Uktha or Prāṇa is identified, by the help of many fanciful etymologies, with the authors of the hymns of the Rig-veda: with the ṛiks (stanzas), half ṛiks, and words or syllables—the chapter deriving all its value from the evidence that we thereby obtain for the existence, in the days of the Āraṇyaka, of the whole text of the Rigveda pretty nearly in the very form in which we have it at present. The third adhyāya once more reverts to the topic of the first, substituting Ātman for Prāṇa but ultimately reaching the equation Uktha=Prāṇa=Ātman=Indra, almost in the fashion of the Bāshkalamantropanishad, or the third chapter of Kaushītaki Upanishad. The sub-Upanishad offers very few points of contact with other texts, the only chronological relations that can be established being: (1) The priority of the Prāṇa-saṁvāda passage in Ait. Āraṇ. II. i. 4 to the version of the same appearing in Chh. Up. v. 1, Bṛih. vi. 1, Kaush. Up. ii. 12-14 and iii. 2, Praśna ii. 1, or Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇyaka ix. 2-7. (2) The Indra-Viśvāmitra story in II. ii. 3 may have been earlier than the corresponding and more philosophical story in Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇ. i. 6; but more probably these two versions as well as the slight account of it in the Jaiminīya-

* Otherwise called the Nishkaivalya Śastra, a group of 80 verses in the Gāyatrī, Bṛihatī, and Ushṇik metres and prescribed for recitation at the Mahāvrata ceremony, performed on the 24th day of the Sattra called Gavām-ayana.

Upanishad Br. III. iii. 7 are based upon another independent version no longer preserved. (3) Section II. i. 3 seems to be an early precursor on the Brahmin side of the Kshatriya doctrine of the Five Fires as developed in the Bṛih. Up. vi. 2 and Chhāndogya Up. v. 3-10; while the account of the Ātman detailed in II. iii. 2-3 is on a considerably lower philosophic plane than the advanced doctrine of Yājñayalkya in the Bṛihadāraṇyaka. (4) The etymology of the word *satyam* offered in II. 1. 5 seems independent of those given in the Chhāndogya viii. 3. 5, Bṛihadāraṇyaka V. v. 1, Taittirīya Up. ii. 6, or Kaushītaki Up. i. 6. —The second sub-Upanishad is the Aitareya proper. The Ātman doctrine propounded in this text is much more developed than that in the earlier portion: compare Ait. Āraṇ. II. 3. 2-3 with Ait. Up. sec. 5. The doctrine however is not very far removed from the absolutely Advaitic doctrine of the Chhāndogya and the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishads. The derivation of "Indra" at the end of section 3 of this sub-Upanishad appears more primitive than that in Bṛih. Up. iv. 2. 2; but both might have been independently developed, or possibly copied from some other ealier source. The three births of man in Śatapatha xi. 2. 1. 1 are conceived from the ritualistic point of view; those in section 4 of the present Upanishad from the physiological as well as eschatological points of view: no chronological relation can be established between them. Our sub-Upanishad can be proved to be earlier than the Kaushītaki on a review of passages like Aitareya Upanishad section 4, and Kaushītaki Up. ii. 15, or Ait. Up. sec. 5 (importance of *prajñāna*) and Kaushītaki Up. iii, which is more elaborate and which combines prajñāna with Prāṇa, the Bṛih. passage (i. 5. 3-10) probably coming between the two. The enumeration of the elements in section 5 is fuller than what we find in passages like Bṛih. Up. i. 4. 7 and Chhāndogya Up. vi. 2. 3; but as such enumerations are fairly common elsewhere the chronological relation indicated thereby is not very certain. —The third sub-unit is made up of the Saṁhitopanishad, divided into two adhyāyas. A more or less identically worded portion of the Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇyaka (adhyāyas vii and viii)

is probably a somewhat later, more elaborate, though in places a correcter version of the same. The Śikshā Vallī of the Taittirīya Upanishad is also later than the present text.

(9) CHHĀNDOGYA UPANISHAD: The Upanishad belongs to the Sāmaveda, forming the last eight chapters of the Chhāndogya- or, as it is otherwise known, the Mantra- Brāhmaṇa. These eight chapters called Prapāṭhakas are each of them sub-divided into from 13 to 26 khaṇḍas or sections, some of them being of the nature of single self-contained units very little if at all connected with the preceding and succeeding sections, while others form small paragraphs in a larger philosophical disquisition or episode with a unity of contents. Deussen has thus divided the first Prapāṭhaka into 9 units and the second into 8, as follows—

PRAPĀṬHAKA 1.		PRAPĀṬHAKA 2.	
Unit 1 ...	Sect. 1	Unit 1 ...	Sect. 1
—— 2 ...	—— 2–3	—— 2 ...	—— 2-7
—— 3 ...	—— 4	—— 3 ...	—— 8–10
—— 4 ...	—— 5	—— 4 ...	—— 11–21
—— 5 ...	—— 6–7	—— 5 ...	—— 22
—— 6 ...	—— 8–9	—— 6 ...	—— 23.1
—— 7 ...	—— 10–11	—— 7 ...	—— 23.2–3
—— 8 ...	—— 12	—— 8 ...	—— 24
—— 9 ...	—— 13		

In spite of the composite up-build of these chapters (which in fact is what we find in most works of a Brāhmaṇa or Āraṇyaka type) they do possess a sort of a unity in as much as they aim at giving mystic exposition of the Udgītha or Sāman in all its "Bandhus" with an occasional story or two to lend a human colour to the same. As such ritualistic disquisitions on the Sāman or Udgītha have always formed the main theme of all works belonging to the Sāmaveda, and as definite indications are lacking for separating any one of the above units chronologically from any other, we propose to regard both these Prapāṭhakas as one philosophical unit. This does not of course preclude the possibility of an attempt to determine the chronological relations of portions of these texts with passages belonging

to other Upanishadic texts. Thus an intensive study of corresponding passages can establish the following relations—

1. As compared with the story of the "Udgītha-vedha" ocurring in Bṛih. i. 3 the Chhāndogya version in i. 2 shows a developmental difference in as much as the former treats of the Udgītha as an ordinary element in the chanting of the Sāman whereas the latter elevates it to an object of worship or meditation on its own account. The analogous episode found in Jaim.-Up. Br. (i. 60, ii. 1. 10, and iv. 7. 2) is clearly a combination of both the Bṛihadāraṇyaka and the Chhāndogya versions.

2. The correspondences of the three syllables of the Udgītha with three divinities, three Vedas, and three functions given in Chhāndogya i. 3. 6-7 and in the Jaim.-Up. Br. i. 57-8 are analogous but possibily independent of each other; and the same remark holds good of the story of the Metres enveloping the Udgītha as given in Chh. i. 4 and J. U. B. i. 18, the Udgītha within the bosom of the Metres being compared in one account with the fish in water, and in the other with the thread within the beads of a garland.

3. Sections 5 and 6 of the Chhāndogya i also have their corresponding passages in the J. U. B. ii. 6. 10-11, and i. 25-27, but here again the similarity is not so close as to necessitate the hypothesis of mutual influence.

4. In Chhāndogya i. 8-9 occurs the story of three pupils carrying on a disputation as to the goal of Udgītha. If Pravāhaṇa Jaivali who leads the disputation is the same as the Kshatriya author of the " Pañchāgni-vidyā " treated in Bṛih. vi. 2 and Chh. v. 3 the doctrine here given can be viewed as a precursor of the full-fledged doctrine of the Five Fires.

5. The elaboration of the " Bandhus " of the Sāman in five, seven, and ten modes has many other analogous passages in the Brāhmaṇas of the Sāmaveda; and sometimes there are verbal coincidences, as for instance of Chh. ii. 5, ii. 7, and ii. 22 with J. U. B. i. 13. 5, and i. 51-52 respectively. But it would be rather hazardous to draw any definite

chronological relations from correspondences in texts belonging to parallel Śākhās of the same Veda except in clear cases of wholesale borrowing.

The third Prapāṭhaka of the Chhāndogya falls into the following sub-units which, being diversified in tone and contents, may have been also chronologically disparate —

PRAPĀṬHAKA 3

Unit 1—Madhu-vidyā in sections 1-11, with a regular conclusion and *phalaśruti*. It calls itself *Brahmopanishad*, knows the Atharvaveda, and speaks of the mystic symbols (*guhyā ādeśāḥ*).

Unit 2—Ritualistic disquisition on the Gāyatrī in section 12.

Unit 3—Five Divine Gate-ways or *Deva-sushayaḥ* given in section 13 and containing the earliest germs of the eschatological doctrine of the Paths.

Unit 4—The Śāṇḍilya-vidyā (section 14) which is plainly borrowed from the Śatapatha, x. 6. 3. Its absence in the Bṛih. Up. is probably to be accounted for by the rivalry between the school of Śāṇḍilya and that of Yājñavalkya, the out-standing philosopher of the Bṛihadāraṇyaka.

Unit 5—The Universe as Kośa, section 15.

Unit 6—Description of the human life as a Yajña or Sacrifice, sections 16-17. Mahīdāsa Aitareya is mentioned as a great sage of old, ii. 16. 7. There is also a reference to "Kṛishṇa Devakīputra."

Unit 7—Description of Brahman in its four-fold aspects, section 18.

Unit 8—A bit of cosmology (section 19), curious as mentioning a peculiar sound (*ulūlavaḥ*) accompanying the up-rise of the Sun and presumably reproduced by the worshipper. Similar sounds connoting the All-high are *Allah* (=Al+ilah from the Hebrew root *ūl* to be strong), and the Old Testament (*Hallelujah*) probably derived from the Jewish *Hallel*. Compare also Śatapatha iii. 2. 1. 23—"Te'surā āttavachaso *he'lava he'lava* iti kṛitvā parābabhūvuḥ", which is also quoted in the Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāshya, (Vol. 1. p. 2, l. 7). If the

similarity of the sound in all these cases is purely accidental it will have to be confessed that such accidents are very rare. A few minor points of contact between the present Prapāṭhaka and other Upanishadic texts are—

Chhāndogya iii. 12. 5 is presupposed by Bṛih. v. 14, which is more elaborate;

———————iii. 13. 8 and Bṛih. v. 9 probably go back to a common oral tradition; while

———————iii. 15. 2 is analogous to Kaushītaki Up. ii. 8.

The fourth Prapāṭhaka of the Chhāndogya falls into four units, all of them betraying their secondary nature by the systematised form of the doctrine inculcated therein. The units are—

PRAPĀṬHAKA 4.

Unit 1—Sections 1-3, the Saṁvarga-vidyā. The idea of an all-attracting First Principle which subdues, secures, and sustains everything underlies doctrines like the "Brahmaṇaḥ parimaraḥ" in the Ait. Br. viii. 28, or the "Daivaḥ Parimaraḥ" in Kaush. Up. ii. 12-15. That Vāyu-Prāṇa is the highest principle in question is already declared in passages like Śatapatha x. 3. 3 or J. U. B. iii. 1-2 (to be discussed below), and it is probably the latter passage which is the source of the present unit. The story at the end is identical in both.

Unit 2—Sections 4-9: This seems to be an attempt to give a story form to the doctrine taught in Chhā. iii. 18 above. Teachers other than men are often enough introduced; thus we have the story in the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa, Extract 152, of a pupil taught by the cow, to be detailed below.

Unit 3—The next story, sections 10-15, is based on the same motive, and forms in fact a parallel to the preceding one. The doctrine of the Archirādi-mārga taught at the end runs counter to the doctrine of "sadyo-mukti" or immediate release propounded in passages like Bṛih. iv. 4, 6, though it agrees fairly well with texts such as Chh. v. 3-10, or Bṛih. vi. 2.

Unit 4—The last two sections of the Prapāṭhaka deal with the functions of the priest Brahmā, the successful perfor-

mance of which gives the sacrificer access to the Northern Path. The treatment is probably based upon Ait. Br. v. 33, and v.32 (or its analogous passage in Kaush. Br. vi. 10), but seems to directly use the phraseology of J. U. B. iii. 16-17. The old *gāthā* given at the end seems peculiar to our passage only; its third line is not an "evident interpolation" and the word *kurūn* (=priests) has nothing to do with the Kurus.

The fifth Prapāṭhaka of the Chhāndogya is entirely made up of borrowed passages. It falls into three units as under—

PRAPĀṬHAKA 5.

Unit 1—Sections 1-2: Dispute of the Faculties. We have already discussed the six texts having this theme. They can be chronologically arranged as follows:

A—Aitareya Āraṇyaka ii. 1. 4;

B—Chhāndogya v. 1-2 (as exhibiting a simpler form and arrangement);

C—Bṛihadāraṇyaka vi. 1,3 (as being a more developed phase than B);

D—Kaushītaki Up. ii. 14;

E—Kaushītaki Up. iii. 2;

F—Praśna ii. 1;

G—Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇyaka ix. 2-7 (being a clearly late imitation).

Unit 2—Sections 3-10: the famous Pañchāgni-vidyā or Doctrine of Five Fires. The form of the doctrine given in the present unit is certainly more original than that in Bṛih. (Kāṇva recension) vi. 2, which is admittedly a Khila or a supplement; and this is no less true of the somewhat varying form of it in the Mādhyaṁdina recension. As before observed, Chhāndogya i. 8-9 shows the doctrine in the making, while a passage like Aitareya Āraṇ. ii. 1. 3 might be regarded as an independent approach on the side of the Brahmins to a similar solution of the problem. The full-fledged doctrine is a combination of three different lines of speculation: (1) The doctrine of Karman or of post-mortem rewards and punishments for our good or bad actions in

the various stages of evolution of the dogma that we have noticed above (pages 26f. and 75 above); (2) The doctrine of metempsychosis which made it possible for the rewards and punishments being meted out in the world below, except in the case of those elected for eternal reward in the abode of Brahman or for an eternal damnation either in Hell or in an unending succession of lives and deaths as low forms of creation; and (3) The eschatological doctrine of the Two Paths, the successive stages of the soul's ascent or descent being arrived at partly arbitrarily but partly also by a consideration of the physical, physiological, and ritualistic correlates of the faculties in man viewed on the basis of "Bandhutā" philosophy.—The form of the doctrine in Kaushītaki Up. i. 2 ff. is the latest elaboration of it. Compare also Jaim.-Up. Br. iii. 14. 1ff.

Unit 3—Sections 11-24: Vaiśvānara-vidyā. This seems to have been probably borrowed from Śatapatha Br. x. 6. 1, which is an attempt to arrive at the most universal form of the Agni, the present unit identifying that form with the Ātman: Hence also the difference in the opening of the story. The philosophical elevation of our text however terminates by a ritualistic prescription as to the "Prāṇāhutis" with which an orthodox Hindu even now begins his meal (sections 19-24). The "Bandhus" here assigned to the various Prāṇas are the same as those in Chh. iii. 13, viz.—

Prāṇa	Chakshus	Āditya	Dyaus ;
Vyāna	Śrotram	Chandramas	Diśaḥ ;
Apāna	Vāch	Agni	Pṛithvī ;
Samāna	Manas	Parjanya	Vidyut ;
Udāna	[Tvak]	Vāyu	Ākāśa.

The addition of a sixth *āhut* › Brahman is a still further refinement.

THE SIXTH PRAPĀṬHAKA constitutes practically one unit, the break at section 7 being ignored inasmuch as what follows is a continuation of the same instruction in immediate chronological sequence with what precedes it. The following relations can

be borne out by a careful study of the several passages—

Chhāndogya vi. 1. 3. earlier than Muṇḍaka I. i. 3;

————vi. 10. 1————————III. ii. 8; and

-vi. 3 ————Taittirīya ii. 1;

while the doctrine of the 16 kalās in man appears to have been—like the allied passages in Praśna vi, or Bṛih. 1. 5. 14-15, or Ś. B. x. 4. 1. 16ff.—independent elaborations of a common idea familiar to the age. In sections 8-16 of this Prapāṭhaka the sequence of arguments and illustrations does not seem to have been arranged so that each following text removes the inadequacy of the preceding, as is often made out. Some of the illustrations and modes of approach to the problem of the Real are the common stock-in-trade of all Upanishadic philosophers.

THE SEVENTH PRAPĀṬHAKA is one continuous unit in 26 sections. Its contents are distinctly secondary. It mentions not only the Atharvaveda but a number of other texts that might have served as Vedāṅgas and Veda-pariśishṭas. In this Prapāṭhaka we have a list of First Principles arranged in an order of preference. Some of them we know from other sources also [e. g. Rv. x. 125, and Bṛih. iv. 1. 2 for *Vāch*; Chh. iii. 18. 1, Bṛih. iv. 1. 6, and Tait. iii. 4. 1 for *Manas*; Tait. ii. 5 and iii. 5 for *Vijñāna*; Bṛih. v. 14. 4 for *Bala*; Tait. iii. 2, Chh. i. 2. 9, and Bṛih. v. 12. 1 for *Anna*; Bṛih. v. 5. 1 for *Āp*; Bṛih. viii. 14. 1 and Chh. iii. 18. 1 for *Ākāśa*; and passages without number for Prāṇa] as actually recognised First Principles; but whether the same can be assumed in the case of Smara or Āśā is more than what is warranted by the data available. Deussen regards the verses towards the end of the Prapāṭhaka as interpolated, which may have been the case. But there is no justification for regarding the teaching of the Prapāṭhaka as that of the *Kshatriya* Sanatkumāra to the Brahmin-sage Nārada. This is the result of a misunderstanding of the words—*taṁ skandam ity āchakshate.* The pronoun *tam* here does not refer to Sanatkumāra but to the person already alluded to by the pronoun *tasmai* in the same sentence: i. e., the pupil who has won the highest truth and was already called *ativādin.* Skandaḥ means not the War-god but one who has leaped beyond.

The eighth and the last Prapāṭhaka of the Chhāndogya can be divided into the following units—

PRAPĀṬHAKA 8.

Unit 1—Sections 1-6 : These contain a description and glorification of the nature of the Ātman. Deussen regards the whole of the second and the sixth sections, as well as the reference to the Airammadīya Lake and the rest at the end of viii. 5. 3 as later additions. But the supposition is not necessary—at least with regard to sect. 2—if we once concede the secondary nature of the entire Prapāṭhaka. The reference to the Airammadīya Lake is certainly more in place in a context like Kaush. Up. 1. 3, which however does not give this detail ; hence the Chhāndogya might have had an independent tradition to follow.

Unit 2—Sections 7-12 : The Indra-Virochana story, intended to illustrate the Ātman doctrine of Unit 1. Hence we get identical expressions as in viii. 3. 4 and viii. 12. 3. The conception of the " Man in the Eye " here given is distinct from that in passages like Chh. i. 7. 5 or iv. 15. 1, and Bṛih. ii. 3. 5 or v. 5. 2 or iv. 2. 3, and Kaush. Up. iv. 16f. In these latter passages the little figure in the open eye is taken to typify the highest Ātman ; in our passage the image in the eye is a reflection of somebody else's person : it does not represent the real Ātman. Deussen regards, without any real reason, the passage at the end of viii. 12. 3 as interpolated.

Unit 3—Sections 13 and 14, constituting two brief prayers calculated to secure permanent abode in the Brahmaloka.

Unit 4—Section 15 : a summary statement of Vaṁśa and an injunction to do one's duty in all the *three* stages of life. Compare above, Chh. ii. 23. 1.

(10) BṚIHADĀRAṆYAKA UPANISHAD : The Upanishad has been preserved in two recensions, the Kāṇva and the Mādhyaṁdina, varying slightly in the arrangement of material. There are also a few differences of reading. But no portion from one recension is entirely lacking in the other. This will be clear from the following comparative statement—

BṚIHADĀRAṆYAKA

	KĀṆVA-ŚĀKHĀ Adhyāya	Brāhmaṇa	Kaṇḍikā		MĀDHYAṀDINA-ŚĀKHĀ Adhyāya	Brāhmaṇa	Kaṇḍikā
Up.	I	i	1–2	" Ushā vā aśvasya "=Ś.B. X.	VI	iv	1–2
	..	ii	1–22	" Naiveha kiṁchanāgra " ..	..	v	1–8
	..	iii	1–28	Udgītha-vedha .. XIV	IV	i	1–33*
MADHU-KĀṆḌA	..	iv	1–17	" Ātmaivedam agra āsīt " ..	..	ii	1–31
	..	v	1–23	" Yat saptānnāni "	..	iii	1–34
	..	vi	1–3	" Trayaṁ vā idam " ..	..	iv	1–3
	II	i	1–20	Bālāki and Ajātaśatru ..	V	i	1–23
	..	ii	1–4	" Yo ha vai śiśum " ..	..	ii	1–6
	..	iii	1–6	" Dve vāva Brahmaṇo rūpe"	..	iii	1–11
	..	iv	1–14	Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī ..	..	iv	1–16
	..	v	1–19	Madhu-vidyā	..	v	1–19
	..	vi	1–3	Vaṁśa	..		—20–22
	III	i	1–10	Questions of Aśvala	VI	i	1–12
	..	ii	1–13	———Ārtabhāga ..	..	ii	1–14
	..	iii	1–2	———Bhujyu ..	..	iii	1–2
YĀJÑAVALKYA-KĀṆḌA	..	iv	1–2	———Ushasta ..	.. ╳	iv	1
	..	v	1	———Kahola(ḍa) ..	..	v	1
	..	vi	1	———Gārgī	..	vi	1
	..	vii	1–23	———Uddālaka Āruṇi	..	vii	1–31
	..	viii	1–12	———Gārgī	..	viii	1–12
	..	ix	1–28	———Śākalya ..	..	ix	1–34
	IV	i	1–7	Janaka and Yājñavalkya ..	..	x	1–19
	..	ii	1–4	——— ..	..	xi	1–6
	..	iii	1–38	——— ..	VII	i	1–44
	..	iv	1–25	——— ..	..	ii	1–31
	..	v	1–15	Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī ..	..	iii	1–25
	..	vi	1–3	Vaṁśa	..		—26–28

* The difference in the number of Kaṇḍikās is due to further subdivisions: it does not constitute any difference in matter.

BṚIHADĀRAṆYAKA

	Kāṇva-Śākhā Adhyāya	Brāhmaṇa	Kaṇḍikā		Mādhyaṁdina-Śākhā Adhyāya	Brāhmaṇa	Kaṇḍikā
Up.	V	i	1	"Pūrṇam idam"=Ś.B. XIV	VIII	i	1
	..	ii	1–3	Lessons from Thunder		ii	1–4
	..	iii	1	Etymology of *hṛidayam*		iv*	1
	..	iv	1	Brahman as *satyam*..		v	1
	..	v	1–4	"Āpa evāgra āsuḥ"		vi	1–5
	..	vi	1	"Manomayo 'yam"	×	vii	1
	..	vii	1	"Vidyut Brahma"..		viii	1
	..	viii	1	"Vācham dhenum"		ix	1
	..	ix	1	"Ayam Agnir Vaiśvānaraḥ" ..		x	1
	..	x	1	Eschatological fragment	×	xi	1
	..	xi	1	Disease as *tapas*		xii	1
	..	xii	1	"Vi-ram" as Anna+Prāṇa.. ..		xiii	1–3
Khila-Kāṇḍa	..	xiii	1–4	Prāṇa as Uktha, etc.		xiv	1–4
	..	xiv	1–8	Four *pādas* of Gāyatrī		xv	1–12
	..	xv	1	"Hiraṇmayena" =V.S. XL. Sit. 17, 15, 16†			
	VI	i	1–14	Yo vai jyeshṭham=Ś.B. XIV	IX	i	1–19
	..	ii	1–16	Pañchāgni-vidyā	×	ii	1–19
	..	iii	1–13	Śrīmantha ritual		iii	1–22
	..	iv	1–28	Putramantha ritual		iv	1–29
	..	v	1–3	Vaṁśa			..30–33
	..	—	4	Do.	X VI	v	9‡

* The omitted Brāhmaṇa gives the formula *Vāyur anilam* etc. which occurs also at the end of the Īśa Upanishad.

† The order of verses is changed.

‡ This forms the last Kaṇḍikā of Ś. B. X. vi. 5, being a continuation of item 2 on the opposite page.—We may add that the sixteenth Kāṇḍa of the Śatapatha in the Kāṇva recension consists of 8 adhyāyas, the first two (=the first three of the Mādhyaṁdina) treating of the Pravargya, and the last six (sometimes counted by themselves as the seventeenth Kāṇḍa) forming the Upanishad proper.

The fact that there is a list of teachers at the end of each of the three Kāṇḍas—Madhu, Yājñavalkya, and Khila—suggests the first main division of the Bṛihadāraṇyaka into three parts; and on a careful review of the names of the teachers listed Deussen has come to the conclusion that the Madhu-kāṇḍa and the Yājñavalkya-kāṇḍa must have existed for some nine generations before "Pautimāshya" as two independent Upanishads in the Śākhā, to which the Khila or Supplementary Kāṇḍa came to be later added. The Kāṇḍas fall into the following sub-units—

MADHUKĀṆḌA, ADHYĀYA I.

Unit 1—Brāhmaṇas 1-2, glorifying the sacrificial horse.

Unit 2—Brāhmaṇa 3: "Udgītha-vedha"—See above, p. 103.

Unit 3—Brāhmaṇa 4: We have in this a series of cosmological statements held together by the basic idea of the immanence of the Ātman or Brahman in everything. Bṛih. I. iv. 6, along with Chh. vi. 3. 2, seems to go back to a common source where the first germs of the evolutionary doctrine can be traced. Kaushītaki iv. 19 is based upon Bṛih. I. iv. 6. —Possibly, Bṛih. I. iv. 8 can be looked upon as containing the first germs of the central idea in the Yājñavalkya-Maitreyī dialogue.

Unit 4—Brāhmaṇa 5: This unit can be further divided into four more or less disparate portions, namely, 1-13 which distribute the food created by Prajāpati into the various recipients arranged by sets of three; 14-15 which discuss the 16 kalās of Prajāpati from the astronomical point of view; 16-20 which introduce what might be regarded as the earliest germs of the eschatological doctrine of the two paths; and 21-23, styled the "Vrata-mīmāṅsā," where it is possible to discover the first germs of the Prāṇayāmā doctrine of later Yoga. — Bṛih. I. v. 3 and I. v. 14 are respectively allied to, but probably independent of, Ait. Up. v. 2 and Praśna vi. The "Sampratti" in Bṛih. I. v. 17 is more primitive than the "Sampradāna" in Kaushītaki ii. 15.

Unit 5—Brāhmaṇa 6, which is an elaboration of the idea contained in Ś. B. XI. ii. 3.

MADHUKĀṆḌA, ADHYĀYA 2.

Unit 1—Brāhmaṇa 1: The version of the dialogue between Ajātaśatru and Bālāki given here is analogous to that in Kaushītaki iv, and both seem to have been derived from a common source no longer extant. The Kaushītaki account gives 17 rejected first principles, whereas the Bṛihadāraṇyaka gives only 12. Kaushītaki alone brings out the superiority of the ultimate principle—Purusha—over the principles rejected (cp. Kaush. iv. 18), and it contains at the end certain extra reflections borrowed from elsewhere.

Unit 2—Brāhmaṇa 2: Isolated and unconnected.

Unit 3—Brāhmaṇa 3: A secondary compilation of various ideas allied to those in Chh. i. 6-7 (Prāṇa, Vāyu, and Purusha), in Taitt. ii. 6 (Sat and Tyat), and even in Bṛih. iv. 2. 4 (Neti-Neti).

Unit 4—Brāhmaṇa 4: This famous dialogue between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī, which has been well styled the "Testament of Yājñavalkya," recurs at Bṛih. iv. 5; and this fact is a proof by itself of the co-ordinate existence of the Madhu and the Yājñavalkya Kāṇḍas as independent Upanishads. The version of the story at iv. 5 shows certain minor divergences, the most important of them being the added formula towards the end—*Sa esha* "Neti-Neti" *Ātmā*—which occurs in the Yājñavalkya Kāṇḍa in exactly the same form three times more: iii. 9. 26, iv. 2. 4, and iv. 4. 22. The lists in ii. 4. 10 and in iv. 1. 2 are identical; that in Chh. vii. 2 is more elaborate. The idea in ii. 4. 11 and that in Chh. viii. 12. 4 may have been based upon an original working up of a thought like that in Keṇa 1-2. The simile of the lump of salt at ii. 4. 12, which has received a different turn in the version at iv. 5. 13, is probably original in Chh. vi. 13—the germ of the whole idea being a text like Bṛih. i. 4. 8.

Unit 5—Brāhmaṇa 5: The so-called "Madhu-vidyā" in Chh. iii. 1-11 has nothing in common except the name with the present vidyā, which aims at bringing out the correspondence and interdependence of the following 14 outer and 14

inner entities, which is rendered possible reason by of the in-dwelling of the Ātman in them all—

1. Pṛithvī : Śarīra	8. Vidyut : Tejas
2. Āpas : Retas	9. Stanayitnu : Śabda
3. Agni : Vāch	10. Ākāśa : Hṛidayākāśa
4. Vāyu : Prāṇa	11. Dharma : Dharma
5. Āditya : Chakshus	12. Satya : Satya
6. Diśaḥ : Śrotra	13. Mānusha : Mānusha
7. Chandra : Manas	14. Ātman : Ātman.

Unit 6—Brāhmaṇa 6 : List of Teachers.

YĀJÑAVALKYAKĀṆḌA, ADHYĀYA I (3).

Unit 1—Brāhmaṇas 1-9: The whole Adhyāya forms one continuous whole wherein Yājñavalkya meets and overcomes successively in disputation a series of theologians and philosophers. Each Brāhmaṇa is given to a distinct opponent; but it seems that Brāhmaṇas 3 and 7 are different versions of the same episode (a woman possessed by a Gandharva is mentioned in both), as also Brāhmaṇas 6 and 8 (with an identical interlocutor, Gārgī, and an identical form of questioning), and Brāhmaṇas 4 and 5 (which also have the same form of questioning although their sequence is reversed in the Mādhyaṁdina and the Kāṇva recensions). Thus originally the Adhyāya might have consisted, like the others, of only six Brāhmaṇas. — The eschatological teaching in Brāhmaṇas 2 and 3 seems much more primitive than that in iv. 3 or iv. 4; and nowhere in the Yājñavalkya-kāṇḍa do we get the developed eschatology of the two Paths, or the cosmography of the Pañchāgni-vidyā. There is also considerable difference in the cosmography of Brāhmaṇas 3 and 6. — The last or ninth Brāhmaṇa is the developed version of an encounter which is reported in Ś. B. xi. 6. 3. It falls into the following parts: (1) Kaṇḍikās 1 to 9 in which the discussion as to the number of the gods (which alone is given in the Ś. B. version) is reiterated. As this was not enough to justify the anger and curse of Yājñavalkya, we have (2) Kaṇḍikās 10-17 discusssing 8 different *āyatanas* or locations

of the Inner Self, the details of which are differently given in the Mādhyaṁdina and the Kāṇva recensions. Kaṇḍikā 18 opens, like the account in Ś. B. xi. 6, with the comparison of the "wise" Śākalya to the tongs for removing embers (aṅgāra or ulmūka) and, as suggested by Deussen, it was originally followed by the latter half of Kaṇḍikā 26, beginning with *etāny ashṭāv āyatanāni* etc. This completes the second part consisting of nine and a half Kaṇḍikās. (3) Kaṇḍikās 27-28 form the third part, which resembles the Chhāgaleya Upanishad in its metrical conclusion. (4) Kaṇḍikās 19-25 and the first half of Kaṇḍikā 26 form an interpolation, possibly preserving the account of a discussion which sage Yājñavalkya had, but *not* with the "wise" Śākalya.

YĀJÑAVALKYAKĀṆḌA, ADHYĀYA 2 (4).

Unit 1—Brāhmaṇas 1-2: Yājñavalkya and Janaka, First Dialogue, wherein the sage criticises the views of six philosophers who successively maintained Vāch, Prāṇa, Chakshus, Śrotra, Manas, and Hṛidaya as Brahman. These views are, as before noticed (page 108), also met with elsewhere.

Unit 2—Brāhmaṇas 3-4: Yājñavalkya and Janaka, Second Dialogue, wherein Yājñavalkya freely develops his own philosophy. The whole treatment falls into the following stages: (1) Kaṇḍikās 1-6 which treat of the real nature of the Agnihotra in the manner of Ś. B. xi. 6. 2 and xi. 3. 1. 1. (2) Then follows a description of the Ātman in the conditions of Wakefulness and Dream in Kaṇḍikās 7-18, omitting Kaṇḍikā 15, rightly transferred by the Mādhyaṁdina recension to a subsequent place. (3) Kaṇḍikās 19-34 which describe the condition of Deep-sleep and the bliss of that state. The Mādhyaṁdina recension here omits Kaṇḍikā 34 and in its stead brings over Kaṇḍikā 15 from the preceding portion. Kaṇḍikā 20 which describes the Nāḍīs in the phraseology of Chh. viii. 6. 1 may have been a later addition, while the "Beatific Calculus" in Kaṇḍikā 33 may have been a pattern for the more detailed and somewhat diverging account in Taittirīya ii. 8. (4) The next stratum is made up of the last

four Kaṇḍikās of Brāhmaṇa iii and the first six of Brāhmaṇa iv, and describes the death and the subsequent fate of an ordinary mortal (kāmayamānaḥ). The account here given not only goes against Chh. vii. 6. 6, or Kaṭha I. 3. 16 but even against the Pañchāgni-vidyā and the doctrine of the Two Paths described in Adhyāya vi of this very Upanishad. (5) The last stratum consists of Kaṇḍikās 7-25 of Brāhmaṇa iv, where the fate after death of the liberated soul is described. Here the doctrine of Kramamukti is definitely rejected and that of Sadyomukti favoured. There are also quotations from texts like Īśa, Kena, Kaṭha, etc. Deussen justly regards Kaṇḍikās 8-21 (which are avowedly metrical citations) as a later addition.

Unit 3—Brāhmaṇa 5: Secondary version of the Yājñavalkya-Maitcyī dialogue, for which see above, page 114.

Unit 4—Brāhmaṇa 6: List of Teachers. It is strange not to find herein the name of Yājñavalkya. Are we to conclude that the doctrines put into his mouth were current in the school as self-subsisting philosophical reflections which were only subsequently ascribed to Yājñavalkya? The sage appears to have at least as much of the mythical element in him as historical, seeing that in the Teachers' List at the end of the Upanishad (which is to be regarded as that for the whole Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa) he figures as 13th from the Sun.

KHILAKĀṆḌA, ADHYĀYA I (5).

This so-called Supplementary portion is made of small philosophical fragments collected at different times. There are fifteen of them in the first Adhyāya, the fifth of the Upanishad; and although here and there distant echoes of ideas better known from other Upanishadic texts are noticeable, it would be hazardous to suggest definite chronological relations. We content ourselves therefore with a mere placing of the passages side by side—

Bṛihad. v. 3 and Chhāndogya viii. 3. 3;
——— v. 5. 1 and ——————viii. 3. 5;
——— v. 9 and —————iii. 13. 8;
——— v. 14 and —————iii. 12. 5, and J. U. B. iv. 8. 1.

KHILAKĀṆḌA, ADHYĀYA 2 (6).

The first three Brāhmaṇas of the Adhyāya give the story of the Prāṇa-saṁvāda, or the Disputation of the Faculties, and the Pañchāgni-vidyā in pretty nearly the same form as in the fifth Prapāṭhaka of the Chhāndogya; and the relation of the two versions has been already discussed above, page 106. Brāhmaṇa 4 is largely ritualistic, giving prescriptions for the procreation of worthy progeny; and it seems to have been added to the Upanishad by way of a supplement, probably because the instruction was secret and not intended for general reading. — The last or the fifth Brāhmaṇa details the List of Teachers.

(11) KAUSHĪTAKI UPANISHAD : The Upanishad belongs to the Rigveda and constitutes Adhyāyas 3-6 of the Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇyaka, sometimes also called the Kaushītakyāraṇyaka. Adhyāyas 7-10 of the Āraṇyaka also contain reflections of an Upanishadic character and deserve to be recognised as a regular Upanishad; but as their contents have very little of originality we are going to ignore them here. It may suffice to state that—

Śāṅkhāyana Āraṇ. Chapter vii ———————— viii	correspond to Ait. Āraṇ. iii ;
———————— ix ———————— x	———— Chh. Up. v. 1-2.

The four Adhyāyas of the Upanishad proper constitute as many distinct units.

Unit 1—" Paryaṅka-vidyā " so called from the Paryaṅka or the couch of the Most High before which the liberated soul is ushered in. The eschatology of this chapter is in many ways peculiar, being marked at times with a gorgeous Paurāṇic colour so foreign to the general Upanishadic spirit. The chapter opens in the manner of the Pañchāgni-vidyā of the Chhāndogya or the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad; but while there is a recognition in these two Upanishads of a *third* path —" Jāyasva mṛiyasvetyetat tṛitīyaṁ sthānam ", that is definitely rejected in the Kaushītaki. Further, of the two paths which are common to the Pañchāgni and the Paryaṅka vidyās, while the Pitṛiyāṇa leads to transmigration and the Devayāna

to Kramamukti according to both the vidyās, the main interest of the former Vidyā is to describe the stages of the descending path, resulting in rebirth here below; and of the latter that of the ascending path leading to Brahmaloka. This last is very briefly dismissed in the Pañchāgni-vidyā*—Tatra Purusho 'mānavaḥ : sa enān Brahma gamayati—and there is an echo of the Kaushītaki imagery also in Chh. vii. 15. 5-6. For the major part however the description of the pompous reception of the liberated soul in the Brahmaloka as given by the Kaushītaki is without any parallel in the other Upanishads, while the eschatology of Bṛih. iii. 3 is even contrary to it. The Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa (i. 17-18, and i. 49-50) contains, however, the kernel of the whole doctrine, which there occurs in connection with burial rites. It alone helps us to arrive at an exact significance of the Paryaṅka-vidyā, which had hitherto been misunderstood.

Unit 2—This unit is composed of the 15 sections of the second Adhyāya of the Kaushītaki. It is very composite in nature and deals with a number of rites and prescriptions for attaining specific worldly objects. It is called Prāṇa-vidyā for the simple reason that the rites somehow bring in the conception and require the worship of Prāṇa as the highest entity. The chapter has little of philosophical value. The following chronological relations can however be established—

Kaushītaki ii. 12 is later than Ait. Br. viii. 28 ;
————ii. 13 is later than Bṛih. i. 15-17 ;
For ,, ii. 14 compare page 106 above.

Unit 3—Adhyāya iii. The doctrine here taught is not new : sometimes it shows distinct echoes of texts like Ait. Ār. ii. 1 (cp. Kaush. iii. 3) or Bāshkalamantropanishad. But the manner of developing the idea is peculiar and forcibly reminds one of the closely reasoned argumentation of Yājñavalkya in Bṛih. iv. 3-5, although the conclusion here reached is on a somewhat lower philosophical plane, being psychological and epistemological rather than metaphysical.

* Compare also Chh. iv. 15. 5–6.

Unit 4—Adhyāya iv. This is no more than a somewhat elaborated version of Bṛih. ii. 1 ff. We have already discussed it above, page 113. Towards the end in particular we find many small additions, which are mere borrowings from Bṛih. iv. 3. 20, i. 4. 7, and the like.

(12) ŚVETĀŚVATARA UPANISHAD: It is somewhat hard to determine whether the present Upanishad obtained its name from the philosopher mentioned in it, namely, Śvetāśvatara, the philosopher of the white mule, to whom, we are told, the Upanishad was revealed on account of the power of his penance and the grace of the Lord (vi. 21), or whether the Upanishad came to be so called after the Śveta and the Aśvatara, two branches of the Charaka-śākhā of the Black Yajurveda, to which the Upanishad has been customarily assigned. The Vedic mantras quoted in the second chapter of the Upanishad and elsewhere do in any case preserve the readings and the sequence of the Yajurveda, which by itself is an argument for assigning the Upanishad to that Veda. The Upanishad is an excellent illustration of the eclectic tendency of its author or authors, it being in fact just a conglomeration of various original and borrowed ideas, which makes it a very difficult task to critically evaluate the original contribution of the Śvetāśvatara to the Upanishadic philosophy. The six chapters of the Upanishad as they stand do not constitute a coherent, connected and consequential unity, and it is accordingly rather hard to trace out the relation of any one chapter to the others inasmuch as the same ideas and words are repeated throughout. The Upanishad is peculiarly liable to a probelm-by-problem treatment. Thus we may say that chapter one is given to a description of the various doctrines of philosophy prevalent at the time of its construction, above which it places its peculiar doctrine of Triune Unity. Chapter two is mainly concerned with the practice of Yoga. Chapters three, four, and five contain, on the whole, the quintessence of the Śaivite and Sāṁkhya philosophies as advocated in the Śvetāśvataropanishad. Finally the theism of the Śvetāśvatara is prominently brought out in chapter six, but without the

intermixture of any sectarian description, as in chapters three and four. Thus it happens that the dénouement of the chapters is on a par with the progress of argument in the Upanishad, by whomsoever and at whatsoever periods the chapters may have been constructed. The metre used in the Upanishad is of the same wild and irregular nature as in the Muṇḍaka Upanishad. And the several chapters of the Upanishad abound not only in quotations and echoes from other Upanishadic passages but also from chapters of the same Upanishad. The Upanishad falls into three distinct chronological units: viz., (i) Adhyāya 1; (ii) Adhyāyas 5 and 6; (iii) Adhyāyas 2, 3 and 4, with a slight time interval between the first and the last two. We will now consider these units in detail —

(i) Adhyāya 1 — This has a formal ending with the last few words repeated. The adhyāya must therefore have once stood by itself. It introduces riddles (stanzas 4-5) and enumerates and criticises a number of heretic views (which no Upanishad had done so far); and while on the one hand its reference to the three-fold path [viz. Pitṛiyāṇa, Devayāna(=Kramamukti) and Moksha] in stanzas 4 and 11, as well as its images like that of the Brahma-chakra (st. 6) and of the Praṇava as kindling-stick (st. 14) mark it out as later than Upanishadic texts like Chhāndogya v. 10. 8 and Bṛihadāranyaka vi. 2 16, and even Muṇḍaka II. ii. 4, its treatment of the Yoga, on the other hand, is much earlier than the developed teaching of Chapter ii, its Sāṁkhya and sectarian bias (present namely in stanzas 3, 7, 8-10 and 12) being decidedly less pronounced than what we find in adhyāyas 3-5. If we are right in our view that the original Sāṁkhya and the original Vedānta had much in common—even including a belief in God—that inchoate philosophical stage can be represented by nothing so aptly as by the first chapter of the Śvetāśvatara. Compare especially stanzas 10 and 12 with the Bhagavadgītā vii. 4-5 or xv. 16-17, where a Sāṁkhya view nearer to the original form of the system seems to have been implied.

(ii) Adhyāyas 5 and 6 — These two adhyāyas are most probably earlier than the intervening three adhyāyas 2-4, which disturb the context. Our adhyāyas link themselves on directly to the first as containing a reference (v. 5, vi. 1 ff.) to the First Principles enumerated in i. 2 above. The doctrine set forth by the earlier chapter after criticising the opponenets' views may be described to be that of a Triune Unity ; and the same doctrine is more explicitly stated (with possibly a little more theistic or personalistic tinge) in the last two adhyāyas : v. 1, 5, 13 ; vi. 2, 16, etc. The Sāṁkhya technicalities (e. g. guṇas or Pradhāna) are also much more common, to say nothing of the actual reference to Kapila and to Sāṁkhya-Yoga (v. 2 and vi. 13) ; while there is here no pronounced development in sectarianism as one would expect if texts like iii. 7, iv. 10, 12, etc. had gone immediately before them. Of interest also are the references to Brahma-chakra (vi. 1), or to the three-fold path (v. 7). There are also echoes of Kaṭha II. ii. 12 in v. 8 and vi. 9, and of Kaṭha I. iii. 2 and II. i. 13 in vi. 19. Śvetāśvatara vi. 14 is directly borrowed from Kaṭha II. ii. 15, where the stanza is in proper context. Stanzas 21-23 are most probably of the nature of an added epilogue (where alone Śvetāśvatara is named as a sage). The similarities of expression in adhyāyas 5 and 6 are quite on the surface.

(iii) Adhyāyas 2, 3 and 4 — Adhyāya 2 gives in the beginning a long quotation from the Yajurveda (which in part reproduces even the sequence of the original Saṁhitā (cp. V. S. xi. 1-3). The verses are intended as a prayer to the Sun, which seems to have been prescribed as a preliminary discipline to the candidates for liberation. The doctrine of Yoga given in the rest of this Adhyāya is more developed than what we find in Kaṭha I. iii. 10-13 or Kaṭha II. iii. 6-13, and there are even echoes of Kaṭha I. iii. 4 in Śvetāśvatara ii. 9. The last stanza of the adhyāya is evidently a later addition. — Between adhyāya 2 on the one hand and adhyāyas 3 and 4 on the other there is a short

gap represented by the pronounced sectarianism of these chapters, as evidenced by the introduction of names like Śiva, Rudra or Īśa, and of his female consort, who appears as a half personal and half metaphysical entity named Māyā, Śakti, or Īśinī. The chapters exhibit many identical features, such as (a) the proneness to introduce large citations from texts like Rigveda and Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā, and from Kaṭha, Mahānārāyaṇa and Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishads; (b) the similarity of expressions often reaching up to repetitions of pādas and half-stanzas; and (c) the general philosophical view-point, which includes an immanent, all-powerful god with a personality, who creates and sustains the world, and who can be approached by meditation helped on by Divine favour : the interrelation of the two adhyāyas being manifest even in the fact of the number of stanzas, there being just 21 in each. It is somewhat hard to determine the exact and original contribution of these two adhyāyas, as apart from the numerous quotations in each, and especially in adhyāya iii. The Sāṁkhya element in the chapters is principally the "Ajā" mantra (iv. 5); but even there the order of the three colours—red, white and black—does not tally with that of the qualities Sattva, Rajas and Tamas: white the colour of Sattva ought to have been mentioned first. It is thus clear that the usual arguments for assigning a chronological position to this Upanishad will have to be understood in a qualified sense according as the evidence is based on the data contained in the first adhyāya or in the subsequent adhyāyas.

(13) MAITRĀYAṆĪ UPANISHAD: The Upanishad is so named after the Śākhā of the Black Yajurveda to which it is customarily assigned, and as such it is also called Maitrāyaṇīya- Maitrāyaṇīyabrāhmaṇa- or Maitrāyana- Upanishad. The Upanishad is also alternately called Maitri (from the teacher of that name alluded to in ii. 3), this latter name being found often in Mss. of Northern recension (printed with Dīpikā in the Bibliotheca and the Ānandāśrama series), as the former in those of the Southern

(=No. 25 in the Muktika canon). The Upanishad has to be carefully distinguished from two other similar Upanishadic texts—the Maitreya and the Maitreyī—both to be dealt with in our chapter on the Neo-Upanishads—the former (not yet printed) treating only of the significance of the Rudrāksha beads while the latter (=No. 31 in the Muktika canon) is a compendium of philosophical problems in general prefaced in the beginning by a summary of the first chapter of the Maitrāyaṇī. The Northern and the Southern recensions of the Maitrāyaṇī Upanishad show considerable variations, which are exhibited below—

Maitrāyaṇīya (Northern)	Maitrāyaṇīya (Southern)	REMARKS
Prapāṭhaka I. 1	Absent	Introductory link with Maitrāyaṇīya Br.
——— 2-3	Prapāṭhaka I. 1-2	
——— 4	——— 3-7	Smaller sub-divisions: no change in contents.
——— II. 1-5	——— II. 1-5	
——— 6	——— 6-9	Contents the same.
——— 7	——— 10-11	Ditto.
——— III. 1-5	——— III. 1-5	
——— IV. 1-2	——— IV. 1-2	
——— 3	——— 3	
Absent	——— 4	Extra 11 stanzas.
Prapāṭhaka IV. 4-6	Absent	Trika-Upāsana, as also Trimūrti-jyeshṭhya.
——— V. 1	Prapāṭhaka IV. 4	Kautsāyanīstuti = stanzas 12-15 in Southern rec.
——— 2	——— 5	
——— VI. 1-8	——— V. 1-8	
——— 9-38	Absent	
——— VII. 1-11	Absent	

Differences of reading apart, a mere consideration of the above tabular statement should enable us to put down Prapāṭhaka vii

and sections 9 to 38 of the sixth in the Northern recension as two of the latest accretions. A little earlier than these comes the whole text beginning with the " Kautsāyanī stuti " (North. v. 1–vi. 8 ; South. iv. 4, stanza 12, to v. 8), which must have been an addendum likewise. The " Trika " and the " Trimūrti " passages of the Northern recension are an independent addition of that text, balanced by the eleven stanzas describing Yogic perfection in the Southern recension, which are formally introduced as citations. The rest of the Upanishad seems to have once formed a unity by itself, although even here it is permissible to regard the Bṛihadratha part of the story as once constituting an independent episode. Other chronological peculiarities and relations of the several units are—

Unit 1, Prapāṭhaka 1 : This forms the outer framework for the inner episode between Śāṅkhāyana and Maitri, in which last is inset the Vālakhilya-Kratu dialogue. As before mentioned, Bṛihadratha's observations on the transitoriness of things have been by themselves used in a little modified form as an opening for another Upanishadic text: the so-called Maitreyī Upanishad. Although the idea is no more than an elaboration of the sentiment in Kaṭha I. i. 26, yet there are many words used in the text that are better known to us from Buddhistic sources. Such words, for instance, are—aśāśvata, kshayishṇu, pradhvaṁsin (which occur in our text for the first time amongst the Upanishads), niḥsāra, vairāgya, saṁsāra, tattvavid (the last two words known only from Kaṭha and Śvetāśvatara so far) ; the medicinal words śleshman, pitta, kapha; the several names of kings who had to die; the penance of Bṛihadratha with raised arms and sunward gaze for 1,000 days (years, one should have expected) ; and the peculiar use of saṁghāta and nirodha—the last occurring in Chh. vi. 5 and Praśna i. 10, but not in the sense of destruction. It is not quite necessary however to regard this as post-Buddhistic since the doctrine of momentariness was itself pre-Buddhistic. Most of the kings are also included amongst the enumerations at the " Pāriplavas " in Aitareya and Śata-

patha Brāhmaṇas. After this evidence for regarding our unit as fairly late amongst the Upanishads of the earlier canon it is unnecessary to add that "agnir ivādhūmakaḥ" and "anyān kāmān vṛiṇīshva" of the present unit suggest Kaṭha II. i. 13 and I. i. 23 ff., or that "nāham Ātmavit" suggests Nārada's similar sentiment in Chh. vii. 1. 3. Pessimistic declamation on the woes of the world, it is necessary to observe, were a characteristic of Sāṁkhya philosophy even before Buddhism took it over and perfected it.

Unit 2, Prapāṭhakas 2-3: This unit falls into 2 sub-units of a Prapāṭhaka each, two distinct questions being mooted in them. Prapāṭhaka 1 describes the highest soul and the way in which he abides within the body in a detached manner, introducing formal quotations from—

Chh. viii. 3-4 in Maitrāyaṇī ii. 2;
Bṛih. v. 9 in———— ii. 6; and
Chh. iii. 14 in———— ii. 6.

There are also shorter phrases borrowed from other sources. The comparison of the body to the cart or śakaṭa in ii. 3 and to the chariot or ratha towards the close of ii. 6 are echoes from the Chhāgaleya and the Kaṭha Upanishads with certain minor modifications. The comparison of the Prāṇa and Apāna to the two vessels Upāṁśu and Antaryāma, between which the soul, like divine Soma, generates heat, is borrowed from the Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā iv. 5. 6; and the functions assigned to the five Winds within the body (although differing somewhat from those found in older texts like Chh. i. 3. 3, Bṛih. iii. 4. 1, etc.) agree with the functions assigned to these Winds in later texts like the Vedāntasāra. It is curious to find in this Prapāṭhaka also, and for the first time amongst the older Upanishads, words like—Buddhīndriya and Karmendriya, Nirātman and Śūnya, Niyaṁtṛi and Prekshaka. The words guṇa and triguṇa, alone and in combinations, we hear for the first time in the present Prapāṭhaka and in the Śvetāśvatara; and the same is true of the words Prakṛiti and Kshetrajña. It is thus clear that these two Upanishads,

along with texts like Chh. vi. 1-6 or Kaṭha I. 3. 10 f. and II. 3. 7 f. have been the matrix of the Sāṁkhya philosophy; and hence it need not surprise us to find in our unit a phrase like "prekshakavad avasthitaḥ svasthaś cha" which recurs in Sāṁkhya-Kārikā No. 65 ; or a description of the Soul within the body as Viśvaḥ (cp.Māṇḍūkya 3) who is "sāṁkalpādhya-vasāyābhimānaliṅgaḥ" or inferable by the mark of conceiving determining, and self-consciousness. Prapāṭhaka 3 seems to have been a little later than Prapāṭhaka 2 because, once it is declared that it is the Highest Soul who abides within our body and quickens it, and that He is merely the On-looker unaffected by the torments of the flesh, the question, Who is it then that enjoys and transmigrates, does not arise at all; and if it does arise, it cannot be answered in the way in which our text seems to answer it. For, the gist of the reply is that this other soul, the Bhūtātman, is evolved from material elements, is subject to modification, and assumes manifold forms through ignorance. This certainly is not the Sāṁkhya position. For, although the " Liṅga-śarīra " (see Kārikā 40) agrees with the Bhūtātman in composition and function, it is an adjunct to the individual Purusha, in fact his psychic apparatus, whereas in our Upanishad the Bhūtātman is the individual soul himself, controlled by the Supreme Soul. The account of the Bhūtātman in the Mahābhārata (XII. 245. 11ff., XIV. 51. 4) is perhaps a middle point between the present Upanishad and the Sāṁkhya-Kārikās. There occur in this Prapāṭhaka, likewise, a few more " Sāṁkhya " terms for the first time—Tanmātra, Prākṛita-guṇa, Rājasa, Tāmasa, and the verb Pari+nam, which (as also the noun Pariṇāma), amongst the earlier Upanishads, occurs in the Śvetāśvatara and the Maitrāyaṇī alone. Noteworthy also are the words Nāstikya and Niraya, the reference to 84 kinds of existences (which in time grew into 84 lacs), and the phrase " nibadhnāty ātmanātmānam " which recurs in Sāṁkhya-Kārikā No. 63 with a slight variation. There are three long citations introduced in this Prapāṭhaka

with the formal "Athānyatrāpy uktam," but they can no longer be traced.

Unit 3, Prapāṭhaka 4, Sections 1-3: These constitute an epilogue to the last two Prapāṭhakas, being merely of the nature of Vidyā-stuti or praise of the learning. The diction of the sections, especially sec. 2, reads like a passage from the Kādambarī: compare words like mohamadironmatta, mahoragadashṭa, mithyāmanorama, Yamavishayastha, etc. The words māyāmaya, indrajāla, kadalīgarbha, naṭavesha, and chitrabhitti are also used in this unit for the first time in Upanishadic literature to illustrate the vacuity and impermanence of the things of the sense. Noteworthy also are the words āśrama and svadharma, the former having been used only once before in the Śvetāśvatara.

Unit 4—iv. 4 to v. 2: In iv. 4 the Northern recension of the Maitrāyaṇī prescribes the "trika" or three-fold worship of Brahman by Vidyā, Tapas, and Chintā or knowledge, penance, and meditation, which does not seem to have much bearing on the main theme. The next two sections of the same recension aim at showing that Agni-Vāyu-Āditya or Kāla-Prāṇa-Anna are merely forms of manifestation of Brahmā-Rudra-Vishṇu, and this is practically the burden of the prayer of Kautsāyana in v. 1. The 11 verses that precede the Kautsāyanī-stuti in the Southern recension (but form part of section 34 of Prapāṭhaka vi in the Northern recension) occur most of them with very slight variation in the Pañchadaśī, xi. 111 to 118, expressly as from the present Upanishad. In the Kautsāyaṇī-stuti it is just possible to interpret the words "svārthe svābhāvike 'rthe cha" and "Śāntātman" in a Sāṁkhya sense in reliance upon Sāṁkhya-Kārikā No. 56 and Kaṭha I. 3. 13. The short cosmological fragment coming after this stuti is at all events Sāṁkhya in tone, although we have to distinguish between a *primitive* or Upanishadic Sāṁkhya, which speaks of (i) Para or the Highest Principle; (ii) a combination of Tamas + Rajas + Sattva which corresponds to the First-born material principle; and (iii) the Chetāmātra =

Prajāpati = Viśva = Kshetrajña or sentient soul, forming an aṁśa or part of the "Para" and produced out of the Sattva element in matter set in motion by Him, and the *classical* Sāṁkhya of the Kārikās, which substitutes for one "Para" a number of Purushas, and which reduces the Chetāmātra to the position of a Liṅga-śarīra, one for each Purusha and accompanying him in his transmigrations. The identification of each of the three qualities of the Prakṛiti with Rudra, Brahmā, and Vishṇu is also to be noted.

Unit 5, Prapāṭhaka vi, sections 1-8 : Identity of Prāṇa with Āditya and the worship of both by the symbols *Om*, the three Vyāhṛitis (Bhūr, Bhuvas, Svar), and the Gāyatrī verse (Rv. iii. 62. 10). Even the Dīpikākāra regards this and the following Prapāṭhakas as a Khila and so void of coherence. The Unit is full of quotations and echoes from earlier texts not all of which can now be traced. Vidyāraṇya's Anubhūtiprakāśa does not take count of the last two Prapāṭhakas.

Unit 6, Prapāṭhaka vi, sections 9-17 : Section 9 describes the Prāṇāgnihotra and forms a transition between Chh. v. 19-24 and the later Prāṇāgnihotra Upanishad. This paves the way for a discussion of the Food and the Food-eater in sections 10-13, the Purusha being the Eater and all the products of the Prakṛiti (including therein especially the Bhūtātman) the Food. The Brahman is thus identical with Food. In section 14 Brahman is identified with Time, and it is in this connection that there occurs the famous astronomical statement which makes the Uttarāyaṇa commence from Dhanishṭhārdha, which can happen some 1,800 years B. C. On the basis of this some scholars wish to carry the date of the Maitrāyaṇī towards the beginning of the second millenium before Christ, which would, according to them, also suit the date of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, which last, on the strength of the mention of the rise of the Kṛittikās due East (Ś. B. II. i. 2. 3) is placed by them about B. C. 3,000. But seeing that, as regards the Śatapatha passage, Vernal Equinox in Kṛittikās implied by their position due East is incompatible with the

commencement of the year on the Full-moon of Phālguna (Ś.B.VI.ii.2.18), it is clear that the Śatapatha is in both these statements recording older usages and traditions; and the same must obviously be the case with the present passage in the Maitrāyaṇi Upanishad, which is admittedly a "Khila" and otherwise notorious for its quotations from older texts. The case of course is quite different in a professedly astronomical treatise like the Vedāṅga Jyotisha. — Sections 15 and 16 continue the disquisition on Time introducing therein several quotations, while Section 17 describes the Brahman as infinite and all-immanent.

Unit 7, Prapāṭhaka vi, sections 18-30 : A practical path of liberation in the form of Yoga is here given in detail in about a dozen sections. The eschatological doctrine here given is far more developed than what we had in Kaṭha, Muṇḍaka, or Śvetāśvatara ; but it is yet less developed than what we get in the Yogasūtras, where, for instance, we have eight "aṅgas" of Yoga instead of the six mentioned in vi. 18. Some of the quotations from this unit recur in other minor Upanishads. The following peculiar words occurring in this unit will tell their own tale : ananyabhakta, apavarga, alātachakra, ekāgra, karmavaśānuga, kevalatva (only in the Śvetāśvatara before this) ,turyākhya, Devanikāya, dvandva-titikshā, dhāraṇā, nirātmakatva, nirodhana, Prakṛiti-bheda, pratyāhāra, Pradhāna (before this only in Śvet.), prāṇāyāma, manaḥkshaya, moksha, Yogābhyāsa, viśesha, saṁsāra-chakra, sattvastha, samādhi, sarvaguṇasampanna, sāyujyatā, and sushumṇākhya.

Unit 8, Prapāṭhaka vi, sections 31-32 : Discussions of Ātman and his relation to the indriyas or senses.

Unit 9, Prapāṭhaka vi, sections 33-38 : Miscellaneous topics such as the Year and the Prāṇa as Fire ; the three Worlds as the three sacrificial Fires ; the need of curbing the mind, with many verses that recur in the Brahmabindu Upanishad ; *the multiform energy of Brahman immanent in* ether, fire, sun, breath, etc. ; and reward of Agnihotra.

Unit 10, Prapāṭhaka vii: A very late appendage which it is perhaps futile to distribute into further sub-units. Sections 1-7 describe the whole physical and ritualistic universe as constituting the "bandhus" of the Ātman; and herein occur the names of Śani (Saturn), Ketu, and Rāhu: the last known only from a late passage in the Chhāndogya, viii. 13. 1. Sections 8-10 form a polemic against the heretics who are "vagabonds, beggars, pedants who for a little money sell their learning even to Śūdras; unscrupulous officers, caterers for public amusements, and even criminals; enchanters, pseudo-ascetics, false teachers who teach that there is no soul, followers of Bṛihaspati who slander the Vedic religion, and the like, who wallow in ignorance." The reference to the Chārvākas and probably to the Buddhists is here quite unmistakable. Section vii. 8 quotes and misunderstands Īśa 11. The last section, 11, speaks of the "Om" in the heart; and in connection with it quotes two lines from Pāṇinīya Śikshā and gives a verse summary of Bṛihadāraṇyaka iv. 2. 1-2, which should be compared with the Anubhūtiprakāśa xviii. 10-13. Max Müller's argument for an early date for this Upanishad on the strength of certain non-Pāṇinīya peculiarities of Saṁdhi (e. g., chetāmātra for chetomātra, vidyatā iti for vidyata iti, etc.) which belong to the Maitrāyaṇī-śākhā, and which are preserved in our Upanishad, hardly applies to the later additions to the Upanishad in any case. Thus while the early portions of the Maitrāyaṇi Upanishad may well belong to the pre-Buddhistic period of the inchoate Sāṁkhya philosophy its later portions run practically into the Neo-Upaṇishadic period.

(14) BĀSHKALAMANTROPANISHAD: The credit for the discovery of this and the two following Upanishads belongs to F. O. Schrader, the late Director of the Adyar Library. They were hitherto known only in Anquetil Duperron's Perso-Latin translation. The present Upanishad was published with a commentary as an appendix to the Descriptive Catalogue of that Library, Vol. 1. The text

of the other two Upanishads is known only from a solitary manuscript which is very defective and which we got copied for us. The Bāshkala Upanishad consists of 25 Trishṭubh verses, which in form and language resemble a late vedic Sūkta; and there is nothing improbable in this Upanishad having once formed an integral portion of the Bāshkala recension of the Rigveda. Some of the lines are actually met with in the present Rigveda; and where the similarity does not extend to a whole line, the words and idioms used certainly possess a Vedic ring about them. The story of Medhātithi and Indra, although alluded to in Rv. viii. 2. 40, is nowhere fully set forth. It is however perpetuated in what is known as the "Subrahmaṇya" formula in which Indra is invoked as the "Ram of Medhātithi." Weber suggests that the words Meshóbhūtò 'bhi yánnáyaḥ of Rv. viii. 2. 40 were wrongly divided into yan+nayaḥ instead of yan+ayaḥ, and hence arose the idea of Indra carrying the sage away rather than coming up to him. This explanation of the origin of the legend is somewhat doubtful. In any case our Upanishad has very cleverly taken its cue from the legend and given a poetico-philosophic account of the dialogue between Indra and the Sage. The idea of the Upanishad not only points backwards to texts like Rv. x. 125 where Vāch or Logos speaks of her all-pervading greatness, but also forwards to texts like Kaushītakī iii. 1ff. Along with an enumeration of the usual well-known exploits of Indra and a henotheistic exaltation of him above everything else in the world, the declaration, in the last verse, of Indra as being The One, places this Upanishad on a par with other monotheistic utterances like "Sarvaṁ khalv idam Brahma."

(15) CHHĀGALEYA UPANISHAD.—This is another Upanishadic text which in its Sanskrit form is now extant in just one incorrect and incomplete Ms. in the Adyar library. The Upanishad is highly poetic, and its form vouches for it a rather early than a late position. It opens in the right Brāhmaṇic style with the Sages practising penance on the Sarasvatī; launches forth into a discussion as to what makes a Brahmin a Brahmin; mocks at the exaggerated claims put forth by the priests; and by the help

of a "metaphor of the cart" seeks to set forth the relation of the soul to the body, herein suggesting Maitrāyaṇīya Upanishad ii. 3 (where the Vālakhilyas correspond to the Bāliśas of our text), and also a text like Milindapañha 251 (Warren's Translation, pp. 129-133). It is curious that our Upanishad, like the Pāli text, should end with a couple of verses which epitomise the whole incident. Judged by the language alone the Chhāgaleya strikes us as being earlier than the Kaṭha. The mention of Kavasha Ailūsha (the handmaid's son), of the Naimisha forest, and of the Kurukshetra, deserves to be noted. The Upanishad gets its name from the fact that sage Chhāgaleya is declared at the end as having been the narrator of the whole story.

(16) ĀRSHEYA UPANISHAD.—This is a third Upanishadic text the Sanskrit original of which is now represented by just one Ms. in the Adyar Library. The Ms. is incorrect although complete. The Upanishad preserves the general Brāhmaṇo-Upanishadic tone and idiom but strikes us as being later than the two preceding ones. Like some of the more well-known texts from the Chhāndogya or the Bṛihadāraṇyaka, the Ārsheya Upanishad attempts to record a series of progressively more accurate attempts to define and specify the "Brahman." The disputants here are the sages Viśvāmitra, Jamadagni, Bharadvāja, Gautama, and Vaśishṭha, the first, third and fifth of them being the well-known seers of the third, sixth and seventh Maṇḍalas of the Rigveda. Jamadagni and Gautama are also notable figures of the Vedic age, the first being associated with Viśvāmitra, the last with Yājñavalkya. The progressive definitions of the Brahman find their climax in the Ātman, in the description of which the negative language of Yājñavalkya is reproduced. Another verbatim reproduction of an older Upanishadic text occurs in Gautama's description of the Golden Purusha (cp. Chhāndogya i. 6. 6). Curious also is the allusion in the same description to the Puṇḍras, Suhmas, Ūlumbhas, Daradas, and Barbaras as peoples possessing a false kind of knowledge. The Upanishad ends with a metrical quotation from some Vedic Sūkta not known to the Vedic Concordance.

11. CRITICAL NOTES ON SOME PRE-UPANISHADIC UPANISHADS.—We will now select a few passages from the later Brāhmaṇa texts which happen not to be called Upanishads but which contain all the characteristics of Upanishads, and which anticipate in a remarkable manner some of their philosophic discussions. It is neither possible nor profitable to cull together in this place *all* such passages from the Brāhmaṇas. Half a dozen typical texts will suffice to show the general method and trend of their speculation.

(1) PRĀṆA THE TRUE AGNI [Ś. B. x. 3. 3] : This is a dialogue between the Wise Śataparṇeya and the Noble Jābāla which reminds one of a similar discussion as to the nature of the Agnihotra between Janaka and Yājñavalkya (above, page 85). The form of the narration, the graduated advance to a correcter category, and the prescribing of subsidiary rewards at each stage of the argument, are all highly reminiscent of certain well-known passages from other Upanishads.

(2) DISPUTE OF THE DEITIES FOR PRECEDENCE [J. U. B. iv. 11-13]: This might be regarded as an Adhidaivika parallel to the Dispute of the Faculties (see page 106 above) ; and as the dispute of the latter is decided in favour of the Prāṇa so it is now here decided in favour of the Wind. The story concludes with a ritualistic winding-up and an indentification of Vāyu=Prāṇa=Om=Sāman.

(3) VĀYU-PRĀṆA AN ENTIRE DIVINITY [Jaim.-Up. Br. iii. 1-2] : It is very likely that the present passage has been the source of Chh. iv. 3. 1. The idea that a higher deity includes and transcends the lower seems to be the leading idea of this passage as also of the "Daivaḥ Parimaraḥ" passages in the Ait. Br. viii. 28. 2ff. and elsewhere. In the present case the similarity extends upto even the metrical riddle which the disregarded beggar puts to the two proud Brahmins that deny him food.

These three Brāhmaṇa texts exhibit three diverse approaches to the same problem: ritualistic, mythological and narrative. Like Prāṇa-Vāyu, the Sun also has been made the occasion of much monotheistic speculation —

(4) MYSTERY OF THE SUN [J. U. B. i. 25-30] : As representing the third step of Vishṇu, the Sun is himself the immortal goal to which the pious repair after death. He is the source and fountain-head of Water, the First Principle of all creation, and his rays bring life to the universe. These very common ideas have been expressed often enough in a variety of form.

(5) SEARCH AFTER HEAVEN [Jaimini Br., Extract 209] : There are a large number of stories current in the Brāhmaṇas of the Sāmaveda in connection with the origin of some of the modes and tunes of the psalms, which often contain much curious speculation. The story we have selected here is typical of many others which are scattered in the Brāhmaṇa literature, and of many others which probably have been lost to us for ever.

(6) DATVA AND MITRAVID [Jaim. Br., Ex. 152] : A large number of stories of pupils staying in the house of the teachers and performing menial work and receiving at times a rather rough and capricious treatment from the latter must have been once largely current. The Upanishads have preserved only a few of the philosophically significant ones. A few more are found in the Brāhmaṇas and in the Epic. We choose here that of Datva and Mitravid which has not got any Upanishadic parallel, but which is interesting on its own account.

(7) STORY OF PROUD BHṚIGU [Ś. B. xi. 6. 1] : This is mainly a ritualistic parable ; but its form is highly poetic, and in time it came to be used for other higher purposes.

(8) THE EATER AND THE EATABLE [Ś. B. x.6 . 2] : The sixth and the tenth Kāṇḍas of the Śatapatha contain much Upanishadic matter. There are several cosmological passages and also briefer speculations which later got elaborated into the well-known Upanishadic texts. The present text should be compared with passages like Tait. iii. 7 or Bṛih. i. 4. 6.

12. CHRONOLOGICAL GROUPING OF THE UPANISHADIC TEXTS. — These Brāhmaṇa passages could very easily have been multiplied, but it is not necessary for our purpose. We will now attempt in a tabular form a chronological grouping of the several units into which we have distributed our Upanishadic and pre-Upanishadic texts—

CHRONOLOGICAL GROUPING OF THE UPANISHADIC TEXTS

GROUP ONE (BRĀHMAṆIC)		GROUP TWO (BRĀHMAṆO-UPANISHADIC)			GROUP THREE (UPANISHADIC)			GROUP FOUR (NEO-UPANISHADIC)	
Early	Late	Early	Middle	Late	Early	Middle	Late	Early	Late
A.Ā. ii.1-3	A.Ā. iii	Īśa	Tait.ii.1-5,9	Chh. iii. 15	Kaṭha I. i-ii	Praśna(?)	Kaṭha II	Bṛih.ii.6 (Vaṁśas)	Māṇḍūkya
Bṛih. i.1-2	Tait. i	Bāshkala	Chh. iii. 14	——16-17	Chh. v.3-10	Chh.iv.1-3	Tait. ii. 6-8	——iv.6 (Vaṁśas)	Svet. iii-iv
Chh. i	Kena iii-iv	A.Ā.ii. 4-6	——v. 1-2	——18	Bṛih. vi. 2	——4-9	——iii.7-10	——vi.5 (Vaṁśas)	Mait.iv.1-3
Bṛih. i. 3		Bṛih. 1. 4	Bṛih. vi. 1,3	——19	Kaush i.	——10-15	Chh.viii.1-6	Chh.viii.13-14	——iv.4-12
Chh. ii	Plus many	Chh.iii.1-11	Tait. iii. 1-6	——iv. 16-17	Kaṭha I.iii	——v.11-24	——7-12	——15	——vi.1-8
	Brāhmaṇic	——12	Kena i-ii	Chhāgaleya	Muṇḍaka	——vi	Bṛih. ii. 2	Bṛih. v.	——9-17
Plus many	texts *re*	——13	Plus many		Śvet. i	Bṛih. ii. 1	——3	——vi. 4	——18-30
Brāhmanic	precedence	Bṛih. i. 5	Brāhmaṇic			——4	——5	Chh. vii	——31-32
passages	amongst	——6	passages		Plus many	——iii	——iv. 3-4	Śvet. ii	——33-38
treating of	the Gods ;		containing		Brāhmaṇic	——iv.1-2	——5	Mait. iii	——vii
Agni sym-	symbolism		developed		passages	Ārsheya	Kaush.ii		
bolically	of Prāṇa,		psychology		giving an		——iii	Plus many	Plus many
	Vāyu, Sun;				advanced		——iv	late interpo-	still later
	ritualistico-				cosmology		Śvet. v-vi	lations in	interpola-
	philosophic						Mait. i	the Upani-	tions in the
	stories ;						——ii	shads	Upanishads
	etc.								

13. TRADITIONAL AUTHORSHIP OF THE UPANISHADS.—It formed perhaps a necessary condition of the very existence of the several Upanishadic texts that we have been so far considering that they should have been assigned to a particular Veda, that they should have been appropriated by a particular vedic school or Charaṇa. We find at the beginning or the end of several of these texts what are known as Vaṁśas or traditional succession of teachers and pupils, who probably were mainly responsible for the preservation and transmission of these holy words of wisdom to succeeding generations. The apostolic line of succession is in most cases traced back to some God or semi-divine sage who, after the completion of the normal period of apprenticeship, first granted the revelation to the pious mortal whose name is usually mentioned in the text itself. But we have no reason to suppose that the present form of an Upanishadic text is the original form in which it was revealed, or the final form in which the last member of the succession list knew the doctrine; for, with each set of pupil and teacher the apprenticeship and the initiation had to be gone through afresh; and it is quite conceivable that with a given set of learner and master the process of instruction assumed a more vivid and dramatic form, and the dogma itself was expressed and embellished in a very happy manner,—in which case it might often happen that it was this improved form by an author whose identity could no longer be established that alone was preserved in our Upanishads.* At the same time, and as a necessary corollary from this, it could also happen that, where a particular dramatic setting was known to be popular, it should have been adopted *everywhere*, ignoring historical truth. Hence it is that certain familiar openings and certain familiar names, such as that of Śvetaketu, Āruni, Pravāhaṇa, and others, meet us so frequently on the pages of the Upanishads. All these names, in relation to the specific doctrines that are

* This must have been the case particularly with the Saṁvarga-vidyā of our philosopher Raikva "of the cart." For all the sacrifice that king Jānaśruti makes for it, he seems to get in return what is merely a common-place of Upanishadic philosophy. Similarly, in the Śrīmantha ritual (Bṛih. vi. 3. 7 ff.), along with the original form of the doctrine, the additions made by each set of teachers and taught are also recorded.

connected with them, are—some few exceptions apart—mostly poetic or pious fiction, especially when it is remembered that the Upanishadic texts as we now have them preserve for us, in a Brāhmaṇic form and setting, doctrines which originated in a distinct and, possibly, even hostile circle. Thus, at the most, it is the spirit of the original doctrine that can be said to have been generally preserved in our texts, but not always the form. In view of this fact, the question raised by Deussen, Garbe, and others, and at times discussed with evident animus, as to whether the Upanishads have preserved for us the " wisdom of the Brahmins or of the Kshatriyas " loses much of its cogency and force. We could just as well say that some of the doctrines in the Upanishads came from teachers neither Brahmin nor Kshatriya, but belonging to what would probably in these days be called " depressed " classes, such as Sayugvā Raikva. There is absolutely nothing improbable in this, as there is nothing against our supposing, if we choose, that a doctrine like the " Pañchāgni-vidyā was of a Kshatriya origin ; but even apart from the consideration that such really " Kshatriya " vidyās are relatively very few in number, the Upanishads as we have them before us, it must be noted, preserve for us, even in the case of the above vidyās what seems to be mainly a Brāhmaṇic tradition : compare, for instance, the dominance of the idea of the sacrifice even in the working out of the details of the Pañchāgnividyā. We would be therefore justified in assuming that the names occurring in our texts have become more or less conventional, being suggested for the most part by the literary and artistic requirements of the case.

14. THE PERSONNEL OF THE UPANISHADIC DIALOGUES.—It is considered from this point of view that the several interesting figures that flit across the canvas of our Upanishads acquire a new significance. The seeker after the Highest Truth is generally a youthful figure just commencing his career as a pupil and, per chance, like Satyakāma Jābāla, unable to say who his father might have been ; or having just completed his pupilage and, like a Śvetaketu or a Bālāki, redolent with the pride and self-assurance of a full-fledged Bachelor. Sometimes, however, it is a pedant or a

green old "Āchārya" who, for once, has had to puzzle over a problem himself (like Āruṇi in the Kaushītaki), or has at last realised that too much learning is a mere weariness of flesh (like Nārada in the Chhāndogya); or a liberal and appreciative king, like Janaka, learned, and ever ready to learn more. But young or old, rich or poor, our candidate for truth is bent upon his object. Like Nachiketas he is full of enthusiasm for learning and is proof against all kinds of temptations, like Satyakāma he is ready to cheerfully perform any menial work at his master's house, even when for all his loyal service the master would not impart the instruction, as it happened to Upakosala; and above all, when the instruction is at last imparted, he would constantly brood over it and would not, like Virochana, unreflectingly swallow all that is said. The Upanishadic teacher was in every way worthy of such an ideal pupil. He was humble, even at times famishing, like Ushasti Chākrāyaṇa: Nay, he might at times be the very beggar whom a couple of rich house-holders drive away from their door, the beggar nevertheless peacefully singing his song of wisdom. He was a keen observer of men who would tell off characters from countenance; a rigorous task-master who would sternly reprove all indolence, insolence, and cant; and withal eager to teach and most patient and resourceful with his pupils, once they had successfully stood their test. It is accordingly a high compliment paid to this sacred profession of teaching when we find included amongst the roll of Upanishadic teachers not only Yama and Varuṇa and Prajāpati, but even the household Fires, the cow or the bull, the swan, the diver-bird, and even the dog: for, all Nature is full of sermons for us, did we but have the meekness, the docility, the responsiveness that can come only of true inward worth, of real spiritual "Tapas." The varied cast of characters introduced by these Upanishads is thus quite adequate to meet the demands of the highest art.

15. THE SCENIC BACK-GROUND OF THE UPANISHADS.—The scene was normally laid in the house of the teacher with the holy Fires duly tended and blazing cheerfully in the courtyard, and the teacher's wife, kind, loving and compassionate, ready to put in a

word of sympathy or encouragement for the pupil on occasions; or in the open meadow, with cows grazing and fattening under the pupil's fostering care, age-worn Aśvattha trees yielding shade and sermons to all those that sought them, and sacred watering places that mirrored everything into their unruffled interior. At times however there was a shifting of the back-ground: It was a retired place in the forest away from the turmoil of mankind, some inaccessible mountain-recesses where, unmolested, the teacher could impart his instruction, secular or spiritual, magical or mystical; or what answered the purpose equally well, a royal court or a sacrificial session, crowded with throngs of men gathered together from different places and impelled by different motives high and low. There was generally in the latter case some master of the assembly who laid the wagers, regulated the discussion, and assigned the rewards, and who was normally expected to decide points of dispute, unless there existed a *solvitur ambulando* in the shape of the pupil's self-realisation, or the over-weening opponent's head-bursting. The drama of instruction would be extended over a day or two, a few months, a year, and sometimes indeed as many as 101 years—the interval between successive instructions being employed in meditation and self-discipline, in Tapas and Vrata of one sort or the other. -- To be more exact we must add here that there are also a number of Upanishadic texts for which no attempt is made to assign a definite personnel and back-ground; and even where these are assigned, they are never introduced and described for their own sake.

16. THE LITERARY FORM OF THE UPANISHADS.—The Upanishads have attained a varying measure of success as regards their literary form, their artistic frame-work. The earliest Upanishads mostly consisted of short simple disquisitions on single isolated problems. The Īśa, the first unit of Kena, and the Bāshkala are instances in point; and the shorter units of longer texts like Chhāndogya iii, or Bṛihadāraṇyaka vi, might also be cited as illustrations. Then came the attempts to treat a single topic in a variety of ways: you might offer a mystic etymology for Udgītha, expatiate upon the cosmic and psychic "Bandhus" or correlates

of the Udgītha, tell a couple of stories or parables about it, and wind up by prescribing some specific vrata or upāsanā in that connection, as has been done in Chhāndogya i. Or, to take another illustration, you might discuss the problem of the One and the Many by offering a number of similes and analogies from the outward creation, or by taking the learner to the beginning of creation and narrating a cosmological myth or two, or finally, by asking him to look within himself and reflect upon the happenings of the wakeful, dreaming, and sleeping states of consciousness—observation and experimentation going on side by side with inward meditation (Chhāndogya vi). A dramatic element may sometimes be introduced into the above by eschewing the narrative or hortatory form and substituting for it the dialogue form, the characters participating in it being, may be, two fellow-students, or the father and the son, or even the husband and the wife. A more beloved form of opening is to bring together a chance encounter of three, or six, or more learned Brahmins, who, falling into a discussion on questions such as, What is the highest goal (gati), What is the real Agnihotra, Who is the true Vaiśvānara, or What makes the difference between a living body and the corpse, and unable to decide the point amongst themselves, repair to a third party to get their doubts set at rest. Single sustained episodes with a prevailingly poetic story form, such as what we find in the fourth chapter of the Kaushītaki, first chapter of the Kaṭha, or the unpublished Chhāgaleya, exhibit a growing artistic consciousness, the high-water mark being reached in the Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa of the Bṛihadāraṇyaka. In the great Symposium at Janaka's court, for instance, there is great art displayed even in the sequence of the interrogatory: the discussion starting with what might appear as puerile priestly questions characteristic of the Brāhmaṇas and forming, according to the ideas of the day, the essential propædeutics to the culminating philosophy of the Upanishads—the langauge alternately rising and falling in answer to surging inward emotion, summoned up by the grandeur and dignity of the subject matter, until at last it bursts all bounds and pours forth into the exquisitely polished periods of the Antaryāmi-Brāhmaṇa (iii. 7), from which, as by a jerking pull of

the bridle, we are forced back to the stern realities of life, with the figure of poor Śākalya wagging his head in superannuated wisdom —only to lose it, brain and bones and all, so that even the last obsequies could not be performed for this master of priestly learning! The entire effect is unutterably solemn.

17. ITS WEAK POINTS.—But it is not everywhere that the Upanishads have reached this high-water mark of literary finish. As in the Brāhmaṇas themselves, so in these Upanishadic texts which are placed at the end of them, we do occasionally meet with fanciful word-plays, redundant repetitions, ritualistic conceits, threadbare symbolising, sacerdotal rewards and cursings and prescriptions and puerilities without number: and these in places the least expected. The grain and the chaff, the prophetic utterances and priestly twaddle, occur in inconsequential juxtaposition, so that it seems as if the one is the invariable concomitant of the other. There are also inconsistencies and contradictions conscious and unconscious, digressions that largely impede the progress of the argument, far-fetched analogies, and, once in a while, pedantic gossiping and absurd myth-mongering. A beloved framework for a sentence or a paragraph is repeated *ad nauseam*, is spun out *ad infinitum*. Nor are the Upanishads in any way immune from the characteristic defects of the Brāhmaṇic style in general. A comparison with the Dialogues of Plato, suggested by their common literary form, and even by such minor points of resemblance as the frequent use of similes and myths, would be rather misleading, because of the brevity of the Upanishads as compared with the longer literary essays of Plato, where moreover the artistic impulse is consciously realised and is developed with far more consummate skill, and with an eye to the dramatic requirements of the case, including accuracy of character-portrayal. Plato also conducts the discussion from the strictly rational point of view. The "Dialogues" of the Buddha perhaps form a nearer literary parallel to Plato; but we need not pursue the topic in this place any further. In an ultimate estimate of the literary value of the Upanishads it is however necessary to remember that the texts, as we have them before us, have suffered many late interpolations; that the exi-

gencies of memorising a whole text and the absence of anything like copy-right in literary matters might have been responsible for certain repetitions and borrowings that seem offensive to the modern taste; that as all the speculative effort of the texts had an immediately practical end, viz., Self-realisation, the digressions on Yoga or Tapas or Vrata or Upāsanā could not possibly have been avoided: and that a like reason can be assigned for the intrusive element of magic and witchcraft and of the *argumentum baculinum*.

18. UPANISHADIC STYLE.—The Upanishads in their present form are no doubt meant to constitute a continuation and culmination of Brāhmaṇa philosophy: they are in any case coloured by Brāhmaṇic mode of speculation; and Deussen was naturally led to conclude that the earliest Upanishads must have been, like the Brāhmaṇas themselves, written in prose. Since however we have, even in the Saṁhitās, many texts that can be called Upanishads (Īśa and Bāshkala are already so called), it is evident that prose or verse cannot in itself constitute a sure chronological criterion. Other literary considerations must have determined the choice of this external form. Prose was better adapted for discursive narration, verse for a pointed epigrammatic writing. Prose was inevitable in a work which was professedly exegetic; but ideas formulating themselves outside the sphere of priestly exegesis might instinctively adopt the verse form of expression. It is to be noted also that in our so-called prose Upanishads there are many passages of a highly poetic rhythm which are prose only in the name; just as, *per contra*, in some of our metrical Upanishads there are verses which are no more than measured prose. In the best written Upanishads—whether in prose or in verse—there is in evidence a real power in marshalling words and images, a directness and precision, and an astonishing facility in summoning up homely and life-like similes to break and vary the monotony. The Upanishadic similes cover an extensive range. We meet therein the lonely spider spinning out his web, the busy bee garnering up honey from varied flowers, the tethered bird vainly fluttering in his cage, a tired fish swimming from bank to bank, the spirited

horse from Sindhu pulling up his pegs and leggings, or the snake that has cast off his slough or is lying, when dead, with his body upturned on the ant-hill ;—also, from another sphere of observation, waters streaming down the slopes or rivers mingling their waters with the ocean, salt disappearing in water or oil remaining immanent in the seed, spokes fixed in the felly of a wheel or a razor fitted into a razor-case, butter churned out of curds or the slender pith to be extracted out of the Muñja grass, a piece of sod hurled against the rock and shattered into fragments or an iron tongs with which you pick up the ember and save your fingers ;—or, once again, the potter or the goldsmith or the blacksmith who fashions all kinds of pots or ornaments or implements from the self-same material, the blind man who vainly poses to lead another blind man or the blind-folded foreigner released in the forest and unable to discover his way or the hand-cuffed robber who submits to the ordeal of clasping the red-hot axe of steel, or finally, the king who either assigns duties to the officers under him or keps his subjects well under his control or has his entree into the country anticipated and prepared for by anxious village headmen and other local politicians who improvise for the purpose dêpots of food and drinks of all kinds. Added to these we have sustained metaphors such as that of the human body and the chariot (Kaṭha I. 3), or the human body and the fortified town (ibid. II. 2 and elsewhere), or the human body and the tree (Bṛih. iii. 9) ; also the Saṁsāra as an Aśvattha tree (Kaṭha II. 3), the Sun-orb as a bee-hive (Chh. iii), or the soul and the God as two birds perched on the self-same tree ; —to say nothing of longer Upanishadic texts which, on ultimate analysis, are just of the nature of a formal elaboration of an analogy. Mixed up with all these poetic images we also find in our texts, unhappily, some bald ritualistic images, and abstract similes and symbolisms grounded eventually on some puerile word-punning, or suggested possibly by abstruse technicalities of grammar, metrics, or phonetics. There are also, once in a while, dark riddles, the *penchant* for which was an heritage of the older Vedic period.

19. UPANISHADIC METHOD OF PHILOSOPHISING.—A glance at the chronological table on page 135 would make clear to us how it

was only gradually that our Upanishadic philosopher succeeded in freeing himself from the incubus of ritualism. Passages of philosophical interest occur in the texts of the first group only incidently, only as a by-product of sacrificial symbolism. There are a few philosophically significant stories ; and deities like Vāyu-Prāṇa, Āditya, and Śiva-Rudra seem to have attained in speculative matters the same pre-eminence that Prajāpati had already secured in matters sacerdotal. The earliest strivings after monotheism and pantheism, we have reasons to suppose, were connected with the Upāsanā of these divinities ; but Ātma-vidyā as an end in itself, independent of the ritual of the sacrifice, came to be formulated only in texts of the second group, necessitating in consequence a re-adjustment of values in the interest of a compromise. We now find philosophical speculation indulged in for its own sake, although it was naturally only in terms of the sacrifice, only within a ritualistic frame-work. The highest philosophical creations of the period are comprised in texts of the third group; but even here it is not unusual to find things equated and even identified with one another on mere syllabic similarities and other fancied analogies of one sort or the other. The dominance of the " Bandhutā " philosophy had not yet come to an end. Although the philosophical problems were correctly formulated and, in some cases at least, the solutions reached have been amongst the highest that human reason has reached in any country or age, the *method* of argumentation can hardly be called philosophical. There were no proofs as such : even in one of the best instances of sustained argumentation, viz. Chhāndogya vi, there is at best a mere piling up of similes one over the other ; and how it came about that the last one in the series carried conviction to Śvetaketu which the earlier ones had failed to produce, it must pass one's wit to explain. It is true that the candidate for initiation was always a special *adhikārin* who had to discipline his body and mind by a specific period of Tapas. And it may be that the teacher was expected merely to suggest and the pupil to find out the Real for himself. As a consequence, possibly, appeal had to be made to emotion : rarely to cold, relentless reason. They in fact plainly avowed that the way was barred to reason : and it may not be im-

possible to agree with them so far. The only test of truth, the only way to measure success in argumentation, was the ability of the teacher to carry conviction to the learner, who was expected to keep on striving after Self-realisation—the upward pathway towards that goal being marked by certain subsidiary fruits which fell into the lap of the pilgrim if he maintained his progress. And there could naturally be no forced marches on that path. If an unworthy candidate were to persist even when warned off, he might expect to suffer the inconvenient consequence in the shape of a sudden decapitation. We can thus in a way understand how it was that imprecation came to be the *ultima ratio* of Upanishadic dialectics. Truth, according to the ideas of the day, was to be perceived not argumentatively, but intuitively; and the dawning of that intuition was to be determined by the disciple's desert, by his perfection in Tapas. Knowledge and ignorance, light and darkness, were absolutely contradictory: There could be no mediation between the two, no gradual infusion of the rays of the breaking day into the colours of the twilight, no critical educing of knowledge out of ignorance, no " Maieutics " as Socrates might have syled it. From the point of view of the normal man who goes to philosophy for the solution of his normal problems this was a serious drawback, although it would be unhistorical to condemn an ancient philosophical text from this peculiarly modern, democratic, standpoint. We must not also ignore that, all things said, the Upanishads do nevertheless afford enough to meet the requirements of the cultured man, for whose deepest thoughts and noblest aspirations they have not unfrequently found truest and aptest words—words which, even after the lapse of so many centuries, have lost none of their freshness and inspiration. Credit is also due to our Seers for their unflinching devotion to knowledge, their unabating earnestness of endeavour, their indomitable conviction of the sureness of their methods and the significance of their findings.*

* A more detailed appraisal of the achievement of the Upanishads in the domain of general philosophy will be undertaken in Chapter nine.

CHAPTER FOURTH

A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF UPANISHADIC TEXTS

1. THE SCOPE OF THE EXPOSITORY CHAPTERS.—In this and the following chapters we will now attempt a detailed critical exposition of the several Brāhmaṇo-Upanishadic and Upanishadic texts, taking each work in its entirety and collecting together by problems their philosophical views, scattered as they are in different parts. We begin with the Brāhmaṇic texts of the first group.*

i—viii BRĀHMAṆO-UPANISHADIC TEXTS

2. PRĀṆA THE AGNI [Ś. B. x. 3. 3].—We are told that once upon a time Dhīra Śātaparṇeya repaired to Mahāśāla Jābāla, who was a well-known householder diligently tending the Sacred Fires. Jābāla inquired, "Knowing what hast thou come to me?" to which the wise son of Śataparṇa replied that he professed special knowledge of Agni. "What Agni knowest thou?"—"Speech." "What becomes he who knows that Agni"—"He becomes master of Speech: Speech does not fail him." Apparently the answer does not come up to Jābāla's expectation. He repeats his inquiry once more; and Śātaparṇeya makes the successive replies that it was the Eye, the Mind, or the Ear that was the true Agni. Finally the sage declares that he knew "the Agni who is all this here." At that Jābāla steps down to him, approaches him as a pupil, and begs him to teach him that Agni who is present and immanent in all this universe. He declared: "Verily that Agni is Breath (Prāṇa). For when a person sleeps, his Speech merges into the Breath, and so do likewise his Eye, Mind, and Ear. And

* A reference to the corresponding analytical presentation of the text given in the preceding chapter is concurrently suggested as a corrective.

when he awakes they emerge forth from the Prāṇa." Then follows an exposition of the divine correlates of these bodily functions with the following set of equations :

Speech=Fire ; Mind=Moon ;
Eye=Sun ; Ear=Quarters ; and, Breath=Wind.

"When the fire goes out," continues Śātaparṇeya, "it passes up into the wind, whence they say it has expired ; for it is the wind that blows it off. And when the sun sets, it enters the wind, and so does the moon ; and the quarters are grounded in the wind, and from out of the wind they issue forth again." An eschatological deduction from the above teaching brings the text to a close. Says Śātaparṇeya : "And when he who knows this passes away from this world he passes into the Fire by his Speech, into the Sun by his Eye, into the Moon by his Mind, into the Quarters by his Ear, and into the Wind by his Breath ; and being of one essence with them all, he becomes whichever of these deities he chooses, and roams about as he lists."

3. DISPUTE OF THE DEITIES FOR PRECEDENCE [Jaim. Up. Br. IV. 11-13].—The following six divinities—Fire, Wind, Sun, Breath, Food, and Speech—once upon a time fell to quarreling amongst themselves for pre-eminence, saying : "I am the best ; I am the best: adore me as excellence." Not coming to an agreement they call upon each one to declare his excellence. Said the Fire : "I am the mouth of the Gods and of all creatures. In me are offerings offered. I prepare the food for all. If I were not, the Gods would be mouthless, mouthless all the other creatures : no offerings would be offered : all would perish." "Just so," assented the others : "nothing at all would be left if thou wert not."—Then they interrogated the Wind, who averred : "I am the breath of the Gods and all other creatures. When I depart from any one, he drifts away." —Next they turn to the Sun : "How art thou the best ?" Replied he : "I, arising, become the day ; I, setting, become the night. By me as sight are deeds done. All this cannot happen if I were not."—Thereupon they accosted the Breath, who answered : "It is as Breath that the Fire shines, it is as Breath that the Wind permeates space, it is as Breath again that the Sun rises.

From Breath comes food, from Breath comes speech. He was thus the all-in-all of the whole creation." This claim likewise was allowed.—It was next the turn of Food, who put forward an exactly similar claim as Breath, and to that claim too no exception was taken by anybody.—Finally the word was taken up by Speech who declared that she it was who made it possible for men to know this world and the world beyond. She was also allowed to be most indispensable to the world. And so after this interrogatory the problem did not approach a whit nearer the solution. Fortunately, however, a spirit of compromise prevails. Each of the quarreling divinities was declared to be essential in its own sphere and even pre-eminent; and they even agreed to unite their several pre-eminences for a common purpose, which happened to be ritualistic. This dispute thus ends in a draw, and has not anything of the interest and pointedness of the more familiar Dispute of the Faculties.

4. VĀYU-PRĀṆA AN ENTIRE DIVINITY [J. U. B. iii. 1. 1-2].—More dogmatic than the preceding is the present passage which declares: "One entire deity there is, namely Vāyu; the others are only half-deities." This Vāyu, by a play upon words, is declared to be the home (grahāḥ), and therefore, the one who seizes, i.e., includes within himself and transcends, the others. By still another word-play, Vāyu is declared to be the abode (asta) of all deities, and therefore these others set (asta), are merged back, into him. For, the sun sets and the moon and the stars; and they are not "entire." The fire vanishes, and the day, and the night; and they cannot claim to be "entire." The quarters are subject to delusion, as they are lost at night time; the rain pours down but anon holds up tight; the waters dwindle, and the herbs and the trees: none of these can be "entire", as they are funded back into the Wind. What the Wind is in the outer world, that the Breath is in the inner. For, when a man sleeps he speaks not by his speech, thinks not by his mind, sees not by his eyes, hears not by his ear: all these [four] functions are concentrated in the Breath, which alone is the "entire deity," is the "Sāman." An episodic turn is sought to be given to the above doctrine towards the end of the passage,

where we are told that unto Śaunaka Kāpeya and Abhipratārin Kākshasenin, as they were about to sit down to meals one day, approached a Brahmin beggar and asked for food, which was refused. The beggar admonishes them with the following stanza:

Who is that One God who, the world's Lord,
Has swallowed up the Four Great One's ?
Him, O Kāpeya, many know not, though
In many places, O Abhipratārin, he abides.

Him Śaunaka makes his rejoinder with the following stanza:

The Soul of the Gods and of mortals,
Of golden teeth like the Son of Strength ;
Great they say is his greatness :
Himself uneaten he eats him who eats.

—And needless to say the Brahmin gets his food.

5. MYSTERY OF THE SUN [J. U. B., i. 25. 30].—By a variety of reasoning *à la mode de* Brāhmaṇas the text proceeds to show that the Sun is the ἀρχή of all creation. Thus we read : "Ākāśa was in the beginning of all things ; and Ākāśa is the Sun because it is only by the light of the Sun that we perceive the Ākāśa and everything else." "The whole universe," the text goes on to say, "is an ocean. Heaven and Earth are its two banks. The Sun rises at the shore of the ocean, ascends upwards on the back of the Wind, and reaches the other shore, the beginning, the mid-point, and the goal of his journey being alike grounded in immortality." "Truly" says another passage, "where this one blazes forth, there is immortality. If one reaches the Sun, he thereby tears himself away from death and from evil : But who is there able to go through the midst of the Sun ?" In a pantheistic fashion the Sun, in his aspect of whiteness, is then identified in succession with Speech, Ṛik-verse and Death ; in his aspect of darkness, with the mind, the Yajus-formulæ, Water, and Food ; and in his aspect of the Man-in-the-Orb, with Breath, Sāma-chant, Brahman, and immortality. The Sun is also declared to be one with the Person-in-the-Eye, situate in the centre of the white and the black of the eyeball ; one with the reddish-white or the dark-blue streak of the Lightning. Like Indra, the Sun is seven-rayed, virile, powerful.

It is by the ray of the Sun that whoso speaks, speaks; it is by the ray of him that whoso thinks, thinks; it is by the ray of him that whoso sees, hears, breathes, or eats, respectively sees, hears, breathes, or eats. All forms are in him, in him all functions; and it is as such that one should worship him. "As paths lead together up a mountain, even so do all these rays ascend up to him from all sides."

6. SEARCH AFTER HEAVEN [Jaimini Brāhmaṇa, Extract 209].—Another type of texts frequently occurring in the Brāhmaṇas aims at bringing out the mysterious origin and the peculiar and unfailing efficacy of specific chants and specific details of the ritual. The following two stories will serve to show how Brāhmaṇic ideas were slowly taking an abstract non-ritualistic turn. The story goes that once upon a time Preṇin the son of Somāhita, Madhuchchhandas the son of Viśvāmitra, and Asita the son of Devala commenced a session with the express purpose of winning that Heavenly region which is "beyond where the hawk can fly, and wherein the Atharvans of old were known to reside." Years pass by. Our sages get no news of the Atharvans though these latter came to know of the sages' attempt. One of the Atharvans, Udvanta by name, came down from his heavenly abode to test the sages, holding in his hand a sacrificial spoon.* "What are you about?" he asked. "We want to win that Heavenly region which is beyond where the hawk can fly, and wherein the Atharvans of old are known to reside" they answered. "Have you been ever going to the other side of the village?" inquired the Atharvan.† "Yes." — "To what end?" "Just to walk the way." — "Well, that cannot take you up to Heaven." Udvanta looked into his sacrificial spoon‡ and again questioned: "Do you eat flesh?" "Yes." — "To what end?" "Merely to pacify the craving which the sight of it gives, and also for strength." — "No, that might not

* It must be remembered that the Atharvans were themselves mortal priests once, who won their heavenly abode through righteousness.

† A sacrificer was not to cross the limits of his village during the session.

‡ Looking into a polished and reflecting surface is a method of divination. Pictures of past or future objects and incidents, and of objects situated at a distance, are supposed to be thrown into it. The belief and practice persists in parts of India even to the present day.

leád you to Heaven either." Udvanta looked into his spoon and asked once more : " Have you been meeting your wives during all this period ?" " Yes. " — " To what end ?" " That there might be sons to continue our line. " — " That also is not the way to reach Heaven." Udvanta looked into his spoon once more and interrogated finally whether the sages had been telling untruth,* and if so to what purpose. The sages had to confess that in the cause of love, of friendship, and of gain they had allowed themselves to tell a lie on occassions. " There is absolutely no hope of your ever getting Heaven" said the divine sage ; "stop your session forthwith, and I shall give you a boon each for all your ado." At that, Preṇin who was a sinfully disposed fellow demanded the virile power of seven bulls, and with that the command over the love of whatsoever woman he might feel a desire for. — Madhuchchhandas, the son of Viśvāmitra longed to be the foremost of all Brahmins. — It was Asita Daivala who said : " I want to gaze like you into thy sacrificial spoon." " You alone have chosen the right boon," said Udvanta, and granted him the power to " see" the chant known as " Āsita ". That chant (Sāmaveda i. 93) enabled him to attain Heaven and wherever else he cared to go. " In the morning he would take his seat in the assembly of the Gods, at noon in that of men, viz. at the court of Drupada the son of Vaddhravishṇa, in the afternoon, in that of the Manes."

7. STORY OF DATVA AND MITRAVID [Jaim. Br., Extract 152].— This story is intended to bring out the importance of loyal uncomplaining service to the teacher and the futility of seeking short-cuts to liberation. Datva Sautemanasa and Mitravid Daṁshṭradyumna lived as pupils in the house of Pratidarśa Vaibhāvata, a prince of the Śvikna people. Now Mitravid would tend the preceptor's cows and and do other menial work ; Datva, however, would pass all his time in study. At evening time as the pupils met together the one would say to the other : "Come, comrade. Let us both lay our hands together upon what thou hast learnt to-day from the teacher." The other would say : "Come, comrade. Let us both

* Of course flesh, falsehood and incontinence were forbidden during the period the sacrifice lasted.

lay our hands together on what good service thou hast rendered to-day." Now one day the preceptor imparted the teaching to Datva. That evening the two pupils met together, and as Mitravid was exchanging the usual greeting, "No," said Datva: "I have outmarched you to-day in that the Preceptor has imparted the instruction to me." Mitravid passed that night restlessly. With the morning he went out to tend the cows as usual. One of the cows observed his fallen face, and wishing to save him his grief said: "Don't grieve: I shall impart to you the instruction as to the Devayāna path." She gave him the instruction. That evening as Mitravid met his comrade he said: "Hallo Datva! Thou hast received instruction from the teacher: Knowest thou the Devayāna path?" "No," was the reply. "But I know it." "Do tell that to me." "Very well." And Mitravid, having the nobler disposition of a Kshatriya, imparted the instruction as to Devayāna path.* And Datva thereupon, proposed that as they had both now the knowledge of the Devayāna path they should together attempt that path. "Nay," said Mitravid, "after acquiring the knowledge of that path, it is only by liberality, by one's own individual efforts, that one is able to go by that path. Come: let us first give away, let us toil." — The story goes on to say that in time both attained the Devayāna path.

8. THE STORY OF PROUD BHṚIGU [Ś. B. xi. 6. 1].—Bhṛigu the son of Varuṇa deemed himself superior to his father in knowledge. Varuṇa became aware of that and wishing to teach his son a lesson asked him to go in succession eastward, southward, westward, and northward, and in the direction between the two first-and-last mentioned (east and north), taking a northward course, and report whatever he beheld there. — As Bhṛigu went forth eastwards he saw "men dismembering men, hewing off their limbs one by one, and saying 'This to me, this to thee'." The sight horrified him, but inquiring as to the reason of it all and whether there was a

* It is to be noted that even in this story the instruction re the two paths (which is a part of the Pañchāgni-vidyā) comes from one Kshatriya teacher to another, and thence to a Brahmin. The words of the original are—Tasmād u ha Rājanyabandhur eva Brāhmaṇāt suhṛidayatarah.

chance of saving the men through atonement etc., he was told: "Thy father knows." Thence Bhṛigu turned southward, and westward, and northward only to meet the same gruesome sight: in one case the men were employed in the operation of cutting up the limbs of their victims into still smaller morsels, in the other the victims sat silent as they were being eaten up entire, in the third the victims were crying piteously. For an explanation of all these phenomena he was everywhere referred to his father Varuṇa. As he advanced towards the north-east, young Bhṛigu came upon two ladies, one charming and one past her charms, and between them a black man with yellow eyes and a staff in his hand. The sight of the black man terrified Bhṛigu who at once ran up to his father and sat at his feet. But he could not learn his day's lesson. He wanted his father to explain to him the meaning of the sights he had seen. The first four sights are explained in a ritualistic manner as being the four kinds of offerings: samidhs, meat, milk, and water, that are thrown into the fire. The black man with the yellow eyes, Varuṇa explained, was Wrath sitting between Belief and Unbelief. They could be subdued and won over by specific sacrificial offerings. — The story or the parable, it is evident, does not adequately satisfy the expectations raised.

9. THE EATER AND THE EATABLE [Ś. B. x. 6. 2].—The only interest of this the last Brāhmaṇa passage we analyse is methodological. It is a very common manner with the Brāhmaṇas to reach an abstract philosophical notion by universalising an idea however trivial. The ordinary distinction between the eater and the eatable, when universalised, becomes the distinction between the end and the means; and all things in the world can be viewed under this two-fold relation. And the main point to be noted is that when the eater eats the eatable, the latter becomes of one essence with the former: it no longer remains separate. Thus the Fire is the eater of the fuel, the Sun is the eater of the moon, the 'Uk' is the eater of the 'tham' in the word 'Uktham'; and in the subjective world, Prāṇa (=life or soul) is the eater of the food: the eatable in each case bringing delight to the eater. The Fire, the Sun, the Uktha, and the Prāṇa—and their corresponding eatables

—it must be remembered, are not entities separate and unrelated. Prāṇa (=force or breath) kindles the fire, the fire excites the wind and so helps the sun to mount up the sky, and so on through the whole series. It is thus, by a very queer line of reasoning, that we reach the great truth of the unity and the interdependence of all the things in the world.

ix—MAHĀ-AITAREYA UPANISHAD

10. BAHVṚICHABRĀHMAṆA-UPANISHAD.—The Brāhmaṇa passages we have so far considered dealt, each of them, with a single isolated topic. The texts known as Āraṇyakas exhibit to us a grouping together of a number of more or less allied topics dominated by a common speculative tendency. Aitareya Āraṇyaka ii. 1-3 is the earliest and the best illustration; but in accordance with the plan of this chapter we will consider all the six adhyāyas of the second Āraṇyaka and the whole of the third Āraṇyaka together, under the wider title of the Bavṛichabrāhmaṇa- or Mahā-Aitareya-Upanishad.

11. UKTHA AS THE ESSENCE AND SYMBOL OF THE UNIVERSE.—"Uktha" etymologically signifies that from which things arise, and therefore that whereto the things depart. Hence the earth as the source of all produce, the atmosphere as the goal and limit of all upward motion, the sky as the bestower of life-giving moisture to the whole creation: all these are to be identified with "Uktha." And as the regular Uktha of the Mahāvrata ceremony consists of eighty (aśīti) verses in praise of specific divinity, so for the cosmic correlates of the Uktha we get the following deities and constituents:

UKTHA	DIVINITY	EIGHTY VESRSES
Earth	Agni	Anna or Food
Atmosphere	Vāyu	Ditto
Sky	Sun	Ditto

This triad can be established for the microcosm also—

Mouth	Speech	Anna or Food
Nose	Breath	Ditto
Forehead	Eye	Ditto.

It will be observed that "Food" is the common constituent or ground work of everything; and as Earth is both the food and the

feeder, the eatable and eater, in one, we arrive at the conception of the unity of the whole world, as typified by the great Prajāpati.

12. MAN THE HIGHEST PRODUCT OF CREATION.—Our text now goes on to say that the inmost essence of Prajāpati are the Gods ; the inmost essence of the Gods, the rain ; of rain, the herbs ; of herbs, the food ; of food, the semen ; of semen, the off-spring ; of off-spring, the heart ; of heart, the mind ; of mind, the speech ; and of speech, action : action constituting the be-all and end-all of man.

13. PRĀṆA AS THE "UKTHA" IN MAN.—Brahman now enters man by the toe-ends of his feet, gradually penetrating upwards and giving names and functions to hoofs, thighs, belly, heart, and head. In the head are located the following excellencies : eye, ear, mind, speech, and breath. Now, these five fell to quarreling amongst themselves as to who was the best, the "Uktha." They said "Let us each depart from this body. He at the departure of whom the body would drop down, let him be the "Uktha." Speech departed ; but the body endured, speechless, eating and drinking. Eye departed ; but the body endured, sightless, eating and drinking. Ear departed ; but the body endured, hearingless, eating and drinking. Mind departed ; but the body endured, like one demented, eating and drinking. Breath departed : and at the departure of breath it dropped down. Yet they went on quarreling for precedence. As a further test they decided upon re-entering the body one after another. But until the entrance of the Breath or Prāṇa it lay flat and would not stand up. And so they all agreed that Prāṇa alone was the "Uktha."

14. PRĀṆA EXTERNALISING HIMSELF IN THE UNIVERSE.—It is as a consequence of this that the Prāṇa, as Prāṇa (Up-breathing), typifies the Day as the source and inspiration of all activity ; and as Apāna (Down-breathing), the Night as cessation of all activity. The other bodily functions also typify and are dominated by specific divinities, viz.—

Speech—Fire ; Eye—Sun ; Mind—Moon ; Ear—Quarters ; all controlled by Prāṇa. Thus by Speech Prāṇa gives names to all the objects in the world and binds them together as in a knot. By Speech Prāṇa creates the earth, into which the plants ger-

minate, and the fire, which incubates the plants and causes them to ripen. Through the Speech (?) likewise Prāṇa creates the wind and the atmosphere, and so commands all smells and sounds. Through the Eye he creates the sun and the sky, and so commands sight and heavenly moisture. Through the Ear he creates the quarters and the moon, and so from all quarters good fortune comes to him and the moon assigns to him the bright and the dark half of the month for his religious rites. Through the Mind, finally, he creates the waters and the Varuṇa, the one giving him faith * and the other righteousness. In creating the waters he had practically created the entire universe ; for, water is the root of all universe. Prāṇa accordingly is the Father of all creation, and the basis of it. It is not only the bodily functions but the whole universe is in fact absorbed in him during sleep. He is the death of all, himself immortal. Whosoever knows him thus and worships him becomes himself immortal.

15. PRĀṆA AS THE SCRIPTURE.—In adhyāya second of the Āraṇyaka this same Prāṇa is by a series of fanciful etymologies identified successively with—

1. Śatarchins, or seers of Maṇḍala 1 of the Ṛigveda, so called because they composed about 100 verses each ;
2. Mādhyamas, or seers Maṇḍalas 2 to 9 (?);
3. Gṛitsamada, seer of Maṇḍala 2 ;
4. Viśvāmitra, seer of Maṇḍala 3 ;
5. Vāmadeva, seer of Maṇḍala 4 ;
6. Atris, seers of Maṇḍala 5 ;
7. Bharadvāja, seer of Maṇḍala 6 ;
8. Vasishṭha, seer of Maṇḍala 7 ;
9. Pragāthas, seers(?) of the strophic verses (pragātha) in Maṇḍala 8 ;
10. Pāvamānīs, seers(?) of Soma-sūktas of Maṇḍala 9 ;
11. Kshudrasūktas and Mahāsūktas, seers(?) of the shorter and longer sūktas of Maṇḍala 10 ; and, finally,
12. Ṛik, half-Ṛik, Pada (word), and Akshara (letter).

* Water is constantly equated with faith in the Brāhmaṇas.

16. PRĀṆA AS INDRA.—Through penance Viśvāmitra, we are told, attained to Indra's abode. Indra granted him a boon, and the sage chose to know the real nature of Indra. "I am Prāṇa," said Indra; "so art thou also Prāṇa; Prāṇa, all the beings; and Prāṇa likewise this sun here who shines."

17. PRĀṆA AS THE ALPHABET AND AS THE YEAR.—The "Uktha" consist of 1,000 verses in Bṛihatī metre and so contains all vowels and consonants. The 1,000 Bṛihatī verses (8+8+12+8) yield a total of 36,000 letters, a number which corresponds to the days of 100 years; and so Prāṇa is the full period of a life's duration. "He is also the Intelligence, the Divinity, the Brahman which is beyond that. Prāṇa is my own Self: what I am that he is, what he is that I am."

18. AN ADVANCE FROM PHYSIOLOGICAL TO CONSCIOUS LIFE.—The Prāṇa that was discussed in the preceding paragraphs was mainly physiological in his attributes and functions in spite of the fact that the mind was included amongst the faculties over which he dominated. That the conscious or intelligent life of man is more important than the physiological is brought out in adhyāyas 3 and 4 of this Āraṇyaka, and the statement occurring at the end of adhyāya 2 and quoted towards the end of the last paragraph is to be regarded as merely anticipatory. The word Ātman, Self, is now substituted for Prāṇa, and we are told that whereas the physical elements—earth, wind, ether (ākāśa), water, and the luminaries (fire, sun, etc.) were hitherto regarded as each an "Uktha," i.e., as the origin and the goal of everything, it is the Ātman who is really the five-fold "Uktha" in one; for, from Ātman everything arises and into Ātman everything resolves. The physical elements can have between them the relation of the food and the feeder; water and earth go to the making of the food and are therefore the food; heat (jyotis) and wind help the process of eating and are the eater or feeder, ether being the bowl in which the food is eaten. Similarly, plants and trees are the food for animals, and the animals with one row of teeth are the food, those with two rows, such as the man, the feeder,—man in any case being the feeder only and not the food. It is as a consequence of this that the

Ātman finds a progressively fuller expression in plants, trees, animals and men. For, while plants and trees have sap only in them, the animals have mind or consciousness; and this consciousness is most fully developed in man. "Man is most endowed with intelligence: he speaks intelligently, observes intelligently, knows what is to be to-morrow, knows the world and what-is-not-the-world, and through the mortal in him he aspires after immortality." Thus endowed is man. The other animals are lacking in all these characteristics: hunger and thirst comprise all their power of knowledge.

19. ĀTMAN THE SUBSTRATUM OF THE "FIVE-FOLD."—As being the five-fold "Uktha" it was natural that our text should next try to bring out Brāhmaṇa-wise the dominance of the "five-fold" in the nature and relations of the Ātman. Thus, corresponding to the five *elements*: Jyotis, Ākāśa, Water, Earth, and Wind there are five bodily *constituents* or tissues: Heat, Apertures, Blood-Mucus-Seed, Body proper, and Breath; five *breaths*: Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna, and Samāna; five *sacrifices*: Agnihotra, Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa, Chāturmāsya, Paśuyāga, and Somayāga; five *choruses*: Trivṛit, Pañchadaśa, Saptadaśa, Ekaviṁśa, and Pañchaviṁśa; five *Sāmans*: Gāyatra, Rathantara, Bṛihat, Bhadra, and Rājana; five *parts of the bird* (whose shape the altar imitates): Head, Right-wing, Left-wing, Tail, and Trunk; five *metres*: Gāyatrī, Ushṇik, Bṛihatī, Trishṭubh, and Dvipadā; five *stages of the Sāman*: Prastāva, Udgītha, Pratihāra, Upadrava, and Nidhana; and five kinds of *verse-order*, in connection with which we are told that the nature of number is such that "ten tens are a hundred, ten hundreds a thousand," etc. These details are philosophically unimportant.

20. CERTAIN ETHICAL DEDUCTIONS.—More interesting are certain moral prescriptions which are given to us during the course of the exposition. Thus we are told that man is like an ocean, insatiable. Whatsoever he might have won he would always hanker for more. Were he to win the whole mid-region he would still crave for the world beyond. The only way to kill this desire in man, it would seem, is to mount the Divine Chariot named "Desire-Assasin" which is mounted upon by Prāṇa, and "whose seat is

speech, the two sides the ears, the horses the eyes, and driver the mind." — Further on it is said that speech is a tree "whose blossom-and-fruit is truth, whose roots are untruth." Whoso speaks untruth exposes the roots, and so, like the tree, he withers away. Whoso, on the other hand, speaks truth wins the blossom-and-fruit of the tree and becomes famous and of splendid renown. Now *Om* (=yes) is truth, *na* (=not) is untruth. But if one were to always say *Om*, yes, he would be sure before long to empty himself of everything. If on the other hand one were to always say *na*, no, he would acquire an evil name and bring ruin upon himself. The clever man is he who knows when to give and when to withhold, when to say 'yes' and when to say 'no.' It is thus by a combination of truth and falsehood (satyānṛite mithunīkṛitya) that one prospers in the world. Finally, in connection with the assertion of Mahīdāsa Aitareya that a man who duly recites the thousand Bṛihatī verses goes to heaven and becomes Indra by his present bodily form, the question is raised, "In what bodily form then does the man revert to this world?" The reply is that the form is made by the combination of the blood and semen in the woman and the man, which respectively symbolise the fire and the sun: and "therefore one ought not to despise them." The Ātman who thus assumes life, a concluding verse tells us,—

"Neither by name of woman is he called,
Nor yet by the name of neither-man-nor-woman;
Not by the name of man also may he be named
By one who indeed wishes to name him."

21. A GREAT CREATIONIST MYTH.—With the fourth adhyāya of the second Āraṇyaka begins the Aitareya Upanishad properly so called. It opens with a creationist myth which is an important contribution to Upanishadic cosmogony, and stands on a distinctly higher level than other similar myths. Instead of starting the process of creation with a negative conception like Non-being, or a mythical conception like Night, or an abstract conception like Being, the present Upanishad tells us that what was the first to exist before any creation took place was the Self, enjoying his nude Self-hood; but that having felt the necessity of spreading him-

self out into the world of creation, he first created from himself four different regions. Two were of course the heavens in which the lights are situated and the earth which is the place of mortal existence. Beyond these two regions were created respectively the super-celestial region and the sub-terranean region, which both of them are full of water, as the Upanishad tells us. So the cosmogony of of this Upanishad starts with a creation by the Self, from out of his own recesses, of the super-celestial and the sub-terranean watery regions enclosing on all sides the celestial and the terrestrial regions, which between themselves constituted the globe of the world. The second stage in the cosmogony consists in the creation by the Self of the microcosmic person called the Virāj. The Self fashioned this Person from water which, as has been said above, was already created, and then breathed into his nostrils the breath of life. The third stage in the process of creation occurs when the various sense-organs are described as having been created for the Virāj by the Supreme Self. It was in this way that the mouth, the nostrils, the eyes, the ears, the skin, the heart, the navel, and the generative organ were created. The fourth stage in the creationist process was reached when after these different organs had been created, the corresponding functions were created by the Self and lodged in the various sense-organs afore-mentioned. It was thus that the following functions were created : speech, scent, sight, hearing, touch, mind, down-breathing, and seed. The creation of the organs with their respective functions was followed by the creation of the corresponding deities in the Universe. It was thus that the following deities were created : Agni, Vāyu, Āditya, the Quarters, the Trees, the Moon, Death, and Water. Along with all these different deities, two other appetitive detities are also described as having been created, namely Hunger and Thirst, which of course are the preliminary condition of every functional activity. But the deities were so tortured by Hunger and Thirst that they wanted to enter some other organic body; and not having been satisfied with finding an entrance into the body of a cow or a horse, which were presented to them in succession, they entered the body of man who was next presented to them in the hope that they might

make a co-partnership with Hunger and Thirst in that suitable body. The last stage of the creationistic process took place when the Self saw to his surprise that even though all the deities together with Hunger and Thirst had found a suitable lodgment in his handiwork, "the creation should be yet absolutely devoid of his own presence." How can all this be without myself, he asked himself; and if it cannot be without me, by what way shall I myself enter into it? Thus bethinking himself, he opened the suture at the top of the human skull and entered by that path into the head of man. It is just because he tore asunder the human skull, therefore the opening by which he entered is called "Vidṛiti"; it is just because the place where he is lodged in the human brain is full of intensest bliss, therefore it is called "Nandana." And then having found a suitable place for himself in the head of man he began to peep from that door-way at the rest of creation in order to see if it could proclaim to him any ἕτερος which was other than his own Self. But wherever he saw he saw none but his own Self. It is just because he looked at the whole of creation to see whether there was in it any other being than his own Self, therefore it is that he is called "Idaṁ-dra," which may be taken, as the Upanishadic seer tells us, as the mysterious equivalent* of "Indra," which is only another name for the Highest God.

22. VĀMADEVA'S PHILOSOPHY OF THREE BIRTHS.—The second adhyāya of this Upanishad, the fifth of the Āraṇyaka, takes us to an entirely different conception—the conception of three births as it was formulated by the sage Vāmadeva. We are told that Vāmadeva obtained this mysterious knowledge while he was dwelling in the womb of the mother and observing therefrom the phenomena of the innumerable births of the gods.† He tells us in a very strikingly mystical way that a hundred strong-holds kept him, but

* "Parokshеṇa," for the Gods hate the direct statement and love the indirect mode of assertion—Parokshapriyā iva hi devāḥ, pratyakshadvishaḥ.

† Rigveda iv. 18 and iv. 27, which are the ultimate source for this legend, are generally interpreted as describing the birth not of sage Vāmadeva, but of Indra himself, who was confined in Aditi's womb by iron fetters, and who managed to secure his release by breaking through his mother's side.

like a falcon he broke away from all of them. The piece of knowledge, however, which Vāmadeva seems to have obtained in this manner does not appear to be of any very great philosophical consequence. He tells us that there are three births for a man other than what we know to be his birth proper. When it is once maintained that the son is merely the image and the transcript of the man, it follows that all the main vicissitudes of a son's life are equally the vicissitudes in the life of the man himself. The first birth of man therefore, says Vāmadeva, occurs when he imparts seed to his wife. We are told by the Upanishadic seer that the Self of the son is already latent in the seed of the man. This only means that the fructifying spermatozoon of the man is only his other self. The second birth of the man takes place when the spermatozoon becomes an organic part of the woman's body causing no injury to her, and being nourished by the woman until the son is born as the ectype of the father. This constitutes, according to Vāmadeva, the second birth of the man. The third birth of the man occurs, says Vāmadeva, when the father departs from this body and is born again in some future kind of existence. The theory of three births which Vāmadeva here advances is open to much criticism. In the first place we have no mention in the scheme of the first actual birth of the man himself. In the second place, the committing of the seed to the woman, or the birth of the son from the woman could scarcely be called the birth of the man himself, unless we go merely by words and regard the son as merely the second self of the man (*Ātmā vai putranāmā*). The stages which Vāmadeva indicates are not entitled to the name of the *births* of the man at all. Most charitably interpreted the committing of the seed and the generation of the son might only be called the stages in the progressive evolution of the Self, physically considered. It is true, however, that the rebirth of a man after death might fitly be called another birth of the Self that is in the man. The Self in each human being is qualitatively unique, and must be regarded as suffering bodily transmutations in the uniqueness of his own personal existence. How one Self is the cause of the generation of another is a great mystery; but for that reason we could

not take the birth of the son as constituting the birth of the man. Vāmadeva's philosophy of three births is of value only as it indicates certain stages in the progressive evolution of the Self, and must not be understood as a serious philosophical doctrine. There is decidedly a qualitative discontinuity between the life of a man and the birth of a son to him, and then between the birth of the son and the rebirth of the man; and a philosophy that tries to explain all these events as qualitatively continuous falls very much short of truth.

23. INTELLECTUALISTIC PSYCHOLOGY AND IDEALISTIC METAPHYSICS.—The third adhyāya of the Upanishad (the sixth of the Āraṇyaka) gives us certain indications of intellectualistic psychology and an idealistic metaphysic. Whether these also belong to the sage Vāmadeva himself, it is difficult to decide. The philosopher of this adhyāya, whoever he is, first makes a noteworthy classification of the various psychical functions, at the basis of which, he says, lies intellection. The passage is remarkable as being one of the earliest contributions to a classification of mental stages: "Sensation, perception, ideation, conception, understanding, insight, resolution, opinion, imagination, feeling, memory, volition, conation, will-to-live, desire, and self-control,—all these are only different names of Intellection." It is remarkable that the seer not merely mentions the different levels of intellectual experience such as sensation, perception, ideation, and conception, as different from one another, but also recognises the other two characterisitic forms of experience—viz., feeling and volition—makes a distinction between volition which need not involve the idea of activity, and conation which does, recognising likewise the processes of imagination and memory.* Finally, the intellectualistic trend of thought in the seer is apparent from the way in which he makes intellect the fount and source of all mental

* It is of course possible that the English equivalents used to translate the words of the original convey a sense of precision which might not have been intended. Still some sort of a systematic attempt at classifying the mental states is certainly there, and deserves to be recognised for what it is worth.

activity whatsoever. From such an intellectualistic psychology, it is no wonder that an idealistic metaphysics follows. The intellectualistic seer of this section is an idealist as well. We are immediately told how intellect is the back-bone not merely of psychical functions, but of reality itself: "This god Brahmā, and this god Indra, ... these five great elements (earth, air, ether, water, fire), ... creatures born from the egg, from the womb, and from perspiration, sprouting plants, horses, cows, men, elephants, and whatsoever breathes, whether moving or flying, and in addition, whatsoever is immovable: all this is led by Intellect, and is supported on Intellect. The world is led by Intellect. Intellect is the support. Intellect is the highest Reality." This is as out-spoken an Idealism as Idealism can be. The author says that all the movable and immovable objects in this world, all the creatures which walk or fly, all the elements, and even the gods exist in intellect and by virtue of intellect. This is in the very spirit of Bishop Berkeley: "All the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind; and that their being (*esse*) is to be perceived (*percipi*) or known." To a like intellectuo-idealistic altitude are we taken also by the unknown author of the last adhyāya of the Aitareya Upanishad, and it is impossible for us not to admire the daring genius of that great Upanishadic philosopher.

24. PHILOSOPHY OF THE COMBINATION OF WORDS.—After the identification, in adhyāyas 2 and 3 of the second Āraṇyaka, of the Prāṇa-Vāyu-Ātman with the seers of the Veda and various portions of it, it was inevitable that what are known as the Saṁhitā, Pada, and Krama modes of Vedic recitation should be also subjected to a similar symbolic identification. This is what is attempted by Ait. Āran. iii, which is otherwise known as the Saṁhitā-Upanishad. In the Padapāṭha each word is an independent unit and its finals and accents are not affected by the following word. The Saṁhitā joins the preceding word with the following, making the needful vowel and consonant combinations. These combinations and the consequent modifications in accent must have proved

very puzzling to the student. The secret of the science of combination was in fact placed on a par with other Upanishadic doctrines, and many were the attempts made to elevate the "Combination" into a universal principle. These are exhibited in the following table:

1st Element (*a*)	2nd Element (*b*)	Combination (*ab*)	REMARKS
Earth	Heaven	Wind	Māṇḍūkeya's view;
Do.	Do.	Ether	Mākshavya's view;
Speech	Mind	Prāṇa	Śūravīra's view;
Mind	Speech	Truth	His son's view;
Earth	Heaven	Rain	Śākalya's view;
Lower part of man's body, where the seed (fire) is	Upper part of man's body, where the eye (sun) is	Hollow space between the two, where Prāṇa (heart) is	Do. *N. B.*—The first two views are Adhidaivata, last three Adhyātma.

In the exposition of these views we are told that Mākshavya substituted ether for wind because the combination must be a self-subsisting entity which the wind was not, being included within the ether; that Śūravīra's son put the mind first, for by mind one first resolves and then utters speech; and that the combination of the mind, speech, and breath within the human body is like a chariot with three horses. It will be seen that in the adhyātma views, and particularly the last, the Self has already become the symbol of the whole universe. Needless to add that the knowledge of the correlates of "Combination" is at each stage accompanied by the promised possession of profuse earthly rewards.

25. PHILOSOPHY OF THE PERMUTATION OF WORDS.—In the mode of recitation known as the Kramapāṭha each word was repeated twice, once with the preceding word and once with the following; and this ensured a better preservation of the text, each word receiving a different accent value according to its position in the combination, and so the position of its natural accent standing out most clearly. This was a complicated form of recitation

which, one can easily understand, excited the vanity of those that knew it and the ridicule of others that did not know it, the ridicule being reciprocated by curses. The original names for the Saṁhitā, Pada, and Krama modes of recitation were, respectively, Nirbhuja, Pratṛiṇṇa, and Ubhayamantareṇa; and these were identified, in order, with the earth, heaven, and ether. A subtle point raised in this connection is the way in which a combined or dipthong vowel (*e*), formed by the combination of (*a*) and (*i*) was to be pronounced. It was required to be pronounced with a slight lengthening of the combined vowel so as to accentuate the two elements of the combination and yet not to make them appear as two: "neither separating entirely nor uniting absolutely." This subtle combination is typical of the combination of the speech with the breath,* of the breath with the wind, of the blowing wind with the Viśve-devas, of these Devas with the world of heaven, of the world of heaven with Brahman. Speech is the symbol of that combination or union; for, "by speech friends are united, by speech all beings." Another symbol is the union of man and wife to produce the son who is, so to say, the father and the mother in one, and yet distinct from each individually.

26. A GALAXY OF METAPHORS.—In the second adhyāya of this Āraṇyaka we get a splendid array of metaphors. The first is that of the "cross-beam and rafters" given by the "Senior" Śākalya. "As on the central cross-beam of a hall the slanting rafters rest, so do the eye, the ear, the mind, the speech, the senses, the body, the whole Self in fact, rest on Prāṇa or breath." The second metaphor, for which Māṇḍūkeya the "Short" seems to have been responsible, equates the breath with the sibilants; bones with the mutes; the marrow with the vowels; flesh, blood, etc. with semi-vowels—the Self thus standing for the sum-total of the alphabet. A third metaphor identifies the Self with the year, the various bones in the body, the marrow, and the several joints being somehow

* Typical in the sense that "when one repeats or speaks, breath is in speech, and speech then swallows breath; while when one is silent or in sleep, speech is in breath, and breath then swallows speech: they both swallow each other"—are one and yet distinct.

made to total up the figure 720 which is the sum of the nights and the days of the year. Kauṇṭharavya, while trying to review the third and the second metaphors by showing that—

360 syllables = 360 days = bones;*

360 sibilants = 360 nights = marrow or breath or seed ;

360 syllabic unions = 360(?) twilights = joints;—

says that the total number of 1,080 represents the sum-total of the rays of the sun, and that of the syllables in 30 Bṛihatī verses. This implies a fourth metaphor of the Self with the Bṛihatī verses. Another worthy named Bādhva takes these four metaphors of the Self as four forms of Self: the corporeal, the syllabic, the metrical or Vedic, and the temporal or cosmic. The essence of the first, says Bādhva, is the conscious Self, of the second the letter *a*, of the third the priest Brahmā, and of the fourth the Sun who gives rise to time. In connection with the last we are told that the incorporeal conscious Self and the Sun are the same; and hence it is that the Sun appears to each and every man. Says the Vedic Ṛishi (Rv. i. 115. 1)—

The bright face of the Gods hath gone up,
The eye of Mitra, of Varuṇa, of Agni.
It hath filled Heaven and Earth and Mid-region :
Sun, the Self of the moving and the immovable.

"That same [Self] the Bahvṛichas formulate in the great Uktha, the Adhvaryus in the Fire, the Chhandogas in the Mahāvrata rite. They see him in this earth, in heaven, in the air, in the ether, in the waters, in plants, in trees, in the moon, in the constellations: in all beings. Him they call the Brahman." Another passage tells us that this person within all beings who is "not heard, not reached, not thought, not subdued, not seen, not understood, not classified, but who himself hears, thinks, sees, classifies, sounds, understands, and knows" is no other than one's own Self.†

* Separate numbers for the bodily parts are not given though the total is said to be 1,080, there being 540 on each side.

† We ignore here the metaphor of the "human body and the lute" for which see above, page 44. The "signs of approaching death" given in Ait. Āraṇ. iii. 2. 4 have obviously very little philosophic in them.

x—ĪŚĀVĀSYA UPANISHAD

27. THE DIVERSIFIED CONTENTS OF THE ĪŚA.—The Īśāvāsya-Upanishad (sometimes shortly called Īśa-Upanishad) has been so named after its initial words (or word), very much like the collection of Scandinavian myths called the "Heimskringla" so named after the opening words of that work. As constituting the last or the 40th chapter of the Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā the Upanishad is also called the [Vājasaneyī-]Saṁhitopanishad. The text, as we have it before us, seems to contain scattered reflections on various topics, the central theme being the attempt to effect a compromise between the older ritualism and the newer metaphysics. The Upanishad has not yet lost its moorings in Vedic mythology, and we have reminiscences in it of Vedic deities such as Mātariśvan, Yama, Sūrya, Prajāpati, and Agni. The Upanishad seems to have been written at a time when a transition was taking place from the old Vedic legendary hymns to the new Upanishadic philosophical verses. The reference to the " Previous Seers," which we have in this Upanishad, presupposes a long line of antecedent thinkers, each philosophising in his own way, the cumulative result of their reflections being transmitted down to the times of the Īśāvāsyopanishad. The Upanishad under consideration is a very interesting specimen of the way in which all sorts of philosophical ideas—metaphysical, mystical, ethical, and eschatological—can be sprung upon us within the short space of only eighteen verses, which contain among them also two very celebrated " Riddles of the Sphinx " which we shall duly notice in the course of our discussion.

28. METAPHYSICS OF THE ĪŚA.—The Metaphysics of this Upanishad takes us to a discussion of the Self, who is regarded as " bright and incorporeal and whole, pure and uncontaminated by evil. He is the seer, the only true *σοφός*, omnipresent, and Self-existent. It is due to this Self that things have been disposed of rightly for eternity"—(Verse 8). A little after this, we are told that even though this bright luminous Self exists as the eternal back-ground of all things, fulfilling all the conditions of the highest Reality, in fact, verily, as the *ens realissimum,* still His face, we learn, is hidden by a golden disk which comes like a cloud between the Sun

and the observer; and in this conception of the "Veil" some have detected the presence of the germs of later illusionistic speculations. Finally, as in every Upanishad so even in this, the author insists upon the identity of the Self in man, and the Self in the sun (verse 16)—a conception which is the current coin of all Upanishadic philosophy.

29. MYSTICISM IN THE ĪŚA.—The mysticism of the Upanishads as a whole is contained in a peculiar description of the Self which they give, and which goes very much beyond a mere metaphysical treatment of it. Metaphysics we should say is as short of Mysticism as mere Thought is short of Reality. The mystical description of the Ātman in this Upanishad tells us that He does not move and yet is faster than even mind; that none of the senses were able to reach Him; that even though He is stationary, He moves beyond anything that has any motion whatsoever. In this way is an attempt made to reconcile contradictions in a mystical description of the Ātman. "The Self moves and yet does not move. He is both far and near. He is internal to everything and yet at the same time He is external to everything that exists." Is this a mere poetic way of putting it, or is it some real mystical description of the "motion and no-motion" of the Self? Only the mystics can say. For our present philosophical purposes, it is sufficient to know that we can reconcile ourselves to such a description only on the hypothesis that the Ātman is uncontaminated by any touch of phenomena; and that it is on account of this that He transcends all seeming phenomenal contradictions.

30. ETHICS OF THE ĪŚA.—One of the main features of the Īśa-Upanishad is the ethical advice that it offers; and it is interesting to note that the ethics of this Upanishad are definitely based upon the metaphysical position advanced in it. The very opening words of this Upanishad tell us that God pervades everything. As a corollary from this metaphysical position, the ethical advice it offers is that a man ought to enjoy whatever God bestows on him in the firm belief that as He pervades everything, whatever is bestowed on him by God must be good. It follows naturally that the Upanishad should forbid us from coveting another man's property. In

fact, and at the conclusion of the Saṁhitā which enjoins all kinds of rites calculated to yield varying fruitions in this life and the next, we are fittingly taught here a lesson of contentment with one's own lot, in the belief that whatever is, is divinely ordained, and is hence good for us. Another moral advice, and one which assumes such a great importance in the later teaching of the Bhagavadgītā, is that man must spend his life-time always in doing action, specifically the Karmas enjoined in the Śāstras, in a mood of believing resignation to His will. Inactivity, according to this Upanishad, would be the canker of the soul. It is only when a man spends his life-time in doing actions in this manner that he can hope to attain the ideal of *Naishkarmya*. The connecting link between the doctrine of "action throughout one's life-time" and the anticipated result of "actionlessness" as the goal of human life can be only a complete mental detachment from action; but this is not prominently placed before us in this Upanishad. Finally, the text goes on to say that a man who sees all beings in the Self, and sees the Self as existing in all beings: in fact, for whom all beings and everything that exists have become the Self—how can such a man turn away from anything in disgust? How can such a man suffer infatuation? What ground would such a man have for grief? Loathfulness, infatuation and grief verily proceed from our not being able to see the Ātman in all things. But a man, who realises the oneness of all things, for whom everything has become the Self, must *ipso facto* cease to be affected by the common foibles of humanity.*

31. ESCHATOLOGY OF THE ĪŚA.—The eschatological hints which the Īśāvāsyopanishad throws out are not less interesting. Those who die soul-less, says the Upanishad, go to the region called "Asurya," which is full of pitchy darkness. The author does not discuss where those who are not soul-less go after death. Those, however, who have murdered their souls in life must, according to our author, go

* Readers of James' Pragmatism will remember into what exultation he is carried in discussing the ethical import of the metaphysico-mystical realisation of the oneness of the Self. It were much to be wished that he had seen the original of the conception over which he so exultantly expatiates, in a section like the one in the Īśāvāsyopanishad to which we are referring.

to a region like the Hades which, however, is denominated in the present Upanishad as the "Asurya" region. Whatever the original significance of this word might be, it is evident that in the present passage the word has an altogether mythological colouring. Then again our author tells us in a pessimistic vein that at the time of a man's death, the vital breath is merged in the wind of heaven ; what remains of the body here on earth is consigned to flames, and is merely reduced to ashes. When the author has thus prepared our mind to think of this gloomy situation, he suddenly recalls our mind to a contemplation of the deeds which are performed in one's life-time. The implication here seems to be that a man must consider the deeds performed by him in his life-time as his guardian-angels, and that it is these which possibly assign to him the kind of existence which he merits. This eschatological suggestion has evidently an ethical bearing inasmuch as it fully fixes on man the responsibility of all the actions which he has done in his life time.

32. THE "RIDDLES OF THE SPHINX."—We must now pass on to a consideration of one of the most important topics in the Īśāvāsyopanishad, namely, the discussion of the two riddles propounded in this Upanishad which have taxed the brains of all theological commentators over a right interpretation of the philosophical texts so as to make them conform to their own particular dogma. We must therefore try to face the situation as it exactly presents itself before us in verses 9-14 of this Upanishad, without being unduly influenced by these dogmatic exegeses that undertake to prove either that right knowledge is uniquely superior to works, or *vice versa*, or that only a combination of knowledge and works is essential for the realisation of the highest end of human life. Briefly stated the two riddles that have been propounded here may be thus expressed : (1) those who go in search after Avidyā enter into blind darkness, but those who betake themselves to Vidyā enter into greater darkness still. It is only those who know both Vidyā and Avidyā *together* that conquer death by means of Avidyā, and attain immortality by means of Vidyā. (2) Those who go in search after Asambhūti enter into blind darkness ; but those who betake themselves to Sam-

bhūti enter into greater darkness still. It is only those who know both Sambhūti and Asambhūti *together* that conquer death by means of Asambhūti, and attain immortality by means of Sambhūti. The great questions that arise here may be stated as follows: What is meant by the expressions Avidyā and Vidyā? What is meant by the expressions Asambhūti and Sambhūti? How is it that while Avidyā and Asambhūti lead one to blind darkness, Vidyā and Sambhūti, which are metaphysically higher categories, lead him to greater darkness still? And, finally, what meaning can we attach to the dictum that a right combination of Avidyā and Vidyā in the first instance, and Asambhūti and Sambhūti in the second, would enable a man to conquer death and thereby reach the life immortal? To our mind, it appears that Avidyā and Vidyā have here almost the same meanings which the words δόξα and ἐπιστήμη had in Greek thought, "false knowledge" and "true knowledge," the latter alone being entitled to the dignity of knowledge proper. When we understand the words Avidyā and Vidyā in these senses it follows that those who seek the path of false knowledge necessarily enter into blind darkness; but those who betake themselves to right knowledge, for right knowledge's sake, that is those who pride themselves on their possession of right knowledge, go into greater darkness still. It is only those who are able to make a relative valuation and judicious combination of false knowledge and right knowledge at the same time, that are able, by means of their apprehension of opinion as opinion, to cross the ocean of life and, by their appreciation of knowledge as knowledge, to attain immortality. Passing on to the second riddle, we must remember in the first place that the alternative word which the author of the Īśāvāsyopanishad uses for the word Asambhūti is the word Vināśa, that is, annihilation or destruction. Therefore, by Sambhūti, we must understand the opposite of this, namely, creation or construction. If we were to go back once more to Greek thought, we might substitute for Asambhūti and Sambhūti the words ἀναλυτική and συνθετική that is, "analysis" and "synthesis" respectively, which are only other names for the processes of destruction and construction; or yet again the words

αἰτία and *λόγος*, which represent the processes of "false causation" and "true causation" respectively. When we take the words Asambhūti and Sambhūti in these senses, it follows that those who take recourse to the path of destruction, of analysis, of the false cause, go into blind darkness ; but those who deliberately follow the path of construction, of synthesis, of the true cause for its own sake, go into greater darkness still. While it is only those who know how relatively to evaluate the two paths, and make a right combination of them, that are able by means of their knowledge of the false cause to cross the ocean of life, and by their knowledge of the true cause to attain immortality. The meaning of these assertions is that false knowledge and true knowledge, false cause and true cause, are alike relative in their nature ; that neither merely the one, nor merely the other, enables man to attain to Reality ; that it is by a relative evaluation and right combination of cause that the end may be attained. The innermost " logical " meaning of the two riddles of Avidyā and Vidyā on the one hand, and Asambhūti and Sambhūti on the other, seems to be that it is never by mere negativity nor by mere positivity that the Real could be reached ; that the Real contains both the negative and the positive as its moments ; that it is only when the negative is subordinated to the positive and the positive cancels the negative in a higher synthesis that Reality is reached. It is easy to make certain metaphysical deductions from this logical position. (1) Those who take recourse to the path of works, and those who take recourse to the path of knowledge for the sake of knowledge, are equally frustrated in their endeavours. Those who know how to subordinate works to knowledge, and how to make knowledge cancel their works, are alone able to reach the state of realisation. (2) Then again, those who take recourse to the false cause and yet again to the true cause of the universe for its own sake, are alike frustrated in their attempts ; but those who subordinate the false cause to the true cause, and make the true cause absorb the false one, are alone enabled to move beyond mere causal meanderings and reach the trans-causal state of intuitive realisation. It is true that all this is only implicitly stated

by the author of the Īśāvāsyopanishad. What he explicitly states are merely certain cryptic Heraclitean formulæ which we have to interpret as best we may; but it is evident that the philosopher of this Upanishad had reached a very high level of thought when he envisaged, as through a glass darkly, that it is only a destruction of the hypothesis that leads to the Real.*

xi—BĀSHKALAMANTRA UPANISHAD

33. MEDHĀTITHI'S ABDUCTION.—We are told that, assuming the form of a goat, Indra carried away to the Heavens Medhātithi, the son of Kaṇva. Much put out, the Sage's son interrogated: "Who now art thou, so different from things of ordinary knowledge (vyavāyaḥ)? I have absolutely no knowledge (āvāyaḥ) of thee.

* Deussen, as is well known, equates Vidyā and Avidyā with the One and the Many, and Sambhūti and Asambhūti with Being and Becoming; summoning up for the purpose the Parmenidian ὄν and the Kantian "Ding-an-sich." It may be seen that these explanations do not quite fit in with the original text. As regards the first pair of words we may notice that the first two verses of the Īśāvāsyopanishad, like Muṇḍaka I. i, set forth the Thesis embodying the teaching of Aparā Vidyā or Brāhmaṇic ritualism, while verses 3 to 8, like Muṇḍaka I. ii, set forth the Antithesis extolling the Parā Vidyā or the "new" thought of the day. Instead of understanding Avidyā and Vidyā therefore in the sense of the knowledge of the Many and the One we may safely understand them as implying the Way of Works and the Way of Knowledge, which might at the same time be regarded as the Way of "Opinion" and the Way of "True knowledge." As regards the second pair of words Deussen's interpretation of Sambhūti and Asambhūti by Being and Becoming is etymologically untenable, because by Sambhūti we had rather understand Becoming, as is so gloriously evidenced for us by the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa vi. 6. 2.10-12, where the word "Sambhūti" is thrice used to signify the power of germination and growth. Our interpretation of these words as "False Cause" and "True Cause" in the epistemological sense or as "Analysis" and "Synthesis" in the logico-scientific sense may also be supplemented by a possible sociological interpretation, where "Sambhūti" might signify social cohesion and "Asambhūti" social disruption—an interpretation for the first part of which at least we have the testimony of the Manusmṛiti (ii. 147), the Yājñavalkyasmṛiti (iii. 125) and the Mahābhārata (i. 2. 101, xiii. 178. 15). Co-operation and non-cooperation would not be bad equivalents, as it is only in their "togetherness" that development might consist: only we must remember that the Upanishadic seers lived in times of old!

Thou dost bounce in a graceful fashion. Seeing thee thus none would call thee a goat." The divine goat however kept on mounting higher and higher, and Medhātithi in wrath threatened him with a Brahmin's curse, particularly emphasising the fact that he was a special protégé of Indra "the guardian of men, the bull who quickly overwhelms and subdues, and whose descending bolt causes terror unto those that transgress the law." The threat also naturally proves ineffective, and Medhātithi in anxiety wonders whether "that God our Father be sleeping," or whether the other gods also have been, per chance, offended by him and so are no longer affording him any help. Eventually Indra, smiling, dispels his doubts by declaring his identity, explaining at the same time that it was because Medhātithi had formerly practised penance in many ways that Indra had assumed the present form with a view to instruct his worshipper.

34. INDRA AS THE COSMIC SPIRIT.—Indra then declares that he was the giver of gifts and protection unto singers, of oblations into the mouth of the gods, and likewise of sustenance to the goat or the deer or even the beast of prey. He was the great drinker of Soma who with his might smote the Dragon sheltering on the mountain: smote down the sides of the mountains in order to distribute the divine dew-drops and win the nectar. His residence is said to be the "World's Egg-shell" as also the "Cave [of the human heart]," although it must also be remembered that Indra truly pervades and encompasses the whole universe, supervising and controlling it, from his never-failing chariot, carefully and fearlessly: He is in fact "every way the friend, the father, and the mother of this world." "With my miraculous powers," continues Indra, "I often and often assume birth in different forms (st. 11), dwelling in the world in a thousand different ways and purifying it from all quarters—the One Shining God that he always is—incomprehensible in his real nature alike to the giver and the non-giver, though the common goal of all the world's aspirations." Finally Indra declares his mastery in all knowledge appertaining to the Vedas, the sacrifices, the metres, and the gifts, he being one with the Jātavedas or Fire and with the Sun who, "spreading through both

the Heaven and the Earth sustains the "Gharma" for the protection of mankind."

"I am the light, the immortality, the [world's] bond ;
Am what has been, will be, and is being born.
Am thyself ; am myself alone : but observe that thou
Art thyself and myself too : Doubt me not through simplicity.

All-ruler, All-sustainer, having all forms ;
In leadership Rudra or peaceful Prajāpati ;
The Swan, sorrowless, ageless, ancient :
I am in sooth the straight-going one.

I am the singer, all-faced,
All-pervading, All-highest, observer of men.
I am everywhere, full of propitiousness,
I alone am The One that all this whatsoever is."

xii—KENA UPANISHAD

35. THE DISPARATE UNITS OF THE KENA.—The Kenopanishad, like the Īśāvāsyopanishad, is so named after its opening word. It is otherwise known as the Talavakāropanishad. The reference in this Upanishad to Previous Seers (verse 3), as also the highly developed and almost enigmatic form of its philosophical presentation, presupposes the existence of much speculative activity that must have gone before its time. In the first part of the Upanishad we have an interesting psycho-metaphysical discussion of the nature of the Ātman, and a peep into the results of the attainment thereof. In the latter part, we have an interesting parable, which aims at pointing out the supremacy of the Highest Brahman over any of the presiding deities of the phenomenal forces of Nature. There is a rather obscure link of connection between the first part and the second part of this Upanishad, and it seems to have been furnished by the last verse of the second section, from which we learn that the inner principle reached by introspection is identical with that which underlies all physical phenomena. Another possible connecting link between the two parts may be said to consist in the idea of humility. "No self-knowledge is possible without humility" is the lesson of the first part ; and "humility alone leads one to the knowledge of the Sup-

reme Brahman, as it led Indra" is the lesson of the second. The author of the Upanishad points out towards the conclusion that one who knows this Upanishad shakes off all evil, and reaches the highest world of heaven. This is the reward promised by the author for a proper study and knowledge of the contents of this Upanishad. We are also told that the Upanishad rests on three feet: namely, those of penance, restraint, and sacrifice. This is as much as to say that nobody, who does not possess these virtues, could hope to attain the knowledge that is imparted in this Upanishad. It seems that this conception is based on the idea that it is moral virtues (including a conformity to prescribed rites etc.) that enable a man to attain to intellectual knowledge. "No knowledge without virtue" would be the thesis which the conclusion of the Upanishad would accordingly seem to propound to us.

36. SPIRITUAL AGNOSTICISM OF THE KENA.—The most important part of the Kena Upanishad, however,—the part on which the fame of this Upanishad deservedly rests—is the first portion of it which contains a very interesting discussion about the nature of the Self and the results of the attainment of Self-knowledge. It starts with a psychological inquiry as to what must be regarded as being at the back of the five psychical functions that we are aware of: namely, thinking, breathing, speech, vision, and audition. Why is it that the mind is able to think, and who is it that regulates the vital breath? How is it that the mouth, the eye, and the ear enable us respectively to speak, and see and hear? Are the sense-organs to be regarded as enjoying complete autonomy, or is there an entity which lies at the back of them all, and which inspires them with the power that each one of them possesses? To this psychological inquiry the author of the Upanishad replies by pointing out that there is a Self which is behind all the different psychical functions; that it is this Self which inspires the sense-organs to perform their functions; that it is the Self that we can speak of as the ear of ear, as the mind of mind, as the speech of speech, as the breath of breath, and as the eye of eye. The author goes on to ask: Even supposing that there is a Self at the back of all these psychical functions, would the eye be able to see it, or the ear be able to hear it, or the mind be able to think it? The answer

which he immediately proceeds to give to this problem is that the Self must be regarded as transcending the reach of these senses, as lying in a region absolutely beyond the power of these senses. The eye is entirely powerless to see it and the ear to hear it, nor is the mind able to have any thought of it. "The Self is beyond not merely what is known," says the philosopher of this Upanishad, basing his conclusion on the wisdom imparted to him by certain Previous Seers, "but even beyond what is unknown." In this way does he place the Self beyond the reach of knowledge as well as of no-knowledge. But a further question does arise : Can any one say that when one has known all this, he has known the real nature of the Self? It is here that the Socratic irony of the philosopher is exhibited in our Upanishad. It is here that we have a justification of spiritual Agnosticism. For, our philosopher contends that he who says that he knows the Reality, must be regarded as not having known it at all. It is only he who says that he has not known the Reality, that has to be regarded as having attained to the knowledge of it! The sense-transcending greatness of the Self can be revealed only in parables, only in hints. It is only the man who has obtained this knowledge about the Self, says the author of the Upanishad, that comes to be endowed with spiritual strength, and eventually attains immortality. Finally, the philosopher exhorts us to attain to this kind of Self-knowledge even while we are yet encased within this body; for, it is here, in this very life, that it is possible for a man to attain to this kind of knowledge. When once a man is misled in this life, he is misled for ever. Annihilation is the lot, says the philosopher, of the man who dies without having attained to the knowledge of the Self, without havig *realised* the Self.*

37. THE PARABLE OF INDRA AND THE DAMSEL.—The ethical lesson which one may draw from the above consideration may be supposed to be the lesson of humility. Unless a man is always humble in his effort after knowledge, it would not ever be possible for him to obtain it. Want of humility implies merely an annihilation of knowledge. It is possibly this lesson of humility which is illustrated in the in-

* See also Chapter IX, § 39, below.

teresting parable in the latter part of the Kenopanishad. The story goes that there was, once upon a time, a great conflict between the gods and the demons, and the gods were successful. The gods thought that the success was entirely due to their own power, and forgot that this power was only a manifestation of the energy of Brahman in them; and they became proud. The Brahman knowing this, suddenly made its appearance before them, and the gods were greatly wonder-struck, not knowing what it was. Then they sent forth one of them, namely the god of Fire, as an emissary to this Brahman, and charged him with the task of learning the real nature of that great phenomenal manifestation. The god of Fire ran in pride to Brahman. Brahman asked him, who he was, and the god of Fire proudly answered that he was Jātavedas, in whom lay the power of burning the whole earth if he pleased. Then Brahman threw before him one small blade of grass, and asked the god of Fire to burn it. The god of Fire was unable to burn it with all his might. He became disconcerted and returned to the gods. Then the gods sent another godling of nature, the god of Wind, and charged him with the same mission. The god of Wind ran in pride to Brahman, and being asked who he was, said that he was Mātariśvan, in whom lay the power of blowing away anything from off the surface of the earth. Brahman again threw the blade of grass before him. Not with all his might was the god of Wind able to move it to even an infinitesimal distance. And so the god of Wind returned in shame, not being able to know the nature of that great Being. Then the gods sent Indra and charged him with the same mission. Indra was a more modest god than either the god of Fire or the god of Wind. He ran to Brahman to know its nature, and Brahman disappeared from his sight. Then suddenly sprang forth before Indra one very beautiful heavenly damsel, whom Indra asked what the great being was which had made its sudden disappearance from before him. The woman explained to him that it was Brahman, and said further that it was due to the prowess of Brahman that the gods had gained victory over the demons, and not to their own individual, isolated, boasted power. God Indra was wise enough, and he understood that the power of

the gods was a manifestation of the power of the Absolute. It was on account of his humility, which made it possible for him to go to Brahman and touch him nearmost, that he became the foremost of the gods. " It is verily the power of Brahman which flashes forth in the lightning, and vanishes again. It is the power of Brahman which manifests itself as the motion of the mind in us, and bethinks itself again and again." The "electrical" as well as mental power must be regarded merely as a manifestation of the power of the Supreme Self who thus has a two-fold aspect, an Adhidaivata or celestial and an Adhyātma or psychical ; and that it is only a consciousness of one's own humility that may enable one to attain to the knowledge of the Supreme Self.

CHAPTER FIFTH

A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF UPANISHADIC TEXTS

xiii—Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad

First Adhyāya.*

1. A Ritualistico-Philosophical Description of Cosmos.—The first section of this adhyāya contains a glorious description, somewhat on the lines of the Purusha-sūkta (Rv. x. 90), of Virāj regarded as a sacrificial horse, " whose eye is the sun and whose breath is the wind, whose back is the heaven and whose chest is the earth. The main quarters constitute its sides, and the intermediate quarters its ribs ; the seasons are the members of its body, and the months the joints ; the stars are its bones, and the clouds its flesh ; the rivers are its bowels and the mountains its liver and lungs ; while the plants and the trees constitute its hair." It is in this ritualistico-philosophical way that we are introduced to the conception of the Universe regarded as a great sacrificial horse with the celestial and terrestrial existences as its members and limbs. The only value of this metaphorical description, it seems, consists in the help that it may render to the meditative worship of the cosmos regarded as the Supreme Reality.

2. Death, the ἀρχή of All Things.—The second section opens with a curious cosmological story, which reminds one of the Orphic or Hesiodic cosmogonies of Greek writers. We are here told that what existed at first was " Nothing." This " Nothing " is immediately identified with Death, and Death with Hunger. And it is strange to find that, death should have been the cause of

* The Kāṇva recension is generally followed except where otherwise specified.

life. For, we are told that this Death bethought himself that he might have a body. He thereupon practised worship and from out of the worshipping process emerged Water* which, we learn, got hardened, its hardened froth becoming the Earth.† It is related further that Death laboured on Earth, and from out of his toil Fire was produced. This Fire became tripartite, *viz.* the Sun, Fire proper, and the Air, the production of Air out of Fire being explained possibly because Air can fan the Fire and can grow hot with it. Now from this Air as Prāṇa, says the Upanishad, were born the heaven and the intermundane regions and all terrestrial existence. Very soon again we are informed that not being content with this productive activity of his, Death tried to produce "logical" existences (in the root-sense of the term) by bethinking himself again that he might have another body, and embracing Speech. It was from out of this embrace—out of this curious cosmogonical marriage of Death with Speech —that the Rik, the Sāma and Yajur Vedas were born. But is it not curious to be told in the same breath that what Death brought forth it resolved again to eat up ? It was in this way that all things that existed became evanescent and subject to the influence of Death. Death however resolves to make further penance, and it was as a result of this penance that he became a horse, and bethinking himself that he should be deemed fit for sacrifice, offered his body for the purpose. It was thus that the Aśvamedha sacrifice was born. It seems that this last detail is merely an attempt at a ritualistic linkage of this section with the last. We should have been glad for the cosmological story offered to us in the first two parts of this section, if the story had ended there. We should have then had at least what we might call a curious ante-diluvian

* The only difference between this conception and the Thalesian conception seems to be that while Thales regarded Water as the primeval existence unpreceded by Nothing, the author of the present section holds that Water was produced from Nothingness. Water however was the first sensible existence to emerge from out of the primeval Chaos.

† This would remind one of an analogical process of condensation in Anaximenes. See page 67, above.

cosmogonical story, reminding us of analogical myths among other races and nations ; but the third part of this section takes us beyond cosmogony and drops us into ritualism once again.

3. THE SUPREMACY OF PRĀṆA.—The next section introduces us to a curious parable which is also connected with ritualism on the one hand and with cosmology on the other. We are told that there once took place a fight between the gods and the demons. The demons "pierced with evil" every effort which the gods made to overcome them. It was thus that speech, and breath, and eye, and ear, and mind were pierced with evil by the demons. In Platonic fashion we are told that the evil which was in these different physiological elements was potent enough to destroy them. It was only the vital Prāṇa which the demons were unable to pierce with evil, and which therefore was considered supreme. This deity then purged the other deities of their evil, and carried them beyond death. It is thus that we arrive at the cosmological result that speech and breath and eye and ear and mind in the microcosm were able to produce Agni, Vāyu, Āditya, Space, and the Moon in the macrocosm. And then, as usual, a ritualistic praise emerges in regard to the efficacy of this vocal Prāṇa. It is the vocal Prāṇa who is Āṅgirasa, because he is the essence of the limbs. The vocal Prāṇa is also Bṛihaspati, because speech is Bṛihatī, and the vital Breath is her lord. He is also Sāman, because he is "equal" (*sama*) to a grub, a gnat, an elephant, the worlds, or the universe. He is also the Udgītha, for he really "up"-holds the universe. Finally, we are told that the sacrificial singer must recite the following three lines when he begins to sing the Sāman—

Lead me from the unreal to the real;
Lead me from darkness to light;
Lead me from death to immortality.

It is only when he chants the prayer in this strain that he is able to transcend the regions of illusion, darkness, and death. We are thus presented in this section with a curious parable in support of the physiological supremacy of the vital Prāṇa above the other physiological elements, which is woven into a story which immediately takes a cosmological turn, and ends with a

ritualistic praise of the vital Prāṇa as Sāman, followed by an ethico-metaphysical prayer that the singer may be carried beyond the limitations of unreality.

4. CREATIONIST MYTHS.—The next section offers a motley collection of five different creationist stories, which merely show what different notions were held on the subject. All the different stories posit a primary eternal existence, call it Brahman or Ātman, as you please. But whereas the first story (sections i-vi) emphasises the dual aspect of creation, the second (sections vii–ix) emphasises the immanence of the Ātman in the world created, and the third (section x) the identity between the Creator and the creation ; while the fourth (sections xi-xvi) is a narration of the origin of caste in the terrestrial and celestial worlds, the fifth and the last (section xvii) bringing out the quintuple formation of all existence whatsoever. We shall take these in order. (i) The first story of creation narrates that the Ātman alone existed in the beginning and that He was called Purusha because He had the capacity to burn (*ush*) all sins (*pāpman*) whatsoever ; that this Ātman came to self-consciousness in Fichtian fashion; that He feared because He was alone ; that He led a joyless existence because He had no companion to live with ; that, as a similar story in Plato's Symposium or the Genesis would have it, He thereupon split Himself into two parts—male and female—"each one like half the shell of a sea-animal's body." The woman, when she saw that He was her generator and yet her lover, began to hide herself and became a cow, while the husband became a bull ; she became a mare, while the husband became a horse ; she became she-goat, the other a he-goat ; finally she became a ewe, while the other became a ram. It was thus, the story tells us, that all the goats and sheep and all things that exist in pairs down to the ants were born. This myth merely emphasises the dual aspect of creation, and we are unexpectedly introduced here to the name of Yājñavalkya as possibly holding this doctrine of creation ; because it is recorded that it was he who maintained that man and woman are each of them like half a shell, they together constituting a whole. (ii) The second story tells us that in the beginning there was nothing but

an amorphous, undeveloped, undifferentiated existence, and that it was from this formlessness, that form emerged ; and that when this form was generated, the formless Brahman entered it to the very tip of its finger-nails, as a razor may do into a razor-case, or fire into fire-wood This only emphasises the immanence of the Creator in his creation. But we are also told that he who looks upon the Creator as being in any sense qualified by any attribute cannot be said to know him, for he is devoid of all qualifications whatsoever ; that this Being which is the Ātman, must be regarded as the innermost and the nearmost kernel of existence, dearer than children, dearer than wealth, dearer than anything else that exists ; and that, therefore, he who might worship this Ātman as the dearest, for him the object of his love may never perish. (iii) The third story emphasises the idea of identity between the Creator and the creation. We are here introduced to the name of the sage Vāmadeva, to whom apparently this doctrine belongs ; for it was he who, we learn, regarded himself as inhabiting the sun, or as even having manifested himself in an earlier age as Manu.* As to the cosmology of the section it is not much developed. We simply read that what primarily existed was Brahman ; and that, therefore, he alone, among men, gods, or sages, may be said to have become enlightened who regards himself as identical with Brahman. He who worships the Deity as apart from himself does not know. "He is like the beast of the gods; for verily as beasts nourish a man, so does this man nourish the gods." (iv) The fourth account details the generation of the castes from the primary Brahman in the terrestrial as also in the celestial world. We are told that Brahman originally was alone, and that it was supreme. But it did not think itself powerful enough, and so created the Kshatra or warrior race on earth, corresponding to the deities Indra, Varuṇa, Soma, and others among the gods. It did not think itself yet powerful enough, and so created the Viś race on earth, corresponding to the deities Vasus, Rudra, Maruts, and some others in the celestial world. It did not think itself even yet powerful enough, and so

* This transcendent vision of Vāmadeva is also referred to in the Aitareya Upanishad. See page 161, above.

created the Śūdra caste on earth, corresponding to the God Pūshan in the celestial world, for it is the God Pūshan who nourishes (*pushyati*) all existence. The story proceeds to narrate that the original Brahman did not find itself strong enough even after it had created these castes on earth with their counterparts in heaven, and that, therefore, it was then obliged to create Law; for Law was the Kshatra of the Kshatra, and there was nothing higher than Law: "It was on account of the supremacy of Law that even a weak man is able to govern a strong one." This Law was identical with Truth, for they are essentially the same at bottom. It was only after this and on account of the superior potency of Law that heaven and earth were able to hold together. (v) The last creationist story is rather uninteresting. Here we are told that originally the Self alone was, but that he desired that there should be a wife for him and off-spring and wealth, and that these came to be provided for him in order that completeness may be restored to him. In the course of this account we are introduced to the *pāṅkta* doctrine, the doctrine of five-fold existence, which implies that the completeness of the Self can be restored only through the five-fold existence: namely, mind and speech and breath and eye and ear.

5. PERCEPTIVE AND INTELLECTIVE LEVELS OF EXPERIENCE.—There is nothing of any philosophical importance in the two sections of this Adhyāya that follow, except a stray remark in the third paragraph of the 5th section to the effect that we ought to institute a distinction between perception on the one hand and understanding on the other. We very often hear people say: "As our mind was elsewhere, we did not see or hear." It is clear from such statements, says the writer, that we are able to see and hear not with our eye and ear respectively, but with mind. This is an exaltation of the fact of mental understanding over the mere physiological processes of perception. For, mind is at the back of everything: "Desire, will, doubt, belief, disbelief, memory, obliviscence, shame, reflection, fear,—all these are veritably the mind." This is asmuch as to say that unless the mind were active there would be no kind of mental cerebration possible.

SECOND ADHYĀYA.

6. THE REGRESS FROM THE PHYSICAL AND PHYSIOLOGICAL CATEGORIES TO A PSYCHOLOGICAL CATEGORY.—The second chapter of the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad consists, like the first, of six sections, the first of which opens with a conversation between Gārgya the proud Brahmin, and Ajātaśatru the quiescent Kshatriya king.* The purport of the story is to show the deficiency of cosmological and physiological categories as compared with a psychological category. The proud Gārgya-Bālāki goes to Ajātaśatru, and tries to impose upon him by saying that he would impart a piece of wisdom to him which the king had not already known. Ajātaśatru welcomes this great Brahmin, who begins by saying that true knowledge would consist in regarding the sun as the Ultimate Reality. But Ajātaśatru tells Gārgya the limitations of such a conception. Then Gārgya goes on to say how the Ultimate Reality is to be found, one after another, in such objects as the moon, the lightning, the thunder, the sky, the wind, the fire, the water, the mirror, the echo, the sound, the shadow, the body, the Prājña, the right and the left eye. Each time, Ajātaśatru points out to Gārgya the limitations of his conception, and tells him that all the cosmological and physiological categories which Gārgya had taken for Ultimate Reality must be regarded as deficient in that respect. Gārgya therefore confesses that his knowledge was exhausted, and that he did not know anything more. Ajātaśatru thereupon takes Bālāki by the hand and goes to a man fallen into deep-sleep and tries to wake him up shouting, "Thou great one, thou clad in white raiment, king Soma!" Still the man, who was really fast asleep, remains lying as before. Finally Ajātaśatru shakes him with his hand (Bṛih.), or with his stick (Kaush.), and the man rises at once. Ajātaśatru thereupon tells Bālāki that the Ultimate Reality was to be found in the deep-sleep-consciousness, as in the person who had gone to sleep. It is however hard to reconcile ourselves to the truth of this statement. There is as little connection between deep-sleep-consciousness and pure Self-consciousness as there is,

* The story recurs in the Kaushītaki Upanishad with some changes. Our account combines the peculiar features of both the versions.

as Spinoza would say, between *dog* and *god.* Although therefore Ajātaśatru's category is manifestly superior to the physical or physiological categories mentioned by Gārgya, we cannot, as may be pointed out in other Upanishadic passages, stop short of positing pure Self-consciousness as alone constituting the Ultimate Reality.

7. POETICO-PHYSIOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SELF, THE EYE, AND THE HEAD.—The section that follows introduces three very interesting physiological conceptions. In the first place, we are told how the Soul may be looked upon as a babe, "its place being the body, its chamber the head, its post the vital breath, to which it is tied by the rope, which is food." This is asmuch as to say that even though the Soul may be looked upon as inhabiting the whole body, its special location must be regarded as being the head; and it resides in the body at all, because food enables it to carry on the function of breathing which is so essential to life. In the second place, we have in this section a fine physiological imagery with respect to the eye, wherein the red lines of it are identified with the angry god Rudra, the water inside the eye with the god Parjanya in the heaven, the pupil within the eye corresponding to the Sun, the black iris to Agni, the white eye-ball to Indra, the lower eye-lash to the Earth and the upper eye-lash to the Heaven. This is a fine illustration of the way in which our texts seek to establish a parallelism between microcosm and macrocosm. Thirdly, we are introduced to a new imagery altogether when we are told to look upon the head as being like an inverted cup with its mouth below and its bottom above, corresponding respectively to the mouth and the skull of the human body. In this cup, says the writer, rests manifestly the glory which is no other than the glory of sense-activity, the glory of perception, audition and the rest. On its lip live the seven Ṛishis, who are just the seven Prāṇas, while the tongue is represented as communicating with Brahman inasmuch as it was commonly held that the joy of beatification experienced in the head was communicated down into the throat by the inner tongue.

8. THE PERSON IN THE EYE AND THE PERSON IN THE SUN.—In the third section there are described for us two forms of Brah-

man: one material, mortal, definite, and solid and the other immaterial, immortal, indefinite, and fluid. The second which no doubt is the higher form is identified with the Air and the Sky in the macrocosm and with the Breath and the Ether-in-the-heart in the microcosm; and its essence is said to be the Person in the disk of the Sun and the Person in the right eye. The implication of this bipartition is that the Person in the eye must be regarded as having an analogical existence with the Person in the Sun. But the mythical description that is given above of either the Person in the eye or the Person in the Sun cannot be made to square with the mystical intimations that are thrown out all of a sudden towards the end of this section, when we are told that this same "Person" is experienced as being of the nature of saffron-coloured raiment or white wool or cochineal or flame or fire or white lotus, or, finally, a sudden flash of lightning. This again is hardly consonant with the fact that the Supreme Person can only be described in negative terms. At the end we have a description of the Person as being the "truth of truth"; as being, in other words, the essence of a world which substantially exists as apprehended in various ways by our sense faculties.— It is scarcely possible to regard all these random views as constituting in any sense a continuous philosophical argument.

9. THE ĀTMANISM AND SOLIPSISM OF YĀJÑAVALKYA.—The fourth section of this chapter is of great importance in the history of Upanishadic thought. We are there introduced for the first time to the famous philosopher Yājñavalkya — the one outstanding personality of the Bṛihadāraṇyaka—in connection with a discourse on the way to the acquisition of immortal life, which the sage holds with his wife Maitreyī.* Yājñavalkya tells her that he is intent upon entering a new Āśrama, and that, therefore, he must make a partition of his possessions between his two wives Kātyāyanī and Maitreyī. Maitreyī, as would become a spiritual wife, refuses to be content with mere worldly possessions :"Even if the whole earth be offered to me full of gold, how would the possession of it enable

* The same story also recurs in the fourth chapter of the Upanishad with only a few changes.

me to obtain immortal life ?" Yājñavalkya is pleased to hear such a noble sentiment from his wife, and accordingly expatiates upon certain great spiritual truths which he desires his spiritual wife to know. "Not for the sake of the husband is the husband dear to the wife," says Yājñavalkya, "but for the sake of the Self." "Not for the sake of the wife is the wife dear to the husband," he continues, "but for the sake of the Self." The son is dear not for the sake of the son, but for the sake of the Self; wealth is dear, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the Self; and so on. The meaning of these statements is that the love that we bear to anything must be regarded as an aspect of the love that we bear to the Self. Things are dear to us because the Self is mirrored in them. The love that we bear to anything in this life is but the reflection of the love that we bear to the Self. This Self then, says Yājñavalkya, "must be seen, must be heard, must be meditated upon." When we look upon anything except as in Self, it is lost to us. The reason is that things exist just because the Self inspires them, and they exist for the Self. Whosoever looks for anything elsewise than in and for the Self loses it altogether. The Self is verily the All. Then follows that famous description of the Self by Yājñavalkya in vari-coloured imagery: "As the sound of a drum cannot be seized until the drum is itself seized, or the beater of the drum; as the sound of a conch-shell cannot be seized until the shell itself is seized, or the blower of the shell; as the sound of a lute cannot be seized unless the lute itself is seized, or the player of the lute: similarly," says Yājñavalkya, "nothing of any moment can be apprehended unless and until the Self itself is apprehended." — "As clouds of smoke proceed from the fire kindled with damp fuel, so verily do all the sciences such as Rigveda, Yajurveda, and Sāmaveda, the Itihāsa-Purāṇa, and the rest, proceed from this Ultimate Self. It is from him alone that all these are breathed forth." — "As the sole repository of all touches is the skin, and of all tastes the tongue; as the sole repository of all smells is the nose and of all colours the eye; as the sole repository of all desires is the mind and of all learning the intellect: as, finally, the sole repository of all actions are the hands and of all

motions the feet: verily, as all the waters rest in the sea and the Vedas in speech, similarly is the Self the *Summum Bonum* and the τέλος of all that exists." Putting us in mind of a similar metaphor from the Chhāndogya Upanishad, Yājñavalkya further tells us—"As a lump of salt when thrown into water becomes dissolved into it and we are unable to find it any more, similarly, does this great Being, endless, infinite, and the quintessence of all knowledge, rise from out of all these elements and vanish after them." — "When a man is departed," says Yājñavalkya, "no consciousness remains." This last assertion was sufficient to confound the intellect of his wife Maitreyī. "You do bewilder me," says she to her husband, "when you say that when a man is departed, no consciousness remains." This surprises Yājñavalkya and he only hastily excuses himself by saying that what he had already said was enough for her knowledge. It is rather hard for us to understand exactly what Yājñavalkya must have meant when he said that when a man departs, no consciousness remains. Does he mean that when a man dies there is an end of the matter: the curtain falls never to rise any more? Or does he take his stand on the pedestal of absolute monism, from which point of view reincarnation, consciousness *post mortem*, and immortality are alike a delusion and a farce? It seems that Yājñavalkya chooses to resort to the second alternative because he immediately goes on to say—"When there is a duality between subject and object, one perceives while the other is perceived; one smells while the other is smelt; one hears while the other is heard; one says while the other is said; one thinks while the other is thought; one meditates, while the other is meditated upon: but when Brahman is the ALL, how can one smell, while the other be smelt; how can one see, while the other is seen; how can one hear, while the other is heard; how can one think, while the other is thought; how can one meditate, while the other is meditated upon?" All processes of perception and understanding were possible IF there had been a ἕτερος But, by hypothesis, there is no duality; therefore, there is no *heteros*; and consequently, there is no distinction between subject and object, between perceiver and perceived. If perceiver alone

exists, would it be possible that he himself may be perceived? For who may perceive the only Perceiver? Into such solipsistic abysses does Yājñavalkya's absolute monism lead us.

10. DADHYACH'S DOCTRINE OF THE RECIPROCAL DEPENDENCE OF ALL THINGS.—We are next introduced to the famous "Madhu-vidyā" of the philosopher Dadhyach Ātharvaṇa. This seer seems to have held the doctrine of the mutual interdependance of things because all of them are indissolubly connected in and through the Self. All things are related to one another, because they are bound together by the same basic bond, namely, the Self. "The earth," says Dadhyach, "is the honey (*madhu*) of all beings, and all beings are the honey of the earth, just because the same lustrous immortal Self inhabits them both. The fire is the essence of all things, and all things are the essence of fire, just because the immortal Self is the essence of both." Similarly are the wind, the sun, the space, the moon, the lightning, the thunder, the ether, and even law and truth and humanity the essence of all things whatsoever and all things are the essence of these, inasmuch as the same law, the same element, the same indissoluble bond, connects them both. Finally, the individual Self is itself the essence of all things and all things are the essence of the individual Self, inasmuch as both of them are held together by the same Universal Spirit. It is this Universal Spirit which is the lord and king of all things. "As all the spokes are contained in the axle and the felly of a wheel, so are all things and all Selves connected in the Supreme Self." It is on account of the Supreme Self that all things stand related together. All things appear on the back-ground of this eternal curtain. "Nothing exists that is not covered by the Supreme Self. He becomes like unto every form, and all the forms are only partial revelations of Him. The Lord appears many through his powers." Thus does Dadhyach teach the doctrine of the supreme existence of the One, and the apparent existence of the Many.

THIRD ADHYĀYA.

11. THE GREAT SYMPOSIUM AT JANAKA'S COURT.—The third chapter of the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad introduces us to the

great symposium at Janaka's court, where the philosopher Yājñavalkya has to meet a number of other inquirers, and to satisfy their curiosity about certain philosophic questions put to him. The prize that was set by king Janaka for one who would stand victorious in the argumentative tournament that was going to take place at his court was no less than the possession of one thousand cows and a treasure of ten thousand gold coins attached to the horns of the cows. It was announced that whoever thought himself fit to carry the prize might do so, but nobody ventured to take the prize excepting the sage Yājñavalkya, who quietly ordered his disciple to take possession of the cows and coins, and walk home. At that he was interrupted by all the philosophers who were gathered at Janaka's court, each of whom asked Yājñavalkya a question, which he must satisfy before he could be allowed to take away the cows and the coins.

12. ASVALA'S RITUALISTIC QUESTIONS.—The first interlocutor was the sacrificial priest of king Janaka, named Aśvala. There is not much of philosophical consequence in the conversation that took place between Aśvala and Yājñavalkya ; but there is only one significant point which emerges from it. " All this that exists," said Aśvala, "is pervaded by death, is subject to the changes of day and night, and the bright half and the dark half of the month. How could the sacrificer, the Yajamāna, be saved from sharing the fate of all these things ?" — " Moreover, " said Aśvala, "the interval between the earth and the sky is supportless, and so it hangs unpropped at both its ends: how can the Yajamāna ascend through this intermundia ?" To all these questions the answer which Yājñavalkya gave was that it was sacrifice alone which would enable the Yajamāna to free himself from the trammels of death, to remain uninfluenced by the dualities of day and night, of the bright and dark half of the month, and to ascend by the ladder of righteousness through the unpropped intermundane region. When we consider that Yājñavalkya's answer was addressed in this case to Aśvala, we might very well praise Yājñavalkya for this *ad hoc* answer which he gave to his interlocutor. The man who believes in nothing but the utility of the sacrifice needs only to be answered

in terms of sacrificial praise, and this praise Yājñavalkya was prudent enough not to withhold.

13. JĀRATKĀRAVA'S QUESTIONS ON DEATH AND OTHER KINDRED TOPICS.—The second questioner of Yājñavalkya was Jāratkārava, who exhibits a more philosophical turn of mind. Jāratkārava's first question may be expressed thus: "They say that Death eats up everything; what Deity is there, that eats up Death himself?" The answer which Yājñavalkya gave is that that Deity which may be regarded as eating up Death himself, should be called Water which eats up Agni, the Death. This, as we find, is no sufficient answer to the question. It is yet on the ritualistic plane; and we do not know whether Jāratakārava was satisfied by it. The second question which Jāratkārava then proceeds to ask is familiar enough to students of Upanishadic thought: Does the vital breath leave a sage when he dies, as it leaves the body of an ordinary man? Yājñavalkya's answer to it is that we cannot suppose that the vital airs leave the sage at the time of his death. In that respect he is not like an ordinary person. "The vital airs stand pent up within the dying body of the sage, and the body, when dead, remains inflated and puffed up." It is somewhat hard to determine the efficacy of this answer. We may only conjecture that while it may be supposed that when an ordinary man dies his Liṅgaśarīra or subtle body leaves its former tenement, the Liṅgaśarīra of the sage does not leave his body, and is entirely destroyed within him at the time of his death. The third question that Jāratkārava propounded was: "When, after the death of the man, the eye is dissolved into the sun, the mind into the moon, the ear into the space, and the body into the earth; when the speech is dissolved into the fire, the hair is transferred to the plants and trees, and the blood to the watery element of the world; what happens to the Person that inhabits the mortal vesture which we call the human body?" In fact, the gist of this last question is—What is the condition of the Self when it leaves the human body? Does it thereafter lead an embodied or disembodied existence? This question Yājñavalkya is shrewd enough not to answer in the

presence of the assembly in the court of king Janaka. He takes Jāratkārava by the hand, leads him out of the assembly, and there holds some conversation with him. What the conversation exactly was, we are not told. But we are only given to understand that the conversation turned on the topic of Karma:—" that a man's action was the determinant of his fate; that if he did good actions, he would reap good results therefrom, while if he did bad actions, he would have to suffer evil: *i. e.* in other words, meritorious actions would procure for him a meritorious life, while evil deeds would lead him to a very sinful and evil existence." Our deeds then must be regarded as our angels. For good or evil, they are the shadows that stand by us still. The importance of this conception of Karma and its relation of the Vedic notion of Ṛita or Dharma on the one hand and to the Buddhistic dogma of the " Kamma " on the other will have to engage us in another chapter.

14. BHUJYU'S INTEREST IN PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.—The third interlocutor of sage Yājñavalkya was named Bhujyu, the son of Lāhya. This thinker seems to be interested in the question of psychical research. He told Yājñavalkya that while once a-touring, he had gone to the house of one Patañchala, and found that his daughter was possessed by a Gandharva. Bhujyu asked this Gandharva a very peculiar question: Where had the Pārikshitas (who were possibly the descendants of the Pāṇḍavas) gone after their mortal existence? This question was sufficient to test the omniscience of the Gandharva. "I ask you the same question," said Bhujyu to Yājñavalkya. " Can you tell me where the Pārikshitas went ?" The answer which Yājñavalkya gave was that the Pārikshitas had gone to the place where all the Aśvamedha sacrificers went. This is no more than a mere "Barbara" reasoning :

All Aśvamedha sacrificers go to a particular region.

The Pārikshitas were Aśvameda sacrificers.

∴ The Pārikshitas also went to the same region.

But the question arises, what is this very peculiar region to which the Pārikshitas went ? Yājñavalkya characterises it more fully. He tries to picture for us the region where the Pārikshitas had gone ;

but the description is only mythical in its nature and philosophically of little consequence, and need not detain us here longer.* The only significant point that emerges in the description of that region is that it was the God of Air who carried the Aśvamedha sacrificers to their destined place ; and that it was on account of this that Air could be regarded "as everything by itself, and as all things together," in fact, as microcosm and macrocosm. It is strange that Yājñavalkya should try to reach the philosophical conception of Air as both microcosm and macrocosm from the very mythological description which he gives of the region of the horse-sacrificers.

15. USHASTA AND KAHOLA ON THE REALISATION OF ĀTMAN.— The two sections that follow, the 4th and the 5th, introduce us to two other interlocutors, Ushasta and Kahola. In the conversation which these two sages had with Yājñavalkya, some very great philosophical problems are brought out ; and hence it is necessary to note them carefully. Ushasta first asked Yājñavalkya : "What is the nature of the Ultimate Reality, the Ātman, who may be realised with that intuitional vividness which is exhibited in the perception of objects of sense, for example, a cow, or a horse ?" Yājñavalkya's answer to the above query is that the Ātman must be regarded as existing inside the percipient ; that it is he who enables all the vital functions of the body to go on regularly and without interruption ; that this same Ātman is immanent in the whole world ; that he it was whom we might call the ultimate seer, and hence any perception of him in the ordinary sense of the term would be impossible ; that he might be regarded as the ultimate hearer, and that therefore any audition of him is impossible ; that he it was whom we might regard as the ultimate thinker, so that even a thought of him would be impossible ; and finally, that it was he whom we might regard as the intuitor, hence even an intuition of him might be regarded as impossible. This introduces us to a very great philosophical doctrine. Yājñavalkya here propounds the secret of his own philosophy. Hitherto we saw him arguing in a mythical or ritualistic vein ; but here we see the

* We may however note in passing that it is inconsistent with the Doctrine of the Two Paths.

real philosopher in him.— Kahola, the next interlocutor continues the theme and asks Yājñavalkya how it might be then possible to realise this great Self immanent in the whole universe. Yājñavalkya's answer is, that he who is able to bear the extremes of hunger and thirst, of grief, infatuation, age, and death ; he who rises higher than all desires for sons or riches or fame ; that, finally, he who takes up to a mendicant's life putting aside all considerations of learning and leading the guileless life of a child, observing silence : he alone is able to realise this Ātman , everything else being an illusion only. In this answer of Yājñavalkya, we get to his ideas about the practical method for the realisation of Ātman. Yājñavalkya is here merely preaching an ascetic's life, unhampered by any of the ordinary objects of desire such as wealth, or fame, or even learning.

16. GĀRGĪ THE DAUGHTER OF VACHAKNU.—The next section introduces us to a very interesting interlocutor, *viz.*Gārgī, the daughter of Vachaknu,* who seems to have been so well equipped with intellectual missiles as to be able to encounter even a formidable philosophical adversary like the old redoubted Yājñavalkya. Gārgī asks Yājñavalkya certain questions, and is intellectually so forward that Yājñavalkya is obliged to check her intellectual impudence with what we might call a philosophical rudeness unbecoming in anyone gifted with the art of chivalry in matters philosophical. For, he told her bluntly that if she persisted in her annoying questions her head would fall off, whereupon Gārgī was obliged to desist. But somehow this same woman takes heart again and approaches Yājñavalkya once more (section viii) with two questions, which if Yājñavalkya was able to answer, she would declare in the presence of that august assembly that Yājñavalkya stood supreme as a philosopher, and that therefore none in the assembly should go forward to meet him at the philosophical assizes. That the Vāchaknavī of section viii is the same as Gārgī the daughter of Vachaknu of section vi is apparent both from the form in which the questions are put—*Kasmin nu khalu otaṁ cha protaṁ cha*—and from the further fact that Yājñavalkya actually addresses her as Gārgi.

* The father's name signifies a talkative person.

17. GĀRGĪ'S ἀπορία AND YĀJÑAVALKYA'S DISCOURSE ON THE IMMUTABLE BRAHMAN.—Gārgī begins abruptly by asking what it was that sustained water and gave it support—more literally, what it was in which water was " woven like warp and woof. " Yājñavalkya answered that it was air. — " What is the substratum of air ?" Gārgī asked, continuing her peculiar mode of expression. Yājñavalkya replied, " the intermundia. " — " What is then the substratum of the intermudane region ?" " The Gandharva world." — "What is the support of this Gandharva world ?" "The world of the sun." — " On what does the world of the sun repose ?" "On the world of the moon.*" To further successive questions of Gārgī in the same strain Yājñavalkya went on saying that the world of the moon was buttressed up by the world of the stars, the world of the stars by the world of the gods, the world of the gods by the world of Indra, the world of Indra by that of Prajāpati, and the world of Prajāpati, by the Brahmaloka. Then when Gārgī went on to ask Yājñavalkya what it was that the world of Brahman itself hung from, Yājñavalkya was obliged to administer a check to her never-stopping inquiries. But later Gārgī again puts in her appearance and asks Yājñavalkya two questions : "What is it in which that which is above the heaven and below the earth and in intermundane regions is woven like warp and woof ?" In other words, what was it that was the support of the whole visible universe ? Yājñavalkya's answer was that it was Ether or Ākāśa. "What is it," asked Gārgī finally, " which gives support to this Ether itself ?" Yājñavalkya answered that it was what we might call the Akshara or the Immutable Brahman. Yājñavalkya now goes on to give a philosophical discourse on the nature of this Immutable Brahman to which the question of Gārgī thus led him. " The Immutable Brahman," he says, "is neither dense not subtle, neither short not long, neither glowing nor humid ; without shadow and without darkness, without air and without ether, without attachment and without taste or smell or sight or auditon or thought ; without light and without breath, without mouth and without measure ;

* Regarded, as usual, as being behind or at the back of the world of the sun, and therefore as being more remote than the world of the sun.

neither within nor without, neither devouring anything, nor having anything as the devourer of it." This is what we might call veritably " the negative theology " of Yājñavalkya. Yājñavalkya here characterises the Supreme Reality in mere negative terms: tells us what it is *not* rather than what it *is*. In a moment, however, he proceeds to give us the argument from order, with which students of philosophy are familiar in the history of thought. That there is this Ātman, slight reflection, says Yājñavalkya, enables us to know. " How otherwise would the sun and the moon stand in their respective positions, regulated in their respective motions? How otherwise would the heaven and the earth lie sundered as we see them? How otherwise should we have been able to divide time into its various parts, and distinguish the moments from the hours, the days from the nights, the bright half and the dark half of the month; and finally, the months and seasons and years themselves? What is it that regulates the rivers flowing eastward and westward from the white mountains?" All this constitutes the usual argument from order which involves the existence of a Supreme Reality as controlling and regulating the changes in the Universe. Yājñavalkya continues his philosophical soliloquy, being once thrown into the vein of it, and pours out the very soul of his philosophy when he tells us further that he, who worships or sacrifices or practises penance without having attained to the knowledge of this Immutable Brahman might be said to have wasted his labours on a chimera; he who knows this Immutable Brahman by living in it, he alone might be said to have really led a life worth living; such a man alone was worthy to wear the respectable title of a " Brāhmaṇa "—a knower of Brahman. " This same immutable Brahman is the ultimate seer without himself being seen, is the ultimate hearer without himself being heard, is the ultimate knower without himself being known, is the ultimate intuitor without himself being intuited. There is neither seer nor hearer nor thinker nor intuitor beyond Him. It was in this immutable Brahman alone that Ether (which we might physically characterise as the final reality) is itself metaphysically grounded." Is it not strange to find that Yājñavalkya here confesses that the

ultimate Brahman, which we might characterise only in negative terms, is itself the ultimate seer and the ultimate knower and the ultimate intuitor and the rest of them,—marks far too positively characteristic of the Immutable Brahman to allow a mere negative description of it? It is needless to add that Gārgī, even though she had come with two very supremely trenchant philosophic missiles, was abashed at this great display of the intellectual skill of her adversary, and as would become her female modesty, characteristically desisted from further questionings, and advised her other compeer sages not to take up the gauntlet against the veteran philosopher, Yājñavalkya. One more interlocutor however presents himself, with what result will be described presently.

18. UDDĀLAKA AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE SŪTRA AND THE ANTARYĀMIN.—The question which Uddālaka Āruṇi asked Yājñavalkya, in between the two series of interpellations of the learned Gārgī, was a variant upon the question which Bhujyu had previously asked him. In fact, both Bhujyu and Uddālaka refer to the house of one Patañchala, the son of Kapi, who lived in the Madra territory. Both of them seem to be interested in psychical research. Both of them mention a certain Gandharva* who had seized in one case the daughter, and in the other the wife, of Patañchala, and whom they asked some philosophical questions, which they reiterate in the presence of Yājñavalkya. The question which Uddālaka had asked was a variant in point of matter and was worded as follows: "What is the Thread (sūtra) that holds this world and the next and all the beings thereon in their places; and again who is the Inner Ruler of this world and the next and all the beings thereon?" In his answer to Bhujyu, Yājñavalkya had said that it was Air which might be regarded as both microcosm and macrocosm. In his answer now to Uddālaka, Yājñavalkya tells us once more that it was Air itself which must be regarded as the Sūtra, as the Thread which weaves together the different worlds and the beings that live in them. Moreover, the Antaryāmin, or the Being who is immanent in the worlds and regulates the motions

* Named Sudhanvan Āṅgirasa in the first account, and Kabandha Ātharvaṇa in the present.

and changes in them, says Yājñavalkya, could only be the Ātman whose body the worlds and the beings are, and who lies unscanned within them, controlling them, and being of a veritably immortal nature. The discourse which Yājñavalkya here gives on the Antaryāmin is very famous in the history of the Vedānta. The point that emerges from it is the immanence of the Ātman who lies encased in every form of existence in the universe. It is thus that the Ātman inhabits not merely the elemental existences such as the earth and the water, the fire and the sky, the air and the heavens, but he also inhabits and inspires the sun and the moon, the quarters, the globes, and the ether. The Ātman is thus regarded as the Antaryāmin or immanent principle even in the Air itself which, we were told previously, held together all the objects in the universe. Yājñavalkya further describes the Ātman as "existing within darkness as within light, within Prāṇa as within all the organs of sense such as those of speech, vision, audition, and touch, as well as within the mind, and the thinking faculty." Finally, the Ātman is described as being immanent in all germinal seeds which sprout up into different existences that we know of in this world. In fact, Yājñavalkya says that the Ātman inhabits every existing object in the world, and that it is the Ātman who is the "unperceived perceiver, the unheard hearer, the unthought thinker, and the unintuited intuitor," and that everything else besides him is an illusion. Here again, we have Yājñavalkya re-iterating his favourite doctrine of the reality of the Ātman, and the unreality of all other objects of experience.

19. THE THEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS OF ŚĀKALYA AND HIS SAD FATE.—The last interlocutor of Yājñavalkya was Vidagdha Śākalya. It seems that this Vidagdha Śākalya was theologically inclined, and wanted to inquire of Yājñavalkya as to how many gods really existed in the world. Yājñavalkya put him off time after time, but being pressed hard by Vidagdha, had ultimately to confess a monotheism. To Vidagdha's first query as to how many gods there were, Yājñavalkya replied that there were "three and three hundred, and yet again, three and three thousand." Vidagdha was not satisfied with this answer. He pressed him again. Yājña-

valkya said in return that there were thrity-three gods. Vidagdha asked him again ; and Yājñavalkya replied that there were six, and three, and two, and one-and-a-half(!) God. Vidagdha was eminently dissatisfied and asked him again. Yājñavalkya replied that there was only one God. Vidagdha seems to have been satisfied with the final monotheistic answer that Yājñavalkya gave ; but he again asked him the details of his previous answers : Who were the different three and three hundred gods and three and three thousand gods, and yet again the thirty-three Gods, whom he mentioned, and Yājñavalkya gave answers which would satisfy a ritualist as they would proceed also from a ritualist. Vidagdha asked who were the six gods whom Yājñavalkya had mentioned. Yājñavalkya's answer was that they were the gods of fire, earth, air, the intermundia, the sun, and heaven. " Who are the three gods ?" asked Vidagdha. "The three worlds," was Yājñavalkya's answer, "for in them all these gods exist." To Vidagdha's query as to who the two gods were, Yājñavalkya replied saying that they were the Food and Breath respectively ; and to his query, who was the one-and-half (*adhyardha*) God, Yājñavalkya said that it was the wind, because when the wind was blowing, everything grew (*adhi-ārdhnot*) ; and when Vidagdha asked him who the one God was, Yājñavalkya replied that it was Prāṇa and that he was identical with the Brahman who, as before discussed, was immanent in the earth and the sky, darkness and the light, water and seed, and all forms of the world. If this had been the end of the conversation between Vidagdha and Yājñavalkya, we should have had reason enough to regard the symposium in Janaka's court as having been a comedy. But it fell about that Vidagdha took into his head to question Yājñavalkya on further unnecessary ritualistic matters, which so enraged Yājñavalkya that he eventually told Vidagdha that if he did not know the person taught in the Upanishads who was described merely by "No-No," and who was incomprehensible and imperishable his head would fall off. As this altercation proceeded from Yājñavalkya Śākalya confessed that he did not know that person, and therefore his head fell off. We are told that the very thieves took away the bones of Śākalya, mistaking them for something else. In

this way the symposium at Janaka's court became a tragedy. It is needless to say that the other Brahmins stood aghast at the spectacle of a compeer fallen dead by the altercation of Yājña-valkya; nobody dared to ask him any further questions. Yājña-valkya stood victorious (although unhappily his victory cost a Brahmin his life), and he finally set an eschatological problem to the assembly—" Man is verily like a mighty tree in the forest: his ears are like leaves, and his outer skin is like the bark. From his skin flows forth blood, as sap from the bark of the tree. His muscles are like the layers of wood, and his fibres like the tendons of the tree; but while the tree when felled grows up again from the root, from what root, tell me, does the mortal man grow up after he has been felled by death ?" The whole assembly, we are told, stood speechless and trembling, and thus, terminated the historic meeting in Janaka's court.

FOURTH ADHYĀYA.

20. YĀJÑAVALKYA'S CRITICISM OF THE PHILOSOPHERS.—The fourth chapter of this Upanishad consists, like the others, of six sections, of which the fifth is merely a repetition of the conversation between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī, which has been already described, while the sixth is a description of family lineages of the Ṛishis, and is of no philosophical importance whatsoever. The first four sections consist of two different dialogues between Janaka and Yājñavalkya, the first two containing the first dialogue and the last two containing the second. These, along with the symposium in the third chapter, contain the quintessence of the philosophical teaching of Yājñavalkya. Once upon a time Yājñavalkya had been to king Janaka and they fell to discuss philosophical matters. Yājñavalkya asked Janaka what knowledge he already possessed in regard to the nature of Ultimate Reality. Now as Janaka was a great philosopher-king, and philosophers of every description flocked to his court, it was natural that he should have come to know the philosophical opinions of various thinkers of the time. Janaka first told Yājñavalkya that the philosopher Jitvan Śailini had told him that Speech was the Ultimate Brahman. Yājñaval-kya replied that this was only partially true. Thereupon Janaka

proceeded to narrate the opinions of other philosophers, every one of which Yājñavalkya weighed and found wanting. Janaka thus said that Udaṅka Śaulbāyana told him that the Vital Breath was the Ultimate Reality ; that Varku Vārshṇa held that the Eye was so ; that Gardabhīvipīta Bhāradvāja had identified the Ultimate Reality with the Ear ; that Satyakāma Jābāla had found it in the Mind ; while Vidagdha Śākalya had said that the Heart was to be regarded as the Ultimate Reality. Yājñavalkya criticises all these views by declaring that they were merely incomplete answers to the problem of Ultimate Reality; whereupon Janaka asked Yājñavalkya what he himself regarded as the Ultimate Reality. Now Yājñavalkya replied that the Ultimate Reality could be nothing else but the Ātman; that its repository was the heart; that it was in the heart that the Person in the right eye mysteriously called Indra and his wife who was the Person in the left eye called Virāj, met and sang praises together. " The food of these two Persons is the red lump within the heart. Their hiding place is the network within the heart. The road on which they move is the artery that rises upwards from the heart. Like a hair divided into a thousand parts, so are the veins of it, which are called Hitā, *i. e.*, "placed firmly within the heart." In this way is the physiological *habitat* of the Ātman described in this Upanishad ; and it is significant to find that it was the heart rather than the brain which should have been regarded as the locus of the soul. The Ātman, who exists in the heart and in whose praise the Persons in the right and the left eyes meet together, can only be described, says Yājñavalkya, in negative terms. " He is incomprehensible for he cannot be comprehended. He is indestructible for he cannot be destroyed. He is without attachment because he does not attach himself to anything. He is unbound* and so is not tormented by pain or grief," being Fearlessness himself.

21. YĀJÑAVALKYA'S CONSTRUCTIVE PHILOSOPHY.—Sections 3 and 4 describe another meeting between king Janaka and Yājñavalkya. This was even a more interesting occasion than the former one, and we see Yājñavalkya here pouring out his

* Or, "is not affected or injured by a sword."

heart on various philosophical matters to king Janaka. These are: THE LIGHT OF MAN.—The first point about which Janaka questions Yājñavalkya concerns itself with "the supreme light of man." Yājñavalkya, following his usual method of answering such questions, begins with a most plausible answer and ends with the most remote and yet the most adequate answer. Thus his first answer is that the light of man may be said to be the sun. "For is it not by the help of the sun," he asks, "that man is able to sit and move about and do his work and return?" "So indeed it is," is Janaka's assent. But Janaka further asks, "When the sun has set, O Yājñavalkya, what is the light of man?" Yājñavalkya thereupon tells him that the light of man may then be said to be the moon. "What when the moon has set?" asks Janaka. "It is the fire which is then the light of man," answers Yājñavalkya. "When the sun has set, and the moon has set, and the fire has been extinguished, what is the light of man?" asks king Janaka. Yājñavalkya answers that it is the sound. "But when the sound itself has been silenced, what is it that functions as light for man?" Yājñavalkya, being pressed quite home on this point, answers that the supreme light of man is the Ātman. "What is this Ātman?" asks king Janaka. This query enables Yājñavalkya to weave together a number of philosophical lucubrations which, though seemingly sundered, may yet be said to constitute a philosophic unity. THE SOUL IN THE STATES OF SLEEP AND OF DREAM.—Yājñavalkya first describes the condition of the soul as it passes from the state of sleep to the state of wakefulness. "This supreme person of light who is encased in the heart wanders from one world to another, namely, from that of sleep to that of wakefulness *as if* thinking, *as if* moving." But the transition-state between sleep and wakefulness, the dreamy state of existence, what we might call the twilight of consciousness, does not itself fail to attract the attention of Yājñavalkya. In the state of dream, says the philosopher, the Self sees all things by spreading out its own light. It creates its own objects of perception and experience in that state. "There are neither any real chariots, nor any roads, neither the tanks, nor the lakes, nor any rivers, which the Self in the con-

dition of dream actually perceives; but all these are created by the Self out of its own native light. The dreamy state of consciousness is like the water which runs between the banks of a river, and the Self moves on like some fish along the two banks—those of sleep and of wakefulness—through the waters of dream-consciousness. Like a falcon which soars high on its pinions and afterwards, being exhausted, falls to sleep, even so does the Soul, full of exhaustion after the tumult of worldly experience, fall into repose."

THE DEPARTING CONSCIOUSNESS.—The transition from the consideration of the dream aberration of man's consciousness to the apparition, if we may so call it, of departing consciousness is next effected by Yājñavalkya, who now proceeds to consider the state of the Soul when he is about to leave the human body. "As a heavy-loaded carriage moves along groaning, even so does this bodily Self, being mounted on by the intelligent Self, leave along groaning at the moment when a man is about to expire. Verily, like a mango fruit or a fig or a *pippala* fruit which, when separated from its stalk, hastens back to the place from which it started, so verily does this man, separated from the stalk of life, hasten back to the existence from which he sprang. And as policemen, magistrates, equerries, and governors wait with food and drink, for a king who is coming back, so do all the elements wait on him who knows this, saying—the Brahman comes, the Brahman approaches." The point of a dying man's heart becomes lighted up, and by that light his Soul departs either through the eye, or through the skull, or through any other part of the body. Man's knowledge and work follow him in order to prepare for him a future existence. "And as a caterpillar leaves the end of one blade of grass only after it has secured its hold on another blade, similarly does this Self leave the human body only after it has found another tenement in another kind of existence. And as a goldsmith taking a piece of gold turns it into whatever newer and more beautiful shapes he pleases, so does this Self create for itself a newer and more beautiful existence, be it the existence of the Manes, of the demi-gods, of the gods, or of any other beings that it pleases."

DOCTRINE OF KARMA.—It is here also that Yājñavalkya's famous

doctrine of Karma emerges. Man's future existence is made for him by his previous acts: as a man has acted and behaved so shall he also be in a future state of existence: "He becomes pure by pure deeds, and sinful by sinful deeds." In fact, the actions of man are the guardians of his destiny. "As a man desires in his life, so does he will, and as he wills, so does he act." It is in the fitness of things therefore that a man should resolve to do good deeds in this life so as to secure for himself a future worthy state of existence. For, when the mortal body lies like a slough, the disembodied spirit flies away taking along with itself the whole stock of its merits and demerits. THE FREE SOUL.—That Self which is free from both good and bad deeds becomes veritably identical with Brahman. Such a Self is the lord of all, the king of all beings and the protector of all things. "The pure Soul stands like a bank or a boundary in order that the worlds may not be confounded." "The Brahmins" we are told, "seek to know him by the study of the Vedas, by sacrifice, by gift, by penance, by fasting; and he who knows him becomes a Muni." Wishing for the world of Brahman, mendicants leave their homes. "What shall we do with off-spring," they ask, "we who have this Self as our world?" A person who knows this becomes quiet, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected, and looks upon everything as identical with the Self. "Evil cannot overcome him, for he overcomes all. Evil cannot burn him, for he burns all. Free from evil, free from spots, free from doubts, such a person truly realises Brahman." This is the ideal which Yājñavalkya holds before Janaka, the philosopher-king; and no wonder that Janaka is tempted to fall prostrate at Yājñavalkya's feet, and offers him his body and his kingdom and his all.

FIFTH ADHYĀYA.

22. A MISCELLANY OF REFLECTIONS.—The fifth chapter of the Upanishad contains no developing philosophical argument, but only some stray philosophic thoughts gathered together in course of time, and belonging possibly to various unknown authors. It would therefore be impossible to give any systematic exposition of this chapter. We can only bring together a few salient points. In

the first place, we have the mention made of a moral advice imparted to the gods, men, and demons by Prajāpati their father and creator. Prajāpati imparts to each one of them only the single syllable 'Da'. The gods understood it to be equivalent to "Damyata" *i. e.*, be subdued; men as "Datta" *i. e.*, give; the demons as "Dayadhvam" *i. e.* be merciful. We are also told that the voice of Prajāpati the father and creator was re-echoed by the thunder which imparted the same reverberating sound "Da,—Da,—Da," to the gods, men, and demons, teaching them respectively the lessons of self-restraint, charity, and mercy.—The next point of philosophic importance in this chapter occurs in section v, where we are told in Thalesian fashion that Water was the first thing to exist; Water produced the True, the True produced Brahman, the Brahman produced Prajāpati, and Prajāpati produced the gods. It was in this way that from out of a primeval physical entity were produced even such moral conceptions as truth, and the gods.—The third point is the description in sec. vi of the "Person-in-the-form-of-mind situated within the heart who is small "like a grain of rice or barley. He is the ruler of all, the lord of all: he rules all this and whatever that exists."—In a brief section after this, lightning is identified with Brahman, because the lightning (*Vidyut*) cuts off (*vidānāt*) all evil. "Whoever knows that lightning is Brahman, from him all evil is manifestly cut off."—Then there is given in section ix that eschatologico-physiological hint which occurs in other Upanishads also, *viz.* that when a man is on the point of departing from this life, he does not hear the noise which is all the while going on within him and which while living he has only to cover his ears to experience.—Another section affords us the description of what happens to a man when he departs from this life. "When the individual Soul leaves this body, he goes to the wind; the wind makes room for him like unto the hole of a carriage-wheel, and through it the soul soars higher. He comes to the sun; the sun makes room for him like unto the hole of a *lambara* (a musical instrument) and through it he soars higher again. He next comes to the moon; then the moon makes room for him like unto the hole of a drum and through it

he soars higher still, and arrives at the world where there is neither any sorrow nor cold ; and there the Soul dwells for eternal years." —Another important topic concerns itself with the discussion of the highest penance of a man, which is said to consist in calmly suffering pain when laid up in bed with sickness, or in being carried over to the forest when dead, or in being placed on fire in the act of cremation.—The 14th section of this chapter discusses the relative importance of vision and audition as criteria for truth, the palm of superiority naturally going to occular perception.—Finally (sect. xiv) we have an interesting little incident wherein we learn that once Janaka Vaideha recognised the philosopher Buḍila Āśvatarāśvi in the elephant that was carrying him, and asked him how it was that he became an elephant and carried him on his head. Buḍila's answer was—" Because I did not know the mouth of Gāyatrī." Whatever the value of this ritualistic explanation, the student of Greek thought is irresistibly put in mind of a similar story of Pythagoras who recognized a dead friend in a dog which was piteously crying before him.

SIXTH ADHYĀYA.

23. THE PARABLE OF THE SENSES.—The sixth chapter of the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad contains five sections of which the first two alone are philosophically important. The third section is merely a ritualistic exposition of the way to the attainment of greatness : to become, in the words of the original, " the best lotus among men." The fourth section contains some very crudely naïve reflections, putting us in mind of Ātharvaṇic enchantments to secure such results as the winning of a suitable wife, the destruction of a possible paramour, and the generation of " the healthiest, strongest, and the most beautiful and intelligent sons, who will be at the same time public men and popular speakers." The last section is merely an enumeration, once more, of the Ṛishis and their pupils.—In the first section of this chapter, we have before us the parable of the senses which occurs in substance if not in letter in many other Upanishads also. In the present section we have the version as follows. There was once a quarrel for superiority between the various senses, as they could not agree as

to what function must be regarded as the most essential to the upkeep of the body. Brahman to whom the matter was referred for arbitration advises them to depart from the body one at a time and so decide the question by an appeal to actual experience. The question was, was it speech which was the most essential of the bodily functions, or was it vision or audition, or again thought or seed ? Not the first, because we see dumb people living. Neither the second nor the third, because we see the blind and the deaf live and do well. Neither the fourth nor the fifth, because fools live even though they may have a dementia, and eunuchs live even though they have no seed. The parable ends by establishing the superiority of the vital breath above the others. It is the vital breath which, if it departs from the body, tears up the senses, "as a spirited horse from the Sindhu country might tear up the pegs to which he may be tethered."

24. PRAVĀHAṆA JAIVALI'S DOCTRINE OF THE FIVE FIRES.—The second section is one of the most important passages of this Upanishad. Śvetaketu was the son of a learned Brahmin called Gautama. He was instructed by his father in various branches of learning, but neither the father nor the son knew anything about the most touching of philosophic questions. When Śvetaketu had once been to the settlement of the Pāñchālas, he went up to meet the king Pravāhaṇa Jaivali, who asked him whether he had learnt anything from his father. Śvetaketu replied that he had been instructed by his father in whatever his father knew. The king asked him five very significant questions, bearing mostly on eschatological matters. The first question was, whether Śvetaketu knew how the souls, when they had departed from here, were separated from each other in the transmundane regions. The second was whether he knew anything about the way in which they return to the world. The third demanded why it was that the other world was never too full even though it contained all the departed who had left this world. The fourth was a ritualistico-philosophic question : How was it that the waters came to be endowed with human voice and were able to speak.* And the fifth was whether

* Or, "Why was it that the waters came to be called Purusha."

Śvetaketu possessed the knowledge about the Path that led to the Gods and the Path that led to the Fathers. Śvetaketu blankly confessed that he knew nothing about these eschatological questions. He thereupon went to his father and told him that the king Pravāhaṇa Jaivali had set him five very peculiar questions which it was not within his power to answer. The father, being greatly amazed at the knowledge which the king seemed to possess about the eschatological problems, went directly to him and bowed to him reverently, even though he was a Brahmin and the king a Kshatriya. The king, being pleased with the humble attitude of Gautama, and being pressed very much to supply him with the answers to the questions which he had set to the boy Śvetaketu, told him the secret of his eschatological knowledge. The one grand idea that runs through his teaching is that almost every existence in this world must be regarded as the embodiment of "sacrifice," and that wherever we go, we must try to realise the spirit of sacrifice. When we cast our eye at the sky, we see that the heaven is the great altar in which the sun is burning as fuel, his rays being smoke, the day being the light of the sacrificial fire, the quarters the coals, and the intermediate quarters the sparks of the fire ; from the oblation that is offered in this sacrifice, namely "Śraddhā (faith)," rises the Soma.* Then again, says Jaivali, if we once more look at the sky, we see that Parjanya (rain) is the great altar in which the year is burning as fuel, the clouds being the smoke, the lightning being the light of the sacrificial fire, the thunder-bolt the coals, and the rumbling of the clouds the sparks of the sacrificial fire ; from the oblation offered in this sacrifice, namely the "Soma," rises shower. Then again, the whole world is a great altar in which the earth burns as fuel, fire being the smoke, night being the light, the Soma being the coals and the stars the sparks of the fire ; from the oblation offered in this sacrifice, namely shower, rises food. Fourthly, man himself is a great altar in which the opened mouth is the fuel, the breath the smoke, the tongue the light, the eye the coals, the ear the sparks ; from the oblation offered in this sacrifice, namely "food," rises

* The word means both the moon and the Soma plant.

seed. Then, finally, woman herself is a great altar in which "seed" being offered as an oblation rises man. In this very peculiar way does Jaivali's philosophy connect the Śraddhā libation with the Soma, the Soma with the rain, the rain with the food, the food with the seed, and finally the seed with the man. This is his celebrated doctrine of "Five Fires." In conclusion we are told that when a man is cremated, from out of the cremation-fire which serves as altar, a lustrous person arises, who goes either to the world of the Gods, or to the world of the Fathers, according to his qualifications.

25. PRAVĀHAṆA JAIVALI'S ESCHATOLOGICAL TEACHINGS.—The doctrine of the Five Fires as narrated in this Upanishad may be usefully supplemented by another version of the same story from the Chhāndogya Upanishad, and the two be rolled into one to constitute the full eschatological teaching of Pravāhaṇa Jaivali. The essence of his teaching seems to be that there are open two ways to men who have led a good life—the bright way and the dark way, the Archir-mārga and the Dhūma-mārga, the Deva-yāna and the Pitṛi-yāṇa, the way of the Gods and the way of the Fathers. Those who have practised penance in forests in their life-time—whether after their death people perform their obsequies or not—enter the path of light and move successively "from light to day, from day to the bright half of the month, from the bright half of the month to the six months during which the sun moves to the north, from these months to the year, from the year to the sun, from the sun to the moon, and from the moon to the lightning. There is a person superhuman who carries them to Brahman. This path is known as the Path of the Gods, or the Path of Brahman. Those who proceed on this path never return to the cycle of human existence, yea, never return." Over against this path there is another reserved for those who, living in towns, lead a life of charitable deeds and perform works of public utility. Such people do not indeed travel by the Path of the Gods, which is reserved only for the penance-performing ascetics of the forest. They travel by the Path of Smoke. "From smoke they go to the night, from the night to the dark half of the month, from the dark half of the month to the six months during which the sun moves to

the south—but they do not reach the year. From these months they go to the world of the Fathers, from the world of the Fathers to the sky, from the sky to the moon. There they dwell till the time comes for them to fall down. Thence they descend by this road : from the moon they come down to the sky, from the sky to the wind. Having become wind they become smoke, having become smoke they become mist, having become mist they become a cloud, having become a cloud they rain down. Then they are born either as rice or barley, herbs or trees, sesame or beans. At this stage, verily, the path is difficult to follow. Whoever eats the food or discharges the semen, like unto him do they become." It is also interesting to note that creatures low in the scale of evolution—like flies and worms—are sundered by Jaivali as with a hatchet from the rest of creation. They are denied the right to enter either of the two paths, and they have to keep the perpetual round of coming and going. Their rule is not " die to live," but "live to die," and it is strange that a tiger or a lion or a boar should have been here associated with such insignificant creatures as a worm or a moth, a gnat or a mosquito. Jaivali assigns all those who lead a wicked life in this world—those who steal gold or drink wine or dishonour the *Guru's* bed or kill a Brahmin, as well as those who keep company with these—to eternal perdition. It is only those who have a knowledge of the Five-fold Fire who, in Jaivali's opinion, deserve to enter a happy world after their death : those who lead a life of charity to enter the Path of the Fathers, and those who lead a life of piety and austerity to enter on the Path of the Gods.

CHAPTER SIXTH

A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF UPANISHADIC TEXTS

xiv—Chhāndogya Upanishad

First Prapāṭhaka.

1. The Significance of the Om.—The first Prapāṭhaka of the Chhāndogya Upanishad is of little philosophical consequence. Even the famous story of Ushasti Chākrāyaṇa, the famishing sage who would not mind eating beans left over in the dish of a rich man, but who would refuse to drink water from the same source because it was not absolutely necessary for his life as the beans were—even this story of great human interest has not a philosophically significant ending. For the rest the Prapāṭhaka is given merely to the extolling of the Udgītha, which, according to the old sacerdotal way of looking at things, schematically represents the spiritual significance of Sāman and comes to be identified with the tri-monosyllable *Om*. The *Om* is the beginning of all the Sāman hymns and typifies the very essence of all spiritual endeavours for the realisation of God. Even the sun in the sky moves on singing this Udgītha, says a passage of this Prapāṭhaka. The *Om* verily fills the whole Universe. In man it is identified with breath, and in the outer world it is identified with ether. Being the essence of both internal and external life, it is immortal and fearless, and those who meditate upon this immortal and fearless symbol of spiritual life themselves come to be clothed with immortality and fearlessness. The very dogs that would sing this Udgītha would attain all that they ever desire, to say nothing of man. It is significant that this Udgītha or *Om* should have been regarded in these ancient times as not merely the beginning of all sacrificial

endeavour, but the mark of all mystical endeavours likewise. This, in course of time, furnished all the later devotional writers with a pattern, after which they constructed other nominal symbolisms of the God-head.

SECOND PRAPĀṬHAKA.

2. THE MEANING OF SĀMAN.—The second Prapāṭhaka of the Chhāndogya Upanishad also contains little of philosophical value. It begins by a philological consideration of the identity between the conception of Sāman and Sādhu, which it immediately proceeds Brāhmaṇa-wise to identify. The purport of it is that the Sāman is Sādhu, good, and whoever would sing Sāman would thereby attain all goodness. The Sāman treated of in this Prapāṭhaka is very probably to be identified with the syllable *Om* which formed the topic of the last Prapāṭhaka and of which we hear again in the 23rd section of the present Prapāṭhaka.

3. KINDS OF SĀMAN.—This Sāman is regarded as of five different kinds, into the technique of which it is needless philosophically to enter. It has no more than a ritualistic value. Sections 2-7 contain a discussion of the meditation of the Sāman of five different kinds; and sections 8-10 contain a discussion of the Sāman of seven different kinds. And at the end of each discussion we are told that whoso meditates in the manner prescribed is enabled to get possession of the things on which he is meditating.

4. NAMES OF SĀMAN.—Next follows (sections 11-21) a discussion of the various names of Sāman. The Sāmans are known as Gāyatra Sāman or Rathaṁtara Sāman or Vāmadevya Sāman or Bṛihat Sāman, and so on. These also have no more than a mere ritualistic or exegetical significance.

5. A PHILOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION.—Section 22nd takes us to a grammatical distinction between the Svaras, Sparśas, and Ushmans, which among themselves entirely exhaust the Devanāgarī alphabet. This discussion of the analysis of the alphabet in the Chhāndogya Upanishad is certainly of some philological or grammatical consequence. It stands midway between the Brāhmaṇas of the earlier age and the great Grammarians, Etymologists, and Prātiśākhya-writers of the following period.

6. BRANCHES OF MORAL LIFE.—The next is a complex section, though a small one. In the first part, the author at once introduces an ethical discussion of what constitutes the essence of moral law. Moral law he regards as of three different kinds. The first part of the moral law is sacrifice, study, and charity. The second is austerity or penance. The third is intellectual tutelage and life in a master's house. While the last part is life in *Brahman*. This suggests to us already the fourfold division of the "Āśramas" in human life. In the order of narration in this section, they are respectively the Gṛihasthāśrama or the householder's life, the Vānaprasthāśrama or that of the forester, the Brahmacharyāśrama or that of the bachelor-student, and the last is the Saṁnyāsāśrama or the life of the recluse. The order followed in the present section is neither logical nor chronological.

7. THE GENESIS AND FUNCTION OF OM.—The second part of section 23 tells us a brief story. Prajāpati is said to have meditated upon the different worlds, and from his meditation sprang the three Vidyās, *viz.*, Rigveda, Yajurveda, and Sāmaveda. When these again were meditated upon, the three worlds sprang out of them, *viz.*, Bhūḥ, Bhuvaḥ, and Svaḥ—the earth, the intermundia, and the sky. When these were again meditated upon, Prajāpati was able to produce the supremely significant Tri-monosyllable, *Om*. "As a number of leaves might be held together by a spike which passes through them, so is all this world held together by the *Om* which interpenetrates it." It is the *Om* which, if we might be allowed to vary the metaphor, is the string that ties together the pearls of existence. It informs them, is at the back of them, and is responsible for holding them together. The world would be a chaos, according to the Upanishadic philosopher, unless the *Om* was immanent in it from the beginning to the end.

THIRD PRAPĀṬHAKA.

8. THE PARABLE OF THE SUN.—The first eleven sections of this Prapāṭhaka stand by themselves, and contain what we might call the famous Upanishadic parable of the Sun, which bears a close similarity to certain Platonic parables. It cannot in any sense be called an aetiological myth or a mere poetical fancy ; but

there is justification enough for us to regard this as a transcendental myth. The author of the Upanishad regards the sun as the honey of the gods, the heaven as a supporting beam from which the intermundia hangs like a bee-hive. The sun, he says, is the honey of the gods preserved in this bee-hive. The rays which the sun spreads in different directions—the Eastern, the Southern, the Western, the Northern and the Upward—are the different honey-cells. The hymns of the Vedas, as well as the body of occult utterances, constitute the bees which work on the bee-hives in various directions, collecting honey from all kinds of flowers such as those of the Rigveda, the Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda, the Ithihāsa-Purāṇa, and finally the Brahma-Vidyā. The different colours of the sun are the several varieties of nectar on which live the various kinds of divinities. The Upanishadic philosopher supposes that there are five different colours issuing from the sun: the red, the white, the black, the dark, and finally, a certain sort of inexpressible colour. While the various kinds of divinities like the Vasus, the Rudras, the Ādityas, and the Maruts live on the first four kinds of nectar, the Sādhyas alone (who seem to be the saints among the gods) live on that fifth nectar of inexpressible colour which, for our present purposes, might be taken to be the quintessence of the sun. The Upanishadic philosopher, however, is careful to point out that the gods do not partake of the nectar by the ordinary processes of drinking or eating which are familiar to us; but that they are satisfied merely by "looking" at it. This seems to give us some insight into the *θεωρεῖν* of the gods. The concluding section of the parable tells us finally that the supreme condition is reached when for the mystic the sun neither rises nor sets, *i. e.*, when the experiencer enjoys day once and for all; when for him the distinction between night and day finally ceases. If this is not true, says the author, may he lose all prestige in Brahman. The philosopher seems to be so much convinced of this experience that he does not mind even profanely swearing by God.

9. GĀYATRĪ.—The two sections that follow give us a very peculiar form of what we might call a philological philosophy. The

subject matter under discussion is the verse Gāyatrī. Gāyatrī, as being derived from the two roots, *gai* and *trai*, means literally that which, singing, protects. Now the author tells us that the earth is what sings and protects. Therefore Gāyatrī is to be identified with the earth ; and the human body, being made of the earth, must be identified with it. So Gāyatrī must be identified with the human heart. Let us now find out, says the author of the Upanishad, what is contained inside this heart. Within this heart, there is an ether, *ākāśa*, as without it there is another likewise. So the heart first comes to be identified with the ether inside, and comes also later to be identified, by parity of reasoning, with the ether outside. But the ether inside and the ether outside are impersonal conceptions; so they must somehow be identified with the Person inside and with the Person outside Hence it is that the Gāyatrī comes ultimately to be identified with the Person within and the Person without. This certainly is a very peculiar way by which the author of the Upanishad educes philosophical considerations from philological identifications formulated in the spirit of the identification-philosophy of the Brāhmaṇas.

10. THE PHYSIOLOGICAL PROOFS OF PERSONALITY.—Towards the end of section 13, we are told that the light which shines in the highest heavens is also the light which shines within man. In fact, that the Person without is the same as the Person within ; that the macrocosm is to be identified with the microcosm. But the question arises, What is the proof of the existence of this great light beyond, and this great light within ? The author tries to give two very peculiar proofs of Supreme Existence. They might be called the perceptual, and the audile proofs respectively. The perceptual proof consists in the simple fact that we are able to discern the warmth in the human body as soon as we touch it. This warmth is indication enough of the existence of the light within. Then follows the audile proof. The very fact that we are able to hear a peculiar rumbling sound like that of a blazing fire within our ears as soon as we close them by the hand is again a sufficient indication of the energy that burns within. According

to our author we need not have any further proof of the existence of Personality within us : and the author strangely goes on telling us in terms which closely bring to our mind the reasonings of the modern New Thoughts-school, that he who thus regards the supreme Existence as either perceivable or audible, becomes himself perceived and heard, in fact, becomes conspicuous and celebrated.

11. ŚĀṆḌILYA'S COSMOLOGICAL PROOF.—The same identification of macrocosm and microcosm is carried on in the 14th section of this Prapāṭhaka. The soul within us who is smaller than the mustard seed is also the soul without us, and is greater than the greatest of worlds. He is the abode of all good qualities. From Him has proceeded all that exists. In Him does it live, and to Him shall it return. It is only when a man meditates on Him with a firm and composed mind that he is able to obtain Him. He who makes up his mind in this way while living, shall also return to this Fount-of-Existence after he is dead. This is the teaching imparted to us by the sage Śāṇḍilya. We get here also incidentally what might be called the cosmological proof of the existence of the Supreme Being, *viz.* that drawn from the emergence, the sustenance, and the future destruction of the world.

12. TWO COSMOLOGICAL PARABLES.—Of the sections that follow, the 15th and the 19th contain cosmological parables in which an attempt is made to envisage the existence of the world as it hangs in space, and the emergence of the sun from primeval, chaotic Non-Being. The two parables bring to our mind the close parallels afforded to us in early Egyptian and Babylonian thought, where also the world comes to be envisaged as a chest with the sky as its upper lid, the intermundia as its inner contents, and the solid earth as its base. That original Not-Being was, is in itself a great logical conception ; that this Not-Being further comes to be identified with the primeval egg and that, in fulness of time, this egg breaks open, the upper part being the golden heaven, and the lower part the silvery earth, and that all the existences on the earth such as the mountains and the rivers, should have proceeded from the solid and the liquid contents within this egg, shows a

good cosmological imagination. Even though the value of it might not come near to what modern evolution has to say about creation still, in any case, it is a much better conception than the ordinary accounts of Creation out of the sea of non-existence by the mere fiat of God as taught to us by the Genesis and other similar texts.

13. TWO MINOR SECTIONS.—Section 16 is only of some eugenical interest, telling us that it is possible for man to reach the age of 116 with proper ritualistic care, and that Mahidāsa-Aitareya did actually live that age even though he was tormented in his life-time by a disease. Section 18 harps once more upon the favoured theme of the identification of the microcosm and the macrocosm.

14. IS THE KṚISHṆA OF THIS UPANISHAD THE SAME AS THE KṚISHṆA OF THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ ?—We have to consider an important point to which section 17 of this Prapāṭhaka introduces us. We are there told that a sage named Ghora Āṅgirasa imparted some wisdom to " Kṛishṇa who was the son of Devakī." The piece of wisdom consists in the instruction that man's life may be regarded as a veritable sacrifice ; that man is bound in his life neither to enjoy nor to seek bodily pleasures ; that whenever he intends to do so he should seek them not as rules of conduct but exceptions of conduct ; that the gifts that he has to bestow upon the priests at the sacrifice are no other than the life of penance, of charity, of straightforwardness, of non-killing and of truthfulness ; that the pouring down of the libation for the sacrifice is his regeneration ; and, lastly, that his death constitutes the Avabhṛitha ceremony, the final act of the sacrifice. Now the great question that arises is, Who is this Kṛishṇa, the son of Devakī, to whom Ghora Āṅgirasa gave this instruction? Attempts have been made to identify this Devakī-putra Kṛishṇa with the Kṛishṇa of the Mahābhārata, if not also with the Kṛishṇa of the Bhagavadgītā ; and one of the arguments adduced for the identification is, that the very words—*Tapaḥ, Dānam, Ārjavam, Ahiṁsā* and *Satyam*—which occur in the passage in question occur likewise in the early verses of the 16th chapter of the Bhagavadgītā. Since however the reference is somewhat vague and the author of the Bhagavadgītā was wont to avail himself

of scattered verses or expressions spread broad-cast in the various Upanishadic texts, we feel that the argument is not sufficiently convincing, and prefer therefore to leave it an open question.

FOURTH PRAPĀṬHAKA.

15. RAIKVA'S DOCTRINE OF AIR AS THE PRIMARY SUBSTANCE.—The first two sections and half of the third together constitute the first continuous episode in this Prapāṭhaka. We are told there an interesting story of Jānaśruti Pautrāyaṇa and the philosopher Raikva-with-a-car. The way in which Jānaśruti Pautrāyaṇa goes to see Raikva-with-a-car reminds us irresistibly of the way in which Alexander the Great went to see the philosopher Diogenes-with-a-tub. The purport of the story under discussion is that Raikva preaches to Jānaśruti Pautrāyaṇa an Anaximenean doctrine about Air being the be-all and the end-all of things—the source, in other words from which things originate and the haven to which they return. The Air is to be understood either as air in the macrocosm or as breath in the microcosm. In either case, it is what inspires man as well as the cosmos.

16. TO CONCEIVE REALITY IS TO BECOME IT.—The second part of section 3 has for us no philosophical meaning, except the fact that it teaches us once more that a man who meditates upon Reality in a particular way makes himself master of the Reality as he conceives it. Thus, for example, a man who meditates upon Reality as the eater of food himself comes to enjoy food. This vein of thought runs all through Upanishadic philosophy.

17. A PARALLELISM.—Sections 4 and 10 of this Prapāṭhaka contain two parallel stories which, between themselves, may be regarded as constituting one complete philosophic episode. In the first part, we are told how Satyakāma Jābāla obtained instruction from his teacher Hāridrumata Gautama. What the teaching was is not definitely made known at the end of the first part of the episode. But what it must be is evident from the way in which Satyakāma Jābāla, in the second part of the episode, acts in his turn the part of a teacher and instructs his own disciple Upakosala Kāmalāyana, who had come to live with him as a student. There is a parallelism between the two parts of the episode. In

the first part, Satyakāma Jābāla as a student receives instruction; in the second part, as a teacher he imparts it. Neither Gautama nor Satyakāma Jābāla nor Upakosala, however, seem to possess the highest instructions about the Self, which may be found in other Upanishads. But it is evidently the case that they are keen students of spiritual knowledge, who continuously went in search of illumination.

18. THE STORY OF SATYAKĀMA JĀBĀLA.--Satyakāma Jābāla had no very enviable parentage. He is born from a woman who seems to have led quite a loose life in her youth. When the young Satyakāma asks her, as he comes of age, from whom he is born, the mother confesses that she could not say who his father might have been inasmuch as she herself had led a rather free life in her youthful days. When Satyakāma Jābāla goes to his teacher and is asked the name of his father, he tells his maste exactly what his mother had told him previously. Being greatly struck with the love of truth disclosed both by Satyakāma and by his mother, the teacher Gautama argues that Satyakāma Jābāla could not have been the son of anybody but a Brahmin, and therefore has no objection to confer upon him the knowledge which he possessed. Satyakāma Jābāla goes to tend the herd of his preceptor's cattle. When in the forest, he is addressed first by the bull, then by the fire, then by the swan, and lastly, by the diver bird; but his knowledge receives its completion only when he returns to the home of his preceptor to be instructed by him.

19. THE STORY OF UPAKOSALA—When Satyakāma Jābāla in the fulness of time himself became a teacher, and when Upakosala dwelt with him for spiritual instruction, Upakosala carefully tended the three fires of his preceptor; and the fires, being pleased with the services of the boy, told him that the Highest Reality of which he was in search was the Person in the sun, in the moon, and in the lightning, respectively. These were after all merely physical categories. Satyakāma Jābāla told Upakosala that the knowledge which he had thus obtained from the fires could not be regarded as the final knowledge, and that true knowledge would consist in regarding the Person within the eye as equivalent to the Highest

Reality. "This is the immortal and fearless Brahman. They call Him *Saṁyadvāma*, for all blessings go to Him. He is *Vāmanī*, because he leads to all blessings. He is *Bhāmanī*, for he shines in all the worlds." This was an advance over the knowledge which was imparted to Upakosala previously, inasmuch as there is a progress from merely physical categories to a physiological category, *viz.* the Person in the eye. The story winds up with the eschatological intimation that the soul of a man passes away by the Path of Light familiar to all students of the Vedānta. "When a man dies, he goes to light ; from light to day ; from day to the bright half of the month ; thence to the six months of the northward wending of the sun ; thence to the year ; thence to the sun himself ; from the sun to the moon : from the moon to lightning—where a Superhuman Being conducts such a soul to the resting place of the gods." Those who travel by this Path, the Upanishad tells us, shall never return.

FIFTH PRAPĀṬHAKA.

20. AŚVAPATI'S DOCRTINE OF ĀTMAN VAIŚVĀNARA.—The first two sections of this Prapāṭhaka give the story concerning the "Dispute of the Faculties" leading to the superiority of the Prāṇa as the life-principle in man ; while the next eight sections present us with the "Doctrine of the Five Fires" and other eschatological teachings —both on lines almost identical with those followed in the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad already discussed in the last chapter. The remaining 14 sections to the end of this Prapāṭhaka introduce us to a set of five metaphysicians : Prāchīnaśāla Aupamanyava, Satyayajña Paulushi, Indradyumna Bhāllaveya, Jana Śārkarākshya, and Buḍila Āśvatarāśvi, who are discussing among themselves the question, What is the nature of the Ātman ? They then go to a sixth metaphysician, Uddālaka Āruṇi by name who, being likewise unable to solve their problem of the Final Reality, takes them all over to Aśvapati Kaikeya who was reputed to know the Ultimate Reality in the shape of the Vaiśvānara Ātman. Now Aśvapati Kaikeya began to cross-question them with a view to educe their own notions about the nature of Reality. Aupamanyava told him that he had regarded Heaven as the highest kind of

existence. Aśvapati replies that it was merely the head of the Ātman and so an inadequate exposition of the problem. Satyayajñya said that the Sun was in his opinion the Final Reality. Aśvapati Kaikeya criticises it as being merely the eye of the Ātman. Indradyumna held that Air was the Final Reality, which Aśvapati characterises as merely the breath of the Ātman. Śārkarākshya believed that Ether was the Final Reality; but Aśvapati puts it away as being only the trunk of the Ātman. Buḍila declared that Water constituted the Final Reality; and again Aśvapati objects inasmuch as it was merely the bladder of the Ātman. Finally, Uddālaka Āruṇi avers that the Earth should be the Highest Reality, which view Aśvapati once more disapproves in that the Earth constitutes merely the foot of the Ātman. It was in this way, we are told, that the ordinary physical categories were examined and found wanting by Aśvapati Kaikeya, according to whom the only true Reality consisted in the Ātman designated as the "Vaiśvānara" who dwells in all beings and measures a span in height. This declaration by Aśvapati Kaikeya apparently satisfied all his learned guests. The truly significant element in his conception is the universal immanence of the Ātman. But having risen to this conception Aśvapati descends at a stroke to the ordinary level of ritualistic practice, and gives prescription for offering Agnihotra oblations to the Vaiśvānara Ātman, so as to satisfy respectively the different vital airs such as Prāṇa, Vyāna, Apāna, Samāna, and Udāna. All that is philosophically valueless.

SIXTH PRAPĀṬHAKA.

21. ĀRUṆI'S INSTRUCTION TO ŚVETAKETU.—The 6th Prapāṭhaka of the Chhāndogya Upanishad is a continuous instructional dialogue between Śvetaketu the aspiring disciple, and his father Āruṇi who was already well versed in spiritual matters. Even though Śvetaketu was sent to school to learn all the different branches of learning he returned to his father as ignorant as ever, and full of conceit. On cross-questioning him, his father found apparently that his son did not know what might be regarded as the supreme object of knowledge. There are three points that emerge almost immediately in the conversation that took place between Śvetaketu and his

father. When Śvetaketu asked his father that he should be illuminated on the topic presented by his spiritual father before him the father told him first to find what might be called the ἀρχή of knowledge—that by knowing which everything else might become known. Secondly, this same supreme object of knowledge might be regarded from the cosmological point of view, as the substratum of all things. Just as the substratum of all iron weapons is iron, and the substratum of all earthen pots is the earth; just as the substratum of all golden ornaments is gold: even so is the subtratum of all phenomenal objects. It might be regarded as an eternal underlying hypostasis, the cosmological counterpart of the afore-said ἀρχή of knowledge. And, thirdly, the father told his son that when this ἀρχή of knowledge was obtained, when this eternal substratum was found out, the knowledge of that alone was real, while everything else was merely the phenomenal manifestation of it. This is asmuch as to say that whatever happens is merely a name; while the real substance is only what underlies all phenomenal manifestations. It is these three points, therefore, upon which the dialogue between the father and the son turns. These points being mooted in the first section of the chapter, the rest of the sections are merely an illustration in various ways of the points so mooted.

22. THE PROBLEM OF BEING AND NON-BEING.—Sections 2 to 4 contain a consecutive exposition of how the original existence must be regarded as Being, as opposed to Non-Being. This is evidently a common topic of cosmological discussion. Readers of Greek philosophy are aware how the problem of the conflict of Non-Being and Being arose even before the days of the Sophists, and how the voice of some of the Sophists calling for the principle of Non-Being as the fundamental principle of existence was finally hushed up by Socrates, and later by his disciple Plato, who upheld Being as against Non-Being. It seems that in the Upanishadic days also the same problem of Non-Being was mooted, and even though elsewhere we have some justification for supposing that certain Upanishadic philosophers regarded Non-Being as the primary reality, in the present Upanishad we are told that the conception of Non-

Being must be dispelled before that of Being could be posited. Being, therefore, exists alone and without a second. Being is also credited with powers of perception and thought. Being is no longer an impersonal conception. It thought that it might be many, we are told, and from its thought proceeded all the primary elements. Moreover it is described as having entered into these elements in order to endow them with living force, and constitute the objects of the animate world. It seems as if the primary elements were first without the presence of Being in them : as if Being entered into them as a God-like activity from without. For we learn that it did so enter into the elements and thus manifested all Names and Forms. We might note that in this account Being is not regarded as from the very beginning immanent in all the objects of the world. It was somehow transcendent ; but it later entered the elements to instil into them the principle of life. We may bring to mind here the close analogy of this description with the Aristotelian conception of the Soul as having entered the Soul-less objects as a Divine activity from without.

23. THE TRIPARTITE SCHEME OF DIVISION IN THE ELEMENTS.—Now what are the primary elements into which Being so entered ? It may be observed that the primary elements are not mentioned here as forming the ordinary quintuple enumeration into ether, air, fire, water and earth with which we are familiar in the later Indian thought and in the early Greek Philosophy. The primary elements are only three : Tejas, Āp, and Anna. Tejas signifies the invigorating, energetic principle. Āp stands for all liquid existence. Anna, which signifies whatever is solid, only indirectly designates the earth or food. We are thus in possession of three different primary elements : solid existence, liquid existence, and energy or force, which last is prominently manifested in fire or light. The tripartite division of the primary elements seems to be earlier in thought than the quintuple, or even, as in certain cases, the quadruple : namely, fire, air, water, and earth—omitting the ether. It seems also that Āruṇi thought that all the objects of phenomenal existence were the product of a suitable and judicious combination of the above three different principles, informed and

invigorated by spirit ; and that objects were known to be more fiery, to be more watery, or to be more earthy, according as the principle of fire, or water, or earth predominated. We are thus carried to the Empedoclean doctrine of there being a portion of everything in everything—except the spirit, which alone stands outside and is transcendent. The tripartite scheme, unfolded in the present Upanishad, supplies us with the basis on which the later Pañchīkaraṇa doctrine was founded.

24. APPEARANCE AND REALITY.—But after all it must be remembered that what is produced by the combination of these three different principles is only an appearance, and not reality. When we analyse, says Āruṇi, any of the phenomenal manifestations into their three component parts—when we find out what these component parts are,—what remains is the eternal substratum which alone is real, everything else being an appearance. To take an illustration : if we were just to analyse into its component parts the fire as we find it—the terrestrial fire in the hearth, or the celestial fire of the sun and the moon and the lightning,—it might be reduced to three constituent parts : the redness belonging to the primary element of fire, the whiteness belonging to the element of water, and the blackness to the element of earth. When these have been subtracted nothing remains of the fire except the original substratum out of which it is constituted. It was this substratum alone that is real. What this substratum is we shall have occasion to see very soon. It will, as we shall see, be identified with the Soul of the Universe, the "Ātman." Whatever else exists is a phenomenal manifestation. No wonder that this passage should have been pressed into their service by the great Advaitic writers in whose opinion nothing but the Ātman could be real, everything else being an appearance.

25. A CRASS PHYSIOLOGISM.—The dialogue between Śvetaketu and his father carries us next to another tripartite division, viz. what is dense, what is medium, and what is subtle ; and in this connection we are told in sections 5 and 6, how mind is the subtlest part of the food that we take, how Prāṇa is the subtlest part of the water we drink, and how speech is the subtlest part of the light we

see. We are not concerned here with the dense part of the different elements. They are not philosophically important. What we are concerned with is the knowledge of the subtle portion only ; and is it not peculiar to find that the mind is believed to be constituted out of food ; or that speech is nothing more than the subtle portion of the light within ? It seems evident that Āruṇi had no better conception of mind than that it was merely a physiological product inasmuch as he regarded it as emerging out of different kinds of food. That is a crass physiologism which we recommend to the notice of modern physiological thinkers.

26. A FASTING PHILOSOPHY.—Section 6 stands by itself. In it we are given some information about the practice of a fortnight's fasting and the copious drinking of water. The main reason why a fortnight is prescribed is because a man is made up of sixteen portions (Kalās); and as long as at least one of them still dominates, it would not be possible for a man to leave his body. The view that man is constituted of sixteen parts has evidently paved the way for the later Sāṁkhya conception of the LiṅgaŚarīra consiting of seventeen or eighteen parts.

27. PHYSIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.—Section eight is of a very composite structure. It contains various points, somehow brought together, which ultimately converge to the conclusion that the Ātman alone is the real existence. We are told at first in a sheer philological fashion that *svapiti* (sleeps) is nothing more than *svam apīto bhavati* : that in sleep a man becomes " united with his true Self." This seems to be a curious state of affairs. If it were possible for us to become united with our own true Self in sleep we had rather all the while lie sleeping instead of meditating on Ātman. But it seems that the philosopher intends only to assert that we are making during sleep merely an unconscious alliance with the true Self, and not a conscious one. For he says again that in sleep the mind is fastened to breath (Prāṇa) even like a bird which is tethered with a string, and that howsoever much the bird may fly about, it must always fly within the sphere engendered by the motion of the string, as it cannot fly even a foot's distance away from it. The meaning of this would be that it is

only when we control our breath or Prāṇa that we may hope to control our mind also: a dictum which assumes some significance in later Yogic Philosophy. After this declaration the philosopher merges back into a physiological discussion of hunger and thirst; but the discussion ultimately leads him to the basis of all these physiological functions: namely, the true Self—*Sanmūlāḥ saumyemāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sadāyatanāḥ satpratishṭhāḥ*. Finally we are told that when a man departs, his body is merged into the mind, his mind into the breath, the breath into the light, and the light into the Highest Being. Even here we are brought once more to the fount and source of all existence, *viz.* the Real Being, which is to be identified with Ātman. Āruṇi further tells his boy that this Real Existence he must find within himself; and wisdom would consist in an identification of one's inner Self with this Ātman. This is an utterance which has given a good deal of trouble to all dualistic philosophers, as it evidently preaches an identification between the Individual and the Universal Self.

28. IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL SPIRIT.—This identification of the Individual and Universal Self is the burden of the remaining sections in this chapter, each of them emphasising some one aspect of this element of identification. Honey seems to be made out of the juices of different trees; and yet the juices must lose their individuality before they become honey. Similarly all the Individual Selves must lose their Self-hood before they are merged into the Real. As the rivers are fed by the water which emerges from the watery vapour of the ocean, and ultimately merge back into the same ocean, similarly have all the Individual Selves emerged from the Absolute, and must vanish in the Absolute. These two different analogies illustrate the emergence and mergence of the Individual Selves from and into the Absolute.

29. THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUALITY.—The section that follows is philosophically somewhat important. The question that is discussed there is, What is the mark of individuality*? When the parts of a tree are lopped off, the parts cease to live, and yet the tree remains; but time comes when the tree itself dies and the parts

* This is exactly the question that arises in Bergson's *Creative Evolution*.

necessarily wither. Similarly the parts of a body might wither and yet the body might live ; but the time may come when the body may die and all the parts necessarily die likewise. The tree in the first place and the body in the second, live and die only as the Self in them informs them or leaves them away. Thus the question of individuality is here only mooted, and we need hardly expect the Upanishadic philosopher to give any thorough philosophical discussion of it.

30. THE SUBTLETY, AND IMMANENCE OF ĀTMAN.—The section that follows gives us an insight into the subtlety of the all-pervading Ātman. When the fruit of the Nyagrodha tree, for instance, is cut open, we discover an infinite number of minute seeds each one of which is potentially a whole big Nyagrodha, although if one were to open out the seed-kin no trace of the tree is seen. The tree is thus latent in every small seed-kin. In a like manner we can say that the whole universe is latent in the Ātman. The Ātman is the subtle essence that underlies and informs the whole universe like unto the salt which when dissolved into water may not be seen, and yet is immanent in the whole of the water into which it is dissolved. It is only from the Atman's in-dwelling presence that the whole universe emerges or even appears. Such a subtle, immanent, substance none could ever hope the know by his own unaided effort. It is only the preceptor that can impart the knowledge of this hidden universal essence.

31. SELF AND REALITY IDENTICAL.—It is only when we " cover ourselves with the truth of Ātman," that we may be able to face boldly the ordeal of life. If we cover ourselves with unreality, there is no hope for us. It is Truth therefore which ultimately matters. Truth is identical with the subtle essence of the universe, and that is the Ātman. " That THOU art " is the recurring instruction which Āruṇi gives to his son Śvetaketu.

SEVENTH PRAPĀṬHAKA.

32. NĀRADA THE SPIRITUAL DISCIPLE.—The seventh Prapāṭhaka of the Chhāndogya Upanishad contains a conversation between Nārada and Sanatkumāra—Nārada playing the part of a disciple

and Sanatkumāra that of the spiritual teacher. Nārada is introduced to us here not in his mythological rôle of the singer of divine hymns, who moves about from heaven to earth and from earth to heaven, relieving his devotional fervour by a sort of marplotic creation of conflicts and enmities between the peasants and princes on earth. He is introduced to us here in the humble capacity of a layman, who approaches a great spiritual teacher, only in order that he might receive illumination as to the Highest Reality. He is introduced to us as one who is conversant with all the intellectual learning of those days. He has studied all the Vedas ; he has studied all the History and Mythology ; he has studied all the different sciences including the science of Archery and the science of Astrology, the science by which ghosts could be laid and missiles regulated. He approaches Sanatkumāra in an humble vein and requests him to unfold to him the secret of the spiritual life inasmuch as he finds that all his intellectual equipment proves of no avail in landing him beyond the ocean of worldly sorrow. Being wafted over by the gales of chance in the raft of the worldly existence on the ocean of life, he finds it impossible to cross it unless a helmsman comes and directs the raft to a spiritual haven where he might be altogether beyond the reach of sorrow. He bewails that he has learnt all except the science of Ātman, and no one who is not conversant with that science could ever hope to pass beyond the ocean of existence. Sanatkumāra is gracious enough to ultimately confer upon his humble disciple the secret of his spiritual life.

33. MEDITATION ON THE " NAME."—Sanatkumāra begins however in the peculiar fashion, familiar to the students of Upanishadic philosophy, of piling categories over categories so as to constitute a philosophical sorites. He begins by telling Nārada that all the learning that Nārada had hitherto acquired was merely a "Name," that whosoever would meditate upon the " Name " as Brahman would himself reach as far the name itself extends, but no farther. Santakumāra brings in here the conception of the " Name " which is only a lower form of Reality ; but the significance he gives to the expression falls greatly short of the significance which that same conception came later to possess in the history of the

Bhakti doctrine. It is not merely by meditating upon the different sciences as "Names" that a man could hope to reach God; but somehow, as the later Bhakti doctrine would inculcate, the "Name" is indeed the doorway to God, provided it is understood as a Divine Name, as a symbol by which one might try to realise God. As in Christian Mysticism, so also in Indian Mysticism, the "Name" occupies a very prominent place, though unfortunately the significance which Sanatkumāra here gives to the idea falls short of the significance which must rightfully be assigned to it by Mystics of all Ages.

34. PSYCHOLOGICAL CATEGORIES.—Sanatkumāra then proceeds to say that Speech is better than Name, and that Manas is better than Speech; that Saṁkalpa is better than Manas, and that Chitta is better than Saṁkalpa; that Dhyāna is better than Chitta, while Vijñāna is superior even to Dhyāna. So far here is strung together for us a number of psychological categories, even though the meanings which we might attach to the words could not be definitely ascertained. What can we mean by Manas? It seems after all to be merely an aspect of the thinking principle, possibly the imagination. By Saṁkalpa we might understand the act or process of desiring, if not the volition. By Chitta we might understand conception; by Dhyāna, meditation; and by Vijñāna, the act of intellectual solidarity. Anyhow we, of course, cannot sit in judgment on the precise meanings which the Upanishadic philosophers of those days assigned to these words; yet the way in which we have tried to interpret these conceptions seems to be at least a fair indication of what they might have meant.

35. BACK-SLIDING TO PHYSICAL CATEGORIES.—It seems curious that Sanatkumāra should have proceeded to regard power as even superior to knowledge, unmindful of the Baconian adage that knowledge is power. The reason why Sanatkumāra seems to be compelled to give precedence to power is that a powerful man can by mere brute force shake even a hundred men of knowledge, if they are arrayed against him. The intellectuals are skeletons after all! Anyhow, granting that power is superior to knowledge, it seems very strange that Sanatkumāra should have from that point onward

slid from the psychological categories back to the mere physical categories. He is not merely content to say that physical power is superior to knowledge, but that Food is superior to Power as well as is the cause of it; that Water is superior to Food, as it is also its cause. Superior to Water is Fire, and superior to Fire is Ākāśa as their respective causes.

36. NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL CATEGORIES.—Nobody could have said a word against this back-sliding, if Sanatkumāra had not taken into his head to go over once more to the psychological categories. From the 13th section onwards he says once more that Memory is stronger than Ākāśa; that Hope is stroger than Memory; and that finally, Prāṇa or the vital principle, which is a psychologico-metaphysical category, is superior to the barely psychological category of Hope. As in other places, so even here, the vital breath is magnified beyond all measure; but it seems strange that Sanatkumāra who was one of the greatest spiritual teachers of antiquity should have regarded vital breath as the highest category of existence. "In it are all beings centered, as in the naval are centered the spokes of a wheel. Verily, the vital breath is itself the father and the mother, the brother and the sister, the preceptor and the Brahmin. In fact, it is the All." The up-shot of this teaching would be that we should regard Prāṇa as the Highest Reality, and should meditate thereon.

37. SPIRITUAL HEDONISM THE KEY TO A NEW MORAL SORITES.—But the 16th section of the Prapāṭhaka takes us to a new sorites altogether. We might call it a moral sorites. At the conclusion of the last section we were told that a man who conceived the Prāṇa as a supreme, trans-phenomenal principle, might be regarded as one who declares things which are undeclarable: as one who shoots beyond the limits of knowledge. But one could not hope to be such an *ativādin*, unless one had first the principle of Truth, unless he possessed superior Knowledge. Never again would a man be able to possess Knowledge unless he had a sharp Intellect, unless he had Belief. Belief was impossible without Faith. Faith could be declared only in Action. Action is impossible without the idea of Happiness, and Happiness is the supreme end of

human existence, as the spiritual hedonism of Sanatkumāra would tell us. The idea of happiness produces action. It is the acting of a thing which produces faith in it. Faith gives us belief. Belief is the cause of right intellect. Right intellect is real knowledge, and it is from real knowledge that we reach truth. In any case the consideration of happiness is made the coping-stone of this moral sorites. And this happiness is not merely ordinary, phenomenal, worldly happiness, which is of little consequence. It is that supremely great happiness of God-Realisation. Every other happiness in this world is merely an aspect of that supreme happiness. Wisdom, therefore, would consist in knowing what this supremely great happiness is. Metaphysically we may say that this happiness would consist, according to Sanatkumāra, in an immergence into Reality where there is no distinction between the subject and the object; where there is neither hearer nor heard, but hearing merely; where there is neither seer nor seen, but simply knowledge. It is in this supremely ecstatic, theoretic, Self-spectacular state that, the highest bliss consists. It is the highest bliss which is infinite. It is this which is immortal. Everything else is of little or no consequence in comparison with this Reality.

38. THE IMPLICATION OF SELF-REALISATION.—The next question that arises is, how is this supreme bliss to be obtained? Sanatkumāra answers that it is obtained when Ātman is realised as being above and below, on the right and the left, before and behind: when the supremely mystical identification takes place between the Ātman that is sought, and the mystic that is the seeker. It is of such a mystic that we might say that he lives in the enjoyment of his own happiness. He has no other companion except his own Self. He it is that has truly obtained Svārājya. The worlds open out before him and welcome him as their ruler and king. He can enter any world he likes and do whatever he wills. It is of such a great spiritual mystic that we might say that he alone can see how it is that from the Ātman all objects emerge. It is from the Ātman that the Prāṇa emerges; that hope and memory emerge. It is from the Ātman that the Ākāśa, the

fire, the water, and the earth emerge. It is from Him that emerge power, and knowledge, and meditation, and thought, and will, and imagination. It is from the Ātman that verily the Speech and Name emerge. It is Ātman that is responsible for the *āvirbhāva* and the *tirobhāva* of things, for their coming into being and their passing out of sight. It is only of a mystic who has realised the Ātman that we can say that he has neither death nor disease nor sorrow. He knows everything and obtains everything. We are also finally told that this great spiritual knowledge would not come to anybody unless his sins had died within him, as they had done in the case of Nārada. It is only a man who has finally ceased from doing wrong and destroyed the evil traits in his character that can hope to go beyond the ocean of worldly darkness.

EIGHTH PRAPĀṬHAKA.

39. THE CITY WITHIN AND THE CITY WITHOUT.—The first five sections of this Prapāṭhaka, by pointing out the subsistence of Ātman in the heart as well as in the world outside, aim at providing the means by which a knowledge of the Ātman may be attained. We are told at the very outset that there is a City of Brahman inside the heart in almost the same sense in which the world itself might be regarded as the City of Brahman ; that there is a great parallelism between this City within us and the City without. Both of them might be regarded as illustrations of the Theopolis—with this distinction only that the City within is the microcosm while the City without is the macrocosm. All the existences that we find in the world without, such as the sun, the moon, the stars, the heaven and the earth, are present also in the City within the heart ; that the Lord of the City within is the Individual Self, just as the Lord of the City without is the Universal Self ; that the two Selves are identical in their nature, and may both be comprised within the general conception of the Ātman ; that the Ātman neither ages nor dies ; that he is free from all evil and sin, free from age and death, free from grief and desire, and that, finally, he who knows the Ātman attains any world he pleases.

40. THE REALISATION OF ĀTMAN MEANS THE FULFILMENT OF ALL DESIRES.—But the Upanishadic philosopher has not made it

clear how a man who has attained Ātman can possibly have any of his desires unfulfilled. What his realisation of the Self has got to do with the world of the fathers and the mothers, the brothers, sisters and friends—the worlds where scents and garlands might be enjoyed, where all the revelries of food and drink might be obtained, where all the charms of women and the sweet airs of music might be enjoyed—one fails to perceive. He who attains Ātman has obtained already the consummation of his desires : there is no desire left for such a man unfulfilled, because he has no desires at all to fulfil. It is therefore strange that one who has thus realised the Ātman should ever wish for the attainment of the other worlds above metioned. It appears however that at the end of the second section, the Upanishadic philosopher grows wiser and thinks that a man who has attained Self-realisation may obtain anything that he desires, *provided* he desires it. But the great question here is that of the " provided." After all that has been said above, it would be needless to point out that an aspirant after Self-realisation cannot have any desires left to himself except the single one of the bare attainment of the full-orbed Self.

41. THE VACILLATING WISDOM OF THE UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHER.—There is greater wisdom in the third section when the writer of the Upanishad teaches that all desires which are not directed towards the realisation of Ātman are desires which may be regarded as having been pervaded and covered by Untruth ; that the only desire which Truth pervades and covers is the desire for the realisation of the Ātman. It is not without justification that this philosopher should have added that it is scarcely possible for people to realise the existence of Ātman, even though this Ātman is hidden in themselves, just as it might be impossible for people who walk upon a hidden golden treasure to find its existence just below their feet. But once again the philosopher brings in the favourite Upanishadic idea that it is possible for us to be united with the Truth, that is, to reach the world of Brahman, when fallen into deep sleep, ignoring the fact the there is a great difference between an unconscious union with God and a conscious unification with Him. But the philosopher, it seems, becomes wise once again

and regards the Ātman as the verity which discloses itself in full splendour before the aspiring mystic in the image of the aspirant himself, thus paving the way for the ultimate identification of the Individual with the Universal Self.

42. THE RADIANT WORLD OF ĀTMAN.—The philosopher then goes on to describe the Ātman as the eternal "bund of existence," as the bank which all the phenomenal forces of nature are unable to traverse, as the eternal cosmological verity, the ballast of the ship of the cosmos which prevents it from rocking to and fro. "Neither day nor night, neither age nor death, neither good nor evil are able to reach this Ātman. A man who reaches Him gains sight, even though he is blind; remains unwounded, even though he is mortally wounded; loses all sorrows, even though he might have been struck with sorrow. All night is clothed with the redness of light in the world of Ātman, which is eternally radiant and luminous."

43. BRAHMACHARYA THE WAY TO GOD-REALISATION.—The question arises, how is the aspiring mystic to attain to the possession of this world of Atman? The answer is, by Brahmacharya. Now what is the meaning of Brahmacharya? Does it mean celibacy, as the word is generally understood to mean? Does it signify sacrifice? Does it signify silence? Does it signify the mere process of fasting? Does it signify the life in forest? To all these questions, the philosopher answers by a definite " No. " Brahmacharya is none of these. It is the "life lived in Brahman" which constitutes Brahmacharya. It is true that the philosopher is here full of philological subtleties and curious imaginative derivations to account for this essential element in the conception of the Brahmacharya; but the fact remains that he does after *all* point out that Brahmacharya consists in the practical realisation of Ātman.

44. ESCHATOLOGICAL PHYSIOLOGY.—Section six of this Prapāṭhaka stands by itself. It concerns itself with some physiological considerations about eschatological psychology. We are told how during deep sleep a man's Self moves in certain Nāḍīs, and how it is this entry into the Nāḍīs which causes deep-sleep. It follows inferentially herefrom that when the soul is outside the Nāḍīs a man is in the waking state, and when the soul is just

on the entrance to the Nāḍīs he is at the twilight between wakefulness and sleep. This twilight may be called the dream-state.* Our Upanishadic philosopher tells us that there are a hundred and one different Nāḍīs that run from the heart to the head. What he exactly means by the term Nāḍī—whether there is an exact psychological counterpart corresponding to this conception—it is hard to determine. Writers on Indian Mysticism have variously used the word Nāḍī to signify either the vein or the artery, or the nerve. In the present case we can only regard the word as the equivalent for an artery. Of a hundred different arteries that, according to the old Upanishadic physiology, run from the heart to the head, there is one of supreme significance; and the mystic is enjoined, when he wants to depart from the body, to move out of it by the door-way of this one supremely significant artery which, for the purpose of the present conception, might be identified with the Nāḍī which leads to the *Brahma-randhra*. Those who are not of mystical qualifications, who are merely ordinary beings, leave by different other arteries, and in consequence they return once more to the world of life. Only gifted mystics, according to the Upanishadic philosopher, could move out of the body at the time of death by the Nāḍī which leads to the *Brahma-randhra*.

45. THE MYTH OF INDRA AND VIROCHANA.—We now come to a famous myth in the Chhāndogya Upanishad which affords a very clever analysis of the psychological states through which a man's soul passes. The author of the myth wishes to say that the ultimate Reality must not be mistaken for bodily consciousness; that it must not be confused with dream-consciousness; that it transcends even the deep-sleep-consciousness; that, finally, it is identical with the pure Self-consciousness which transcends all bodily or mental conditions. Once upon a time, the gods and demons, both anxious to learn the nature of final Reality, went in pursuit of its knowledge to Prajāpati. Now, Prajāpati had maintained that "that entity

* For a parallel to this idea compare the Cartesian conception of the Soul inhabiting the Pineal gland and moving into and out of it during the states of sleep and wakefulness respectively.

which is free from hunger and thirst, which desires nothing and which imagines nothing, must be regarded as the Ultimate Self." The gods and the demons were anxious to know what this Self was. So the gods sent Indra and the demons Virochana as their emissary to learn the final Truth from Prajāpati. They dwelt there as pupils at first for a period of thirty-two years, which condition was necessary before a master could impart spiritual wisdom to his disciples. But even then Prajāpati would not immediately tell them the final Truth. He tried to test them by saying first that the Self was nothing more than the image that we see in our eye. This, he told them, must be regarded as the immortal and the fearless Brahman. Indra and Virochana asked him whether this image in the eye was not the same as the image that we perceive in water or in a mirror. On receiving an affirmative answer from Prajāpati, Indra and Virochana became complaisant in the belief that they had understood the nature of the Self. They bedecked themselves by putting on excellent clothes and ornaments, cleaned themselves, looked into a water-pan, and imagining they had seen the Ultimate Self, they went back quite composed in mind. Virochana went directly to the demons and told them that he had won the highest secret, namely, that the so-called Self was no other than the image that one sees in the eye, in a mirror or in a pan of water, thus identifying the nature of the absolute Self with mere bodily consciousness. The Upanishad goes on to say how there are a certain set of people who take this as final gospel, "the gospel of the Asuras." There must be a slight reference here to those who, like the later Chārvākas, maintained that the Self was nothing more than the mere consciousness of a body. — Indra, however, unlike Virochana, did not go to the gods but, on his way, he bethought himself that Prajāpati must not have given him the final instruction concerning the nature of the Ultimate Reality. There was this difficulty that pressed itself before him. "It is true," he said, "that when the body is well adorned, the Self is well adorned; when the body is well dressed, the Self is well dressed; when the body is well cleansed, the Self is well cleansed: but what if the body were blind or lame or crippled? Shall not the Soul himself be

then blind or lame or crippled ?" He accordingly went back to Prajāpati to request him once more to teach him what the Ultimate Reality was. Prajāpati advised Indra to practise penance once more for thirty-two years; and when Indra had undergone that penance, Prajāpati supplied him with another piece of knowledge. "The true Self is he," said Prajāpati, "who moves about happy in dreams. He is the immortal, the fearless Brahman." This seemed to please Indra and he went back; but before he reached the gods, he saw again that there was another difficulty in the knowledge that was imparted to him by Prajāpati. "Do we not feel," he asked himself, "as if we are struck or chased in our dreams ? Do we not experience pain and do we not shed tears in our dreams ? How can we account for this difficulty in the conception of the Self as identical with the dream-consciousness ?" So he went back to Prajāpati again and told him that the knowledge which he had imparted to him previously could not be final, inasmuch as the dream-consciousness seemed to him to be affected with feelings of pain and fear. The true Self ought to experience neither pain nor fear. Prajāpati saw that Indra was a pupil worthy to know higher things, and so he asked him once more to practise penance for another thrity-two years, at the end of which time he imparted to him another piece of knowledge, which yet was not the highest kind of knowledge : *viz.* that the Ātman was to be regarded as identical with the deep-sleep-consciousness in which there is perfect repose, there is perfect rest Indra was satisfied with the answer which Prajāpati gave, and returned. But before he reached the gods he again saw that the real Self could not be identified even with deep-sleep-consciousness for the simple reason that in deep-sleep we are conscious neither of our own selves nor of objects. In fact in deep-sleep we are as it were only logs of wood. Feeling this great difficulty in the teaching he went back again and told Prajāpati that he could not be satisfied with the knowledge imparted to him. Prajāpati now saw that Indra, by his shrewd insight, had made himself worthy of receiving the highest wisdom that could be imparted to him. So he asked Indra once more, and this time

finally, to practise penance for a period of five years again, thus completing on the whole the full round of penance for a hundred and one years. At the end of that period, Indra went in all humility to Prajāpati, and Prajāpati said, "Verily, O Indra, this body is subject to death, but it is at the same time the vesture of the Immortal Soul. It is only when the Soul is encased in the body that it is cognisant of pleasure and pain. There is neither pleasure nor pain for the Soul once relieved of his body. Just as the wind, and the cloud, and the lightning, and the thunder are without body, and they arise from heavenly space and appear in their own form ; so does this Serene Being, namely, the Self, arise from the mortal body, reach the highest light, and then appear in His own form. This Serene Being which appears in His own form, is no other than the Highest Person." There is here an assertion of the true nature of Ultimate Reality as being of the form of self-consciousness. That which sees itself by itself, that which recognises itself as identical with itself in the light of supreme knowledge, that must be regarded as the final Reality. There is a great meaning that runs through this myth. By an analysis of the different states of consciousness, the philosopher of the Chhāndogya Upanishad points out that the bodily consciousness must not be mistaken as final Reality, nor the consciousness in dreams, nor that in deep-sleep. The soul is of the nature of pure Self-consciousness, the Kantian "I am I." Those who mistake the Ultimate Self as identical with bodily consciousness are the materialists. Those who identify it with the consciousness in the dream state rise a little higher no doubt, but they mistake the Self for what the modern theosophists call the "Etheric Double." Those, on the other hand, who regard the Self as identical with the "no-consciousness" in deep-sleep misunderstand its nature, because there can be no consciousness either of the objective world or of the Self involved in deep-sleep. The true Self could only be the Self-conscious Being shining in his own light, thinking of nothing but his own thought, the νόησις νοήσεως of Aristotle, the supremely theoretic Being, the eternal Self-spectator.

CHAPTER SEVENTH

A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF UPANISHADIC TEXTS

XV—The Taittirīya Upanishad.

1. The Doctrine of the Unificant.—The Taittirīya Upanishad is one of the famous Upanishads of the older canon, deservedly taking its place alongside of the great Upanishads, the Chhāndogya and the Bṛihadāraṇyaka, and affording us like them a very excellent illustration of the way in which all sorts of philological, cosmological, physiological, psychological, ethical, metaphysical and mystical thoughts might be huddled up together to constitute an Upanishad, although that fact need not detract from the value of the great contribution which this Upanishad has undoubtedly made to Indian philosophical literature generally, —if only one were to judge by the many quotations from this Upanishad which occur in all Vedāntic writings. But as it is not necessary for our purposes to go into the extra-philosophical problems raised in the Upanishad, we shall confine ourselves only to those which have some philosophical value. And the first of such that comes for notice is the curious theory of union which is advanced in chapter one, section three. In the celestial region, we are told, the Earth and the Heaven are united together in Ether, the instrument of unification being the Wind. In the world of light Fire and the Sun are united together in the Water (of the clouds), the unification being effected by lightning. In the field of knowledge the Teacher and the Pupil are united together in Learning, the means of unification being Instruction. In the human world the Mother and the Father are united together in the Off-spring, the instrument of unification being the Procreative process. In the physiological sphere, the Lower-jaw and the Upper-jaw are united together in

Speech, the means of unification being the Tongue. — Were it merely for the details of the discussion, we would scarcely have attributed any importance to the peculiar doctrine hithertofore mentioned. What we are concerned with, however, is the doctrine of the Unificant, which is implied in this peculiar theory of union. The elements which are united together are of little consequence, as well as the fact of their union. It is only the idea of the instrument of union which is relevant for our purposes from the philosophical point of view. The Upanishad does not further develop the doctrine.

2. A CONTRIBUTION TO MYSTIC PHYSIOLOGY.—A very important, though at the same time cryptic, contribution to mystic physiology is made in section 6 of this chapter by a sage whose identity remains unknown,* when he imparts to his disciple named Prāchīna-yogya his doctrine of the relation of the soul (which is located according to him in the human heart) to its overlord the Brahman, supposed to reside in the head. The teacher of Prāchīna-yogya tells us how the soul in the heart moves by a passage through the bones of the palate right up to the skull where the hair are made to part, to meet on its way the Brahman, its overlord and master. It is important to remember that while the soul in the heart is characterised as the *Manomaya Purusha*, the Brahman that resides in the brain is called the *Manasas-pati*. For a proper understanding of the peculiar theory advanced by this philosopher, it may not be amiss for us to quote his actual words. "What is known as the space inside the heart, therein is this immortal Golden Person of the nature of mind (namely, the Soul). What is known as hanging like a nipple between the bones of the palate—through it lies the passage to the Lord, right up to where the hair are made to part between the bones of the human skull. *Bhūḥ*....*Bhuvaḥ*....*Svaḥ*....*Mahaḥ*—the (last) word being uttered, the Soul joins its over-lord, the Brahman, obtains autonomy, and becomes the master of speech, the master of vision, the master of audition, the master of knowledge. Nay, it even becomes identical with the Brahman whose body is ether, whose nature is truth, in whom the Prāṇas rejoice and the mind

* The Vārtikakāra (i. 126) identifies him with Māhāchamasya.

is delighted, and who is full of tranquillity, and immortal. Worship thus, O Prāchīna-yogya." A great deal of difficulty has been occasioned in the right interpretation of this passage. There is no doubt that there is an implication in this passage that the sense centres, as well as the intellect centre, are situated in the brain, inasmuch as we are told that the Soul obtains mastery over these after moving to the brain from the heart. Yet the actual path of the Soul's journey to Brahman cannot be traced without difficulty. What is the nipple-like organ through which, according to the teacher of Prāchīnayogya, lies the way to Brahman? Is it the Uvula, or the pituitary body? Deussen and Max Müller have both understood it to be the Uvula. But the expression "*antareṇa tāluke*" can hardly be reconciled with this interpretation, inasmuch as the Uvula does not lie *between* the bones of the palate, but *behind* them. Are we then to understand that the Upanishadic philosopher is referring to the pituitary body which is situated just above the pair of the bones of the hard palate? On the latter interpretation we could understand the philosopher to mean that the Soul in the heart could travel along the course of the sympathetic nerves through the pituitary body to meet its overlord in the lateral ventricle, around which, in the grey matter, are situated the various special sense-centres, over which it is described as obtaining mastery. The Uvula-interpretation, on the contrary, favours the "hanging" appearance of the organ as well as the traditional supposition of the union of the Soul with Brahman in the ecstatic enjoyment of mystic nectar oozing through Uvula into the pharynx from the ventricles of the brain. It is hard to determine exactly what the teacher of Prāchīnayogya had in mind when he imparted his mystic physiologic wisdom to his disciple. One cannot be sure that he was interested in anatomy enough to be able to trace the actual path of connection between the heart and the brain through the sympathetic nerves and the pituitary body, or in occultism enough to envisage the union of the Soul and the Brahman by means of the Uvula which he found inexplicably hanging in the human throat.

3. DOCTRINE OF QUINTUPLE EXISTENCE.—We go on next to discuss the doctrine of quintuple existence taught in the seventh

section of this chapter. The author of the Taittirīya Upanishad it would seem has taken his cue from Bṛihadāraṇyaka i. 4. 17, and generalised his problem so as to make the quintuple arrangement applicable to all physical as well as physiological existences. Thus we are told that in the cosmic sphere, the following elements are arranged in sets of five each : the earth, the mid-region, the sky, the main quarters, and the intermediate quarters ; the fire, the wind, the sun, the moon, and the stars ; water, herbs, trees, ether, and the body. While so far as physiology is concerned we have the following new sets of five : Prāṇa, Vyāna, Apāna, Udāna, and Samāna ; skin, flesh, muscle, bone, and marrow ; and finally, eye, ear, mind, speech and touch.* The essence of the teaching is that whatever exists must be regarded as a compound of five different elements and therefore amenable to a five-fold division.

4. SUPREMUM BONUM.—The question that is raised in the ninth section of the first chapter concerns itself with the determination of what should be regarded as the highest virtue. An allusion is made to the opinions of three previous sages, namely, Rāthītara, Paurušishṭi, and Nāka Maudgalya. Rāthītara maintained that the highest virtue was Truth. Paurušishṭi said that Penance constituted the highest virtue. While Nāka Maudgalya supposed that it was merely the Study and Instruction of the Vedas which constituted the highest virtue of man. The author of the section under consideration, however, seems to be of opinion, that no one of these might be singly regarded as being the highest virtue. In fact he holds that for the *Supremum Bonum* a number of virtues are necessary. It is true that he reiterates the moral efficacy of the Study and Instruction of the Vedas ; still, other virtues are no less prominent. Thus, for example, we have from him a detailed enumeration of different virtues which might be taken in their entirety to constitute the *Supremum Bonum.* The Right and the True, Penance and Restraint, Tranquillity and Sacrifice, Hospitality and Social duty, Marriage and Procreation,—which last involves an unbroken continuity of the family—all these might be regarded, as a whole, to constitute the highest good of man.

* Substituted for the "breath" of the Bṛihadāraṇyaka.

We have, in general, very few passages in the Upanishads which are purely ethical in their nature. The present passage is one of them, and it is worth noting that the ethics of this passage is purely an *a priori* ethics, unconcerned and uninfluenced by any metaphysical considerations. We have here, in short, an unmetaphysical moral philosophy, and an attempt at a classification of the moral virtues which are essential for securing the highest good of man.

5. A MORAL EXHORTATION.—Another important moral exhortation occurs a little later (i. 11) in this same chapter in a section which from the ethical point of view might be regarded as one of the most important sections in the whole of Upanishadic philosophy. Here again, we have an unmetaphysical ethical philosophy imparted by a teacher to his disciple as he is about to part from the master after having finished his course of studies. The passage where this moral exhortation occurs is quoted so often and in such widely different contexts that it is sacrcely necessary for us to translate it word for word. We may only note in general the value which it attaches to the inculcation of certain moral virtues. Truthfulness and Duty, the Study and Instruction of the Vedas, Sacrifice and Procreation, are preached in this section with an equal earnestness as in the last. But there are certain further points of moral advice which it is necessary for us to note carefully. In the first place, we are told that Greatness for greatness sake must not be shunned ; in fact, it is the duty of man to try to secure Greatness in life. Secondly, the eudæmonist aspect of ethics is clearly brought to the fore when it is maintained that one must try to secure Good at all costs. Then again, certain aspects of social duty are enjoined when the mother and the father are apotheosised, as well as the guest and the teacher. We are told also that the fees of the teacher must be paid after the completion of one's instruction in his house. Fourthly, the duty of Charity is taught with a very clever analysis of the motives of charitable actions. These, we are told, must be inspired with feelings of sincerity, modesty, and fear. Then again, there should be no joyless charity, nor any charity which does not take into account the merits of the case

and is not therefore based upon feelings of appreciation. Finally, an injunction is given that only blameless actions must be performed, with a very subtle and clever analysis of the Standard of Virtue. The conduct of the good, we are told, must always be regarded as the type and the pattern of duty; and wherever the moral agent is in doubt in regard to the morality of a particular course of action, his conduct must be regulated according to the instructions of those who are better able to judge than himself, provided these latter are not too rigoristic, though they are devoted to duty for duty's sake. The analysis of the motives of good conduct which is presented in this section is a very close and subtle one, and by the establishment of the true standard of morality it puts us in mind of a similar dictum from Aristotle who tells us that our conduct must be guided by the judgment of those who have a better insight into matters than our own selves.

6. THE MYSTICAL SCROLL OF TRIŚAṄKU.—From no other passage is the composite character of the Taittīriya Upanishad better apparent than from that abrupt little section which contains the mystic utterances of Triśaṅku after he had attained self-realisation. This section is connected neither with what precedes it nor with what follows. It stands entirely by itself and the cryptic formulation of its ideas has offered a standing obstacle to Upanishadic interpreters. Some have supposed that it contains the Teaching of the Veda according to Triśaṅku; others have understood it to be merely the Word of Knowledge of Triśaṅku. But the meaning of the section might become clear only if we understand that it contains the utterances of Triśaṅku after (*anu*) he had come to realise the Self.* Triśaṅku tells us that he is the "mover of the tree." What is the "tree" to which he is referring? It may be "the tree of the world" as some interpreters have understood it, or it may even mean "the tree of the body." The body is often-times characterised as a tree, as in the passage *samāne vṛikshe purusho nimagnaḥ* (Muṇḍaka iii. 1. 2, Śvetāśvatara iv. 7). Triśaṅku tells us that after coming to the knowledge of the Self, he felt as if

* The Vārtikakāra (i. 158) also says—Triśaṅkor Brahmabhūtasya hyāraham saṁdarśanam param.

he could move the tree of his body or even the tree of the world. Further he tells us that his "glory is like the top of a mountain." The poet Tukārām has expressed that when he had come to the knowledge of Self, he felt as if he stood on a mountain. In a like spirit must we understand the mystic utterances of Triśaṅku. Triśaṅku tells us further that he is "pure in his origin." This means probably that he regards the source from which he came as being the purity of divine life. He tells us also that he is "like the immortal Being in the Sun." This is what he apparently experiences by way of a mystic identification of the personality within him and the personality in the Sun—an idea which occurs in many Upanishadic passages. Triśaṅku tells us furthermore that he is "the most supreme treasure" in himself. May it not be that a mystic regards his Self as of priceless value? And may it not therefore be that he comes to regard himself as the repository of all that is precious and valuable in this world? Finally, we are told that Triśaṅku comes to identify himself with "the intelligent, the immortal, and the imperishable One." Such high sentiments of the identification of the Self with Ultimate Reality could not come from a pupil who had merely studied the Vedas, as some interpreters have understood it, but only from one who had been already in full possession of the secrets of spiritual realisation.

7. A MISCELLANY OF POINTS.—The second chapter of the Upanishad contains a number of short, dispersed reflections upon all possible topics, which are so incisive and penetrating that one must needs stop to consider them with some care. We are told, in the first place, that the three chief marks of Ultimate Reality are existence, consciousness, and infinity. The ontological trend of this characterisation of the Absolute is evident from the way in which it identifies the aspects of "existence" and "consciousness." Over and above the elements contained in the ontological argument we have here the element of both special and temporal infinity as a further characteristic of Brahman.—Secondly, we have in this chapter a very important contribution to cosmogony. According to our author cosmogony is not a process of creation but of emanation. But while the ordinary connotation of the idea of

emanation is that what emanates is to be understood as illusory, the value of our author's conception of emanation lies in the fact that it must be understood in the realistic sense. From the Brahman proceeds ether, from ether air, from air fire, from fire water, from water earth, from earth the herbs, from the herbs food : and it is from food that man is produced. The main interest of this theory of emanatory cosmogony, however, lies in the explanation of the origin of man from *Anna* or food. This leads him, as we shall see later, to posit the "Annamaya Kośa" as the first external clothing of the real man. — Then, thirdly, we have a suggestion in this chapter of the idea of thought-force when we are told that he who meditates on the Ultimate Reality as non-existence shall himself cease to be, while, he who meditates on it as real existence shall himself share in the life ever-lasting. This is a constantly recurring theme in the Upanishads. We have seen in the Chhāndogya Upanishad that whosoever meditates on God as light comes himself to be endowed with brilliance. A little later, in the third chapter of the Taittirīya Upanishad (iii. 10), we are also told that if we meditate on Brahman as support, we shall ourselves get support ; if as greatness, we shall ourselves become great ; if as mind, we shall ourselves receive honour ; if as " Parimara, " round about (*pari*) us shall die (*mṛi*) all the enemies who hate us. — Then, fourthly, we have the idea of a personalistic creation suggested to as when it is said that after the Creator had sent forth all the things of the world he himself entered into them, and having entered them, became both *Sat* and *Tyat*, i. e., what is manifest and what is not manifest, what is defined and what is not defined, what is supported and what is not supported, what is conscious as well as what is not conscious, what is real as well as what is not real. In fact, the Creator became All (ii. 6). — Over against this, fifthly, we have another theory of creation, viz. that whatever evolved evolved from a primary Not-Being ; that Not-Being was chronologically prior to Being ; and that it was from Being that everything that exists later proceeded (ii. 7). This doctrine is probably to be understood as the doctrine of the "pūrvapaksha," as later commentators have taken it. But there is nothing to forbid us in supposing that the doctrine

of Not-Being as the ἀρχή of all things was actually held by certain thinkers in Upanishadic times.— Sixthly, we have in this chapter (ii. 7) a very clever and acute psychological analysis of the emotion of fear. We are told that the emotion of fear proceeds from an artificial dichotomy of existence into Self and not-Self. For him who has realised the oneness of things what fear can there be?— asks the author of the Taittirīya Upanishad. In fact, it is only when there is an idea of a "heteros" that fear proceeds.—Seventhly, we have in this Upanishad (ii. 8) a reminiscence of the Kaṭhopanishad (II. iii. 3) when our author tries to account for the existence of God from the consideration that all the cosmical forces seem to work only in terror of Him; thus it is only in terror of Him that the Wind blows, or the Sun rises, or Death runs away. It is important to notice that instead of the ordinary argument of design, our author uses the argument of terror. For teleology, he substitutes theophobia; and he carries his argument for the proof of God's existence at the point of the bayonet. Finally, we are told in a very lofty strain (ii. 9) that he who has realised God is not distressed by the ordinary thoughts about good and evil; he does not ask himself like an ordinary person why he did not do good or why he did only bad actions. One who has realised God goes beyond both good and evil, and ceases to be tormented by the ordinary human conceptions about them; because, apparently, according to our author, both good and evil are negated in God.

8. THE DOCTRINE OF SHEATHS.—We now proceed to consider in some detail the doctrine of the Five Sheaths which seems to have been advanced only in the Taittirīya among the Upanishads of the older canon. It would be necessary to handle this doctrine with some care, inasmuch as its inner meaning has very often been misunderstood by writers on Vedāntic subjects. The doctrine, in brief, is as follows: "Within this physical body which is made up of food, is another body which is made up of vital air; the former is filled with the latter which is like unto the shape of man. More internal than the body which is made up of vital air is another body which consists of mind; the former is filled with the latter which is again like unto the shape of man. More internal yet than the

mental body is another body which is full of intelligence; the former is filled with the latter which is again like unto the shape of man. Finally, still more internal than this body of intelligence is another body consisting of bliss; the former is filled with the latter which also is like unto the shape of man." Here we are told that there are various bodies pent up within this our physical body, as if our physical body should be like unto a Pandora's box; that the wise man is he who knows that there are what may be called by sufferance the physical, astral, mental, intuitional and beatific "bodies" of man; that every internal body is enclosed within an external one; and finally, that all these bodies are made in the pattern of man. The question arises—What is the real significance of these so-called *bodies*? Among a certain class of modern interpreters especially, this theory has assumed quite an extraordinary importance. The etheric double they say, is exactly like the shape of the human body; that it lingers a few days after the death of the physical body; that the etheric double of a child lingers only for three days after its death; but that in the case of an adult it may linger for a sufficiently long time to allow for the period of mourning; that in dreams while we are having the curious experience of flying like a bird in mid-air, of swimming like a fish in the sea, it is our etheric double which, by a kind of endosmosis, is transmitting its experience into our physical body; that the scheme of the bodies mentioned in the Upanishads is only a description of the "manifest" bodies of man: and that over and above these are two more "unmanifest" bodies which may be called the Monadic and the Divine, the Aṇupadaka and the Ādi, or in Buddhistic terminology, the Parinirvāṇa and the Mahāparinirvāṇa. So far as we apprehend it, the general mistake of this theory consists in understanding words for things: in refusing to see that what are by sufferance styled the "bodies" of man in the Upanishads are nothing more than mere allegorical representations of certain psychological conceptions. Man is made up of a physical body, of vital air, of mind and intellect, and of the faculty which enables him to enjoy an ecstatic θεωρία. This is all that is meant by the passage in question. To ignore its merely psychological aspect

and to proceed to erect an occultist philosophy upon the doctrine would be scarcely justifiable. The great Śaṁkara did recognise the Kośas, but he understood them as having merely an ideal existence. We have in thought (*viveka*), he says, to go behind each one of the five Kośas, and to find our true Self beyond physical body, beyond the life-principle, beyond mind and intellect, beyond even our beatific consciousness. He wavers, however, in his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra i. 1. 19 as well as on the Taittirīya Upanishad, in deciding as to whether we should *identify* the Brahman with beatific consciousness, or whether we have to penetrate even *behind* it to find the Brahman ; but in any case, he insists that the Kośas or Sheaths have no real existence.

9. THE METAPHYSICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF SHEATHS.—That the words " Anna, Prāṇa, Manas, Vijñāna, and Ānanda " are not to be understood as signifying veritable sheaths may be seen by a reference to the third chapter of our Upanishad, where the author is discussing what should be regarded as the ἀρχή of things ; and he rules out of order theories which regard " matter," "life," " mind," or " intellect " as such a first principle, and comes to the conclusion that " intuitive bliss " alone deserves to be regarded as the source of Reality. The world is according to him neither idea, nor imagination, but intuitive bliss ! " That from which things are born," he says " that by which they live when born, and that to which they repair, and into which they are resolved: *that* is to be understood" as Brahman. Would it be too much to ask our readers to note the extremely analogous way in which, according to Aristotle, the early Greek cosmologists conceived of their primary substance ? Ἐξ οὗ γάρ ἐστιν ἅπαντα τὰ ὄντα, καὶ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται πρῶτον, καὶ εἰς ὃ φθείρεται τελευταῖον ....τοῦτο στοιχεῖον καὶ ταύτην ἀρχήν φασιν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων— (Meta. i. 3). Anyhow, the author of the third chapter of our Upanishad makes Bhṛigu approach his father Varuṇa, and ask him about the nature of Ultimate Reality. The father directs him to practise penance and learn the truth for himself ; he only gives him the hint that the Ultimate Principle should be one " *from* which things spring, *in* which they live, and *into* which they are finally resolved." The

boy after practising penance returns to his father and tells him that food (or matter) may be regarded as the principle of things. The father is not satisfied, and asks him to practise penance again. Then the son comes back with the answer that the vital air may be regarded as the principle, and so on. The father is not satisfied with the successive answers which his son brings, telling him that the Ultimate Reality is to be regarded as being mind, or intellect; and when the son finally brings the answer that it may be the beatific consciousness which is the source of all things whatsoever, the story abruptly ends and we have no means of knowing whether the father was satisfied with the final answer. We are only told that this piece of knowledge shall be for ever known as the Bhārgavī Vāruṇī Vidyā, and that this is "exalted in the highest heaven," meaning thereby that it will be honoured even amongst the gods. The trend of this story, as our readers may observe, is evidently to point out the cosmo-metaphysical significance of the five conceptions which have for by-gone ages supplied the pabulum for an occultist philosophy concerning the vestures of the human body.

10. THE BEATIFIC CALCULUS.--Reverting a little to the second chapter, we find that its last but one section makes a very important contribution to æsthetico-moral philosophy in a theory of the "beatific calculus." With the audacious vision of a gifted thinker, the author of the section proceeds to outline for us a scheme of the calculus of bliss. It is to be noted that he is concerned not with the conception of happiness as ordinarily understood, but with the conception of bliss, which is evidently a conception superior to that of happiness. The central idea underlying his treatment of the problem is that a commensuration of all beatific values is possible; that as soon as the unit is determined as well as the standard of measurement, the mensuration of all intermediate values becomes evidently possible. What then is the unit which our philosopher adopts for the commensuration of all beatific values? Take for granted, he says, that there is a young man who is noble-born and learned, who is swift and strong and powerful, endowed likewise with the lord-ship of the earth, which brings in its train

unimaginable wealth and glory. The bliss of such a man might be taken as the unit by which a mensuration of higher values may be made. What is the maximum quantity to be measured? Our author maintains that it is evidently the bliss which belongs by right of acquisition to the sage who has realised the Brahman. How then to establish an equation between the unit and the standard?—that is the problem for our philosopher. A rich and young and noble man's bliss is the unit by which the beatific state of the demi-gods could be measured.* The beatific state of the demi-gods is the unit for the mensuration of the bliss of the gods. The bliss of the gods is the unit for the mensuration of the bliss of the King of gods. The bliss of the King of gods is itself a unit by which the bliss of Brahman might be measured. And, is it not wonderful, asks our author that each and all of these quantities of bliss belong in their fulness to the sage who has realised the highest Brahman in himself? Such a sage enjoys all the degrees of bliss afore-mentioned, for the simple reson that he is always in the enjoyment of the highest. The æsthetic aspect of the beatific calculus, however, immediately gives way in our philosopher's hands to the moral, and we are told—some persons might consider this to be even a bathos from the æsthetic standpoint,—that the highest bliss of the sage afore-mentioned consists in being "free from all desires." Is it not desirelessness which is the highest mark of such an ideal sage, asks our author; and if so, does not desirelessness itself constitute the highest bliss imaginable? It thus happens that the æsthetic *Ānanda* of our philosopher gives away to a conception closely akin to the Stoic ἀπάθεια, or the Epicurean ἀταραξία, and we are told with all the gravity of a rigoristic moral philosopher that it is only he who has left in him no desires to fulfil that may be said to have realised all desires imaginable.

11. THE SONG OF UNITIVE LIFE.—Finally, we have to take note of an important contribution to the description of the unitive

* Through intermediate stages, each possessing a hundred times more bliss than the preceding. There are ten such stages in the present passage, but only six in the corresponding Bṛihadāraṇyaka passage.

life of a mystic which occurs at the end of the Taittirīya Upanishad. He who has realised the oneness of existence, says our author, *ipso facto* reaches beyond the sweep of physical, etheric, mental, intuitive, and even beatific existence, and sits down singing the song of universal unity. "Oh, wonderful! wonderful! wonderful!" he exclaims. "Am I not myself all this material existence? Am I not also the sole enjoyer of it all? Am I not again the maker of their unity?" This is as much as to say that, according to our author, the mystic identifies himself with all the objective as well as the subjective world, as also with the subject-object relation. Such a seer sits down on the pedestal of spiritual glory, continuing his song of unitive life: "I am the first-born of all creation; I am older than the gods; I am the navel of immortality. He that gives me keeps me. I envelope the whole universe with light as of the Sun." Such mystic utterances about the experience of a unitive life from the pedestal of spiritual glory are scanty in all human literature; but as they come from an Upanishadic seer of such great antiquity, they are invested with an ineffable grandeur, and a force that is absolutely irresistible.

xvi.—THE CHHĀGALEYA UPANISHAD.

12. THE ESSENTIALS OF A BRAHMIN.—The sages once held a sacrificial session on the bank of the Sarasvatī. And they debarred from the Initiation Kavasha Ailūsha as being the son of a maid-servant. Said they: "This is contrary to Ṛik and Yajus, contrary fo Sāman." He asked, "Revered Sirs! That you come to the session, recite the Ṛiks, the Yajus, and the Sāmans—through the greatness of what is all this?" They replied: "We are Brahmins, and that is [permitted] to us." Kavasha again asked: "Inasmuch as you are thus going through the Initiation and debarring me from it, what is it by virtue of which you are Brahmins?" They answered: "The fact that they performed our birth-rites by Ṛik and Yajus formulas and kissed our head and performed the Upanayana—because of that we are Brahmins." Thereupon the maid-servant's son pointed to the Brahmins Ātreya the Acchāvāka whose corpse was lying hard by, and said: "That performance of birth-rites by Ṛik and Yajus formulas, and the

kissing of the head, and the Upanayana—was it wanting to this [corpse]?" "What is that?" they asked. He replied: "In the Naimisha forest these Śunakas held a session. They had this Ātreya as their Acchāvāka who recited everything: be it Yājyās, or Anuvākyās, or Prātaranuvāka, or Praüga, or Ājyā, or Marutvatīya; be it also the mantras to accompany the decorating of the Mahāvīra pot, or those by which the Fire is circumambulated, or King Soma purchased, or the juice pressed from it, or the second pressing made the next day, or the juice dedicated; whether it be the Trivṛit chant or Pañchadaśa or Saptadaśa or Ekaviṁśa: Where has all that departed from him?" The Brahmins were at a loss to find the answer. And so they all together repaired to Kavasha and said: "Do you teach (up-naya) us." But he, smiling, replied: "Look well and do not make a mistake. Surely a low-born one cannot be a teacher to the highest persons!" "Do not formally teach us, if you like: but you it is that must show us the way," persisted the Brahmins nevertheless. Thereupon Kavasha Ailūsha advised the Brahmins to go together to Kurukshetra and wait upon "those there who were leading the life of children." The proud and elderly Brahmins did not like to be sent to mere children for instruction, but finally went to Kurukshetra and approached the Child-sages. These knew as the Brahmins were approaching them that they wanted such and such a thing, and said: "Why do you approach us the Child-sages, being as you are great householders and great experts in the Scriptures? There surely are other great house-holders and great experts in the Scriptures in the Kurukshetra?" At that the Brahmins looked at each other's face, and thought that it was not in vain that Kavasha told them to repair to these very Child-sages. And they said: "You utter words transcending those of the most revered ones in that you have divined our thoughts as though some one here were to win by a dice-throw what is in our mind. And, accordingly, here are we approaching you as those free from malice and full of credence."

13. THE DRIVING CHARIOT.—The Child-sages asked: "What is it that you seek from us?" The Brahmins replied: "In the Naimisha forest these Śunakas held a session. They had Ātreya

as their Acchāvāka who recited everything and was an expert in all sacrificial matters. Where has all his knowledge departed from him in that he is lying down the way a corpse lies down ?" The Child-sages answered : " The Ancients have indeed enjoined upon us the rule not to teach those that have not been in residence [as pupils] for a year. Reside, therefore, for a year and you will know."— And they stayed one year. At the end of the period the Child-sages, wishing to instruct the Brahmins, took them out with them and went along the highways. Anon they came upon a chariot undergoing driving exercise for pleasure. And the Child-sages inquired : " Do you notice this ? What is it ?" "It is but a chariot, Gentle Sirs !"—" Quite so : What manner of a thing is it ?" Replied the Brahmins : "Just as an advancing ocean with its transverse up-tossing waves would bounce forward bearing aloft the glittering fish, even so does the chariot bound forward following the movement of the galloping horses ; just as one who is a competitor would run the race with the rival-runner, even so is this chariot racing in sport. Just as this horse is galloping hither and thither and from this side to that, is roaring, is taking a bounce and would anon drop down, even so does the chariot gallop hither and thither and from this side to that, roars, takes a bound and anon drops down. And just as a horse would carry the King or may-be a royal officer to the resting place, even so would this chariot carry the charioteer to the resting place."— Asked the Child-sages : " And are you sure of this ?" " Quite sure," they replied. And they all kept on along the track of the same chariot until they came to the end of the journey at evening time.

14. THE RESTING CHARIOT.—Towards the evening, as the driver unyoked the horses and went away leaving the chariot behind, it tumbled down. " Did you mark how it fares with it now ?"— inquired the Child-sages. The Brahmins replied : " Just as we see a bundle of fuel tied up, even so we see the chariot lying outstretched on the ground, powerless. It neither moves, nor turns, nor goes away." At that the Child-sages asked : " If it has become like that what is it that has departed from it ?" " The driver of course."— " Quite so, my gentle Sirs !" resumed the Sages. "The soul is the

impeller of this body, the senses the horses, the veins the straps, the bones the reins, blood the lubricant, volition the whip, speech the creaking, and skin the outer top. And just as the chariot abandoned by the driver would neither move nor creak, even so does this body, abandoned by the intelligent Ātman, neither speak nor move nor breathe ; it putrefies and dogs may run at it and crows alight upon it and vultures tear it and jackals devour it !" Thereat the Brahmins at once knew ; and they touched the feet of the Child-sages and said : " We have not the wherewith to repay this ;" and they folded their hands in reverence. — Thus has the revered Chhāgaleya declared. And here are the verses*—

As a chariot-frame, by the driver abandoned,
Moves not a whit ahead.
Even so does this our body appear,
Of intelligent Ātman bereft.
What to the chariot the fellies and wheels,
What poles, and yoke, and top,
What the whip, and thong, and yoke-pin :
So to the body its manifold parts.
And when the human frame collapses,
And the organs cease to function,
The laments and wails of friends and relatives
Naught to the body avail.

xvii—KAṬHA UPANISHAD.

15. THE KAṬHA UPANISHAD AND THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ.—The Kaṭhopanishad is one of the most famous of the Major Upanishads, and it is one of the few Upanishads which try to commingle Poetry and Philosophy. In many parts the Kaṭha seems to be the prototype of the Bhagavadgītā, as for instance in the image of the Aśvattha tree with its root turned upwards and its branches wending downwards (II. iii. 1), or in the inter-relation of sense, mind, intellect and Self (I. iii. 10), or yet again in the description of the Ātman as veritably unborn, immortal and eternal, and as neither killed nor killer (I. ii. 18-19). But more than any of these

* The last verse and a half, wanting in the Ms., is supplied from the Perso-Latin version.

resemblances stands the great resemblance of the dialogue and the dénouement of the two philosophical poems. Thus, whereas in the Bhagavadgītā Kṛishṇa becomes the teacher of Arjuna, it is Yama, the God of Death, that becomes the teacher of Nachiketas in the Kaṭhopanishad. What right Yama, the God of Death, had to become the imparter of spiritual wisdom to Nachiketas, we do not know. It was probably imagined that, as the God of Death, Yama would be the fittest person to describe the fate of man after death: Compare Rv. x, 135. At one time Yama might also have been, like the Sun whose robe seems to have fallen upon his shoulder, the object of highest worship amongst a section of the people. In the MBh. at any rate Yama does play the part of a great moral teacher. The question of immediate philosophical importance, however, is not who the spiritual teacher is, but what the value is of the spiritual wisdom that is imparted; and it is from this point of view that the Kaṭhopanishad may be said to stand on a level in no way second to that of the "Song Celestial." As in the case of the Bhagavadgītā so in the case of the Kaṭhopanishad, attempts have been made and will continue to be made to distinguish the earlier from the later portions; but the great worth of the Kaṭhopanishad, as of the Bhagavadgītā, does nor lie in the antiquarian pabulum which it affords, but in the spiritual wisdom that is imparted therein.

16. THE NARRATIVE PRELUDE.—The story which forms the basis of the philosophical instruction in the Kaṭhopanishad is already well-known. Nachiketas, the son of Vājaśravasa, is a very devout young boy who, learning that his father was giving over all his wealth to the Brahmins at a sacrifice, asks, "To whom wouldst thou give *me*, father?" The father is silent, but on repeated inquiries from Nachiketas, tells him that he intends to make him over to the God of Death. Nachiketas thereupon goes to the abode of the God of Death, where the God meets him, and being pleased at the arrival of a guest like Nachiketas, offers him any three boons he may choose. By the first boon Nachiketas asks to be reconciled with his father; by the second he desires to attain the knowledge of the Celestial Fire; by the third he desires to be in-

structed as to the state of the Soul after death. The first two boons the God of Death has no difficulty in fulfilling for Nachiketas. Yama tells Nachiketas that he would be reconciled with his father on his return below, and that the Celestial Fire whose knowledge Nachiketas was seeking from Yama would be known in future as "Nachiketas Fire." But the God refuses to impart to him any knowledge about the condition of the Soul after death. He tells him that even the gods had failed to get possession of this knowledge, which was the subtlest of all kinds of knowledge, and that therefore Nachiketas had rather choose sons and grand-sons, cattle, elephants and horses, any amount of gold, kingdom and longevity, damsels impossible for any human being to obtain, or any other boon he may be pleased to choose. Nachiketas refuses point-blank to be satisfied with any of the offers that Yama makes him. He points out the perishableness of the mortal body, and the transiency of all happiness dependent thereon. He would be satisfied with no other boon save the knowledge of the state of the Soul after death.

17. THE ESCHATOLOGICAL PROBLEM MOOTED.—The philosophical romance of the Kaṭhopanishad begins with the above narrative prelude. Nachiketas, we may well believe, is merely giving vent to one of the most gnawing problems that affect the human mind—What happens to the Soul after the falling away of the physical body? We are not concerned here very much with the futile controversy that has raged between certain interpreters of this Upanishad as to whether Nachiketas was only desiring to seek the knowledge of the condition of the *liberated* Soul, or the state of *every* Soul after the dissolution of the human tenement. If we try to interpret the Kaṭhopanishad without any theoretical prepossession or any theological bias, verse I. i. 6 makes it evident that the question which Nachiketas asks is quite general in its reference to the destiny of each and every Soul, as if its incarnation in any specific form were analogous with the appearance of the crops year after year in the fields. The question is one that, through all lands and through all ages, man has asked times and again. Every human soul that leaves this world is the fore-runner of many that may have to leave it; in the midst of many, again, that leave

it at any particular moment, does also leave every Soul that goes Death-ward (I. i. 5).* The body seems to fall down. What vestige remains behind of the Soul which so long inspired it (II. ii. 4)? Is the Soul entirely annihilated? Are they right who say that it ceases to be, or does it continue to live in a future state of existence (I. i. 20)? These questions trouble every human being who has suffered the pangs of the loss of persons whom he has cherished almost as dearly as his own life. Nachiketas, however, has no occasion for the inquiry in the shape in which we have put it, but the author of the Kaṭhopanishad plants the philosophical impulse in the breast of Nachiketas only as a generalisation from his experiences of the eschatological thoughts of mankind in general.

18. ITS DOGMATICAL ANSWER.—The answers which the God of Death gives to the queries of Nachiketas are not arrived at by any chain of philosophical arguments, but are merely dogmatical assertions about the immortality and the imperishableness of the human Soul. He who thinks that this world alone matters and not the other world—such a man comes time and again under my sway, says the God of Death (I. ii. 6). The Soul neither comes from anything nor does anything come out of him. He is unborn and eternal. He has existed from all eternity. He neither kills nor is killed (I. ii. 18-19). Moreover, says the God of Death, many souls have to take on a body once more, while others have to go according to their works and wisdom even to inhabit the inanimate world (II. ii. 7). The liberated Soul, on the other hand, is able to throw off his mortal coil finally; he is able to move by the up-wending nerve from the heart to the brain, while every other Soul moves by other nerves and is destined to reincarnate (II. iii. 16). Immortality, in other words, comes only to him who is able somehow to get possession of this one nerve. The physiological wisdom embedded in this passage (which, it may be noted in passing, belongs to the later portion of the Upanishad) is quite curious inasmuch as it makes immortality depend on the ability

* Another rendering of the stanza would be—"Unto many I am just in the prime of life; unto many again I am an adult; (but none considers me as old and of an age to die): why should Yama be anxious to have me ?"

to enter the brain through a particular nerve emanating from the heart. Much more acceptable is the statement which immediately follows this and which says that immortality comes only to him who has succeeded in throwing away all his desires and in attaining to communion with God (II. iii. 14). Accordingly physiology can be said to have been made to a certain extent merely ancillary to theology, the introduction of this physiological feature being, possibly, no more than a concession to current beliefs.

19. THE DREAM APPROACH.—It is not merely the eschatological search about the state of the Soul after death that matters in the Yama-Nachiketas conversation. We are also introduced to the other enquiry from which philosophical speculation starts, namely the question as to what happens to the Soul in the state of dream. What is it that keeps itself awake in man when the bodily tenement seems to have gone to rest in the state of sleep ? What is it that creates form after form for the satisfaction of desires in that dream-state (II. ii. 8) ? This is another approach to the problem of Soul. "That by means of which a person is able to discriminate between the nature of dream and the nature of wakefulness—what is that entity that breathes within man (II. i. 4)?" The state of dream is only a miniature form of the state of death. In either case, the man seems to sleep ; but while in the first the forms of experience may probably be remembered, in the second, what time it may take the human Soul to come back (if ever) to its mortal coil, and what "dreams" it may experience in that state one cannot even so much as imagine. It is thus that the dream-problem was, with the ancients, on all fours with the eschatological problem.

20. THE PARABLE OF THE CHARIOT.—The eschatological enquiry and the dream enquiry are merely out-side enquiries for the search after the exact nature of the Soul. We may verily call the Soul the Lord of the eleven-gated citadel if we please (II. ii. 1) ; but that takes us not a whit nearer to a direct knowledge of the Soul. All psychological and physiological descriptions of the Soul are no more than merely inferior apologues, unless the true mystical turn of our enquiry makes it clear what the nature of the Soul must be. Even the poetical description of the Soul as

the Lord of the Chariot (I. iii. 3ff.) takes us no nearer to a mystical apprehension of him. It is very curious, however, that this myth of the Soul as the Lord of the Chariot in the Kaṭhopanishad should have been almost identically worded with the Phædrus myth of Plato. Chronologically it seems that the Kaṭhopanishad was by a few centuries the elder of the Phædrus ; but it is very difficult to trace the passage of the myth from one nation to the other. We would have merely stopped short of the bare mention of the parallelism if it had concerned itself with only a few points; but the extraordinary resemblance of the two descriptions down to the smallest details staggers us, and we must confess we do not know how to account for it. We reach the climax of the parallelism when the Sadaśva and the Dushṭāśva of the Kaṭhopanishad (I. iii. 5-6) are transformed into the noble and ignoble steeds of the Phædrus (246 B), one taking the soul virtue-ward and the other vice-ward. Whatever ethno-historical value the parallelism may have, it is at least evident that there is a great psycho-ethical meaning in the parable. The body is a chariot, says the Kaṭhopanishad, of which the Soul is the Lord, and intellect the charioteer; the mind constitutes the reins, while the senses are the steeds which roam on the pasture-lands of worldly objects. A person whose mind is not composed, is taken to evil paths by the unruly and wicked steeds, while he whose mind is composed is taken to good paths by the noble steeds. The inner meaning of this parable is that the tossing of the mind to and fro must be regulated by the ballast of the intellect, and though the Soul, in his essential nature, may remain calm and composed, regardless of whatever may befall the chariot by the vice-ward or virtue-ward motions of the steeds, still it is only by a due control of them that the phenomenal Soul soars, as both the Kaṭha and the Phædrus put it, to the habitations of the gods.

21. SĀṀKHYA DOCTRINE IN THE KAṬHA.—This leads us to an interesting inquiry as to what place the author of the Kaṭhopanishad assigns to the Soul in this Metaphysics, and what divisions he makes of it in the spirit of Sāṁkhya philosophy. It seems to us that the Kaṭhopanishad must have been written at a time when the Sāṁ-

khya and the Vedānta doctrines as to the nature of the Soul were not clearly discriminated, and no " Soul-theology " definitely arrived at. The passage in Kaṭhopanishad I. iii. 10-11, which gives us a gradation of existences arranged probably in the order of reality, tells us that " beyond the senses.....is the mind ; beyond the mind is intellect ; beyond intellect is the Mahat Ātman ; beyond the Mahat Ātman is the Avyakta ; beyond the Avyakta is the great Purusha : while beyond the Purusha there is nothing else." This leads us to the consideration of the meaning that was assigned by the author of the Kaṭhopanishad to the Mahat Ātman, Avyakta, and Purusha. It is well known that the Vedānta-sūtrakāra was conscious of the Sāṁkhya tendency of this passage and has devoted a separate Adhikaraṇa (I. iv. 1-7) to prove that these terms do not represent the technicalities of the Sāṁkhyas. On the other hand, the Sāṁkhya doctrinaires have made too much of these passages to prove that the Kaṭhopanishad sanctions nothing but Sāṁkhya Philosophy. For our part, we must consider the meanings of the expressions Mahat Ātman, and Avyakta, and Purusha irrespective of any Sāṁkhya or Vedāntic bias. An investigation into the meanings of these expression is sure to lead us simultaneously to the determination of the meanings of the different kinds of Soul mentioned in Kaṭha (I. iii. 13). We are told there that "higher than the Jñānātman is the Ātman, and higher than the Mahat Ātman is the Śāntātman." If we have to educe any consistent doctrine from the above passages, it would be probably that the author of the Kaṭhopanishad understood by Jñānātman the intellective Soul, while by Mahat Ātman he understood the transmigrating Soul with relations probably more extended (mahat) than those of the intellective Soul, while by Śāntātman he meant the Ātman freed of all relations, and therefore as equivalent to the ultimate tranquil existence. This agrees well with the assertion of the author of the Kaṭhopanishad that beyond the intellect is the Mahat Ātman which is the transmigrating Soul, while beyond the Mahat Ātman is the Avyakta, which is probably to be regarded as identical with the Pradhāna of the Sāṁkhyas, while the highest Purusha, beyond whom there is nothing else, must be equated with the Śāntātman or

the Universal Soul in whom everything is composed and who leads a tranquil existence undisturbed by any happenings in the phenomenal world. In this way we may say that the author of the Kaṭhopanishad brings in the Avyakta as between the Mahat Ātman and the Purusha.

22. THE INCHOATE VEDĀNTA OF THE KAṬHA.—But now the author of the Kaṭhopanishad proceeds to bring these "Sāṁkhya" ideas in a line with the analogous Vedāntic conceptions. It would seem that the inner spirit of the Sāṁkhya Philosophy as understood in his own day was probably not far removed from the inner spirit of Vedāntism. It is therefore that we find here not only a subordination of Avyakta to the Purusha but also the formulation of a distinction (I. iii.1) between the two Souls—the Individual Soul and the Universal Soul—one being merely the shadow of the other. It seems however that the author of the Kaṭhopanishad has not yet before his mind's eye a definite conception of the difference between the Individual and Universal Souls, especially as he describes both of them as being obliged to taste of the fruits of action. For true Vedāntism, it is only the Individual Soul which could thus be described as "Ṛitapa," as enjoying the fruits of action ; on the other hand, the Universal Soul must be entirely deprived of the trammels of action and fruit. Otherwise, what justification would there be in supposing that the one is merely the "shadow" of the other ? If the Universal Soul alone counts, and the Individual Soul is merely its appearance, so long as the appearance exists, only so long must actions and their ends be supposed to exist. On the other hand, the Universal Soul must be regarded as entirely deprived of such influences. It is from this point of view probably that the Muṇḍakopanishad (III. i. 17) corrects the thought expressed in the Kaṭhopanishad, telling us that even though both the Individual and the Universal Souls exist like birds on the same tree of the human body, only one of them tastes of the fruits of actions, while the other, without tasting them, merely looks on in the spirit of the Aristotelian " theorising " God.

23. THE ADVAITIC DESCRIPTION OF ĀTMAN.—But the author of the Kaṭhopanishad is fully aware of the fact that even though,

for intellectual purposes, it may be necessary to make a distinction between the Individual Soul and the Universal Soul, spiritually there is no essential distinction between them. They alone are happy, he tells us, who identify the Universal Self with the Self within (II. ii. 12). From death to death does he go, he tells us, who sees that there is difference and distinction in the world (II. i. 10), implying thereby that the world must be understood as a complete unity. Now it follows that the world could not be a unity unless it were permeated by the same immanent Principle. Just as the same fire manifests itself in different forms in the world, just as the same wind manifests itself in different shapes, similarly does the same Universal Spirit manifest itself in all beings and is yet transcendent (II. ii. 9-10). This is how the author of the Kaṭhopanishad arrives at the conception of the simultaneous immance and transcendence of Universal Spirit. The author also tells us, in the manner of the Phædo, that just as the Sun is the eye of the world and cannot be affected by the defects of the eye, similarly is this universal Spirit beyond all grief and sorrow and is not affected by them (II. ii. 11). This same Universal Spirit, which from one point of view may be regarded as God and from another point of view as the Absolute, takes on both personal and impersonal shapes, inasmuch as it essentially transcends them both. From the personal point of view, it may be said that all the phenomenal forces of nature obey the behests of this Universal Spirit as if in fear (II. iii. 2-3). From the impersonal point of view, the Universal Spirit could be characterised only in terms of negative theology as being without sound and without touch, without form or taste or smell, without beginning and without end, but as the only real existence (I. iii. 15). Essentially, however, there is no distinction between personal and impersonal Spirit. It stands as the goal of all existence, the illuminator of the world of phenomena, the lode-star to which all creation moves.

24. THE ETHICS OF THE KAṬHOPANISHAD.—The unreality of the world is not an impossible deduction from the sole existence of Universal Spirit. We are told in Kaṭha I. ii. 5 that most people play only the part of blind men following the blind. They live in

an atmosphere of unreality, and yet bethink themselves to be learned and wise men. Not such, however, is the case with the really learned and wise who seek for no resting place in this slippery world (II. i. 2); for, it can never be possible for unreal things to lead a man to reality (I. ii. 10). It follows that a man must suddenly turn himself away from the life of a physical contemplation of the pleasure of beauty and of love (I. i. 29). Two paths open out before man, we are told, the path of good, and the path of the pleasant, carrying a man to different destinations. One who betakes himself to the path of good meets with good; on the other hand, one who betakes himself to the path of the pleasant is foiled in his effort for the realisation of good (I. ii. 1). We are advised in an anti-hedonic spirit to ever choose the good before the pleasant (I. ii. 2); but the thing to note is that by betaking oneself to the path of good, one is carried beyond good and evil, beyond religion and irreligion, beyond duty and no-duty (I. ii. 14). The only way towards the attainment of this state is, in the beginning, severely to turn one's gaze inward away from the world of sense, to which one is naturally inclined to turn one's sight. Immortality cannot be gained without introversion (II. i. 1) and without a practical mystical realisation by means of Yoga, in which one is able finally to compose all the organs of sense together with mind and intellect, so that a steady contemplation results (II. iii. 10), by means of which all desires come to an end, the knots of the heart are dissolved, and one is able, as the Kaṭhopanishad puts it, "to enjoy the Godhead" (II. iii. 14-15).

25. THE MYSTIC WAY.—What are the definite outlines of the mystic path which is thus enjoined by the Kaṭhopanishad for the attainment of God? We may say that the Kaṭhopanishad contains in miniature the quintessence of all the mystical teachings of Upanishads, as we have in outline here a full description of the the mystic way to God-realisation. The author of the Kaṭhopanishad is a very practical man and tells us not to rely upon any future life but try to realise, in this very life and while the body lasts, our identity with God (II. iii. 4). He tells us in a spirit of exhortation to rise and awake; the mystic way may be as difficult

to tread as verily the edge of a razor (I. iii. 14), and yet glory would consist in having walked on it. Poets of old have said that it is a very difficult path to tread; but that need not detain us from very earnestly pursuing the path. To the question, what a man should do to realise God, the Kaṭhopanishad replies by saying that a man must first go to a Guru who is capable of imparting spiritual wisdom to him. Not without the help of such a spiritual teacher is it ever possible for a man to attain to the subtle knowledge of God (I. ii. 8-9; I. iii. 14). Very few indeed are fortunate to have even hearing knowledge about God, and fewer still are they who having heard it are yet able to know Him. Rare is even the speaker about God; rare indeed is he who is able to attain Him; most rare is yet he who is initiated by such a rare teacher in the path of God (I. ii. 7). What are the practical hints which such a clever seer of God imparts? The Kaṭhopanishad tells us that all the hints may be summed up in the mere contemplation by the help of the mystic "Om." Is not this symbol, asks the author of the Upanishad, the imperishable Brahman itself? Do not the Vedas throughout expatiate on the significance of this very symbol? Are not all penances directed Om-ward? Is it not on account of realising its full significance that people lead the mystic life, and is it not the best support for spiritual thought (I. ii. 15-17)? We must make all our senses worship the God who sits in the equipoise of the up-moving and down-moving breaths (II. ii. 3). We should guard the spiritual fire hidden in the two fire-sticks, like a child in the womb by a pregnant woman, to be adored day after day by men who keep awake and bring oblations (II. i. 8). The mystic apprehension of God, however, does not consist in merely an intellectual cognisance of Him. No amount of words will ever enable us to express the nature of God. Neither intellect, nor much learning, may ever lead us God-ward (I. ii. 23). Not unless we have composed our minds shall we ever be able to attain to God by mere force of wisdom (I. ii. 24). Neither is speech competent to express Him, nor the mind; nor is the Ātman ever attainable by physical vision (II. iii. 12). It is a sort of subtle and piercing intuition that alone enables one to attain to the knowledge of God (I. iii. 12); and

even then God must choose the devotee before the devotee is able to attain to the vision of God. Before such an one alone, does God unveil His form (I. ii. 22). We do not know whether the formulation of the question of grace was definitely present to the mind of the author of the Kaṭhopanishad ; but it seems that in a rudimentary way at least he knew the uselessness of human endeavour unaided by divine grace for the realisation of God. How does the Ātman reveal himself initially to the aspiring mystic ? The Kaṭhopanishad tells us that the Ātman shines before the mystic like a smokeless flame, and appears to be only as large as the size of a thumb (II. i. 13). God is always present in the heart of man, having assumed a form of the size of a thumb; and the Kaṭhopanishad enjoins upon us the duty of drawing out the Ātman steadily from the body, as one may draw the pith from a reed. Great courage is, however, required in the extrication of the Soul from out of the body. It is only when a man has succeeded in this process of extrication that he is able to reach the pure and immortal Existence (II. iii. 17). Neither the sun shines there, nor the moon and stars, nor even this lightning, far less then this earthly fire : it is only when the Ātman has shone that all these shine afterwards (II. ii. 15). This is as much as to say that it is not any of the so-called luminous things that make the Ātman shine before the vision of the aspiring mystic : on the other hand, the mystic sees that the luminosity of all these objects springs from the source of them all, namely the Ātman himself. In a spirit of apparent contradiction the author of the Kaṭhopanishad tells us that, though sitting, the Ātman seems to proceed afar, and though lying down, to move everywhere; and we could very easily excuse the justifiable pride of this mystical author when (in Yama's words) he asks : Who ever except himself has yet been able to know the God who rejoices and rejoices not (I. ii. 21) ?—remembering that it probably is the personal mystical experience of the author.

26. DOCTRINE OF LIBERATION.—The question of God-vision is not far removed from the question of liberation. There has been a great deal of controversy among the interpreters of the Kaṭhopanishad as to what doctrine of liberation has been advanced by the

author of the Upanishad. Did he advance a full-fledged doctrine of Jīvanmukti, or did he advance the doctrine of Kramamukti? And if he advanced the doctrine of Jīvanmukti, what kind of doctrine did he exactly maintain on this head? It seems evident from a consideration of Kaṭha II. iii. 5 that the author did really maintain a kind of Kramamukti or liberation by stages. In a beautiful image he tells us that there are different grades of God-vision in the different worlds, and it seems as if the ultimate stage of God-illumination may be reached only through a process of gradual spiritual evolution from world to world. In our life on this earth, he tells us, we may be able to realise Brahman only as in a mirror, that is to say, contrary-wise, right being to the left and left being to the right. In the world of the Fathers, he tells us, one experiences the Godhead as in a dream, where the earlier defect is removed, but the vision of God yet lacks substance. In the world of the Gandharvas, there is a further improvement and we are able to visualise divinity like a pebble, say, under a sheet of clear water, the image being true and yet defective owing to refraction. It is only when we go to the Brahmaloka that the vision of God becomes as clear as day-light: even as we may discriminate light from darkness, similarly are we there able to attain to the knowledge of God. It thus seems that the author of the Kaṭhopanishad believes in a gradation of God-experiences through different worlds, one kind of experience being higher than another. This, therefore, we may take as the author's contribution to the philosophy of Kramamukti. On the other hand, it is not impossible to see in the Kaṭhopanishad a definite leaning towards the doctrine of Jīvanmukti or full liberation in this very life, when the author says that the moment the Ātman is seen the knots of the heart are broken and the desires are at an end (II. iii. 14-15): As pure water may be poured into pure water, similarly does the Individual Spirit live in communion with the Universal Spirit (II. i. 15), and an experience of identity (tattvabhāva) follows (II. iii. 13). When a man is able to realise this identity he becomes Jīvanmukta. As to what kind of Jīvanmukti it is which the author of the Kaṭhopanishad advocates, there are no clear helps to ascertain. Only the general ten-

dency of the Upanishad may be noticed: it thus seems that any kind of Jīvanmukti which makes it impossible for a mystic to step down a little from the high pedestal of ecstatic communion, the Kaṭhopanishad does not sanction. On the other hand, if we regard that Jīvanmukti is not incompatible with the mystic's occasional descent from state of ecstatic bliss, such a Jīvanmukti may, on the whole, be said to be countenanced by the general trend of argument in the Kaṭhopanishad.

xviii.—KAUSHĪTAKI UPANISHAD.

27. THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS.—The first chapter of the Kaushītaki opens with a grand eschatological allegory of the Soul's progress to the world of Brahman, which irresistibly reminds one of the Pilgrim's Progress. King Chitra Gāṅgyāyani, we are told, once upon a time, appointed Āruṇi Uddālaka as his sacrificial priest who, in his turn, sent his son Śvetaketu to perform the function. The king asked young Śvetaketu whether, now that he was to officiate as the priest and win for his patron a world (*mā loke dhāsyasīti*), he knew if that world was closed up (*saṁvṛitam asti* or *āste*) without any egress, or if, per chance, there was a path leading out of it (*anyataro vā adhvā*) to another region. Śvetaketu answered he did not know, and went straight to his father and asked him if he knew how to reply to the king. Āruṇi, being ignorant likewise, repairs to the king as a disciple, along with his son. The king expounds the dogma to them. According to him the world of Brahman was the highest goal and a true place of safety. He then describes the Two Paths—the Path of the Gods and the Path of the Fathers—the paths running up together upto the world of the Moon, and then branching off in two directions, upward and downward, the former leading a man to the Brahma-loka, and the latter involving him in the cycle of birth and death. We are told that all creatures first go to the world of the Moon after their death, and that, in the bright half of the month, it is by their vital breaths that the Moon waxes, but that in the dark half they are sent back again to the earth in the form of rain: that is to say, such of them as are not able to make the proper reply (*yo na pratyāha*). These become born over and over again in different places on this earth

according to their deeds and knowledge: as a worm or as an insect, as a fish or as a bird, as a lion or as a boar, as a serpent (*paraśvā*) or a tiger or a man, or as something else. To the question that is invariably asked to all who come to the Moon-world, viz., "Who art thou?" those that thus return to the world make the following answer: "From the Illustrious one [the Moon], the fifteen-fold, the [new-]born Lord of the World of the Manes, O ye Seasons, the seed was gathered: Do ye, then, send me on into a male progenitor, and deposit me into the mother." The proper reply on the other hand is—"[I am] he that is being born and reborn as the twelfth (or the thirteenth) month through the twelve-fold (or thirteenth-fold) Father [i.e., the year]. This I know well (*sam*+*vide*); am assured against the contrary (*prati*+*vide*). Therefore, ye Seasons, lead me to deathlessness (*amṛityave*)." And it should be added: "With that truth, with that fervour (*tapas*), I am myself the Season, the Child of the Seasons." In the further course of the journey he may also be asked, who he is. "Who am I? I am Thou," should be his reply; and at this reply the soul is set free to proceed onwards.* The mounting Soul, when thus let go, moves by the Path of the Gods and comes to the World of Agni, and thence goes successively to those of Vāyu, [Āditya,] Varuṇa, Indra, and Prajāpati, and lastly to the world of Brahman. In this world of Brahman, we are told, every moment pacifies one's desires (*ishṭiha*). There is also there the great lake Āra, the ageless river Vijarā, the tree Illya, the station called Sāllaja,† and the unassailable palace called Aparājita, with Indra and Prajāpati as its two Door-keepers. There is further the Audience-chamber of Brahman called Vibhu, with Reason as the throne and endless Splendour as the couch. Here the beloved Mānasī (power of mind) with her counterpart

* The whole story puts us in mind of an analogical passage in the literature of the Orphic Mysteries, where we are told that the aspiring Soul in its progress to the Seven Worlds comes to the holy Well-spring near the Lake of Memory protected by the Guardians, and is allowed to drink water therefrom, when the soul declares that it is a "Child of Earth and starry Heaven, but that its race is of Heaven only."

† Perhaps Sallaja=sat+la+ja, i.e., the source of the existence, mergence, and emergence of everything. Compare "Tat Jalān" in Chh. iii. 14. 1.

the Chākshushī (power of vision), surrounded by innumerable nymphs (Ambā, Ambāyavī, etc.) and other dancing attendants (naṭyaḥ), are engaged in weaving together various flowers produced by the Cosmic Spirit (Vairājagāni). The aspiring soul, upon his reaching this world of Brahman, obtains a very pompous reception, Brahmā himself being anxious that he should safely cross the river of agelessness. Five hundred nymphs approach him—one hundred with fruits, one hundred with ointments, one hundred with garlands, one hundred with gorgeous apparel, and the last one hundred with perfumes—and beautify him with all sorts of ornaments worthy of Brahman. Thus adorned, the knower of Brahman moves onwards. He comes to the lake Āra, and crosses it by the mind only, all his accordant and discordant thoughts (*sam- prati- vido*) being drowned underneath. Then he comes across the desire-pacifying moments, which run away (with his desires). Then he passes on to the river Vijarā, which also he crosses by the mind alone. Here he is freed from good and evil, as also from other duals. When he reaches successively the tree Illya, the station Sāllaja, and the palace Aparājita, the odour, flavour, and splendour of Brahman successively approach him. When he comes to the palace, the Door-keepers, namely, Indra and Prajāpati, run away from him, and he passes on to the Hall of Brahman, where the glory of Brahman enters into him, and he comes to think himself as Brahman. He approaches the Throne of Self-knowledge, the front and back pairs of legs of which as also the two cross-pieces joining them—consist of specific hymns and chants, and mounts the Couch of endless Splendour, where Brahman is seated. Of this Couch which is Life, Time past and future, Sustenance, and Splendour form the four legs ; the cross-pieces, the warp and woof of the webbing, the carpet, the back-piece and the cushions being likewise identified with certain details of ritual and worship. The Soul as he approaches touches the Couch with his foot. Brahman asks him, " Who art thou ?" and he should say, " I am the Season, the Child of the Seasons, sprung from the womb of Infinite Space, the seed in the mother, the quintessence of the year, and the Self in all things. Thou art all this, the Self in all things ; What

Thou art, that I am." Brahman is then declared to be one with Truth, and all the cognitions of Brahman now pass on to the Soul, whom Brahman finally assures : " All this world that is mine (read—*tamāha yo* for *tamāhāpo*) is now thy own."

28. CERTAIN SOCIAL CUSTOMS AND OBSERVANCES.—The second chapter of the Kaushītaki introduces us to certain observances that were prevalent at the time of the Upanishad. (i) We are told (sect. 3) that if a person wishes to obtain the highest treasure, he should perform a sacrifice with ghee, and offer oblations to various deities such as Speech, Prāṇa, Prajñā, and having inhaled the smell of the smoke, and having applied the ghee to all his limbs, he should walk in silence and declare his wish, or he should send a messenger. This, we are assured, will surely secure him the highest treasure. (ii) Again (sect. 4), if a person intends to obtain the love of another, he should perform the sacrifice exactly in the manner described above, and offer oblations saying, " I offer thy Speech, Mind, and Prajñā in myself, Svāhā !" He should then walk in silence, or try to come into contact with the person whose love he intends to obtain, or stand speaking to the wind. He will thus surely secure the love of the person he desires. (iii) We next proceed to consider the Three Meditations of Kaushītaki (sect. 7ff.). The great sage tells us that if a person intends to be delivered from his sins, he should meditate on the Sun when rising, when at the zenith, and when setting. And again, if a man intends to avoid all misfortunes concerning his children, he should meditate on the New Moon. Finally Meditation on the Full Moon as the Lord of creatures brings one prosperity, and his children never die before him. (iv) Next, we have the description (sect. 11) of the manner in which a father should greet his son on his return home after a long absence. He should kiss his son's head and say : " Thou, springing from every limb, art born from the heart. Thou, my son, art verily my own Self." He should then bless him with longevity, and wish him to be as strong as a stone, as sharp as an axe, and as brilliant as a piece of gold ; and finally he should wish him not to cut off the line of his race. (v) Then follows the Daiva Parimara or the dying around of the enemies as the result of the

meditation on Brahman as absorbing the two sets of gods or powers: viz. the cosmic powers such as fire, sun, moon, lightning and air, and the individual powers such as speech, eye, ear, mind and breath. Brahman is declared to shine so long as these gods shine and to die (!) when these do not shine—the cosmic powers being absorbed into air, and the individual powers into breath. But though thus absorbed they are not finally resolved, and out of the very air or breath they rise again. One who knows this does not die even if the mountains crush him; but his enemies die round about him. (iv) Finally, we may mention the way in which a father transmits his tradition to the son (sec. 15). When on the point of death, the father should impart to his son, in the presence of the holy fire, all his sense-powers, speech and mind, happiness, joy, and off-spring, in addition to the knowledge of the scriptures and his Prāṇas. If the father survives he should live under the authority of the son, or else wander as an ascetic.

29. FOUR METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINES.—In the same chapter we are introduced to the metaphysical doctrines of the four great philosophers, viz. Kaushītaki, Paiṅgya, Pratardana, and Śushka-bhṛiṅgāra. The sage Kaushītaki maintained that Prāṇa was Brahman, the mind being its messenger, speech the house-keeper, the eye the guard, and the ear the informant. All the sense-organs bring unasked offerings to the Prāṇa which is Brahman; thus may all creatures bring offerings unasked to the person who knows this. The only moral rule that such a person should observe is "not to beg." Paiṅgya endorses the doctrine of Kaushītaki that Prāṇa is Brahman and adds that the eye stands firm behind the speech, the ear behind the eye, the mind behind the ear, and Prāṇa behind the mind—Prāṇa or the Spirit thus forming the substratum of the senses and the mind. Pratardana may be supposed to be one of those free-thinkers who disbelieved in external ritualism and its efficacy in fulfilling the desires of the people. He favours the conception of the inner Agnihotra, thus turning the attention of the people from ritualism to the inner psychical world. He maintained that man is ever offering the two oblations, namely speech and breath. So long as a man speaks he cannot breathe, for he is

offering all the while his Prāṇa into his Speech ; on the other hand, when he breathes, he cannot speak ; for then he is offering his Speech into his Breath. Oblations such as those of milk have an end, like all other works ; but these two are endless and immortal. Finally, we may mention the doctrine of Śushkabhṛiṅgāra who regarded the Uktha as Brahman. Those who meditate on it as Ṛik, Yajus, and Sāman come to be regarded as the best among men, and are praised by all ; those again who meditate on it as might, glory, and splendour become themselves mighty, glorious, and lustrous. This is a very good illustration of the Upanishadic belief in the motive power of ideas.

30. THE DOCTRINE OF PRAJÑĀTMAN.—The third chapter of the Kaushītaki contains the dialogue between Indra and Pratardana, in which is advanced the peculiar doctrine of Prajñātman, Prāṇa being first identified with Consciousness and then with the Conscious-Self (the Prajñātman). (i) Indra first identifies himself with Truth and tells Pratardana that knowledge of him is most beneficial to man. Here we find preached a kind of a-moralism with a vengeance. We are told that Indra, who is Truth, incurred no sin by slaying various persons and by breaking treaties ; and that likewise will it happen to a person who knows him. Such a man will not be harmed even if he murders his father, mother, or children, or commits any theft; on the contrary the bloom, the blue tinge, will never depart from his face. (ii) Indra then identifies himself with Prāṇa, and asks Pratardana to meditate on him as Life and as Immortality. Life is verily Prāṇa, and Prāṇa is life ; and it is by Prāṇa that man obtains immortality in the other world. Incidentally we are told that all Prāṇas are really one ; otherwise, neither perception nor action would be possible. Thus while speech speaks, all Prāṇas speak after it ; while the eye sees, all Prāṇas see after it ; and while the mind thinks, all Prāṇas think after it, and so on. (iii) Indra then tells Pratardana that Prāṇa is Prajñā, and that they both live together in the body and depart together. The evidence adduced to prove this is that in deep sleep man becomes one with Prāṇa. When he is thus absorbed in Prāṇa, the speech with all names, the eye with all forms, the ear with all sounds,

and the mind with all thoughts, are absorbed in him ; and when he awakes, all the Prāṇas proceed from the Self, as sparks from the burning fire, and it is from Prāṇas that the sense-powers proceed and from the sense-powers the worlds. We are further told that at the time of swooning and also at the time of death all the senses, along with speech and mind, become absorbed in Prāṇa, and when Prāṇa finally departs from this body, it departs along with Prajñā or consciousness. (iv) Indra further emphasises the significance of consciousness and tells Pratardana that without consciousness no thought occurs, and therefore no knowledge is possible. Unsupported by it, all the perceptive and active senses, along with speech and mind, are powerless and incapable of grasping their objects. "My mind was absent," says the man, "and therefore I did not perceive the objects." Thus it is only when consciousness is present that man can know all names by speech, see all forms by the eye, hear all sounds by the ear, and think all thoughts by the mind. (v) Indra then asks Pratardana to try to find out not what speech is, but the speaker ; not what smell is, but the smeller ; not what sound is, but the hearer ; not what food is, but the food-eater ; not what actions are, but the actor. We are further told that the Elements of Being have reference to Elements of Knowing and that both objects and subjects are correlated ; that if there are no objects, there would be no subjects, and if there are no subjects, there would be no objects, and thus on neither side singly could anything be achieved ; and finally that the Elements of Being are held by the Elements of Knowing, which in their turn are fixed in Prāṇa, just as the felly of a wheel is held by the spokes which are themselves fixed in the nave. Here is a peculiar mixture of a realistic epistemological relativism and a spiritual monism in which the pluralistic aspect of psychology is not negated but only subordinated. (vi) Finally, Indra goes on to identify this Prāṇa with the Conscious Self or Prajñātman. We are told that this Self is full of bliss and is imperishable and immortal. He does not increase by good actions nor diminish by bad actions, for he it is who inspires man to do good or bad actions. What is preached here is not the freedom of the will but the freedom of the

Ātman. Our passage then preaches a sort of Occasionalism in which it is not man's Will that is described as determining his actions, but his Ātman alone.

xix—THE MUṆḌAKA UPANISHAD.

31. DIVERSIFIED CONTENTS OF THE MUṆḌAKA.—The Muṇḍaka Upanishad, like its compeer the Kaṭha Upanishad, is a very happy synthesis of poetry and philosophy, and it is even more remarkable than the latter as a work of style, in which the art and freedom with which the metre has been handled is noticeable at every stage. It is true that the metre of the Muṇḍaka, as a modern commentator expresses it, occasionally loses itself in a wild rhythm; but the wildness itself is so pleasing that it only continually adds to the spiritual impression that is made upon the learner's mind. The Upanishad is called Muṇḍaka, possibly after the verse III. ii. 10, where the rite of carrying the sacrificial fire on the head is enjoined upon all the students of this Upanishad; possibly also because it is regarded as an Upanishad for 'Shavelings,'* almost like a 'Saṁnyāsa' Upanishad of later times. As to whether there is in this Upanishad an artistic design and a coherence in the development of thought, or whether it is merely a congeries of dispersed fragments and occasional meditations : opinions differ. The Upanishad seems to justify neither of these extreme views, though it is somewhat hard philosophically to reconcile the various statements scattered through the text, some favouring the monistic (III. ii. 8), others the qualified-monistic (III. i. 3), and yet others the dualistic (III. i. 1) conception of metaphysics. Further, the speculations on immortality in the Muṇḍaka (III. ii) are so variegated and diverse in their nature that it is almost impossible to deduce any consistent doctrine out of them, although it at the same time remains true that what it thus loses as a work of art it more than makes amends for by the spiritual value of its isolated teachings which are couched in words and phrases that had long become the current coin of Upanishadic thought. It is also from this very circumstance that, like Kaṭha, the Muṇḍaka has supplied many ideas and expressions to the Bhagavadgītā. Thus, for in-

* Not necessarily Buddhistic monks : the practice was common to all monks.

stance, the description of the Cosmic God in Muṇḍaka (II. i. 4), where fire is described as his head, the sun and the moon as his eyes, the quarters as his ears, the Vedas as his speech, the wind as his breath, the universe as his heart, and the earth as having come from his feet, may be said verily to be the prototype of the description of the Viśvarūpa in the 11th chapter of the Bhagavadgītā, which seems merely to be a long-drawn-out commentary on the idea original to the Muṇḍakopanishad. Then again, it seems from a consideration of the halting attitude of the philosopher of the Muṇḍaka, while in one breath he extols ritualism (I. ii. 1-6) and in another condemns it outright (I. ii. 7-12), that even in this respect as also in its final ethical teaching in III. i–ii the Muṇḍaka has been the original of the Bhagavadgītā. It is hence probable that both the Muṇḍaka and the Bhagavadgītā were composed at a time when the ghost of ritualism was not yet finally laid, when it did continue occasionally to haunt the minds of philosophers, who had to find for it a place in their philosophical speculations.

32. THE PECULIAR POSITION OF THE MUṆḌAKA IN REGARD TO RITUALISM.—The second section of the first Muṇḍaka is a very remarkable illustration of the way in which the claims of, and the attacks against, ritualism are set forth in that Upanishad in equally vigorous language. We may say that the two parts of this section constitute the thesis and the antithesis of the philosophical argument of this Upanishad, although the synthesis of the two, if implied, is not as clearly indicated. In one breath, the author exhorts us to practise diligently all sacrificial rites so that they may lead us to the world of good. We are enjoined in faith to offer oblations between every two portions of melted butter, after the fire has been lighted and the flame is flickering as if greedy to devour the oblations. We are also told that if a man's Agnihotra is not followed by the new-moon and the full-moon sacrifice, as well as the four-months' sacrifice and the harvest sacrifice, or if it is unattended by a guest, or not offered at all, or offered without ceremony to all the gods, or not according to rule,—then destroyed are all the seven worlds for him! Then again, we are told in feeling language that rewards come to the man who observes all

these ceremonial rites: his offerings, tranformed into the rays of the sun, lead such a sacrificer to the place where the one Lord of the gods dwells: saying to him "come" "come" and addressing sweet words, praising him, and saying, "This is verily the meritorious Brahmaloka which has been gained by thy good works" (I. ii. 1-6). Contrast with this the sentiment expressed in the next six verses of this section, which is exactly the opposite of what has been described above. Unsafe boats, we are told, are these sacrifices which enjoin merely the lower kind of ceremony. Fools they, who call this the highest good: again and again do they go into the clutches of old-age and death. Fools, who live in ignorance and yet are wise in their own conceit, and who, being puffed up with knowledge, go round and round, staggering to and fro like blind men led by the blind! Children they, who live in ignorance and yet consider themselves as having accomplished the goal of life. Filled with passion these sacrificers know no good, and fall down miserable as soon as their merit is exhausted. Considering sacrifice and merit as the chiefest of things, these fools know no higher good, and having enjoyed in the highest heaven the reward of their good works, they fall down into this world or even enter one yet lower. On the other hand, only those who lead a life of austerities and practise penance in the forest and live on alms—it is only they, who, when they rid themselves of all passions, go by the doorway of the Sun to where the immortal and imperishable Person dwells. It is thus that the life of religious austerities is enjoined in preference to the life of sacrifice, and we are advised to go, *samidhs* in hand, to acquire spiritual insight from a well-versed spiritual teacher (I. ii. 6-12). Both the 'yea' and the 'nay' of ritualism have rarely been so splendidly exhibited in two such short sections like what we have in this Upanishad.

33. THE SĀṀKHYA AND VEDĀNTA COSMOLOGIES IN MUṆḌAKA.— If we look at the philosophical contents of the Muṇḍakopanishad, we come to find that it begins with a cosmological query and ends with the problem of immortality, while many mystical and metaphysical arguments are interspersed in between the extremes. Muṇḍaka I. i. 3 begins with the cosmological question of Śaunaka:

What is that which being known, everything else is known ?—and the reply given points to the All-cause, as the goal of knowledge. We may say that there are, on the whole, two different theories of cosmogony advanced in the Muṇḍakopanishad. In the first place, in I. i. 8-9, we find that the primeval Brahman is described as being the cause of the Manifold through penance, the first thing produced from it being Anna or Food. The introduction of "Anna" in the cosmological context is likely to be misunderstood, and pronounced as almost childish ; but by this term the author does not probably mean "food" but rather the "material constituent" of the universe, almost equivalent to the Pradhāna of the Śāṁkhyas. From Anna is produced Prāṇa or energy, and from Prāṇa Manas or the psychical world, while from the Manas is produced the Satya, that is to say, the concrete, tangible, physical world. The outcome of this cosmological description is that from the Primeval Being was first created the material constituent of the world, from the material constituent the principle of movement, from the principle of movement the psychical world, and from the psychical world the physical world—a description which takes us quite near to the Sāṁkhya cosmogony as later formulated. It is also noteworthy that this conception of cosmogony in the Muṇḍakopanishad is a definitely realistic one, inasmuch as it calls the physical world the real world, designating it as "Satyam." Then again we have, in the whole of the Muṇḍaka II. i, a very good description of another kind of cosmogony. There we are told that from the primeval heavenly Person—without body, without Prāṇa, and without mind—were born in order Prāṇa, mind, the senses, ether, air, light, water, and earth (II. i 3). It was from this primeval Being likewise that the Rigveda was born, and the Sāmaveda, as well as the Yajurveda. It was from him that all rites of initiation were created : all sacrifices, the year, the sacrificer, and the worlds in which the moon shines brightly as well as the sun. It was from him also that the gods were born : genii, men, cattle, birds, the upmoving and the downmoving winds, rice and corn, penance, faith, truth, abstinence, and law. From him also were born the oceans, mountains, rivers of every kind. From him came all herbs, as well as the essence

by means of which the inner Soul dwells in all beings (II. i. 9). It is in this way that all earthly and celestial existences, along with all moral, physical and psychical qualities, are described as having proceeded from the primeval bodiless Person; and it is evident that the conception has inspired the later Vedāntic cosmogonies. It thus comes to pass that both the Sāṁkhya and the Vedāntic conceptions of cosmogony are embedded in the thoughts of the Muṇḍakopanishad.

34. THE METAPHYSICS OF THE MUṆḌAKA.—It is noteworthy that the Muṇḍaka stands in a sense apart from the other Upanishads inasmuch as it asserts rather too prominently a metaphysical realism. We have seen above that the cosmic conception which emerges from a consideration of the Muṇḍaka cosmogony is a realistic one. Similarly, does the text of the Muṇḍaka (II. i. 1) clearly announce, in a realistic spirit, a plurality of souls who emerge from, and are ultimately merged back into, God—a text which has been found serviceable by all pluralistic and semi-pluralistic theories of Upanishadic interpretation: " As verily the well-lit fire throws out innumerable sparks of like nature, similarly does the primeval and imperishable Being throw out innumerable existences of like nature, which are ultimately resolved into it." We find from a consideration of this passage that the existence of souls, so long as they continue in the world, must be taken as real, even though there is a sort of a postulation of their creation from, and re-absorption into, Ultimate Existence—a fact which is not much to the fore in Indian thought. Can we at all speak of the creation of the souls from the Indian point of view? And can we ever say that the souls ultimately perish? We shall not discuss the philosophical significance of these conceptions, but we mention them here as coming out of the passage under consideration. The Muṇḍakopanishad is not content with the assertion of a metaphysical realism in the case of the psychical world: it must also postulate a metaphysical realism in the case of the physical world. Just as the Souls have been created from God, so also is Nature created from Him: " As a great spider sends out and re-absorbs its thread, as the earth sends forth the herbs, as the hair of the head and the

body spring from the living man, similarly does the whole of the universe proceed from the Imperishable"—(I. i. 7). In these images we are told how the physical world must itself be regarded as coming out of Ultimate Existence as well as ultimately vanishing into it. But just as the thread of the spider is real so long as it exists, and the herbs on the earth or the hair on the body of man are real so long as they exist, similarly must we regard the universe as absolutely real so long as it is not resolved into the Absolute. It is to be remembered also, that the ultimate imperishable Existence is regarded in the Muṇḍaka as personal more than as impersonal. It does not seem that the impersonal aspect is very prominent in the Muṇḍaka except as in (I. i. 6), where we have a description of the Absolute as the invisible, the inapprehensible, the colourless, the eyeless, the earless and so on. We have rather the Ultimate Existence conceived as personal, as for example, in the whole cosmogonical account given in II. i, the macrocosmic Person, who is described as being even beyond the Imperishable (II. i. 2), being postulated as the primary existence from which the whole creation proceeds. Not less evident is the personal aspect of the Universal Soul as we find it in Muṇḍaka III. i. 1-2. We have already discussed the significance of the ideological advance which the Muṇḍakopanishad makes upon the Kaṭha in its attribution, in almost a deistic fashion, of a divine "theorising" activity to the Universal Soul, while it places the responsibility of actions and enjoyment upon the Individual Soul, who is described as being immersed in misery so long as he remains away from the Supreme Soul, but who loses all his grief and becomes powerful as soon as he is conjoined with his mate. The dualistic school of Upanishadic interpretation has tried to make much capital out of this passage, and it does seem as if the passage favours a dualistic view. It may also be noticed how monistic interpreters have fared in the interpretation of this passage, Śaṁkarāchārya, among them, having given inconsistent explanations of it in his Upanishad-Bhāshya and his Commentary on the Brahma-Sūtras (I. ii. 12 and I. iii. 7), the inconsistency having been flung in his face by Viśishṭādvaita commentators like Raṅga-Rāmānuja. But it is evident from the

point of view of Śaṁkarāchārya that he does not negate the separate existence of the Individual Souls, so long as they phenomenally exist. It is only from the noumenal point of view that they may be regarded as not different from, and therefore as indentified with, the Universal Soul. We need not dwell here at any length upon the distinction that Śaṁkarāchārya makes between the two different kinds of states, the state of the phenomenal, and the state of the noumenal world ; but it cannot be gainsaid that the Muṇḍaka also exhibits certain purely monistic leanings. Thus Muṇḍaka II. i. 10, asserting as it does the identity of the Person within and the Person without, the Individual Soul and the Universal Soul, goes against any merely pluralistic or qualifiedly pluralistic interpretation of Reality in the Muṇḍaka. It seems somehow that the author of the Muṇḍakopanishad has the reconciling interest in his heart, and tries to harmonise the different claims of pluralism, qualified monism, and monism in a way which could only be described as the way of an eclectic mystical compromise.

35. THE MUṆḌAKOPANISHAD, A MYSTIC EPITOME.—One of the chief functions of mysticism is to annihilate the merely intellectual conceptions of Reality ; and thus all mystical theories try to lay the axe at the roots of the merely intellectual disputes between monism and pluralism. The mystical attitude is the insistently practical attitude, and as we have said, there is the same gulf between metaphysics and mysticism as there is between theory and practice. The fundamental problem of mysticism is, How can Reality be actually reached ? It is from this point of view that we may say that the Muṇḍaka, like the Kaṭha, is an epitome of the entire mystical teaching presented by the Upanishads. It starts with the distinction between the two different kinds of knowledge : one the knowledge of the world, and the other the knowledge of the spirit ; one which concerns itself with the Veda, the Śikshā, the Kalpa, the Vyākaraṇa, the Nirukta, the Chhandas, and the Jyotisha ; the other which concerns itself with the practical attainment of the Absolute : one the Aparā Vidyā or lower knowledge, the other the Parā Vidyā or higher knowledge. We need not enter here into an exhaustive consideration of the way in which the

monistic and the qualified-monistic interpreters of the Upanishads understand the exact nature of this Parā Vidyā. A full description of this will have to be given in another volume of this History, where we shall investigate the real significance of Upāsanā and Jñāna, faith and knowledge, as the ways to reaching God. But we cannot forbear remarking in this place that the Advaita and the Viśishṭādvaita candidates for God-realisation must be regarded as possessing two different psychological attitudes, the one going by the way of reason and the other by the way of faith, though the goal they have to reach is, in the final result, of the same kind. There exists a difference between these two attitudes not so much from the point of view of the goal that is to be reached, as from the point of view of the preliminary process of reaching it. In any case, it stands to reason that Upanishads like the Muṇḍaka should have thus exalted the supreme science of spirituality above the ordinary sciences of learning. "Who shall not be thrown into an attitude of disgust and dismay," asks the Muṇḍaka Upanishad, "when he considers how the worlds to which the works of a man carry him are fraught with evil? Who shall not thus go to seek spiritual wisdom, *samidhs* in hand, to a Guru who has been well-known as a great spiritual teacher, and who has been conversant in all the learning with which he might fence round his mystical experience (I. ii. 12)?" But the Muṇḍakopanishad tells us further that such a spiritual teacher would impart spiritual wisdom to a disciple only when he finds that the mind of the disciple is calm and composed (I. ii. 13), and when he is likely to make conquest of the spiritual world by great mental strength, by an undeviating pursuit of the spiritual path, and by a severe life of penance (III. ii. 4). Efficacy of the contemplation on the "Om" is advocated at this stage, and the spiritual disciple is directed to move onward to Reality by the help of the Om. "Verily is the Praṇava or the Om like the bow, and the Soul like an arrow, which is discharged at the target of Brahman, by the undistracted efforts of the disciple, so that the arrow finally becomes one with the target (II. ii. 4)." One of the important contributions of the Muṇḍaka to the philosophy of Yoga

consists in the fact that it tells us that this arrow must be whetted by devotion (II. ii. 3); it is only then that it becomes sharp-pointed and is able to pierce the target so as to become one with it. But the identification of subject and object in a mystical experience cannot take place without the attainment of a moral status. God is to be reached, says the Muṇḍaka (III. i. 5), only by truth and by hard austerity, by right knowledge and a life of celibacy. It is to be noticed with what insistence the Muṇḍaka enlarges upon the efficacy of Truth in the spiritual life. "Truth alone succeeds not false-hood ;* for by truth is paved the path of the gods, following which the sages have had all their desires fulfilled, and have been able to reach where exists the highest Treasure of Truth (III. i. 6)." We are also told that nobody would be able to enjoy the "unitive life" unless the mind is first purged of its impurities by the control of Prāṇa or breath, and it is only when it is so purged that the Soul shines forth in his native lustre (III. i. 9). Nor can the aspiring devotee ever hope to reach God unless God chooses to reveal himself to him (III. ii. 3). The faculty by which one is able to reach God is, however, described in the Muṇḍaka (III. i. 8) as being not sense-vision but Vijñāna, a higher faculty of intuition (II. ii. 7), which is brought into being when the whole inner man is purified by the light of knowledge (III. i. 8). Then the mystic sees God as a white lustrous light within his body (III. i. 5 and II. ii. 9), a light which far transcends in power the so-called luminous bodies, being their fount and source (II. ii. 10). The Muṇḍaka also otherwise describes the God whom the mystic sees as the golden-coloured God (III. i. 3), or even as the spotless Light of lights set in a disk of gold (II. ii. 9). The mystic who has thus realised God finds Him everywhere—before and behind, to the right and to the left, above and below—and in such full possession of God he looks upon the world, in the Leibnitzian spirit, as the best of all possible worlds (II. ii. 11). In other words, he finds a mystical justification for the philosophical principle of sufficient reason. He who had so long grieved at his impotence which was due to his separation from the Universal Spirit,—when he

* Another translation would be : He acquires truth and not untruth, etc.

has entered into communion with God, becomes now full of power. All his desires are fulfilled, possibly because he has left in himself no desires to fulfil when he has once obtained the Self (III. ii. 2). Not for any smaller reason is it, says the author of the Muṇḍaka, that people resort to a man who has entered God-communion; for, is it not in the hands of such a mystic who has communed with God to bestow upon anybody the fulfilment of any of his desires (III. i. 10)? The knots of the heart of the mystic are now broken and his doubts finally resolved (II. ii. 8). He has an actual experience of the reconciliation of apparent contradictions. God is to him both great and small, distant and near: and is it not most wonderful that He whom he had been so long seeking outside he ultimately finds within himself (III. i. 7)? There is no reason why he should any longer waste his words; like the truly "magnanimous" man he plays with God, enjoys God, and reaches the highest place in the galaxy of those who have realised the Godhead (III. i. 4).

36. DOCTRINE OF LIBERATION.—We have pointed out in our discussion of the Kaṭhopanishad that the question of liberation is not far removed from the question of God-vision to the Upanishadic seers. Granted that the mystic, by a severe one-pointed contemplative life, is able to reach divinity even while he lives, the question arises what happens to the soul of the mystic when it has once departed this life, as well as to the soul of a man who has not led the life of a mystic but only a life of good works. The answers which the Muṇḍaka gives to the question are, as we have pointed out, so variegated and diverse that it seems almost impossible to educe any constructive doctrine out of them. It is at least important to remember that the Muṇḍaka exhausts almost all the opinions that could be logically advanced on this head. In the first place, a passage like Muṇḍaka III. ii. 6 teaches the doctrine of Kramamukti, inasmuch as it tells us that the good souls are finally liberated in the Brahmaloka, to which they have attained by a life of steady philosophical learning and a practical life of renunciation. Then again, we have in Muṇḍaka I. ii. 5, 11 a suggestion of the approach to God through the door-way of the Sun. Differ-

ent again from either of these conceptions is the conception of the "assimilation" (*paramaṁ sāmyam*) of the mystic's Soul with God, after the death of the human body as even during life (III. i. 3). It is this description of the state of God-assimilation which has been mainly relied upon by the philosophers of the qualified-monistic school. Yet a fourth conception of immortality occurs in Muṇḍaka III. ii. 8, where we are told that just as the rivers flowing to the ocean are finally merged in it and lose their name and form, similarly does the Soul which has realised God lose all name and form and become merged in the Highest Person. This is a sort of personal-impersonal immortality, inasmuch as we are told that the souls that are merged in the final Being enjoy a kind of formless immortality, while yet the Being in which they are merged is described as the Person who receives into himself all the Souls that come unto Him. Finally, we have in the Muṇḍaka the conception of a right impersonal immortality almost in the spirit of the poet who tells us that the liberated souls enter the All which is present everywhere (III. ii. 5), and become unified, along with their works, in the imperishable mass of the Absolute (III. ii. 7).

CHAPTER EIGHTH

A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF UPANISHADIC TEXTS

xx—THE PRAŚNA UPANISHAD.

1. THE PHILOSOPHY OF PIPPALĀDA.—The Praśna Upanishad contains the essence of the philosophical doctrines of sage Pippalāda. The questions that are asked of the sage vary from the mere cosmological question of creation and the physio-psychological questions about the vital principle and its essential nature, to a psychological discussion of the conditions of sleep, wakefulness and dream; then through the question of the ritualistico-eschatological significance of the meditation on 'Om,' to, finally, a metaphysical determination of the nature of the supreme immortal Person. We thus see that the questions vary from topic to topic, and the range covered by them may be said to constitute the very essence of the philosophical teachings of Pippalāda. The Praśnopanishad is one of the few Upanishads which in their present shape form a complete philosophical unity in themselves; and as the sage Yājñavalkya is the outstanding philosopher of the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad, so in this case, we can very well assert that the sage Pippalāda is the prominent philosopher of the Praśna Upanishad.

2. THE MATERIAL AND THE IN-FORMING PRINCIPLES.—The first interlocutor of sage Pippalāda is named Kabandhī Kātyāyana. Kabandhī Kātyāyana seems to be interested in the cosmological question of creation, and he accordingy asks the sage Pippalāda his opinion as to the manner in which he thought all the creatures in this world were born. Pippalāda answers these questions by saying that the Lord of Creation existed presumably from eternity prior to the cosmogonical act; became desirous of

The dark half of the month constitutes the material principle; the bright half of the month the in-forming one. The night constitutes the material principle, while the day constitutes the in-forming principle. The last illustration of Pippalāda is Retas, which may be taken to signify both the menstrual blood of the mother as well as the semen of the father, which between them are the causes of all organic creation. It is interesting to note here how physiological considerations jostle with mere mythological conceptions for the purpose of affording an explanation of the diversified creation in the universe. But we cannot forbear saying that the naïveté with which Pippalāda states them is very remarkable.

3. THE SUPREMACY OF PRĀṆA.—The second interlocutor of the sage Pippalāda was Bhārgava Vaidarbhi. He merely continues the thread of argument suggested to him by the question of his predecessor, and he, therefore, asks Pippalāda the following question: When all the beings in the world have been created, what elements hold them *full* and which was the highest of them all? Pippalāda answers that the beings, after having been created, are upheld by the five physical elements: ether, wind, fire, water, and earth; and that they are in-formed by the five physio-psychological entities: namely, speech, mind, eye, ear, and breath. To the question, which of these was the most supreme, Pippalāda gives answer that the vital breath (Prāṇa) is the most supreme of them all. When the vital breath departs, the other entities depart likewise, and when the vital breath enters, the entities enter also; just as when the queen-bee goes out of the hive, all the remaining bees follow suit, and when she enters, the other bees enter also. This is as much as to establish the supremacy of the vital breath in all the organic beings. Then follows a henotheistic praise of Prāṇa by the other physio-psychical existences, which suffer comparative discomfiture at the establishment of the supremacy of Prāṇa. The vital breath is praised in Vedic fashion as being identical with the God of Fire and the God of Light, the God of Rain and the God of Wind, as well as with the Gods Indra and Rudra. The Prāṇa is likewise praised as having been the centre of all existence. As spokes are fixed in the nave of a wheel, so

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are all beings fixed in Prāṇa. The Prāṇa is again praised as being the Prometheus amongst Indian Gods and as the best carrier of oblations to the Gods, and offerings to the Fathers. Finally, the Prāṇa is praised as in-dwelling in speech and ear and eye and mind, and is called upon in a supplicating tone not to leave the organic body: "Everything that exists in the three heavens is controlled by the Prāṇa; protect us as a mother protects her sons, and give us wealth and intellect." This part of his philosophy does not seem to be original in Pippalāda. It is the current coin of all Vedic and Upanishadic literature. It was not so, however, with the previous discussion about the material and the in-forming principles, which seems to be an important contribution of Pippalāda to the history of thought, the interrelation between the two Praśnas treating of this doctrine being furnished by the circumstance that Prāṇa is alike the in-forming principle of the outer world and the regulating principle of the inner or psychic world.

4. THE ORIGIN, ENTRY, AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE PRĀṆA.—Kausalya Āśvalāyana carries on the question which his predecessor Bhārgava Vaidarbhi had asked before him, and the answers which the sage Pippalāda gives to his queries are very interesting to note, inasmuch as they give us an amount of information about the Prāṇa. In the first place, Pippalāda tells us that Prāṇa is born from the Self, and is spread out over the Self like a shadow. This is possibly what the modern occult terminology calles the "etheric double." Secondly, that the Prāṇa enters the body at all, says Pippalāda, is the work of the mind* which so compels the Prāṇa to enter the body. In fact, were it not for the mind, the Prāṇa would never have entered the body. The meaning of this assertion is that it is the mental vehicle which causes the phenomenon of physical birth. The most important part of Pippalāda's teaching concerning Prāṇa, however, discusses the way in which the Prāṇa allocates, in the manner of a Sovereign King, functions to the other entities within and without, thus bringing to our notice once more the analogy of the microcosm with the macrocosm.

* Reading *mano'dhikṛitena*; with the reading *mano'kṛitena* the sense would be that breathing is an involuntary function.

There is a five-fold distribution of the vital breath in the human body, as well as in the cosmic body. In the human body, the vital breath as Prāṇa is situated in the mouth and the nose, in the eye and the ear; as Apāna, it governs the processes of excretion and generation; as Samāna, it is situated in the middle of the body. as Vyāna it moves in the innumerable arteries of the body issuing out from the heart, the seat of the Ātman; as Udāna it moves upward carrying the doer of good actions to a good world, and the doer of bad actions to a bad world, and the doer of good as well as bad actions to the world of men. In the cosmic body, the vital breath as Prāṇa rises as the celestial sun; as Apāna, it abides like the earth; as Samāna, it is the ether dwelling in the mid-region between the heaven and the earth; as Vyāna, it appears as the air in the sky; and as Udāna, it presents itself in the form of light. It is in this way that the five-fold distribution of the vital breath in the human body enables the sage Pippalāda to portray for us an interesting description of the analogy of the microcosm and the macrocosm, the point of special importance being the fact that while Prajāpati, the source of the cosmic Prāṇa, pervades the outer world, it is Ātman, the source of the Psychic Prāṇa (iii. 3), that dwells within the heart (iii. 6).

5. AN ANALYSIS OF SLEEP AND DREAM CONSCIOUSNESS.—The question of Sauryāyaṇī Gārgya takes us to another province not entirely unconnected with the preceding in that it leads to an eventual identification between the Ātman within and the Ātman without. Sauryāyaṇī Gārgya asks Pippalāda to instruct him as to what happens in the conditions of sleep and dream, as contrasted with that of wakefulness. The analysis which the sage makes of the states of sleep and dream is as follows: In the condition of sleep all the senses are gathered up in the mind, just as the rays of the setting sun are gathered up in the descending disk of light. This is as much as to say that the senses become entirely inactive but consciousness as consciousness alone remains. "Therefore, at that time," says Pippalāda, "man does not hear, nor see, nor smell, nor taste, nor touch, nor speak; he neither apprehends anything, nor seeks enjoyment. He does not excrete, nor does he move about.

They say of him that he is fast asleep." But when the senses have been gathered up in the mind, and the mind alone seems to be present, though neither conscious of objects nor even conscious of its own self, then "the fires of the Prāṇas alone are awake in that citadel of the human body, carrying the sacrificer, viz. the mind, every day to Brahman." It is in such a condition of deep-sleep, says Pippalāda, that the mind enjoys great happiness. When, in the condition of deep-sleep, the "light of the mind is overpowered by the light of the Self, there are no dreams, and a great bliss arises in the body." "As birds go to a tree to roost, similarly do all these things rest in the Highest Ātman. The earth and its subtle portions, the water and its subtle portions, the light and its subtle portions, the air and its subtle portions, the ether and its subtle portions—together with the sense and the objects of vision, the sense and the objects of audition, the sense and the objects of smell, the sense and the objects of taste, and the sense and the objects of touch—together also with all the senses and objects of motion, as well as thought and intellect: all these seek rest in the Highest Brahman." And as we have seen elsewhere in Upanishadic philosophy, Pippalāda also teaches that the mind in the condition of deep-sleep is merged in the Supreme Person whose essence is knowledge, and therefore it enjoys the life unitive. It is to be greatly doubted, as we have pointed out elsewhere (p.236), whether it is possible for the mind to become united with the Self in the condition of deep-sleep, as the sage Pippalāda puts it. There is a great difference between an unconscious mergence, if mergence it could be called at all, and a conscious unification. The condition of deep-sleep and the happiness that arises in that state are merely "analogous" to the condition of ecstacy and the great happiness that arises therein, and must in no case be taken as identifiable with them. But Pippalāda is merely echoing the traditions of Upanishadic thought when he says that the mind in deep-sleep is united with the Highest Self. If it were so, there would be no necessity for all those processes of meditation and contemplation to seek "sabbath" in Brahman.—Pippalāda, in the next place, proceeds to offer an analysis of the state of dream. "In this state," says Pippalāda,

"what man has seen, he sees again; what he has heard, he hears again; what he has enjoyed in different countries and quarters he enjoys again. Nay, he also experiences what he has seen-and-not-seen; what he has heard-and-not-heard; and what he has enjoyed-and-not-enjoyed." The reason why he is able to experience all these things, is because "he becomes the All." There are three points to be noticed in this analysis of dream-conciousness. Man experiences in dreams not merely what has already come, while in a wakeful state, within the ken of his experience by the door-way of sense, but he also experiences what he may not have experienced, the reason being that the faculty of imagination is fully awake in the condition of dream, and it calls forth, as out of the grave, not merely things which have been experienced, but things which may not have been experienced at all. As has been elsewhere put by another Upanishadic philosopher (page 205, above), man sees chariots and horses and roads and lakes and pools of water and all the other objects of experience in the state of dream, just because there is an infinite capacity within the Self to spin everything out of its bare existence that might possibly become an object of experience in the condition of dream. The mind of man in that dreaming state has a free play, and his imagination "bodies forth the forms of things unknown, and gives to airy nothing a local habitation and a name."

6. THE EFFICACY OF MEDITATION ON "OM." — The unification of the Individual and the Supreme Soul presupposes a period of intervening penance and meditation; and accordingly, the question of Śaibya Satyakāma discusses the efficacy of the meditation on "Om" as the symbol of the Godhead. What happens, asks Śaibya Satyakāma, if a man meditates on the symbol "Om" till the time of his death? What world is he able to gain thereby? Pippalāda's answer is that if a man meditates on the first *mātrā* of the symbol "Om" he is taken over by the Ṛik verses to the world of men; and being endowed there with the capacity of performing acts of penance, abstinence, and faith, he enjoys greatness on earth. If, again, a man meditates on two *mātrās*, he is taken over by the Yajus verses to the world of the moon; and having enjoyed great-

ness in the world of the moon, he returns again to the earth. Finally, if a man meditates on all the three *mātrās* of the symbol "Om," he is taken over by the Sāman verses to the world of the sun; and as a snake may be freed from its slough, so he is freed from all evil. There he learns from Hiraṇyagarbha—"the central repose of all Individual Souls"—how to perceive the highest, all-pervading Person who enjoys eternal peace, who is free from decay and death, and residence in whom carries one entirely beyond the reach of fear. It follows that man ought to meditate on this syllable "Om" till the time of his death in the hope that by meditation on a single *mātrā* he might return to the earth and enjoy greatness; by meditation on two *mātrās* he might repair to the world of the moon, and then come back in greatness and glory to the earth; and again by meditation on all the three *mātrās* he might go to the world of the sun, from whence there is no return. Such is the teaching of Pippalāda on the subject of the efficacy of the meditation on the symbol "Om."

7. THE PERSON WITH THE SIXTEEN PARTS.—The culminating point of the discourse is attained in the question which Sukeśin Bhāradvāja proceeds to ask. It concerns itself with the determination of the nature of the "Person with the sixteen parts"—a question mooted often enough and differently answered in the several texts. But Pippalāda's analysis of the conception of the Person with the sixteen parts is a very curious combination of all manner of physical, psychological, moral, ritualistic, and cosmological categories. The Person with sixteen parts, according to the sage Pippalāda, is compounded out of the physical categories such as those of ether, air, water, light, and earth; of psychological categories such as senses, mind, Prāṇa, and vigour; of moral categories such as faith, and penance; of the cosmological category of the worlds; and of ritualistic categories such as hymns, sacrifice, and the name. It is out of such a strange blend of all these disparate and *prima facie* incompatible categories that the conception of the "Person with the sixteen parts" comes to be formed. And the psychological value of this conception lies not in the actual analysis which Pippalāda gives, but in the suggestion which he

offers for the construction of the personality of man out of a fusion of various cosmo-psycho-physiological elements, to be later seen in the full-fledged Sāṁkhya philosophy. The metaphysical importance of Pippalāda's conception of the "Person with the sixteen parts" lies in the fact that he regards this Person as reaching the ocean of the infinite light of the Godhead and losing himself in Him like a river into the waters of the ocean. When a river thus merges itself into the Lord of the waters, its very form and name suffer annihilation; so is it likewise with the Individual Spirit, whose very name and form are annihilated, shattered like a reed, lost like a river into the infinite, yawning ocean of Universal Spirit, and who verily becomes immortal. This seems to be the inner meaning of the teaching of Pippalāda on the subject of the absorption and the annihilation of the Individual Spirit in the Life Eternal.

xxi—ĀRSHEYA UPANISHAD.

8. VIŚVĀMITRA'S DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN.—Once upon a time the sages maintained a discourse amongst themselves setting each other riddles. Amongst them Viśvāmitra, deeming himself pre-eminent, said: "That which is between the Earth and Heaven, and pervades everything and passes the ken of our vision, that which —like the Ākāśa—is this way and that, and also where it thunders and glitters and throbs,—that is Brahman. This is its further description: Were they to burn it with the fires, drown it into the waters, tie it up with fetters, secure it with leather straps, strike it with iron hammers, pierce it with needles, infix it with pegs, torment it with leg-fasteners, plaster it up with clay, chisel it with axes, or plough it with plough-shares: they would not be able to do so. We have no power over it, we cannot transcend it."—To that would Jamadagni not assent. He considered it as deficient in that it was possible to flit through such a Brahman, it being just the horizon or the circum-edge of the Earth and Heaven. Said he: "It is merely the mid-region that thou hast ascertained as being thus and thus; but in it I see only the power of That Other which interpenetrates it. He then who knows this as being interpenetrated by That, and accordingly worships it, he comes in-close-bonds with this [world]; but he who worships it not know-

ing that it is interpenetrated by That, he comes by grief and suffers calamity."

9. JAMADAGNI'S DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN.—And to him Viśvāmitra asked: What then in your view is non-deficient? To him Jamadagni replied: "That which remains independent, so to say, of the Earth and the Heaven, which one can neither approach nor see nor pervade—that is Brahman. This is its further description: That Egg-shell wherein from one side to the other the luminaries rise up and fall not and do not drop down or falter or turn round: that which in no wise can beings see or attain by running up: that is Brahman. Some designate it as Water, others as Darkness, others as Light, others as Vacuum, others as the Highest Heaven, and others as Ātman."—To that would Bharadvāja not assent, thinking that what can at all be described as thus or thus by everybody, that can never be an adequate definition of Brahman. Said he: "Deficient is this your view; what we can describe in this and that manner we can attain. Thou art thus worshipping what is merely the power of that *other* Brahman which interpenetrates this. He therefore who knows this as being interpenetrated by That and so worships it, he becomes in-close-bonds with this, lives a full length of life and becomes more prosperous. But he who worships this not knowing that it is interpenetrated by That, he becomes more miserable, meets with calamity and dies."

10. BHARADVĀJA'S DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN.—And to him Jamadagni asked: What then in your view is non-deficient? Bharadvāja replied: "That Light which shines in this orb, incessantly throbbing, glittering, flaring, throwing brilliant shimmer, and suffusing everything: that is my Brahman. This is its further description: Even though indeed they were to attain beyond what is most high, still would they observe it in its fulness, uniform, as it really exists on a nearer view. But if one were to snatch at it by pouncing, at once there are throbbing-lights running forward, roaring, as though devouring: they cannot reach it. When near it looks far away; when far away it looks near: None can transcend its greatness."—To that would Gautama not assent, urging that it was deficient, was inert, in that it remained equally open to the view of those

who had false knowledge, e. g., these "Puṇḍras, and Suhmas, and Ūlumbhas(?), and Daradas, and Barbaras." But surely the Brahman ought to be such that the ignorant ones could not all at once attain to it. You are then merely worshipping what is only the greatness of that other Brahman which is within this as the "Golden Man, golden-hued, golden-bearded, resplendent upto the very nail-ends." "Whosoever worships him thus," said Gautama, "stands forth as pre-eminent amongst all the beings, lives a full length of life, and becomes more prosperous. This [sun] here does not rise without the behest of Him who is the Most High. Whoso thinks that he rises without the behest of the Most High and so worships him, he becomes more miserable, comes by grief, meets calamity. He on the other hand who knows the sun as rising after the behest of the Most High, and as such worships him, he attains the Highest Light and lives the full span of life, and becomes more prosperous—he who thus worships him."

11. GAUTAMA'S DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN.—To him Bharadvāja asked: What then in your view is non-deficient? And Gautama replied: "Here are these lightnings that seem to be quivering, seem to be licking, seem to be devouring; appearing most near when most distant and most distant when most near; were they to burn out much yet would one not obtain anything of them: that is my Brahman."—To that would Vasishṭha not assent, in that these lightning-streaks advance quivering, and they go astray and falsely all of a sudden, even as we notice them. "Nobody could attain to the Highest," said Vasishṭha, "through this entity which is equally open to even an ignorant person. The true Brahman must be sought not in the outer world, but *inside*. The lightning and the rest are accordingly the greatnesses of that inward Knowledge (vijñāna). He who in this manner considers the Outer as the greatness of the Inner, and worships it accordingly, he attains greatness, lives the full span of life, and becomes more prosperous. He on the other hand who worships the lightning-streaks and the rest as independent of the Most High, he does not rise superior, but becomes miserable, comes by grief, dies. But he who worships the Outer as springing from, and as ultimately merging within, the

Most High, he becomes himself Most High, lives his full period of life and becomes more prosperous."

12. VASISHṬHA'S DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN.—And to him Gautama asked: What then in your view is non-deficient? Replied Vasishṭha: "It is that which is of the nature of great Knowledge, leading on by steps to Determination; that in consequence of which they perceive things as thus and thus—this "thus-ness" and "that-ness" giving away, in the case of the Brahman, to the "not-so, not-so." He is that Ātman, infinite, un-ageing, and shore-less. Neither, Sirs, is it outward nor inward; knowing everything, luminous, devourer, all-spreading, possessed of inward light, enjoying everything, subdued of everything, master of everything, and in-dwelling everything: nothing can equal it."—

Him who is higher than the highest, the all-impeller,
Who pervades inwardly all these worlds,
The Fire whom the sons of Kuśika attained,
The Vaiśvānara, Off-spring of Law: Him to reach,

At each of our contests-for-gain, let us invoke
The most assailing warrior, Indra the gracious,
Who, for men's weal, overcometh all,
The much-invoked, all-knowing one, lauded in Ṛiks,

Him, the Dragon-killer, who abides in ocean,
And waxes mighty in his superb strength.

—And to this definition of Brahman as put forth by Vasishṭha all the others assented. They approached Vasishṭha and prostrated themselves before him.—Reverence to Agni! Reverence to Indra! Reverence to Prajāpati! Reverence to Brahman! Reverence to Brahman!

xxii—ŚVETĀŚVATARA UPANISHAD.

13. CRITICISM OF CONTEMPORARY DOCTRINES.—The first chapter of the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad opens with a celebrated inquiry into the nature of the First Principle, involving a mention of the various views on the point held by the current schools of philosophy.

It seems that the Śvetāśvatara was composed at a time when these different schools of philosophy existed ; and the aim of the Śvetāśvatara is to put forth its own constructive philosophy after a brief criticism of the above-mentioned views. In fact, we may say that the Śvetāśvataropanishad is one of the few Upanishads that offer a constructive philosophy through criticism. We shall find that the chief contribution of the Śvetāśvatara to the Upanishadic thought is the philosophy of the Īśvara, who is variously named in the Upanishad as Īśa, or Rudra, or Śiva. This theistic philosophy is arrived at after the criticism of a number of other views. In the very spirit of Greek Philosophy the inquiry is started by saying that the First Principle must be regarded as responsible for the origin and the existence of all things whatsoever (i. 1), and the object of investigation is to discover the nature of this First Principle. The various answers supplied to the query by the existing schools of thought are that the First Cause (Yoniḥ)* must be regarded as being either Time, or Nature, or Necessity, or Chance or the Elements, or the Purusha, or the Combination of all these, or the Ātman. The significance, for the Post-Upanishadic period of thought-ferment, of some of these categories will be discussed in the last chapter of this volume; but it is necessary to point out here what may probably have been meant by these different categories. The origins of the doctrine of Time as the source of all things can be traced back to the days of the Atharva-Veda, and it seems as if, after its postulation as a First Principle in the Śvetāśvatara, Time came also to be elevated to the same rank even in the Mahābhārata and in texts like Shashṭi-tantra. The doctrine of Nature as the First Principle probably makes reference to certain fore-runners of Jaiṇ and Buddhistic thought. The full implications of Nature as the ἀρχή of things may be brought out, as later, when an inquiry was set afoot as to what it was that gave pointedness to the thorns, and variegated colours to woods and

* It does not seem likely that the word Yoniḥ mentioned in i. 2 can be regarded as a separate First Principle on a level with the other First Principles, as has been done by certain commentators, who equate it with either the Māyā of the Vedāntins, or the Śakti of the Śākta school of philosophy.

birds. As against this naturalistic way of looking at things we can assert the later theistic manner of regarding the white colour of the swan, and the green colour of the parrot, and the variegated colour of the peacocks, as due not to Nature working independently, but to Nature as supervised by God. The next principles enumerated, namely those of Necessity and Chance, are familiar enough to every close student of Greek Philosophy. There is a great deal of difference between Necessity and Chance, as Aristotle pointed out. Things that happen by Necessity happen as if by predetermination. As to whether this predetermination is personal or impersonal, we are not much concerned here to discuss. But that things happen as if by predetermination or fate or destiny is a doctrine famous outside the pale of Indian thought as in it. On the other hand, Chance occurs when one cannot adequately account for some happening the cause of which is being sought. In the case of Necessity we could at least assign a reason in predestination : in the case of Chance it is not possible to assign any reason at all. The doctrine of Chance is most excellently illustrated in all cases of accident with which everybody is familiar. As to whether we cannot assign any reason for this accident itself, in other words, whether accident itself may not, with a deeper knowledge of facts, be accounted for rationally, we may not discuss in this place. But it is evident that, at the time of the Śvetāśvatara, Chance was so severed from the doctrine of Necessity as to form a different principle altogether. The next doctrine enumerated regards the Elements as the ἀρχή of all things. This is almost in the spirit of the great line of Greek philosophers from Thales downwards to Empedocles, some regarding the earth, others water, others air, others fire, and others a combination of these, and yet others who would add to these four elements a fifth which has its parallel in the Indian "Ākāśa."—All these elements may be looked upon from the point of view of naturalistic philosophy as constituting the origin and source of all things. We have had occasion to witness in our discussion of the earlier Upanishads how these various doctrines were advocated by different philosophers even in Upanishadic times, and how it would be better to understand these

different Elements in their natural sense, than to interpret them as equivalent to Brahman, as has been attempted by the author of the Vedānta-Sūtras in the first or the "Samanvaya" chapter of that compendium. We next proceed to the consideration of Purusha regarded as the First Principle. What is meant by Purusha as understood by the author of the first chapter of the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad? Context makes it clear that this Purusha is the same as the Ātman referred to in the last pādas of stanzas 2 and 3. Can we then understand the Purusha as Vijñānātman, or Hiraṇyagarbha, or Manas, in conformity with the various commentators? It seems to us probable that the Purusha as here understood does not mean any of these things, and that there is nothing to prevent us from understanding it as equivalent to the "Person" of the Sāṁkhya philosophy as that philosophy was understood in those days.* On the other hand, the Combination of all the various First Principles afore-mentioned (excluding thereform the Purusha howsoever interpreted), says the author of the Śvetāśvataropanishad, cannot be regarded as a different First Principle altogether, for a combination of these things is only a soul-less existence.† There is nothing personal to back up the idea of a mere Combination of Elements. Nor can the Ātman (=Purusha), says the author of the Śvetāśvataropanishad, be regarded as the First Principle, inasmuch as he is not the Īśa (an-Īśa) or the Lord of all these things, and also because the Ātman is the cause of, that is, is liable to, both happiness and misery. According to the Śvetāśvataropanishad (i. 8 and 10), we ought to postulate Īśa, or Śiva, or the Deva as the First Principle, and it seems likely that the Upanishad is in this view voicing a reaction against the doctrines of Time, or Nature, or Necessity,

* We are told that the Maulika-Sāṁkhyas believed in the existence of a distinct Pradhāna for each Purusha. Logically then the system must originally have been idealistic, exhibiting at the same time several points of contact with the Vedāntic equation of I = Brahman = universe.

† Other possible interpretations of the puzzling phrase *na tvātmabhāvāt* (emended to *anātmabhāvāt* by Max Müller) are: because the combination cannot take place by itself (ātmanā); or, because the things to be combined are each an Ātman, an independent existence, not amenable to working in subordination.

or Chance, or the Elements, or the Purusha of the primitive or idealistic Sāṁkhyas, as well as against the impersonalistic doctrine of the Combination of these Principles. It seems, in other words, as if the Śvetāśvataropanishad pits up a philosophy of Śaivite theism against all Naturalism, and even against the Sāṁkhya and Vedāntic doctrines of philosophy, although, in this last respect, its attack seems to be directed rather against the extreme pantheism of the school.

14. THE DOCTRINE OF TRIUNE UNITY IN ŚVETĀŚVATARA.—The remaining part of the first chapter of the Śvetāśvatara may be said, on the whole, to advocate a doctrine of Triune Unity. We are not much concerned here with the numerical puzzles in i. 4 and i. 5. They perhaps indicate the tendency of the philosophical speculation of the day to express itself in numbered categories—a tendency which is best illustrated in the Sāṁkhya, and later, in the Jain and the Buddhistic philosophies. The metaphors of the wheel and the river seem to be merely allegorical representations of psychometaphysical conceptions. But the point of greatest importance in the remaining part of this chapter is the almost synthetic unity which it tries to bring about between two opposite premises of thought, which are supposed to be annulled and reconciled into a higher unity. The perishable and the imperishable, the manifest and the unmanifest (i. 8), the knowing and the not-knowing, the powerful and the powerless, the enjoyer and the enjoyed (i. 9), and ignorance and knowledge (v. 1) are all synthesized into the higher unity of Īśa (i. 8) and of the single Godhead (i. 10) ; while i. 12 proclaims the Triune Unity of the enjoyer, the enjoyed, and the mover. Reality, according to this verse, is three-fold, almost of the nature of a " a Tripod," whose three different constituents are as essential to the whole as the whole is essential to the parts. This is verily the Trinitarian Monism of the qualified-monistic school. But the philosopher of this adhyāya does not stand satisfied merely with having advanced this intellectual conception of Reality. He is a mystic as well. "In this Brahman-wheel," he tells us, " the Individual Soul flutters about like a bird so long as he thinks that he is different from the Mover ; but

when he is conjoined with his Lord, he becomes immortal (i. 6)." In fact, so long as he is not thus conjoined, he labours under the weight of the fetters of existence—the "pāśas" (i. 11), which probably link this chapter of the Upanishad with the Rudraism of the other chapters. In i. 14 and i. 15 (which put us in mind of later as well as earlier Upanishads) we are told how the body must be regarded as the Underwood and Om as the Upperwood, which are being rubbed together in the process of mystic meditation. One is then able to perceive God (i. 14), who remains "like oil in seeds, or butter in curds, or water in river-beds, or fire in wood (i. 15)." It is probably this process of contemplation which brings about the union between the Individual and Universal Souls, and which also forms another connecting link between the first and the second chapters of our Upanishad.

15. YOGA DOCTRINE IN THE ŚVETĀŚVATARA.—The second chapter (if we omit its first seven verses which have been bodily taken over from various Saṁhitās) contains a classical description of the method of practising Yoga, as also of the physiological and mystical results reached by the process of Yoga. The beginner in Yoga is advised here to hold his body with its three erect parts—the chest, the neck, and the head—quite even, and pen up his senses along with the mind into the heart, in order that by the help of the boat of Brahman, he may be able to cross all the fearful streams of existence (ii. 8). Compressing his breaths and subduing his motions, the novice in Yoga should breathe out by the nose the breath when it has been utterly exhausted, and thus control his mind, which is verily like a chariot yoked with wild horses (ii. 9). The beginner in Yoga is also advised to sit on an even and pure seat, in a place which is free from pebbles, fire, and sand, and which is delightful to the mind on account of its sounds, its watery places, its shelters and caves (ii. 10). This is the description of the preparatory stages of Yoga. We are next told how, while this Yoga is being rightly performed, some "forms" present themselves initially to the vision of the mystic, testifying to his progress in Brahma-knowledge, such as, the mist, the smoke, the sun, the fire, the wind, the fire-flies, the lightning, the crystal, and the

moon (ii. 11). While the spiritual side of the beginner in Yoga is being thus advanced, physically he begins to be gradually free from illness, old-age, and death; for verily, we are told, he obtains a body full of the fire of Yoga (ii. 12). Such a man also begins to feel his body quite light and healthy and firm; a good colour comes over his complexion, and his pronunciation becomes quite clear; and he has a sweet odour and slight excretions (ii. 13). Finally, we are told how the height of the spiritual experience is reached when the mystic is able to realise his inner Self "like a lustrous image in a mirror which has been entirely cleaned of its impurities (ii. 14)." The mystic now sees as by a lamp the true nature of Brahman, the unborn, and the real, which is beyond all existences: thus he is enabled to free himself from the fetters (pāśas) which had so long enchained him to the world (ii. 15).

16. ŚAIVISM IN THE ŚVETĀŚVATARA.—The reference to the Pāśas in the previous adhyāya may be regarded as the connecting link between the Yoga philosophy of the second and the Śaivism of the third and fourth adhyāyas of this Upanishad. It is true that even the fifth adhyāya contains references to the "pāśas" (v. 13), to the net (v. 3), and to god Śiva (v. 14); but this does not forbid us from supposing that the third and the fourth chapters primarily constitute the *locus classicus* of the Śaivaite doctrine in the Śvetāśvatara. The description of Śiva given in the third and the fourth chapters is so much suffused by quotations from the Saṁhitās and other Upanishads that it is almost impossible to decide what is original and what is borrowed in these two chapters, excepting of course the doctrine of Śiva itself, which is the peculiar contribution of these chapters. Rudra is described here as holding his powers or nets in his hand, and thus creating, preserving, and destroying the world (iii. 2). It is from him that the Hiraṇyagarbha was first born (iii. 4 and iv. 12). He has his eyes and his face, his arms and his feet, everywhere. He is credited with having created the heaven and the earth (iii. 3). The whole universe is regarded as having been filled by that "Person" who is described as standing motionless like a tree in the sky (iii. 9). By a parody of the Kaṭhopanishad (I. ii. 20), the author of the Śvetāśvatara tells us that

he has himself known this Person of sun-like lustre who is beyond all darkness (iii. 8), undecaying and omnipresent (iii. 21). The Śaivism of these two chapters is so fused with Vedāntism, that the author of the two chapters, whoever he may be have been, has no difficulty in pressing the Māyā of the Vedāntins into his service and calling his God a Māyin (iv. 9, iv. 10) ; but in any case, the God must be regarded as Īśāna (iv. 11), and thus be made identical with Śiva. There can be no " likeness " (pratimā) of Him, we are told, whose name is Great Glory (iv. 19)—a verse which has been cited in recent times as condemnatory of image-worship. The text goes on to say that originally Śiva alone existed when there was neither darkness nor day nor night, when there was neither existence nor non-existence (iv. 18) ; and it is in this way that the Śaivism of the Śvetāsvatara becomes all-to pantheistic with stress on the " Theos."

17. SĀṂKHYA DOCTRINE IN THE ŚVETĀŚVATARA.—The Śaivism of the Śvetāśvatara blinks not merely towards pantheism on the one hand, but also towards the archetypal Sāṁkhya on the other. In fact, the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad is an excellent illustration of the way in which the inchoate Sāṁkhya was at the time gradually shaping itself more and more into a regular system. This Sāṁkhya doctrine is, equally with the Yoga doctrine, pre-Buddhistic ; and it is to be noted that though a reference has been made to Sāṁkhya and Yoga by name in our Upanishad (vi. 13), still we are not to understand by them the developed systems, but the systems in embryo. The Sāṁkhya of this period had not yet clearly lost its moorings in a philosophy of God, and was, like Śaivism, still suffused with several Vedāntic ideas. We have already seen that the Muṇḍaka Upanishad (III. i. 1) makes an ideological advance over the Kaṭhopanishad (I. iii. 1) in fixing the responsibility of the enjoyment of the fruits of action on the Individual Soul, while it cleanly shifts the burden from off the Universal Soul, who is described as merely a "looker-on." The Śvetāśvatara makes a still greater advance over the Muṇḍaka inasmuch as it combines with the image of the two " birds " of the Muṇḍakopanishad, the image of the " two he-goats " (iv. 5). We are told how, while the one he-

goat loves and lies by the she-goat who is red, white, and black, and who is the cause of all the manifold off-springs similar in nature to herself, the other he-goat leaves her after having partaken of her enjoyment. This celebrated image of the two he-goats, one loving and lying by the she-goat, and the other abandoning her, has remained for a long time a bone of contention between the Sāṁkhya and the Vedāntic commentators. If we rid our mind of all prepossessions and prejudices, there is no mistaking of the fact that while by the she-goat, who is described as red, white, and black, is evidently meant the coloured Prakṛiti of the Sāṁkhyas, by the two he-goats are meant the two kinds of souls (one still in the enjoyment of the Prakṛiti and the other who has had his fill of her enjoyments) described in the fashion of the Vedānta. A clearer illustration still of the way in which the Śvetāśvatara advocates an inchoate Sāṁkhya not inconsistent with the spirit of the Vedānta, might be found in v. 5, where we are told how God still rules Nature (Svabhāva), and how the evolutionary process (Pariṇāma) takes place under His direct guidance, and how the qualities (Guṇas) are distributed in their proper places. Other Sāṁkhya terms used in the Upanishad are Vyakta and Avyakta (i. 8), and Pradhāna (i. 10, vi. 16). Nor must we forget to discuss the significance of the term "Kapila" employed in v. 2, and see whether by it is meant the sage Kapila the founder of the Sāṁkhya, as the Sāṁkhya interpreters have understood it, or merely the red-coloured Being as the Vedāntic interpreters have urged. When we remember that we have so much of Sāṁkhya philosophy in the Śvetāśvatara, it is not unlikely that in the employment of the term Kapila, the author had, at least indirectly and at the back of his mind, the Sage who was the founder of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. On the other hand, a right textual interpretation of the verse in question makes it almost impossible for us to understand by Kapila the Sage known by that name. The tawny-coloured Being of v. 2 who was engendered from the Primeval One and who was seen by him when born is quite an analogous idea with the Hiraṇyagarbha of iii. 4 and iv. 12, and the Brahman of vi. 18, which leaves for us no alternative to our understanding by Kapila

the Hiraṇyagarbha or Brahman, the Demiurge who was responsible for all later creation. The three Guṇas, as in iv. 5, can perhaps be regarded as the common property of both the Sāṁkhya and the Vedānta, the origin of the conception being traceable so far back as the Chhāndogya Upanishad (vi. 4). Nor had the Sāṁkhya yet laid special emphasis on the subjectivity of sense-perception, which was primarily responsible for the parting of the ways between the Sāṁkhya and the Vedānta. The doctrine of creation in the sense of evolution was mooted (v. 5), but its full implications had not yet been brought out. The psychology and the metaphysics of the Sāṁkhya were in the making and had not yet been sundered from those of the Vedānta as with a hatchet. It is for all these reasons that we may say that the Śvetāśvataropanishad, in which lie embedded the Sāṁkhya and the Vedāntic doctrines of cosmology, psychology and metaphysics side by side, is a very valuable Upanishad for a genetic study of the two great systems.

18. THEISM IN THE ŚVETĀŚVATARA.—We come finally to describe the theism of the Śvetāśvataropanishad, the *locus classicus* for which is its sixth chapter. The God who had been so long designated as Rudra or Śiva has now renounced his appellation, and we have the description of a nude unsectarian theism in the concluding chapter of the Upanishad. It is evident that the sixth chapter is related to the first as no other chapter is, seeing that it offers a constructive philosophy through the criticism of the various views of the First Principle mooted in the first chapter. The Nature which had been there described as the first principle is now declared to be the first principle of fools (vi. 1), like its compeer Time, whose claim for the same is equally set aside in vi. 2, 5, 16, where God is declared to be the "Time of Time (Kālakālaḥ)." The Elements are declared to be merely the dwelling house of the God (vi. 11), or as merely His handiwork (vi. 2). Moreover, the claims of the doctrine of the Combination of these principles as constituting the first principle is also set aside as being itself under the regulation of the Supreme Agent who is the cause of the Combination (vi. 5). In opposition to all these first principles, is now set forth boldly and clearly the claim of God as the alpha and the

omega of creation (vi. 3). The passage (vi. 1-12) wherein God's nature and greatness has been described is so classical that we might be pardoned if we transcribe it here *in extenso*—

> Some so-called wise men, being under a great philosophic delusion, regard Nature, and others Time, as the source of Being. They forget that it is the greatness of the Lord which causes "the wheel of the Brahman" to turn round. He is the only knower, the death of the Death (Kālakālaḥ), the possessor of all qualities and all wisdom. It is at His command that creation unfolds itself, namely, what people call earth, water, fire, air, and ether. ....He is the eternal source and the cause of accidental unions. He is beyond the past, the present, and the future ; and is verily regarded as without parts. That universal God, who is immanent in all these beings, should be meditated upon as dwelling in our mind also,....that God who is the Lord of all the Gods and the Deity of all the Deities, who is the supreme Master of all Masters and the adorable Ruler of the universe. There is no activity in Him, nor any organ. There is no equal of Him, nor any superior. The great force inherent in Him manifests itself alike in the form of knowledge and power. There is no master of Him in this world, nor any ruler, nor is there anything which we might regard as His sign. He is the only cause, the Lord of all those who possess organs of sense. There is no generator of Him, nor any guardian. ....He is the self-subsistent Mover of the unmoving manifold, who causes the one seed to sprout in infinite ways. It is only to those who regard this Universal Being as immanent in their own selves, that the eternal happiness belongs, and to none else.

There is scarcely any other passage in the whole realm of Upanishadic philosophy which sets forth as unmistakably as this a theistic, and yet an unsectarian, view of the Godhead. It is remarkable also how the concluding verse of the passage tells us that He who may be regarded as the cause of creation must at the same time be regarded as identical with the Self within. Not unless this identity is mystically realised shall any real happiness belong to the seeker after Divine Life. The God who shines outside the

mind does also shine in the light within the human Soul (vi. 18). Much rather might people seek to roll up the sky like a hide, than try to go to the end of misery without realising God (vi. 20). We do not know how far to regard this as an adumbration of the "Bhakti" school of thought as later formulated. It is probable that verse 23, which mentions the word Bhakti, may be a late interpolation, especially as it comes towards the end of the chapter. But ideas matter more than words, and the idea of an intuitive realisation of a personal God, which runs through the whole of the chapter, gives it a far greater significance for spiritual life than what a solitary word like Bhakti could ever help to do.

xxiii—THE MAITRĀYAṆĪ UPANISHAD.

19. THE PESSIMISM OF KING BṚIHADRATHA.—The Upanishad proper opens with the story of king Bṛihadratha, who, coming to understand the transitoriness of the body and the evanescence of worldly desires, grew indifferent to the world, and establishing his son in the sovereignty, went into the forest. There he practised a hard penance, standing with up-lifted arms, and gazing at the sun. At the end of a thousand days there came near him the adorable sage Śākāyanya, lustrous like a blazing fire without smoke. The sage asked the king to choose a boon, upon which the king requested the sage to instruct him in the knowledge of the true nature of the Self. The sage told him that it was a very difficult thing to have a knowledge about the Self, and therefore advised him to choose any pleasures he desired instead of the knowledge of the Self. The king replied that the pleasures were of no consequence whatsoever, considering the foul, unsubstantial nature of the body, which was nothing but a conglomeration of blood, bones, skin, flesh, mucus, ordure, and other dirty things; which was again subject to evil passions and delusion; and which was afflicted by separation from what is loved and union with what is not loved, as well as by hunger, thirst, grief, old-age, disease, and death. "We see," continued the king, "that all beings do ultimately perish; the shrubs and the trees grow and decay; flies, gnats and other insects die. The mighty warriors, the great kings and emperors have to pass away from this earth. Even demigods

like the Gandharvas, demons and sprites, ogres and ghosts, are all alike ultimately destroyed. What of these? Even the greatest of oceans dry, the loftiest of mountains crumble, the steadiest of stars fall down: the earth is submerged, and even the gods are displaced from their stations. Worldly pleasures merely involve a man in the cycles of birth and death." It was on account of all these things that the king insisted upon having the saving knowledge of the Self imparted to him, and requested the sage to free him from worldly existence where he was rotting like a frog in a waterless well. This moved the sage, who thereupon proceeded to explain to him the knowledge of the Self and the science of Brahman as it was delivered to him by the sage Maitri, as well as to the Vālakhilyas by Prajāpati Kratu.

20. DOCTRINE OF THE MOVER.—The first point in this teaching is a discussion of the approach to the Self from a consideration of the question as to what it is that inspires the body and moves it like a cart. There is no difficulty felt by the Upanishadic sages in positing a spiritual principle which is regarded as responsible for the motion of the body. In an almost Platonic fashion, the Self is described in this Upanishad as the mover of the unintelligent body, which he inspires and makes intelligent. The Self is here described as being like an "ascetic," above all qualities, though in the midst of them. "He is pure and holy, tranquil and firm, eternal and independent; he is unborn and undecaying; he is breathless, formless endless, and thought-less, and abides in his own greatness." This subtle, incomprehensible and invisible Self known as the Person, though thus indifferent and free from desires, is declared to dwell in the body without any previous volition, just as a man fast asleep wakes up involuntarily and as a matter of course. This part of Him which is absolutely intelligent is reflected in every person as the intelligence-mass, as the knower of the body, and as characterised by imagination, determination and self-conceit. The Self is also described as one who (in sleep) proceeds upwards from the gross to the subtle body, and who, though apparently modified by impressions and wandering in various directions, is in reality unmodified, and remains unmoved; he it is

who dispels darkness. "That supremely tranquil Self, rising out of this body, attains to the Supreme Light and appears in his own form." To illustrate how the Soul moves the body we are introduced at this stage to a cosmological story. We are told that in the beginning Prajāpati was all alone. He did not feel happy in his loneliness, and therefore meditating on himself he created numerous creatures. But he found them unintelligent and lifeless like a stone, and motionless like a post. He did not feel happy again and thought of entering inside them in order to infuse life into them. He became like air and tried to enter them, but could not. He divided himself five-fold and is therefore called the five Prāṇas, viz. Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Samāna and Udāna. Prāṇa is the breath that passes up, while Apāna is the breath that passes down—both being supported by the breath called Vyāna. The Samāna is the breath that distributes subtle material into each limb, and carries to the Apāna the coarsest material of food, while the Udāna is the breath which belches forth and swallows down what is eaten and drunk. "Between Prāṇa and Apāna the Self-resplendent One created heat. This heat is the Purusha and the Purusha is the fire within man which digests the food that is eaten." Prajāpati did not feel happy still, and thought of enjoying objects. Having pierced through the apertures of the senses he enjoyed the objects by means of the five perceptive organs. These perceptive organs constitute his reins, while the active organs are his horses; the body constitutes his chariot, the mind is his charioteer, his whip being the temperament. Driven by that whip the body goes round like a wheel driven by the potter. Thus is the body made intelligent by the Self who is the driver of it.

21. DOCTRINE OF THE ELEMENTAL SELF.—The doctrine of the Elemental Self or Bhūtātman forms the second approach to the problem of Reality. The Self, who inspires the body that is formed by the combination of the subtle and gross elements, is called the Elemental Self. He is thus subject to the tormentations of the body, which is again pessimistically described here as "arising from sexual intercourse, developing in the hell of the womb, and coming out from the urinary passage; and again, as being built up with bones,

bedaubed with flesh, thatched with skin, filled with ordure, urine, bile and other dirty impurities." He it is also who is overcome by the dark and passionate qualities, as also by the fruits of action. The doctrine of Karman is incidentally preached here, and we are told that, as of the waves of the great rivers, so of what has been already done, there is no turning back. The miserable condition of the Elemental Self is further brought home to our mind when it is declared to be like a "cripple, bound by the fetters of the fruits of good and evil; without freedom like one in prison; in a condition of great terror like one in the grasp of death; intoxicated with delusion as with liquor; rushing headlong like one possessed by an evil spirit; bitten by the objects of sense as by a great serpent; blinded by passion as by night; deluded by māyā as by sleight-of-hand; false like a dream; unsubstantial like the pith of banana-tree; changing its dress like an actor; falsely delighting the mind like a painted wall." The immortal Self is not affected by the transformation of Elemental Self. Being overcome by the qualities, the Elemental Self becomes confused and bewildered, and being attached to the objects of the senses, he remembers not the Highest Place, and sees not the Blessed Lord abiding within himself. Unstable, wavering, fickle, full of desires, and distracted, he comes to entertain the feelings of 'me' and 'mine,' and binds himself by his self, as a bird by a net. The only remedy for the freedom of the Elemental Self from his miseries lies in the attainment of the knowledge of his own true nature, or the real Self. This real Self, we are told, is "like a drop of water on a lotus leaf, unattached to the world and its objects. He is the Inner Person that causes the sense-organs to act, himself remaining unmoved. Overcome by the Inner Person and beaten by the qualities, the Elemental Self assumes different forms, as does a heated ball of iron when it is hammered. But the Person, like the fire in the heated ball of iron, undergoes no transformation though hammered by qualities, and remains unchanged. He it is who causes the manifold to go round and round, as does the potter his wheel." Therefore though the true Self appears to assume various bodily forms when overcome by the qualities and fruits of action—appears as an agent

and as changing—he is in reality not an agent, and is "unchanging, being very subtle, imperceptible, invisible, and unattached to anything. He is verily pure, stead-fast, unmoved, desireless, motionless, like a spectator, and abiding in himself."

22. HYMN TO THE SUPREME SOUL.—Having so far considered the nature of the Self from two different points of view we now pass on to the fifth chapter, which gives at the very outset Kautsāyana's hymn of praise to the Universal Soul, which deserves our attention as a sublime piece of poetry. The ideas in it are quite catholic and the feelings and the emotions it expresses are lofty and edifying. We may be allowed to quote it here in full as a hymn of pantheistic poetry.*—

" Thou art Brahmā, and verily Thou art Vishṇu.
Thou art Rudra. Thou art Prajāpati.
Thou art Agni, Varuṇa, and Vāyu,
Thou art Indra. Thou art the Moon.
Thou art food. Thou art Yama. Thou art the Earth.
Thou art All. Yes, Thou art the Unshaken-one !
For Nature's sake and for its own
Is existence manifold in Thee.
O Lord of all, hail unto Thee !
The Soul of all, causing all acts,
Enjoying all, all life art Thou !
Lord of all pleasure and delight !
Hail unto Thee, O tranquil Soul !
Yea, hail to Thee, most hidden one,
Unthinkable, unlimited,
Beginningless and endless too ! "

23. SOME COSMOLOGICAL THEORIES.—Next we may proceed to consider some cosmological theories advanced in this Upanishad. We are thus told in the fifth chapter that in the beginning of the world there was Darkness alone, and that it existed in the Supreme. Then, moved by the Supreme, it went on differentiating, and became Passion (Rajas). That Passion, in turn, when impelled by the Supreme, underwent a change and became Purity (Sattva).

* Hume's translation.

This Purity, when set in motion by the Supreme, flowed forth as Essence (Rasa). This is the part of the Self which is entirely intelligent and is reflected in man as the intelligence-mass, as Kshetrajña. There are to be found also two other cosmological theories in the sixth chapter of the Upanishad. According to the first theory the creation of the world is explained from Logos or Word. We are told that in the beginning this world was "unuttered." He (the Ātman or Brahman) who is Prajāpati performed penance and uttered Bhūr (earth), Bhuvas (atmosphere), and Svar (sky). This world-form is the coarsest body of Prajāpati and may be said to constitute his cosmic body. The sky is its head, the atmosphere its navel; the earth stands for its feet, the sun for the eye (vi. 6). Then again, we are told that in the beginning Brahman alone was the Limitless One, infinite in all directions, incomprehensible and unborn. Ether was His body, and from that ether verily He wakes up this world, which is only a mass of thought. It is brooded over by Him and in Him it disappears (vi. 17). These cosmological theories are curious specimens of how the world must be conceived as having come out of primeval Darkness, or must be understood as essentially of the nature of Word or Thought.

24. RITUALISTIC SPECULATIONS.—The sixth and seventh chapters of the Upanishad are very composite in their nature—all sorts of ritualistic, astronomical, metaphysical, ethical and mystical speculations being huddled up together to form the chapters. In respect of the ritualistic speculations we find that (i) there is a great deal of discussion in the Upanishad concerning the Sun as Brahman, and (ii) a very high importance is attached to the performance of sacrifices. (i) First, as to the description of the Sun, we notice that it is identified with God Savitṛi, who is invoked to inspire good thoughts in the devotee (vi. 7). The Person in the Sun is identified with the Self within man, who is bright, personal, sexless and immortal (vi. 35). The various metres, hymns, physical and physiological powers, gods, demigods, spirits and all creatures are declared to emanate as rays from the Sun, who is Brahman: they live, continue, and in the end enter, the Sun. The Person in the Sun is described as being pure, bright, mighty, omniscient, incomprehensi-

ble, formless and yet assuming various forms, quality-less and yet enjoying all qualities, the regulator of all things, the highest Lord and supreme Master of all beings (vii. 1-7). The " heliotheism " of this passage borders almost upon a henotheistic pantheism. (ii) Secondly, as regards sacrifices, we find that they are to be performed for the attainment of vigour, heaven and immortality, and we are told that the world and the individual are supported and sustained by the sacrifices (vi. 36). The oblations offered to the sacrificial fire are carried to the sun, who sends down rain in return ; from rain comes food, and from food all beings (vi. 37 : cp. Manu iii. 76). Thus do all beings live and grow on account of the performance of sacrifices. We are again told that those who do not perform sacrifices or give oblations to the fire are debarred from knowing the ethereal place of Brahman (vi. 34). Thus a very high importance comes to be attached to the sacrifices. The sacrifices are not, however, to be regarded as the highest goal of human life ; they are but means to the attainment of Brahman, which remains the highest ideal for man. Thus we are told (vi. 33) that one who offers oblations to the three holy Fires is raised from the earth to Prāṇa, and from Prāṇa to Indra, and is then finally presented to a knower of Ātman who in his turn presents him unto Brahman.

25. ASTRONOMICAL SPECULATIONS.—Sections 14 and 16 of the sixth chapter partly contain astronomical speculations. We are told that the sun is the source of time in which he abides and creates the moon, stars, planets, the year and other things. The visible form of time is the year which is declared to consist of twelve months and to be composed of moments and other measures of time. One half of the year is sacred to Agni (=Southern Path), and the other half to Varuṇa (=Northern Path). The course which is sacred to Agni extends from the asterism Maghā (the Sickle) to half of the asterism Śravishṭhā (the Dolphin), that is from June to December, when the sun moves Southward ; while the course from the Sarpa (=Āślesha or Hydræ) to half of Śravishṭhā is sacred to Soma when the sun moves Northward. The sun passes through twenty-seven asterisms in the course of the year, occupying two asterisms

and a quarter in each month. But Time is imperceptible by sense. and the course of the sun through the parts of time is supposed to be the evidence by which alone the existence of time can be proved. Then follows a logical remark that apart from proof there can be no apprehension of the thing to be proved ; but that the fact that time is composed of parts may make the subject of proof—namely time itself—the proof, in order that it may be truly known ; in other words we may use the parts of time to prove the existence of time as a whole.

26. THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF BRAHMAN.—We may now proceed to consider the various forms of Brahman as described in the sixth chapter of the Upanishad. (i) In the first place, Brahman is proclaimed to be of two forms—the material and the immaterial. The material is unreal, while the immaterial is real. This Brahman bears the name of the " Lone Fig tree " with roots above and branches below (vi. 4). Next are mentioned various triads of the forms of Brahman. The three-fold *Om* is the sound-form ; masculine feminine and neuter, the sex-form ; fire, wind and sun, the light-form ; Brahma, Rudra and Vishṇu, the lordship-form ; Gārhapatya, Dakshiṇa and Āhavanīya fires, the mouth-form ; Ṛik, Yajus and Sāman, the knowledge-form ; earth, atmosphere and sky, the world-form ; past, present and future, the time-form ; breath, fire and sun, the heat-form ; food, water and moon, the growth-form ; intellect, mind and egoism, the intelligence-form ; Prāṇa, Apāna and Vyāna, the breath-form. These are all praised, honoured and included by saying *Om*, which is both the higher and the lower Brahman. — (ii) Then again, food and foot-eater are declared to be other manifestations of Brahman. Pradhāna, along with all its constituents, and the Bhūtātman form the food for the Purusha, who is the enjoyer. All that consists of qualities and all that indicates development form the food for the Person. The Liṅga-śarīra, the elements, childhood, youth, old-age, intelligence-stuff with its qualities, and the senses—all these constitute his food. Thus likewise do the Manifest and the Unmanifest form his food. The enjoyer thereof is without qualities ; but the fact that he enjoys proves that he is intelligent. In the strain of the Taittirīya Upa-

nishad, food is declared to be the Creator, Sustainer and Destroyer of all beings. All beings here run about every day desiring to get food. Even the sun takes food by his rays and the fire blazes up with food. Life consists of food; perception and thought become impossible when a man does not eat food. Brahman created this world with desire for food, which is therefore the highest form of the Soul or Brahman (vi. 10-12). Life is again declared to be the essence of food, mind of life, understanding of mind, and bliss of understanding (vi. 13). It may be that the reference here is to the five forms of Brahman as described in the Taittirīya Upanishad. — (iii) Time and the Timeless are again two other manifestations of Brahman. That which is prior to the sun is the Timeless and is without parts. That which begins with sun is Time, which has parts and which is the Year. Time and the Year are again described each as being the Creator, Sustainer and Destroyer of all beings. This Time in an embodied form is the great Ocean of creatures. Through it Savitṛi produces all physical and moral existences: in fact the whole world. The Year is verily Prajāpati; it is Time, and the Brahma-abode, and the Ātman (vi. 15, 16). — (iv) Finally the Word and the non-Word are described as the last two forms of Brahman. By Word alone is the non-Word revealed. The Upanishad further tells us that some regard *Om* to be the word. By mounting up by means of *Om* the meditator gains independence, as a spider gains free space by mounting up by its thread. Moving upward by *Om*, one attains to absorption in non-Word. This is perfect immortality and bliss. Others again mean by Word the mystic sound that a spiritual aspirant hears. Passing beyond these sounds man becomes absorbed in the soundless, supreme Brahman, and becomes indistinguishable as flower-juices in honey (ii. 22). At the end of the Word-Brahman is the supreme Soundless-Brahman; and one who worships them both gains final liberation (vi. 23). Again, *Om* is the arrow of the bow of the body, with mind as its point. Having cut through the darkness of ignorance, it enables one to gain the vision of Brahman, which is brilliant like a glowing wheel, and to become immortal (vi. 24). Finally, we are told that one should draw in the vital breath by means of *Om*, and sacrifice it

in the lustrous fire of Brahman, as a sportsman draws in fish by a net and sacrifices them in the fire of his stomach (vi. 26).

27. THE ETHICS OF THE UPANISHAD.—We may next turn to the consideration of the ethical teachings in this Upanishad. We are told that mind is the cause of bondage and that a man becomes bound when his mind is full of desires and is subject to volition and conception and self-conceit ; and that his freedom consists in freeing his mind from all these. Purification of mind is therefore essential to real freedom, which may be attained by fixing one's mind on Brahman instead of on objects of sense. Mind, the cause of bondage or freedom, is again declared to be two-fold — pure and impure ; it is pure when it is free from lust, and impure when it is touched by it. It is an eternal truth that what one's thought is, that he becomes. One should therefore endeavour to purify his thoughts, since they are the cause of the cycle of births. When a man's thoughts are turned to things of sense, his mind becomes confused and he does wrong actions. But when his mind seeks the Real, like fire without fuel in its source, his thought becomes extinct owing to the loss of its activity (vi. 34). Control of the senses is real Yoga, and a real Yogin is one who has his senses eclipsed as in sleep, so that even when he is in the midst of objects he is not governed by them (vi. 25). He does not touch the objects of sense when they intrude on him, even as one does not touch women that enter an empty house (vi. 10). Restraint of mind alone is declared to be real knowledge and liberty, everything else being merely an extension of the ties that bind a man to life. By tranquillity of thought are destroyed all deeds good and evil and quietly resting with his self one enjoys eternal happiness. When the mind is freed from sloth and distraction and is rendered motionless, one reaches the supreme state. When one has entered the Ātman by purging away all impurities from his mind by means of meditation, the bliss that he attains baffles all description : it can be experienced by a person in his own heart. When a man is thus absorbed in the Ātman, he becomes indistinguishable like fire in fire, water in water, or ether in ether ; and attains to final liberation (vi. 34).

28. MYSTICAL SPECULATIONS IN THE UPANISHAD.—This leads us to a consideration of the mystical ideas present in this Upanishad. As to the helps for the mystical realisation of the Self, the concluding portion of the Upanishad asks us to avoid the company of those that are unworthy of heaven—their company being regarded as an impediment in the way of the knowledge of Brahman. Among these are included persons who are ever hilarious, begging or living on handicraft; performers of sacrifices for the unworthy, disciples of Śūdras, and Śūdras who learn the scriptures; rogues, and those who wear knotted-hair; also dancers, and mercenaries, the mendicants, and actors, and all others belonging to the same category; those who pretend to allay the evil influences of spirits, ghosts and goblins, and also of serpents and the like, for money, and those who falsely wear the red dress, ear-rings and skulls; and finally, those who by their sophisms wish to shake the faith of the people in the Veda—all these are declared to be thieves, unfit for heaven (vii. 8). But this is only a negative help. Our author proceeds to prescribe some positive helps as well. He insists upon the study of the Veda by Brahmins, the conformity to the order to which one belongs, and the performance of the duty proper to one's order. Not that all can accept asceticism and do penance; and a person that belongs to no order is not necessarily an ascetic. It is however recognised that penance alone brings on perfection, and that from penance is produced goodness and from goodness knowledge. The "six-fold" Yoga and especially Meditation (Dhyāna) and Concentration (Dhāraṇā) are recognised as the chief means for the realisation of Brahman. Dhāraṇā, however, comes to have an occult significance attached to it, viz., the pressing of the tongue against the palate and the conveying of the breath through the Nāḍī called Sushumṇā—the voice and the mind being restrained at the same time: this is said (vi. 18-21) to lead the Soul to the vision of Brahman! It is important to note in this connection the fruits of Yoga as described in this Upanishad. By practice of Yoga one is said to gain contentment, power to endure the pairs of opposites, and peace of mind. The seven kinds of mystical sound which a spiritual aspirant hears are declared in this Upanishad to be either

that of a river, or of a bell, or of a brazen vessel, or of a wheel, or the croaking of frogs, or the pattering of rain, or finally the voice from a secluded place. Next follows an allegorical description of the mystic's progress towards Brahman by eliminating the egoistic tendencies of his mind. We are told that the Palace of Brahman is guarded by a Door-keeper, namely Egoism, who wears the crown of Passion, the ear-rings of Greed and Envy, the staff of Sloth, Sleep, and Sin, and who catches hold of a bow whose string is Anger and whose shaft is Lust, intent on killing all beings in the world. We are told that one should strike down this Door-keeper with the arrow of Unselfishness, after having caught hold of a bow whose shaft is Fortitude and whose string is Asceticism. After having killed this Door-keeper, one should cross the ether in the heart by means of the raft of *Om*, and when the Brahman within the heart becomes manifest, he should enter slowly into the Hall of Brahman as a miner seeking precious metals enters a mine. Here, having come into the sight of Brahman, he abides in his own greatness and looks upon the Wheel of the World as one who has alighted from a car looks upon its revolving wheels (vi. 28). In his mystic enjoyment of Brahman, the Individual Soul becomes merged in Brahman as a lump of iron hidden in the bosom of the earth is reduced to earth; and as the smith or the fire can have nothing to do with such a lump of iron, similarly both thought and its substratum vanish from the man who is absorbed in Brahman (vi. 27).

"And as spray-drops rise in succession from the sea,
Or, as the lightning flashes from the radiant clouds,
Or, as flickering flames appear on the crest of fire:
Even so are the souls merged in the Highest Brahman."

—(vi. 35).

xxiv—THE MĀṆḌŪKYA UPANISHAD.

29. THE FOUR DIVISIONS OF *Om*.—One of the great innovations which the Māṇḍūkya Upanishad introduces is the division of the symbol *Om* into three moræ and a fourth mora-less part (M. 12). There does not seem to be much justification for this kind of division of the symbol, inasmuch as it is manifest that the three moræ, *A-U-M*, exhaust the whole of the original symbol. The reason

why the author of the Māṇḍūkyopanishad posits a further mora lies manifestly in his wish to show the correspondence of the fourfold division of the symbol *Om* with the states of consciousness on the one hand, and the kinds of Soul on the other, that leading him on to posit, through an artificial process of quadruplication, further correspondences with the different worlds and the different Vedas. This is evidently spying out a quantity where it is not. As before, however, even in the Māṇḍūkyopanishad, the three parts of *Om* are made co-terminous with the divisions of time: the past, the present and the future, and the fourth kind of time, which must be supposed to correspond to the mora-less part, and therefore as "a time which transcends time" (M. 1). The "Bandhutā" equations in the Brāhmaṇas are also indulged in by this Upanishad likewise. The first letter *A* must be regarded as equivalent to Āpti or attainment, because it possesses the property of Ādimatva or beginningness (M. 9). The letter *U* must be regarded as equivalent to Utkarsha or exaltation, because it really signifies Ubhayatva or intermediateness (M. 10). The third letter *M* means Miti or Apīti because, it signifies measurement or destruction (M. 11). The fourth mora cannot be characterised by any attribute, inasmuch as probably there can be nothing corresponding to a non-existence. Finally, a Brāhmaṇa-wise glorification of the knowledge of this symbol is also not wanting, when it is said that by the knowledge of the first mora, one obtains all his desires; by the knowledge of the second, a spiritual exaltation; by the knowledge of the third, at-one-ment with the universe; while by the knowledge of the fourth, one by his self enters the Self (M. 12).

30. THE FOUR STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS.—It is when we come to the consideration of the states of consciousness in the Māṇḍūkyopanishad that we become aware of its real contribution to Upanishadic thought. In the earlier Upanishads reference has been made no doubt to the distinction between the waking state, the state of dream, and the state of deep-sleep; and in the Chhāndogya Upanishad there is evidently a recognition of a fourth state in the dialogue between Indra and Prajāpati (viii. 5-7); nor is the reference to the fourth state wanting in the Maitrāyaṇī Upanishad,

as in vi. 19 or vii. 11 ; but it is only in the Māṇḍūkyopanishad for the first time that we find a systematic enumeration of the different states of consciousness, and it is only there that the Turīya or the fourth, as a different state of consciousness, is directly contrasted with the three, with which one is, from the point of view of normal life, ordinarily familiar. The Turīya may fitly be called "the fourth dimension" of psychology. One may easily perceive the difference between the wakeful state and the state of dream on the one hand, and the state of dream and the state of deep-sleep on the other. But the difference between the state of deep-sleep and the "fourth," which has been at times called the super-conscious, but which may more fittingly be termed the self-conscious, is not quite obvious to the ordinary mind. Not unfrequently has the no-consciousness in deep-sleep been identified even in the Upanishads with a seemingly similar annihilation of consciousness in the ecstatic state. The only proof, it would seem, of the reality of the difference is the *solvitur ambulando* : it is only those who have enjoyed the ecstatic state that can pronounce on the distinction between the state of deep-sleep on the one hand and that of ecstacy on the other. As to whether this state may be called the super-conscious, opinions differ. On the one hand it is pointed out that a super-conscious state of consciousness is a contradiction in terms ; on the other, it is maintained that the super-conscious is just a name given to signify the peculiar fourth state which is really indescribable and unnamable. But in any case, it is the great merit of the Māṇḍūkyopanishad to have recognised this fourth state, and to have given it a place in the psychology of the states of consciousness.

31. THE FOUR KINDS OF SOUL.—But even a greater contribution of the Māṇḍūkyopanishad to the thought of the period is the very clever parallelism which it tries to establish between the states of consciousness on the one hand and the kinds of Soul on the other. In fact the Māṇḍūkyopanishad may be said, of all the Upanishads, to have made the greatest contribution to the subject of psycho-metaphysics. Corresponding to the different states of consciousness, namely, those of wakefulness, dream,

deep-sleep, and self-consciousness, the Māṇḍūkyopanishad posits four different kinds of Soul : namely, the Vaiśvānara, the Taijasa, the Prājña, and the Ātman. The Vaiśvānara is just the Soul in the state of wakefuless ; the Taijasa is the Soul sunk in his own light in a state of dream ; the Prājña is the Soul who inspires man even while he has fallen into deep-sleep ; and the Ātman is the pure self-conscious Soul, constituting the fourth dimension of metaphysics, just as his counterpart, the Turīya, constituted the fourth dimension of psychology. The Vaiśvānara enjoys gross things as the Taijasa the subtle (M. 3, 4). The Prājña—which term evidently seems to have been suggested to the author of the Māṇḍūkya, by the Prajñātman of the Kaushītaki—enjoys mere bliss (M. 5), while the Ātman probably enjoys nothing except his own state, and is tranquil in his singleness (M. 7). It is significant to remember that the Prājña has been called (M. 6) the Lord of all, the all-knowing, the inner controller, the source of all, the origin and end of all Being. In fact, the Prājña, to the author of the Māṇḍūkya signifies what philosophy calls God. As contrasted with him, stands the Ātman, which is the Upanishadic equivalent of what philosophy calls the Absolute : " He is neither inwardly nor outwardly cognitive, nor yet on both sides together ; He is not a cognition-mass, and is neither knower, nor not-knower ; He is invisible, impracticable, incomprehensible, indescribable, unthinkable, unpointable ; His essence is the knowledge of His own Self ; He negates the whole expanse of the Universe and is tranquil, blissful, and without a second (M. 7)." The Viśva, the Taijasa, the Prājña and the Ātman are thus the four kinds of Soul concerning themselves with gross, subtle, blissful and pure existence respectively ; and it is worth noting that God is sundered here from the Absolute as with a hatchet, and ultimate reality assigned only to the Absolute and not to God, who is described as merely the Absolute gone to sleep ; while in the Absolute the whole world (Prapañcha) is described as being annihilated, since the Absolute is the one without a second (Advaita), characterised only in negative terms.

32. THE MĀṆḌŪKYA AND ABSOLUTE MONISM.—It is no wonder that the Absolutist commentators should have discovered in the

Māṇḍūkya food enough for their Absolutico-monistic speculations. The negation of the world leads on the one hand to the doctrine of Māyā or illusion, and on the other hand to the doctrine of the Ajātivāda or non-creation. The great sage Gauḍapāda tries to incorporate both the Māyā and the Ajātivāda doctrines in his commentary on the Māṇḍūkya, obliviscent of the fact that the two points of views are inconsistent with each other. Creation by Māyā (Kārikās iii. 27-29), is creation after all. The Ajātivāda (Kārikā iv. 19ff.), on the other hand, signifies that the world was never created.* Moreover the chief argument which Gauḍapāda adduces to prove the unreality of the world is its analogy with a dream. The illusion of waking is described as being absolutely on a par with the illusion of a dream, both being due to the phantasy of the mind (Kārikās ii. 3-15). The ethical conclusions deducible from this metaphysical position are, that a truly wise man must regard himself as neither bound nor as an initiate in the path of realisation; neither one who desires absolution, nor one who has reached it : hence it is that non-duality is real (Kārikās ii. 32, 33). But even the absolutely monistic position has to make some concession to the process of practical attainment to Reality implied in the life of moral preparation (iii. 42) as also mystical perfection in Samādhi which is characterised by great tranquillity and the never-fading illumination of knowledge (iii. 37). It would be a study in itself to see what justification there is for such conclusions being drawn from the text of the Māṇḍūkyopanishad. It is evident at any rate that the negation of the world and the sole reality of the Absolute are clearly indicated by the text of Māṇḍūkya ; but the responsibility for the doctrine of non-creation and the analogy of the dream must evidently lie on the author of the Kārikās instead of on that of the text of the Upanishad proper.

* The question of the authorship and authenticity of the fourth of the Gauḍapādīya Kārikās will be discussed elsewhere. See page 96 f.

CHAPTER NINTH

AN EVALUATION OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

1. SCOPE OF THE CHAPTER.—If the great mass of texts known as the Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas be compared to a vast and limitless woodland, the several Upanishadic texts that we have analysed and surveyed in the last few chapters may fittingly be designated the outstanding landmarks of that woodland—as the distinctive configurations of hills and trees and rills as also the rarest specimens of vegetations that arrest the eye—as features, in other words, that at once represent and illustrate all that there is of the highest and philosophically most significant in the varied and extraordinarily fruitful thought-activity of the whole period. Now, while it is legitimately open for the Botanist to examine his plant with the help of the dissecting knife for the sake of the wonderful revelations of internal structure that await his study, it is equally the rightful function of the Horticulturist to take the plant as a whole and to estimate its economic and æsthetic value in the very form in which the specimen lies before him, with its several essential and adventitious, useful and useless, parts and portions. In the case of the Upanishadic texts, we have already followed both these methods. We have acquired enough data to ascertain just what particular portions from the several texts can be subsumed under definite chronological groups, and are thus in a position to determine the different philosophical ideas dominating a given section of the period. Further, inasmuch as the successive additions made to an Upanishadic text like the Chhāndogya or the Bṛihadāraṇyaka can be held to be more or less governed by the prevailing dogmas and dictates of the specific Vedic school to which the text belongs, it would not be impossible to discover a thread of continuity running through the chrono-

logically disparate parts of such a text, which can then be not unprofitably studied as a unit by itself, as we have in fact attempted in the last five chapters. But just as there is, beyond the Botanist and the Horticulturist, the reflective Nature-poet who, while prepared on occasions to probe the inmost recesses of a flower or a fruit, is yet anxious to visualise and describe not only the individual plant in relation to its own branches and blossoms, leaves and flowers, seed and fruit, but also to consider the same plant as an element in the collective aspect of the woodland, assigning to it a place and a function in a general æsthetic appreciation of the whole scenery : in exactly the same manner it is now essential that we should survey the dominant philosophical tendencies of the whole period, trace their inner lines of development, review them in their historical setting as being the culmination of an earlier period of thought-activity and as the point of divergence for the subsequent, well-rounded philosophical systems, and, finally, evaluate them as a contribution to the evolution of human thought made by a gifted people at such a very early period in the history of the human race. The task is difficult and somewhat delicate, as it has been already attempted by scholars more than once ; but we cannot well avoid it just for the very reason that our conclusions regarding Upanishadic chronology, and consequently our literary and philosophic estimates of the texts in question, as will have been already made amply evident, considerably deviate from the well-worn tracks.* We propose then in what follows to consider in succession such topics as the Upanishadic accounts of world-creation, the Upanishadic doctrines of the Soul, the Upanishadic theories of knowledge and of the Absolute, or the Upanishadic notions on moral conduct and God-realisation, not assuming, of course, as has been often too lightly done—not only by the orthodox commentators and expositors, but also by some of the latest writers in the field—that the Upanishads have just one clear-cut view in the matter ; but rather endeavouring to trace the doctrinal development that there must undoubtedly have taken place as speculation advanced from what

* See Chapter 3, §§ 12 to 19, above

we have designated the "Brāhmanic" group of texts, through the "Brāhmaṇo-Upanishadic texts," on to its culmination in the great texts of the "Upanishadic" group, and from that point onwards to follow the ebbing out of that earlier speculative impulse and the advent of a newer thought-wave which seriously threatened to wash off—foundation and all—the whole stately edifice so skilfully reared up by several generations of seers and teachers. Such an attempt, based upon a systematic chronological stratification of all the available texts arrived at by a strictly philological and more or less objective procedure, has not been hitherto made by any one to our knowledge. Deussen, whose chronology and general trend of conclusions has been accepted by most writers, has not attempted to subdivide the individual Upanishads into further chronologically disparate units, although he seems to have been aware of the importance of doing so; and when some of the modern critics of Deussen disagree with a particular line of doctrinal development that he traces out from what he regards as an earlier Upanishad to a relatively 'later' Upanishad, they have rarely attempted to rearrange the whole series of texts so as to bring out the rival line of doctrinal development that they would fain substitute for that of Deussen. The evolution of isolated doctrines through the whole length of Upanishadic period has been traced by a few writers here and there, but our present attempt is to do the same for the whole gamut of philosophical problems. In so doing we would naturally endeavour briefly to trace the earlier beginnings of the philosophical concept or doctrine in the Vedas, review the form which it assumed or the transformation that it underwent in consequence of the arresting of the normal course of development and the diverting of it upon the side-track of ritualism that it underwent during the Brāhmaṇa period, and finally adjudge the specific contributions of the Upanishadic period strictly so called to the whole issue. It is obvious that to the extent to which we might succeed in exhibiting this whole history as a normal, probable, and logically sequential advance, we would be securing an additional testimony to the correctness of the chronological grouping that has

been tabled by us on page 135, above. And seeing that our treatment is going to be based upon texts cited in their strictly chronological order, and not merely taken at random and out of their proper contexts and correlated, one with the other, as may suit the convenience of the argument—as has been unhappily the habit of most writers on Indian Vedânta—we hope that our treatment will not err or mislead by producing an appearance, on the one hand, of precision and profundity where they do not really exist, and on the other, of a mere vagary and word-chopping where a much deeper historical reason seems to exist for the phenomenon.

i—UPANISHADIC ACCOUNTS OF WORLD-CREATION

2. THE STARTING-POINT OF UPANISHADIC COSMOLOGY.—The earliest awakenings of philosophy inevitably take to cosmology. Originating in a child-like impulse to wonder: wonder at the happenings of the physical world in all their astonishing force, variety and precipitateness, and exhibiting nevertheless a method in their caprice and an orderliness in their sequence, to which the closest approach in the experience of early ratiocination is the will-power of man himself, this philosophical activity almost always begins by endowing every exhibition of abnormal physical energy with its own Divine presence conceived under its own distinctive anthropomorphic colouring, and thus arrives at some half-poetic half-mythological solution of its problems, lacking in real depth or penetration and testifying neither to patient and persistent investigation nor to accurate and systematic procedure. In time, with a truer and deeper knowledge of the "Laws of Nature", these solutions fail to satisfy the critical mind. They are found to be inadequate, inconsistent and even self-contradictory. For a while indeed, and under the notion of thereby paying a tribute of reverence to the Scriptures that contain the solutions in question, speculation might conceivably cultivate a delight in these very contradictions—as it did in the Late Vedic period (vide Chapter i, §§ 26–30)—and might be content to weave together a sort of an "enigmatic monism." Nevertheless, with the progress of society and with the birth and the growth—particularly in the face of a threaten-

ing enemy out-of-doors, say the marauding Dasyus—of a sense of racial or communal unity and solidarity, it was inevitable that, continuing his speculation, man should in course of time reach the first great generalisation in philosophy by realising the world as a whole as *one* great artifact or kārya (on a scale much vaster than the normal handicrafts of man in his family and tribal relations), behind which he postulated a Unitary Power—analogous to the *pater familias* or the tribal chieftain—around which primitive mind was delighted to weave together a poetico-rationalistic fabric of myth, legend, and history. We already saw (Chapter i, § 26) how during the Early Vedic period the process of world-creation came to be likened to the art of the carpenter or the smith, where it was not identified with the procreative function. This of course was little more than a poetic conceit to begin with, there being little evidence of an attempt to discover the bond that links one fact or phenomenon to the other, the thread that interpenetrates them all and holds them together in a system of unity ; and although a little later, in the famous Nāsadīya-sūkta (Rigveda, x. 129), we do discern a frantic effort to fathom and name the secret of world-creation by the force of sheer imagination, the conviction was bound to be evoked before long that the world-secret could not be mastered that way. For, although to give to "airy nothing a local habitation and a name" does tend, in the early stages of reasoning, to fix and further our knowledge of that phenomenon, yet no tangible *advance* in our knowledge is possible if we for ever busy ourselves with the etymology and the aetiology of the mere name. It was necessary, in other words, to turn away from the individual 'gods' of early speculation, and even from the 'Great God' who later reigned over them, to the physical facts for which each stood, and experiment with these physical facts. This at any rate was what Greece learnt to do before very long ; and this is what might have taken place in the history of early Indian philosophy but for the operation of those ethnic, social, and religious forces which we described towards the close of our first Chapter. These factors chased both the primitive poet-philosopher and the prospective nature-philosopher alike out of court. It is the ritualistic philosopher who now intrudes on the horizon

and, rather than allowing the current of speculation to take a turn analogous to what took place in the Nature-philosophy of Early Greece, he starts the significant query as to how these so-called "gods" obtained their god-hood. "Mahad Devānām asuratvam ekam: The Gods have a great and unique character of god-hood"—says the refrain to Rigveda iii. 55; but the sole unfailing mark of this god-hood was now declared to be participation in the sacrifices instituted by the priests. The Aśvins became full-fledged gods only after they obtained such a share through the assistance of the re-juvenated old sage Chyavāna; and, per contra, mortal sages like Manu or Aṅgiras become invested with divinity the moment they establish a claim to participation in the holy haviḥ. Gods are made by sacrifice. Sacrifice in fact is the omnipotent world principle (see Chapter ii. § 26), which not only starts the process of world-creation but comes to the assistance of the Creator every time he feels fagged, out of sorts, or uninspired. And each small detail of the sacrifice comes likewise to be invested with transcendent cosmic significance. We also saw how the Brāhmaṇas, by evolving their peculiar "Bandhutā" philosophy (Chapter ii, §§ 23-25), attempted to reduce the whole universe to an order by spreading their subtle net of sacrifice over all the sundry facts and phenomena contained therein. This was of course an easier way of explaining the world than the far more laborious way of observation and 'scientific' investigation, the progress in which the Brāhmaṇas managed only to nip in the bud—so far, that is to say, as the facts of the physical world were concerned. For a mechanical and an easily intelligible conception of the process of creation, like the one put forth by primitive philosophy, the Brāhmaṇas substituted a far-fetched ritualistic process grounded upon etymological aetiology, in which "tapas" plays the chief rôle. And although some of the more developed cosmological theories in the Brāhmaṇas (such as those detailed by us on pages 67 and following) attempted to incorporate and be faithful to that much knowledge of the physical sciences which was current in their days, there remained the fact nevertheless that our texts could and did, at any stage in the process, always branch off at will in a ritualistic track, introducing, in and out of season, all kinds

of sacrificial entities, at whose entrance all difficulties vanished utterly as by an act of faith, to which those that did not care to be dubbed "Asuras" had to ungrudgingly submit. Dogmatism thus raged unhindered, only here and there partially helped out by appeals to "Bandhutā" reasoning. However, in fairness, let it be conceded that this retarding of the normal progress of cosmological speculation was not an unmixed evil. It did much to tone down the poetic ebullitions of the earlier period that generally passed for sober philosophy, inasmuch as the Brāhmaṇic texts did emphasise, after their own fashion, the need for classifying and discriminating, for systematising and discovering hidden correspondences between things. This developed a breadth of view, a logical acumen, and a patience and even a propensity for details that placed the findings of the subsequent period somewhat above the mere imaginative, haphazard guessings at truth that they might otherwise have become. Also by insisting upon the linking of their cosmological and other speculations with the realities of ritualistic requirements, our priestly philosophers helped to prevent that utter divorce of philosophy from practical life, of which there is always a danger in an abstract system of reasoning, which philosophy very soon tends to become. At the same time, we must not ignore the fact that just herein there was involved the other danger of a cramping of the fervour and freedom in the speculations of the earlier period, and a turning of them into a mere dull lifeless logomachy. This was the stage reached towards the end of the Brāhmaṇic period.— Coming after that, the Upanishadic texts attempted generally to steer clear of the difficulties on either side by cultivating the mean between these extremes; and hence it is that their speculations, although in parts already anticipated by Brāhmaṇic texts to which they are attached as appanages, nevertheless constitute in their emphasis and *ensemble* a distinct stage in the evolution of the theories of world-creation.

3. CHRONOLOGICAL GROUPING OF THE COSMOLOGICAL TEXTS IN THE UPANISHADS.—Let us briefly recount some of the Upanishadic cosmologies, arranging them chronologically into the four Groups into which we have distributed our texts

(see p. 135). We have under this head for *Group One*—Aitareya Āraṇyaka ii. 1–3, Brihad. Up. i. 2, Chh. Up. i. 1. 2, i. 9. 1, and Chh. Up. ii. 23. 2-3; for *Group Two*—Ait. Up., Khaṇḍas i-iii, Brihad. Up. I. iv. 1–6, 7, 10, 11–16, 17, Tait. Up. ii. 1–5, 9, and iii. 1–6, Chh. Up. iii. 19, and Chh. Up. iv. 17 ; for *Group Three*—Muṇḍaka I. i. 7–8 and II. i. 1, 3, 5–9, Śvet. Up. i, Praśna i. 4ff. and vi. 3ff., Chh. Up. vi. 2–3, Tait. Up. ii. 6–7, Śvet. Up. vi. 8ff., and Maitri ii. 6ff.; and for *Group Four*—Brih. Up. v. 5, Śvet. Up. iv. 5ff., and Maitri. v. 2, vi. 5–6 and 11–17. A detailed exposition of the contents of most of these texts is already given by us in Chapters iv to viii under the several Upanishads to which they belong, and a concurrent reference to the specific sections of those Chapters will be helpful in appraising the discussion that is to follow.

4. THE UPANISHADIC COSMOLOGIES AN INCONSEQUENTIAL GROUPING OF ENTITIES.—Now, since it is the exhibition of a power and a precipitateness, and withal an order and a purpose in the facts and occurrences of the universe that originates cosmology, we naturally expect that, whatever the First Principle put forth by the texts of a period, they will at least endeavour to trace the working of that Principle in the gradation and sequence of creation. But thanks to the peculiar turn given to speculation by the Brāhmaṇic theory of the Sacrifice, we do not meet any such systematic attempt in the majority of the texts before us. Consider, for instance, the cosmological myth in Brih. i. 2. We start here with a primitive "Non-being" overspread with Death or Hunger. Through "tapas" or fervour there spring forth therefrom in succession physical entities like Water, Earth, Fire,—the last having three forms : the Sun, Fire proper, and Wind, the last again as Breath, giving rise to all the Worlds : Heaven, Inter-mundia and so forth. The next stage in the process is a "cosmological marriage" between Death and Speech, which produces, through the instrumentality of Time which was the Semen, the three Vedas, the Metres, Sacrifices, Beasts and the rest. These created entities now become subject to Time and perish. With a view to produce a permanent entity, Death practises further *tapas* and brings death upon itself, the corpse being transformed into the sacrificial horse.

the source and symbol of deathlessness. Here it is the ritualistic interest that alone is paramount, and the stages of the cosmological process are altogether haphazard and illogical.—A slight advance in this direction is perceptible in Taittirīya ii. 1–5, 9, which is the next text we choose as representative of Group Two. Here the First Principle is "Ātman" which produces "Ākāśa" or Ether, Ether producing Wind, Wind producing Fire, Fire producing Waters, Waters producing Earth, Earth producing Plants, Plants producing Food, and Food producing Man. There is an obvious logical order in the above sequence. The text goes on to distinguish between the "Food-man" or the physiological aspect of life from the "Breath-man" or the energizing function of life, which is "inside" the former and its essence; and in the same terms it speaks successively of the "Mind-man", the "Intellect-man" and the "Bliss-man." Towards the latter part of this cosmology the interest is predominatingly psychological, the process starting with the Ātman or the All-Soul and ending with the ātman or the individual soul.—Muṇḍaka II. i. 1–9, which gives a typical cosmological speculation of the next Group, is a peculiar combination of the psychological, physical, and ritualistic considerations with a proportionate emphasis laid on each. We there start with the Immutable (Akshara), the divine, formless Person, who creates, first, the Prāṇa, the mind and the sense-organs; then the Ether, Wind, Light, Waters and Earth, who are to be the objects to these; next the ritualistic entities like Ṛik-Sāma-Yajus, Dīkshā, Sacrifices, and Gifts, the Sacrificer, and the Year; also, the Regions where the Moon and the Sun shine, Gods, Demi-gods, men, beasts, birds; and, to conclude the list, Prāna and Apāna, rice and barley, tapas and faith, truth, abstinence and law, seven breaths and the seven worlds, and oceans and mountains and rivers and plants and juice: it would be very hard to find another more motley concatenation! It would therefore be safe to conclude that the Upanishadic cosmologies hardly ever attempt to educe a rational order in the successive stages of the cosmological process, so far that is to say as a physical causal nexus between the consecutive stages is concerned.

5. THEIR DOMINATING PSYCHOLOGICAL TREND.—The first interest of cosmology is almost always the world without. Man and the world within him, although a legitimate subject of cosmology, comes to be actually so only at a later stage. It is this later stage that we find fully represented in our Upanishadic texts, and the more so as the problems of the world without had for them almost ceased to be a vital concern. One of the earliest texts of the First Group, Aitareya Āraṇyaka II. i-iii and especially II. i. 3 and II. iii. 2, while pointing out the correspondence between the plant-life and human-life as far as their physiological functions are concerned—the plants in fact producing the seed out of which man is born—states the all-important fact that "while in plants and trees there is only the sap, in animals is seen consciousness." The Self thus finds, we are told, a fuller realisation in animals than in trees and plants, and the fullest of all in man the crown of creation.—In Aitareya Āraṇyaka II. iv. 1–3 (being the first three Khaṇḍas of the Upanishad proper and by us assigned to Group Two) we have a very neat example of psychological cosmology. The creative process here starts with the Self who first produces the super-celestial, celestial, terrestrial, and sub-terrestrial regions. These do merely furnish the *locus standi* for the "Person" fashioned out of Primitive Waters, who is the most important product of this cosmology. The formation of the various apertures of this Person's body, the breathing of the breath of life into his nostrils, as also the allocation of the different cognitive and conative functions to the organs of sense and action, is next narrated in detail, the whole process terminating with the Creator himself entering into the Person thus created and realising therein his unique Self-hood.—There is one point in this psychological cosmology that must be noted. Concurrently with the production of each organ of the "Purusha," there was produced the external material or element on which that organ was to function, as also the Deity which was to control that function. This is no more than a by-product of the "Bandhutā" philosophy, according to which each entity is required to have its *adhyātma*, *adhibhautika*, and *adhidaivika* correlates. As a consequence, the production of the world without and the world within—of the macrocosm and the microcosm—

came to be regarded as one concurrent process with a dual aspect. — For the next Group we choose two short texts, one early and one late, namely, Muṇḍaka I. i. 7-8 and Maitrāyaṇīya ii. 6ff., which show further progress in the same direction. In the former text the creation starts with the Immutable which, through fervour, produces *anna*, food or the material constituent of the universe. From *anna* proceeds breath or energy, from breath mind and the whole psychical world ; from mind, the "truth," i. e. to say, the concrete, tangible, physical world, including all the regions, and all the activities (kārman) which lead to immortality. This account distinctly recognises matter, energy, and consciousness as the three essential factors or stages of creation which it regards as real and identical with the Reality. Maitrāyaṇīya Up. ii. 6 ff. commences the process with Prajāpati, who creates creatures, but finding them inert and stock-still, enters them as their breath of life, distributing himself into the five life-breaths and performing the functions of the five organs of knowledge and action, and becoming—in appearance—the active agent who experiences the good and bad actions though in reality unaffected by them. He who actually enjoys and acts and therefore transmigrates is, we are told, another "Ātman" known as "Bhūtātman" who, although originally one, becomes manifold under the influence of the *guṇas* of the Prakṛiti. The "Sāṁkhya" trend of the latter part of this cosmology is quite on the surface. — We thus see how the facts of inner life lend a continually deeper colouring to these cosmologies, so that we can almost say that speculation has here swerved from the notion of physical causation to that of ideal causation.

6. THE SYMBOLICAL AND ETHICAL CATEGORIES IN THESE COSMOLOGIES.—We had already an occasion (Chapter ii, §§22ff.) to advert to the importance of specific symbols and formulæ in the setting forth of the Brāhmaṇic theory of the Sacrifice. The Cosmological speculations in the Upanishads formulated under the shadow of that theory similarly occupied themselves with symbolical entities. Thus we encounter the statement in Chhāndogya i. 1–2 which regards the "Udgītha" as the essence and crown of creation ; while Chhāndogya ii. 23. 2–3 details a

cosmology wherein Prajāpati, meditating upon the different worlds, produces in succession the three Vedas, the three "Vyāhṛitis" or holy sounds—Bhūḥ, Bhuvaḥ, Svar—and the Tri-monosyllable, *Om*, the text proceeding to establish a correspondence between these triads. A more or less identical account is preserved in Chhāndogya iv. 17, which we have assigned to Group Two; while the epigonal if not apocryphal passage from Maitrā. vi. 5-6 makes Prajāpati evolve the "unuttered and unformed Reality" into the mainfold worlds as we see them by uttering the three "holy sounds." These symbols however in time came to be banished from the realm of cosmology (there is no symbolical cosmology in Group Three) and relegated to the sphere of Upāsanā to which we will have shortly to direct our attention. — Ethical entities are another exotic growth on cosmology induced by the practical turn which philosophical speculation received from the Brāhmaṇas and which the Upanishads never succeeded in fully eschewing. The best illustration of the sort occurs in Bṛih. i. 4. 11-16, where Brahman (the priestly class), desirous of an expansion of its life, created the martial class amongst men as well as gods. Life was yet felt to be deficient and so the Viś class, and thereafter the Śūdra class, was produced in succession. There was yet lacking something to make life complete and perfect. It was only when the Law (which is identical with Truth) was created, and all the classes or castes in heaven and on earth obeyed the same that there was the fullest realisation of life and its purpose. The moral of this cosmological story is quite obvious. It seems to be an after-echo of the famous Purusha-sūkta (Rigveda X. 90) with the deleting of its ritualistic element. The idea, glorious as it undoubtedly is, does not however seem to have been further followed up.

7. THEIR PROGRESSIVE GRAVITATION TO A STEREOTYPED FORM.—As we come to a consideration of the majority of the later cosmological texts we find in them certain common and outstanding features : (i) The starting point of the cosmological process is almost everywhere some one unique First Principle, howsoever variously named. The definition of this ἀρχή is

clearly given in Taittirīya. Up. iii. 1—"Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante, yena jātāni jīvanti, yat prayanty abhisaṁviśanti,"* and the effect of knowing and realising it in Chh. vi. i. 3—"Yenā-śrutaṁ śrutam bhavaty amatam matam avijñātaṁ vijñātam."† (ii) This Creative Principle, by desiring it or willing it, by practising fervour, by exercising its innate power (śákti), or spreading its cosmic illusion (māyā), makes itself into two, this second principle being either a consort of the opposite sex as in Bṛih. i. 4–3, or the totality of the external creation referred to as "Bhūtāni" (Chh. i. 9.1) or "Sarvam" (Bṛih. i. 4.10) or "Yad idaṁ kiṁ cha" (Tait. ii. 6), or "Sat" (ibid. ii. 7), or "Tamas" (Mait. v. 2), or entities like "Prāṇa" (Praśna vi. 3), or the complementary and inseparable pair of "Rayi and Prāṇa" (ibid. 1. 4), or the self-evolving triad of "Tejas-Ap-Anna" (Chh. vi. 2. 3 f.)—to say nothing of specific elements like Ākāśa (Tait. ii. 1.1) or Waters (Ait. Up. i. 1 and elsewhere) or the Purusha or Hiraṇya-garbha or the Cosmic-egg. (iii) This second principle is the parent of the rest of the creation by a sort of an emanatory process, so that the Creator does not have to come down and effectuate each further step, the initial impulse communicated by him to the first product or the Demiurge generally enduring to the end of the chain. (iv) The succeeding links in the chain, as we have seen, are normally deemed not important enough to be accurately or consistently set forth ; and Purusha or the individual soul is very rarely, if at all, actually included amongst any of these. We have, to be sure, the creation of a "Purusha" mentioned in the Ait. Up. i. 3, but that is clearly the body which the Ātman subsequently animates. The "Purusha" of the cosmology in Muṇḍaka II. i. 1ff. is identical with the "Akshara" with which the creation starts, and these two can be respectively identified with what we might style the "Ur-subject" and the "Ur-object", which are in reality one. The same remark

* "From whence verily all these beings spring forth ; through whom, having sprung forth, they continue alive ; and unto which they repair, into whom they are absorbed."

† "By which what has not been heard becomes something already heard, what has not been thought of, something already thought of, and what has not been known, something already known."

applies to the "Purusha" mentioned in Praśna vi. 2. The "Kshetrajña" described in Mait. v. 2 is said in so many words to be a portion of the quality of "Sattva", evolved from the primitive Tamas or Darkness, and it is what constitutes the intelligence in each individual soul (Chetāmātraḥ pratipurushaḥ). The "Bhūtātmā" occurring in Mait. iii. 2 and declared to be subject to the influence of the guṇas and the cause of the transmigration is no other than the individual soul; but his creation as such is nowhere unmistakably stated. Śvetāśvatara i. 2 enumerates "Purusha" amongst the possible First Principles, but not as a created object. There is only one unambiguous reference to the creation of the Purusha, viz., Taittirīya ii. 1. 1, although even here it is open to one to urge that the "food-man" "breath-man", "mind-man, "intelligence-man" and "bliss-man" is not the soul as such but only his apparel. (v) We find that the majority of the texts of Groups Two and Three speak of the Creator's entrance into his creation. Thus Ait. Up. speaks of the Creator's entrance into the body by the opening in the skull (vidṛiti), while Bṛihad. i. 4. 7 tells us that "He entered upto the very tips of the nails." This "anupraveśa" or interpenetration has for its object—as declared in Chhāndogya vi. 2—the assigning of names unto the objects in creation and the evolution of their functions. A proof of the existence of the Creator within us is afforded by the movements of the five life-breaths, says Maitrāyaṇi ii. 6, in the absence of which the body would remain stock-still. Another proof of the kind is the presence of warmth in a living body, and the hearing of the sound within if "one listens with the apertures of the ears covered up" (Bṛih. V. 9). An equal emphasis is likewise laid upon the entrance of the Creator also into the material or inorganic creation. " Brahman became everything that there is "—says Bṛih. I. iv. 10; " both the actual (*sat*) and the yonder, the defined and the undefined, the grounded and the ungrounded, the conscious and the unconscious, the true and the false: in fact all that there is "—expounds the Taittirīya ii. 6—the immanence of the Divinity all through the creation (whether conceived of theistically as in Śvetāśvatara vi. 11, or pantheistically as in the famous

"antaryāmin" passage from the Bṛihad. Up. III. vii. 3–23), being the inevitable logical corollary from the same. (vi) Finally it has to be admitted that the majority of our texts proclaim the reality of the creation. This reality is however to be understood in a sense distinct from what the later systematised Vedānta assigns to that term. A thing that is real need not therefore be eternal. For we are told that prior to creation the world was absolutely non-existent: compare—Naiveha kiṁchanā'gra āsīt (Bṛih. I. ii. 1), Nā'nyat kiṁchana mishat (Ait. Up. i. 1), Asad vā idam agra āsīt (Tait. Up. II. 7), Asad evedam agra āsīt (Chh. Up. III. 19. 1), and other passages. It is thus a clear case of a creation out of non-existence, and nowhere is there any ground for the suspicion that the act of creation and the creation itself is to be thought of as an illusion. In texts of the Second and particularly of the Third Group however the conception is fundamentally altered. Bṛih. I. iv. 7 speaks of the world prior to creation as being in avyākṛita* or non-manifest form, the Śvetāśvatara (i. 15 f.) furnishing the analogy of the existence of oil in sesame-seed or of ghee in milk or curds. Chhāndogya vi. 2, as is well known, goes further and actually controverts the earlier positions above quoted by asking the fundamental question: How can existence ever spring out of sheer non-existence? This is the final view of orthodox Vedānta, only, our texts are still prepared to call the world both real and eternal. And if there is to be maintained, concurrently with this, the theory of absolute Monism, the world will have to be conceived as the (real) power, or the will, or the energy of the Absolute, which is not distinct from the Absolute itself. That this power is only phenomenal, a mere māyā that is contingent upon a percipient, is a doctrine that is for the first time clearly adumbrated only in late texts of the Third Group like Bṛih. IV. v. 15.

8. CORRESPONDING SHIFT IN THE FIRST PRINCIPLE.—It is interesting to note how there has taken place a gradual change in the starting-point of the creative process *pari passu* with this progressive systematisation in the Upanishadic cos-

* The Maitrāyaṇīya gives "avyāhṛita," unuttered or beyond expression, as a variant.

mologies. The Early Vedic speculation rarely rose beyond the purely physical principles like Water, Air, Fire and, later, the more abstract Ākāśa or Ether. These naturally were not expected to satisfy the inquiring mind for any length of time, as they all lacked more or less the self-initiated movement, which is the very first qualification demanded in an ἀρχή. You have accordingly either to put a divinity into the physical element—an adhishṭhānadevatā (which the Brāhmaṇas continually do)—or else make the physical element in question merely the first product of a Power which is superior to it and which fills it. The earlier sacrificial divinities like Indra, Varuṇa, or Vāyu—conceived as they were in far too anthropomorphic a colouring—were obviously unsuited to play this exalted rôle any longer. Ṛita or Law was far too abstract, and the neither-Nonbeing-nor-Being of the Nāsadīyasūkta (Rigveda x. 129) was far too elusive. Other claimants for the honour that were tried and found wanting were Daksha (Rv. x. 72), Dhātṛi (Rv. x. 190), Hiraṇyagarbha (Rv. x. 121), Vāch (Rv. x. 125), and Viśvakarman (Rv. x. 81-82), as also, in the later period, the ritualistic entities like Śraddhā, Bṛihas- or Brahmaṇas- pati, and the Yajña-purusha (Rv. x. 90)—not to mention the still later Ātharvaṇic entities like Rohita (Atharvaveda xiii. 3) or Uchchhishṭa (Av. xi. 7) or Skambha (Av. x. 7) or Odana and the rest. It was the partly ritualistic and partly mythological figure of Prajāpati, the Lord of Creation, that managed, during the major part of the Brāhmaṇa period, to hold the ground, as satisfying to some extent the needs of both the lay mind and that of the philosopher-priest. During the Upanishadic period we find this pre-eminence of Prajāpati fast disappearing. He is brought in as the First Principle in the texts of the first or Brāhmaṇic Group like Ait. Āraṇyaka II. i. 3 or Chhāndogya ii. 23.2, but thereafter he is supplanted by Ātman (A. Ā. ii. 4. 1–3, Bṛih. i. 4. 1–6), or by Brahman which comes to be, as in Tait. Up. ii. 1–5, synonymous with Ātman, or by Purusha (Muṇḍaka I. i. 7–8, II. i. 3 ff., Praśna vi. 3., etc.), or, towards the end of the period, by Sat (Chhāndogya vi. 2–3), and even by Tamas (Maitrāyaṇī v. ii). It will thus be noted that what the cosmology of the period gained by affording a more

and more consistent and systematic pedigree of creation it practically lost by postulating a growingly abstract and elusive Principle as the starting point of the whole process.

9. REVIEW OF PRAJĀPATI'S CAREER AS THE FIRST PRINCIPLE.—It would be interesting in this connection to trace the origins of the concept of Prajāpati, the 'Protector of the Peoples' and the 'Lord of the Projeny', and to follow in our late Vedic and Brāhmaṇic texts the vicissitudes of his fortunes as the First Author of the creation. Originally, Prajāpati was no more than an abstract epithet almost on a par with words like 'gopāḥ' or 'trātā', and applied indifferently to Savitṛi (Rv. iv. 53. 2), Indra (Rv. ix. 5. 9), and other gods. In portions of the later Veda, and especially in the tenth Maṇḍala of the Rigveda, we see him assume a more or less marked individuality and so brought into relation with the procreative function in Nature. The consequence was that when the world-genesis began to be conceived as a creative process, Prajāpati naturally played the part of the World-creator as well as World-protector, being made synonymous in nature and function with the earlier abstractions such as Tvashṭṛi, Dhātṛi, and Viśvakarman. This led to an arresting of the growth of anthropomorphic myths (e. g. his incest with his daughter, A. B. III. 33, Ś. B. I. vii. 4. 1, etc.) which had begun to gather around him as soon as he assumed an individuality. Once assigned the exalted rôle of the Creator Prajāpati continued to remain an omniform deity which was held to discharge the function of the World-creator the better the more nebulous he became. Bearing in mind the root-idea of the conception, we can well understand how towards the end of the Late-vedic and the commencement of the Early-brāhmaṇic period Prajāpati came to be identified with the Year (Saṁvatsara) as being the normal period of gestation, and thence with Time considered in the abstract, and also with the Sun (=Rohita or the Ruddy-one, in Atharvaveda xiii. 1–3 and in Tait. Br. II. v. 2. 1–8) as the author of Time, as well as with the Virile Bull (=Anaḍvān, in Atharvaveda iv. 11) as being an outstanding type of the male-energy. The mythological conception of Prajāpati which had thus begun to be formulated towards the end of the Late-vedic

period, before it could assume the philosophical form of an ἀρχή in the Upanishadic period, had however to pass through a ritualistic stage for which the Brāhmaṇa texts are mainly responsible. They seized with avidity the rising conception of a new First Principle and used it for their own sacerdotal purposes by using him as both a sanction and an explanation of their numberless ritualistic practices small no less than large. This was rendered all the more easy inasmuch as in the earlier ritual such as that of the Somayāga Prajāpati was never assigned any significant rôle. He was therefore free to play any superior or inferior rôle to suit the convenience of theoretic theology. Instances of how this was done we have already quoted above (pp. 66ff.); and many more can easily be added. This ritualistic rôle, while on the one hand it prevented Prajāpati from being a prominent figure in the Vedic mythology, resulted, on the other hand, in weakening his character as a philosophical First Principle. In fact all through our period Prajāpati seems to remain hovering between a full-fledged ἀρχή and a down-right ritualistic category. Even in the great hymn to the Unknown God (Rv. X. 121) it is worth noting that Prajāpati, although elevated to the position of the World-creator, was yet conceived of as the Golden Embryo floating upon Waters, which have accordingly to be conceived as a principle existing independently of him, although in the same breath he is said to have "generated the glittering waters." In Taittirīya Saṁ. VII. i. 5. 1 we are told: "Waters indeed was all this in the beginning, the ocean. In it Prajāpati, as Wind, produced movement. And therein he saw this Earth, and becoming a Boar he seized it, and as the Viśvakarman he drained it, and it extended and became this Earth. And thereafter Prajāpati laboured upon the Earth and produced the gods: Vasus, and Rudras, and Ādityas." Likewise a passage from the Śatapatha (XI i. 6. 1) unambiguously speaks of the Waters as having produced, after a year's *tapas*, the Golden Egg from which in time sprang forth the man-shaped Prajāpati, Bṛihadāraṇyaka V. v. 1–4 further identifying this Golden Egg with the Truth (Satyam), and Prajāpati himself with the Brahman. Elsewhere Prajāpati is said to have created the world, and

through love entered inside the creatures *in order to be from them reborn* (Prajāpatiḥ prajāḥ srishṭvā premṇānuprāviśat, tābhyaḥ punaḥ sambhavitum—Tait. Saṁ. V. ii. 2. 1), his body in fact forming the substance out of which the creatures are produced (Tait. Br. I. vii. 1. 5). Thus even passages claiming for Prajāpati the status of a veritable First Principle pointed to a something beyond which was independent of Prajāpati's creative activity ; and this holds true as much of a passage like the Ait. Āraṇ. II. i. 3-4 which we have assigned to our First or Early-Brāhmaṇic Group and where Brahman, as a more or less independent entity, enters the Purusha which was the highest essence (retas) generated by Prajāpati, as of a passage (assigned by us to the Third Group) like Bṛih. III. 6 or Tait. II. 8, where Prajāpati's world (loka) and Prajāpati's bliss (ānanda) are declared to be lower than those of Brahma ; and most pronouncedly so of a still later text like Maitrā. II. 5, where Prajāpati, who in Brih. III. 9. 17 was declared to be the Devatā within the Purusha, becomes now synonymous with the Soul inside all the beings (Chetāmātraḥ pratipurushaḥ Kshetrajñaḥ saṁkalpādhyavasāyābhimānaliṅgaḥ Prajāpatir Viśvākhyaḥ), or Bṛih. V. 3, where Prajāpati is straight-way identified with the Heart within (hṛidaya), the culmination of this process of the progressive effacement of Prajāpati being reached by some of our latest texts like Maitrā. VI. 15, or VII. 7, where Prajāpati once again becomes a mere epithet predicable of the Highest Principle. — *Pari passu* with this cosmological downfall of Prajāpati we have also to notice a waning even of his ritualistic significance. An Upanishadic text of the First Group, e. g., Ait. Ār. III. ii. 6, speaks of Prajāpati's being helped in his cosmological function by ritualistic entities like the Metres, while another text of the Second Group, e. g., Chh. IV. 17, details the manner in which Prajāpati, through successive Tapas, produced from the Earth its essence Agni, from Agni its essence the Ṛichas, and from the Ṛichas their essence the syllable 'Bhūḥ' ; and in a like fashion from the Mid-region and the Sky, by the mediation of the Wind and the Yajus and of the Sun and the Sāmans, the other two syllables of 'Bhuvaḥ' and 'Svar'. But this is practically all that our texts have to

speak of Prajāpati even in his ritualistic aspect. He has evidently become, towards the conclusion of the Upanishadic period, a personality of the past; and if he appears in Chhān. VIII. 7-12 or in Brih. V. 2 as the teacher of Indra and Virochana, or as the Father of Gods, Men, and Asuras, who calls upon his children—through 'Da-Da-Da' the voice of Thunder—to practise self-control (dāmyata), charity (datta), and mercy (dayadhvam),—that is no more than just an echo of the past. Prajāpati's career as the First Principle ends by his being ultimately levelled down to the rank of a somewhat shadowy and uninteresting member of the Vedic Pantheon.*

10. ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF BRAHMAN.—From Prajāpati we pass on to Brahman which in time supplanted him. The concept of Brahman is the pivot on which the whole of Vedānta philosophy turns, and different theories are put forth to explain not only its ultimate significance but also its original denotation. Hitherto the most widely accepted view as regards the origin of the concept has been that of Böhtlingk-Roth, who set down as the primary meaning of the term—(1) "the godward striving devotion that appears as a passionate longing or as an exhuberance of spirit, particularly that pious expression of it in the service of the divine." From thence the term was supposed to denote (2) the holy symbol or formula, especially, the potent word of magic; and, from thence again, (3) the sacred learning or theology as embodying the same. This view has been in substance adopted by Geldner who gives as the primary meaning of the word " the inward vigour or ecstatic emotion (often induced by the ceremonious partaking of the Soma and the like)

* Oldenberg (Die Weltanschauung der Br. Texte, p. 32) aptly characterises Prajāpati as having been no more than " an apex to the Pantheon set up by the priesthood; a god moving to and fro with each breeze of fantasy and readily yielding before every caprice of the school: by no means a live god who manifests his power in the inner life of men, in their struggles, sufferings, and conquests,—such a god as Śiva later came to be. Hence it was that Prajāpati also lost his pre-eminent position—in so far as he had ever possessed one—quickly, and apparently without leaving any trace of it behind. The Early Buddhistic and Epic literatures furnish testimony to the same."

of which one becomes possessed when about to perform a deed of valour or achieve an inspired act of piety ;" by Deussen who gives "prayer conceived as the will of man striving upwards towards the holy or the divine" as the first denotation of the word, deriving it in this sense from the root *bṛih* to swell ; as also by Bergaigne, Lanman, and many others.—Slightly different from this is the view put forth by Haug and eventually followed by Wackernagel, Pischel, Hillebrandt, Söderblom Osthoff, Oldenberg, Strauss, and others. Haug derived the word from *bṛih* to grow or to be strong, the word originally denoting growth or upward extension, and thence enlarged in conception so as to denote "anything raised upward, be it the hand, the offering, the twig of holy *barhis* or *baresman*, or the prayer objectively conceived." As Griswold (who works out the implications of Haug's view) points out, this *objective* prayer or holy word led the way to the conception of the *subjective* bráhman in the sense of holy wisdom, and from thence to the *immanent* Bráhman in the form of "a latent power, like electricity, which is not only stirred up or rendered active at the time of the performance of a holy ceremony with the help of the hymns, chants, utensils of worship and other contributory apparatus, but which is also exhibited as the transcendent energy that produces the world-order." This view of the bráhman as a mysterious magical potence was strengthened by appeals to the universal belief of most primitive peoples (compare "the mana" of the Malenesians, "the orenda" of the Hurons, "the divine-fluid" amongst the Egyptians, etc.)* in the existence of some sort of a magic-fluid (Zauberfluidum) which the expert magician or the medicine-man summons up and pours out in the act of effecting a prayer, an incantation, or a cure. † Oldenberg, the most

* Oldenberg suggests also a correspondence between 'bráhman' and Irish 'bricht'=magic, or Icelandic 'bragr'=poetry.

† According to Hillebrandt, Bṛihaspati or Brahmaṇaspati was primarily such a magician, who naturally came to be identified with the "dread wizard Moon who pursues his work in darkness and continually changes his aspects." It is through this identification with the Moon that Bṛihaspati came to be equated with the Dakshiṇāgni which is deposited in an altar shaped like the crescent.

staunch defender of this 'magic' theory, unfortunately changed his views. In an essay presented by him some four years before his death he says—"the word *Bráhman* cannot be traced back originally to the conception of a certain 'fluid' which dwells alike in the holy word, the holy ritual, and the holy man. The root idea in the term is rather the holy word. By the side of this real concrete word there arose the hypostatising of the sacred and magical wisdom concerning specific formulæ. It is only inasmuch as the holy word was seen to be living and working in the priest, in the sacrifice, and in the cosmic existence that *bráhman* began to appear as a potence which constitutes the essence of the Brahmins and which regulates all cosmic happenings. In Bráhman we have to see an Indian expression to denote the conception of that world-pervading, mysterious, supernatural power which to-day students of Comparative Religion prefer to name by the Malenesian term 'Mana.' *Bráhman* in fact has *become* alike to the 'Mana.' Originally however it *was* something different." — Hertel who is the latest writer in the field takes objection to most of the views of his predecessors on the ground that they seem to him to have imported into the term *bráhman* certain ethical ideas of modern Christian religiosity, such as holiness, devotion, piety, and the like, or per contra, certain equally inapplicable primitive notions of Zauberfluidum and the like, which were very probably quite unknown to the Vedic age and hardly consonant with the actual data. On a careful examination of the Brāhmaṇic and Upanishadic passages as also certain indications in the Avestic and other Indo-Germanic religions, Hertel comes to the conclusion that the word Bráhman is to be derived from the root *bhrāj*, Greek φλέγω, Latin *fulgeo*=to shine, and denoted originally 'fire' (including under that conception 'warmth' as well as 'light') or some kind of a fiery substance* which was believed not only to

* In the derivation of the word from *bhrāj* Hertel was partly anticipated by Henry, who took the word to originally signify the radiance and other qualities of the Sun. Max Müller's identification of Bṛihaspati with fire (Science of Mythology, Vol. II, p. 835ff.) was based upon the constant identification of fire with priest, the holy reciter of brahman, the prayer. Agni and Bṛihaspati are both described as the best amongst the Aṅgirasas,

underlie all exhibitions of force or energy in the world without, but of which a person becomes aware as a 'glow within him (cp. brahma-varchas)' whenever he is moved by some passion or impulse or inspiration,—the most outstanding example of the same being the stream of light (physically understood) that issues from the body of king Jānaśruti Pautrāyaṇa and illumines the sky at night, burning any one that dared to touch it (Chhā. Up. IV. 2). That the Upanishadic texts conceive of the 'Absolute Ātman' as a sort of a fire-light substance follows, according to Hertel, not only from the Janaka-Yājñavalkya discussion (Bṛi. Up. IV. 3. 2ff.) as to "kiṁ-*jyotir* ayam Purushaḥ" but from several other direct statements and identifications of the Brahman with the fire or the sun or the bodily-warmth, as in Chh. Up. III. 13. 7–8, III. 19. 1, VIII. 3. 4, Muṇḍaka II. ii. 8, Kaṭha II. ii. 15, Praśna I. 6, etc. But this view, as has been pointed out, fails to account for the fact, in the first place, that the word Bráhman in the majority of the Rigvedic texts* should have denoted nothing more than a hymn or prayer† which, according to Hertel, is only a tertiary meaning of the term; that the word, in the second place, should have been used in the neuter gender while fire is normally in the masculine; that, further, Bṛihas- or Brahmaṇas- pati should ever have come to be regarded as a distinct personality when, as required by the theory, he originally denoted nothing more than Dyaus-pati; and that finally, with the postulated pre-eminence of the fire-light notion, we should at all find in some Brāhmaṇic and Upanishadic texts not only entities like Water and Wind spoken of as the 'Bráhman', but that even the sun and the lightning be declared therein, in so many words, as constituting merely the

* As a clear and typical example it may suffice to cite Rigveda VI. 38. 3–4, where half-a-dozen synonyms of 'prayer are associated with brahman.

† That other synonyms of 'prayer' such as 'ṛich', 'arka', 'dhī', 'dhīti', etc. also primarily signify flame, ray, or light is nothing to the point, because there are still other synonyms where such alleged primary denotation cannot be proved, and there is besides the possibility of the 'brilliance' of the prayers being understood as 'purity.' And the same may hold true in the case of the concepts of 'tapas' or 'brahmavarchas.'

'ādeśāḥ,' i. e., forms of expression or symbols, of the Absolute Bráhman (cp. Kena II. 2, 3–4, Chh. Up. III. 19. 1). In texts like Brihad. II. 1, or Kaushītaki IV, and most definitely in the Ārsheya Upanishad (translated by us for the first time, pp. 297ff. above), we find that the entities that are declared to be 'not-Brahman' are not, some of them, devoid of the 'fiery nature': Brahman in such text clearly seems to have been understood as something beyond the merely physical phenomenon of fire-light; as constituting, that is to say, not only the sum-total of them all, but as their mysterious basis. It, in fact, designates in such contexts some mystic fund of energy whose workings are in evidence no less in the flash of lightning, the flame of fire, or the glow of the sun, than in the breath of life, the birth of an idea, or the thrill of an ecstatic emotion. That the physical effects of 'fire-light' and the psychological and spiritual effects of Intelligence or Brahma-varchas were felt to be similar is evidenced by the daily use in almost all languages of expressions corresponding to the 'glow' or 'light' of reason, the 'illumination' of the mind, etc.; and the Vedāntic formulas of 'Aham Brahmâsmi' and 'Sarvaṁ khalv idam Brahma' may be said to give expression to this very fact. But whether we can go beyond this and assert that *originally* ' Brahman ' denoted the physical 'fire-light' remains for the present at any rate a question. Hertel's view does indeed serve to clearly bring into relief the significance of the worship of the Sun, the Fire, and of Rudra-Śiva and other luminaries in the evolution of the pantheistic monism during the earliest period of Indian Philosophy. This is conceded on all hands; and we may even agree that on that view we may obtain satisfactory answer to some at least of the questions which he poses in his "Die Methode der arischen Forschung" p. 14f. But one and the same key may not be trusted to unlock everything. In our review of the Brāhmaṇic philosophy we already saw how there was in evidence there a tentative, hesitating approach towards the identity of the macrocosm with the microcosm (pp. 71f., above), of which the above Vedāntic formulas seem to be the natural culmination. Such being the ultimate development of the denotation of the term, and with its starting point—so far

at least as the Indian data go—being given by the normal Rigvedic use of bráhman in the sense of prayer—a use which hardly admits of being seriously called into question—it seems to us impossible fully to acquiesce in the views of Hertel no less than that of Oldenberg as to be the primary denotation of the term. That, we are afraid, must remain an object for future investigation, if indeed we must needs delve underneath the Rigvedic equation 'bráhman=prayer' to ascertain the root of the term. It is of course impossible to think that the root-idea of the word was an abstract conception like 'fervour of inspiration' or the like. The word must have at first denoted some concrete fact or phenomenon of outward life which was connected in some way or the other with divine worship; and towards the end of the Vedic and the beginning of the Brāhmaṇic period, the word seems to have been imbued with certain magico-mystical notions which, as we have already seen, had so vitally affected the general outlook of that period.*

11. EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT.—Apart from the question of the origin of the concept of Brahman, it is interesting to trace the gradual accretions in its sense until the Rigvedic bráhman=prayer came to denote the Upanishadic Bráhman=Absolute. The transition in sense from bráhman meaning an isolated prayer to bráhman, the Veda, as being the storehouse (corpus canonicum) of such prayers, or to the totality of all such

* Possibly a safer *via media* would be to postulate a twofold evolution of the idea of brahman. As a *substance* brahman may have denoted the Fire-light essence to which the Avestic and some of the Indian data seem to point, and which came in course of time to be identified with the Absolute. But the Rigvedic use of the term as prayer and the Ātharvaṇic use of it as a magic formula, and its Brāhmaṇic elevation into the mystic power of the sacrifice and even into the mystic cosmic force may equally well represent another line of advance, more subjective or introspective than the other. Because these two lines eventually converged we need not necessarily suppose that they had one common starting-point. It is perhaps possible to think that, at a particular stage, fire may have been supposed to contain the Zauberfluidum *par excellence* and so taken to be the most important denotation of the term brahman. But the other process by which the substance fire could have come down in our earliest texts to mean 'prayer' passes our comprehension.

prayers belonging to all times whatsoever, is easily to be explained; and it is in this sense that we are told (Tait. Saṁ. VII. iii. 1. 4)—" Parimitā vā ṛichaḥ parimitāni sāmāni parimitāni yajūṁshy athaitasyaivānto nāsti yad Brahma (Finite are the hymns, finite the chants, finite the ritual-formulæ : to what constitutes *bráhman* however there is no end)." Compare also the well-known story of Bharadvāja (Tait. Br. III. x. ii. 3-4)—

> For three life-lengths, forsooth, Bharadvāja devoted himself to Vedic studies. Indra approached him who was lying down aged and infirm and asked: 'Bharadvāja, were I to vouchsafe to thee a forth life-length, what wilt thou do with it?'—' Therewith I shall just devote myself again to Vedic studies,' he answered. Indra showed him three mountain-like heaps all of which the sage had yet to learn, and took out a handful from each of them and calling Bharadvāja by name he said: " These are indeed the Vedas : the Vedas are infinite. What thou hast learnt with three life-lengths is just this much. The rest of it is yet to be learnt by thee."

The story then concludes by Indra's teaching the sage what is known as the ' Sāvitrāgnividyā ' and granting him immortality. This infinite Veda was naturally invested with infinite power, and came to be in fact regarded as the source and fountain-head of all the mystic potency of the sacrifice. In the same way, when in a ' henotheistic' mood, the priest wanted to confer highest power and potency upon any one specific formula or ritualistic detail, he would naturally designate it as the very Brahman. Thus we read (Tait. Br. II. ii. 1. 4)—" Etad vai Devānām paramaṁ guhyam Brahma yach Chaturhotāraḥ" or " Vyāhṛitayaḥ Brahman (Ś. B. II. i. 4. 10 ff.)," or " Uktham Brahma (Kaushī. Up. II. 6 : comp. Ait. Ār. II. i. 2)," or " Om iti Brahma (Tait. Up. I. 8. 1)," or, finally, "Brahma yajñaḥ (Ś. B. III. i. 4. 15)." Compare also the metaphor in Atharvaveda IX. 6. 1f : "whoever may know the manifest *bráhman*, with the *sambhāras* for the joints, the *ṛichas* for the spine, the *sāmans* for the hair, the *yajus* for the heart, the *havis* for the straw-bed," etc. — It was only a step from this to consider the (true) bráhman as some-

thing beyond the Trayī made up of Rik-Yajus-Sāman, the latter being designated the "apara" or the lower Brahman, or as the Nāma- or Śabda- bráhman. Compare Muṇḍaka I. i. 4–5, Maitrā. VI. 22, or Chh. Up. VII. 1. 2 ff. — An important stage in this process of evolution was reached when, following the general tendency of the Brāhmaṇic philosophy of the sacrifice at this period, "Bráhman" came to be endowed with a concrete individuality so that Bráhman denoted the prayer or the ritual personified and also the class and function of the priest taken as a whole. It was thereafter inevitable that, when sacrifice came to be regarded as a cosmological force (as in the Purusha-sūkta, Rigveda X. 90, and later Brāhmaṇa texts), bráhman which was the whole sacrifice in miniature should be assigned a significant rôle in the production of the universe, nay, should even be identified with all exhibitions of power in the world outside. * Thus in the concluding portion of the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, in the text known as "Brahmaṇaḥ Parimaraḥ," Brahman is said to be the Wind into which the five divinities of Lightning, Rain, Moon, Sun, and Fire are merged in death, and out of which they later emerge in life—the Wind being later also identified with the Breath or Prāṇa in man, as in the Saṁvarga-vidyā (Chh. Up. IV. iii). More frequent is the identification of Brahman with the Fire, and particularly with the Sun: Compare (Ś. B. VII. iv. 1. 14, XIV. i. 3. 3)—"This Sun here is the Bráhman that, as the first (prathamam), is born day after day in the east (purastāt)," or (ibid, VIII. v. 3. 7)—"This that is the Bráhman, that is this orb here that shines." The words 'prathamam' and 'purastāt' of the original hymn on which the Brāhmaṇa text first quoted is an exegesis are also rendered (e. g. in Atharvaveda IV. i. 1) by '[was born] in the beginning (purastāt) as the first object of creation,' thereby raising bráhman to the position of the Demiurge. Several cosmological texts from the Brāhmaṇas make use of Bráhman in this capacity, although they never completely forget the relation of the word to the holy prayer or formula.

* It is as well to point out in this connection that the other line of the denotation of brahman as the 'Fire-light substance' may have materially quickened this process.

Thus the Śatapatha (X. iii. 5. 11) tells us that there is nothing earlier and nothing higher than Bráhman (apūrvam, aparavat); that it sustains the heaven and the earth (VIII. iv. 1. 3); that it is the substrate of yon Sun, although itself consisting of just seven syllables (X. ii. 4. 6); or, further (X. iv. 1. 9), that it is all that there is or is to be, and yet is merely just one syllable (Om). We have already seen (page 68, above) how in cosmological texts with Prajāpati as the First Principle bráhman or the triple science (trayī vidyā) is said to be the first fruit of Prajāpati's cosmogenic activity through *tapas.* In other passages Prajāpati is declared to be the same as Bráhman: Bráhma vai Prajāpatiḥ (Ś. B. XIII. vi. 2. 8), the culmination of the process being reached in texts in which Brahman straightway assumes the rôle of Prajāpati (Ś. B. xi. ii. 3. 1ff.; above pp. 68 f.) or, as the 'svayambhu' or self-subsisting principle of the world, even lords it over him. This theistic position of Bráhman becomes in time pantheistic through texts (such as Ś. B. XIII. vii. 1. 1) which tell us that, finding the mere practice of *tapas* unavailing, Bráhman makes an offering of itself into the beings, and of the beings into itself (something like the Upanishadic 'anupraveśa'), or through texts which speak of Bráhman as being the material cause—the wood and the tree—out of which the world was fashioned (Tait. Br. II. viii. 9. 6–7). Compare also the following (ibid. III. xii. 9)—

All forms, they say, from the *ṛiks* are born;
All movement forsooth belongs to *Yajus*;
All vitality springs indeed from *Sāman*;
It is Bráhman that has fashioned the whole world.

The final stage in this philosophical apotheosis of Bráhman is its identification with the Ātman, with the Soul within. The "Bandhutā" philosophy of the Brāhmaṇas had already taught men to look for correspondences between the world within and the world without; and when the latter was realised as being permeated by one common source of energy, it required no extra thinking to identify that outward source of energy with the vital energy that we feel working within us as a unitary force.*

* Compare the discussion of the 'Chatushpād' Brahman in Chhā. III, 18.

12. REVIEW OF THE UPANISHADIC STATEMENTS ABOUT BRAHMAN.—The various stages in the evolution of the concept of Bráhman set forth in the preceding paragraphs were already completed in the late-Brāhmaṇic period, so that we find Bráhman spoken of as the enlivening principle within us and so placed above the World-creator or Prajāpati even in the earliest of our Upanishadic texts: Ait. Āraṇ. II. 14 (cp. also Ait. Up. iii. 13). Yet the majority of the texts of the first two Groups are prone to refer to the earlier denotations of 'Bráhman.' Thus the well-known myth in the latter half of the Kena speaks of Bráhman as the true source of the energy by means of which the fire burns, the wind blows, and Indra performs his vaunted exploits. It is a mystic potence whose rapidity and efficiency is symbolised by the lightning or the mind of man.* In Chhāndogya iii. 19 Bráhman is identified with the Sun, in connection with which the sound 'ulūlavaḥ' which the Sun is said to make while rising may be possibly reminiscent of some sound like 'hallelujaḥ' used in the worship of the 'Most High' by some primitive peoples. The more abstract entity of Ākāśa is also directly identified with the Absolute in texts like Chh. I. 9. 1, III. 12. 7–9; contrast with them texts like Bṛih. II. i. 5 or III. 7. 12. We have also in these groups of texts regular Bráhman-cosmology (see esp. Bṛih. I. iv). At the same time references to the 'Śabda' aspect of the Bráhman are not wanting. Ait. Ār. III. ii. 3 speaks for instance of the Person in the form of Metres, of whom the letter 'a' is the essence, as also of the Person in the form of the Veda of whom 'Brahmā' is the essence, while Bāshkala 3 uses bráhman in the sense of Brāhmaṇic potence, and Bṛih. I. iv. 11 employs the word to denote priesthood in general. It is in the texts of the Third or the 'Upanishadic' Group properly so called that the idea of the Bráhman is fully developed and expressed. We have here, in the first place, a series of allied texts like the Bālāki-Ajātaśatru dialogue in Bṛih. II. i. 1-20 and Kaushītaki iv. 1-20, Śākalya-Yājñavalkya dialogue in Bṛihad. III. ix. 10-11, Janaka-Yājñavalkya dialogue in Bṛihad. IV. 1-2, the Vaiśvānara-vidyā in

* Compare also Bṛih. V. 7, and particularly Kaushītaki II. 12.

Chhāndogya V. 11, and above all these the Ārsheya Upanishad, where a number of incomplete views about the Bráhman (i. e., views which identify Bráhman with some solitary fact or phenomenon of the outer or the inner world) are rejected and Bráhman declared be the one in-dwelling ātman, the honey,* so to say, in the whole universe, and the goal of all our wanderings† and aspirations. Next we have a clear-cut distinction formulated between the lower and the higher aspects of Bráhman (cp. Bṛih. Up. II. iii; Chap. V, § 8) and the highest or transcendent form of it declared to be beyond all qualities, infinite, and immutable (Kaṭha I. iii. 15, Śvet. vi. 11, 19) and expressible only in negative terms—'Neti-Neti' (Bṛih. II. iii. 6., III. ix. 26, IV. ii. 4, IV. iv. 22, IV. v. 15). In the third place, we have a consistent identification of the Bráhman without with the Ātman within together with a correlation of the psychological faculties in the microcosm and the physical entities of the macrocosm fully brought out in texts like Chhāndogya VI, Bṛih. Up. II. v. and Kaushītaki ii. 12f. Moreover we have several texts (to be fully discussed in subsequent sub-sections of this Chapter) where the method of knowing the Brahman-Ātman through the 'States of the Soul' and of realising him through Yogic or mystic contemplation is set forth summarily as also in details. Finally, the category of Bráhman is either dropped out or relegated to a subordinate position as Brahmā or Prajāpati, the Demiurge (Muṇḍaka I. i. 1, Śvet. vi. 18, etc.), and a sort of a theistic view imposed upon the Absolute (considered either as the Ātman or the Akshara) in texts like the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā (Chh. III. 14), Śvetāśvatara iii-iv, and Maitrā. v—the last two texts belonging to Group Four. In conclusion it may be noted that the formal definitions of Bráhman, the great majority of Vedāntic utterances (Mahāvākyas), and the full-fledged theory about the immutable Absolute which is beyond the categories of space, time and causality‡ was evolved—barring an occasional anticipation in

* Chh. III. 1-11. † Kausb. Up. I. 7.

‡ Compare. Bṛih. Up. III. 8. 7 and IV. 2. 4 ; Maitrāyaṇīya VI. 17 ; Bṛih. IV. 4. 16f; Śvetāśvatara VI. 5; Maitrā. VI. 15; Chh. VI. 1; Bṛih. IV. 4. 20 ; and many other texts.

the earlier Groups or a sporadic reminiscence in the latest Group—in the texts falling under what we have designated as Group Three, which represents the typical Upanishadic conception of the term Bráhman in its strictly philosophical form.

13. ĀTMAN AS THE FIRST PRINCIPLE.—The culminating point of Upanishadic philosophy is reached with the recognition of the Ātman or the Self as the highest cosmological principle. The word ātman is variously derived. Böhtlingk-Roth derive it from *an* = to breathe, assuming breath as the primary significance of the term, from whence it came to mean the soul or life which lasts as long as the breath lasts, as also, somewhat figuratively, the self or the essence of a thing. Others derive it from *at*=to wander, with a presumable reference to the wanderings of the soul in different lives according to the theory of transmigration, as also, less probably from *av*=to blow. The word ātman in the sense of wind or breath does occur some 3 or 4 times in the Rigveda, and, if derived from *an*, its Indo-European correlates, would be the Greek ἀτμός and German *atmen* = to breathe. But inasmuch as the Rigveda exhibits a more frequent use of *tman* in place of Ātman as the reflexive pronoun in the sense of 'one's self', it has been plausibly urged by Deussen that Ātman is really a euphonically extended form of *tman*; and we in fact meet with the use of *tman* presumably in place of the Ātman in texts like the Kaṭha Up. (I. iii. 12)—*Esha sarveshu bhūteshu gūḍho tmā na prakāśate.** It seem to us quite probable that both these ideas have an equal share in the making up of the ultimate denotation of the term Ātman. The connection of 'breath' or 'wind' with the soul is evident enough. As to the other derivation Deussen supposes that *tman* (originally denoting 'that[t] me[ma]'), may have come to signify one's own proper self or essence, this being considered, according to the stage of speculation reached, as identical with the body, the trunk of the body, the breath, (prāṇa), the mind (manas), the energizing principle (asu) the

* Usually explained as *atmā*, the shortening of the initial vowel being regarded as a Vedic irregularity. It may well be that *gūḍho* instead of *gūḍhas* is that irregularity, if at all there is to be any irregularity in the matter.

soul (jīva), or, finally, the abstract self or being, the innermost essence. Deussen points out that from the very first Ātman so understood was a somewhat relative and negative conception. It is the man's own body as contrasted with the world without, the trunk of the body as contrasted with the exterior limbs, the vital energy that remains over and above the bodily organism and the presence or absence of which makes all the distinction between a living person and the corpse. When it was sought to ignore the relative character of the concept and to think of the Ātman as an individuality irrespective of any reference to the body or the sheaths within which it dwells, we find another term, Purusha, used for the purpose* ; and it is interesting to observe that it is this term, rather than the Ātman, which was later appropriated by the Sāṁkhyas to designate the (individual) soul, who, according to that system, had no *real* relation to the physiological and the psychological apparatus called the "liṅgaśarīra." Now, whatever the derivation of the term, it is obvious that to enunciate the Ātman or the inward Self as the First Cause of the world without constitutes a really venturesome philosophical doctrine, involving as it does the realisation of the great truth that the Energy that we feel throbbing within us is identical in essence with the Energy that sets the world around us moving, howsoever diverse the actual effect and direction of that 'inward' and 'outward' movement; and further that the Energy within can evolve and attain a quantitative no less than a qualitative equality with the Source of Energy at the centre of the universe,† so that the inner Self can be actually conceived of as capable of creating and sustaining the whole cosmic process. Deussen believed that such a result could be attained only through introspection or through reflection upon the states of the waking, dreaming, and sleeping man, culminating philosophically into what was known as "Idealism," which he regarded as the one distinctive philosophical contribution of the Upanishads.

* In Bṛih ii. 1, in the Bālāki-Gārgya dialogue, as also in its analogue in Kaush. Up. iv, the word Purusha is however used in the sense of the inward essence or the Ātman.

† Cp. Chh. Up. iii. 14 : "Etam itaḥ pretyābhisambhavitāsmīti."

Now, it must be admitted that the insistence upon the great efficacy of the knowledge of the Ātman in such early Upanishadic texts as the Īśāvāsya, as also the recognition of *manas*, *prajñā* or *vijñāna* as the most essential factor in the Self in texts like Ait. Āraṇ. II. 3 and Bṛih. Up. i. 5, may seem to lend a colour to this view; and it is no doubt true that in the majority of the texts that we have assigned to Group Three, the 'idealistic' trend of the speculation is quite on the surface. But the normal Brāhmaṇic method of postulating psycho-physical correlates and so opposing with each *ādhibhautika* or *ādhidaivika* category an *adhyātma* category possessing similar powers and functions may have just as well led *a priori* to the conception of the Ātman as the ἀρχή, and it might have been only as an afterthought that the difference between the *outer* creative process where the material was a ready-made datum and the *inner* creative process where the Ātman evolved things from out of its own speculative activity—like the spider his web in Muṇḍaka I. i. 7—was noticed and efforts made to transcend the difference by imposing upon the phenomenal world only an ideal existence such as was seen to be possessed by the appearances in the dream. Upanishadic 'idealism' may thus have come towards the end of the process, and not initiated it; and a halting compromise between the Brāhmaṇic theory of correlation between the Ātman within and the Ātman without with a view to their eventual identification, and the strictly idealistic view of the Upanishads which can permit no independent existence of the Ātman 'without' except through error and ignorance is perhaps represented by such of our texts as exhibit a somewhat decided leaning towards the dualistic view, notwithstanding the fact that they eventually transcend it. Finally, in proportion as the philosophical implications of the theory that made Ātman the root-cause of the world came to be realised and formulated, the Ātman—as was to be expected—came to be automatically bereft of all physiological and psychological and even beatific attributes, until we are placed face to face with the 'negativism' and 'solipsism' of the great Yājñavalkya texts which denounce the world as an unreal phantom.

14. REVIEW OF UPANISHADIC STATEMENTS ABOUT THE ĀTMAN: (A) EARLIER TEXTS.—A survey of our sources in their chronological sequence amply testifies to the substantial accuracy of the line of evolution here postulated. Amongst texts of Group One treating of the Ātman as the First Principle prominence naturally belongs to Ait. Āraṇ. ii. 1–3, and here the treatment is based upon the Brāhmaṇic principle of the identity of the correlates. Ātman is here conceived as the five-fold *Uktha*: "He who knows the Ātman as the five-fold *Uktha* from whence all this springs, he knows the thing positively as well as negatively (sam-prati-vid)". As the Earth, the Wind, the Ether, the Waters, and the Luminaries make up the five-fold *Uktha* without, so also the Body, the Breath, the Apertures, the Blood-Mucus-Seed, and Warmth constitute the five-fold *Uktha* within, which is the Ātman. When the correspondence arrived at this stage, it was inevitable that, like the five-fold Elements without, the five-fold Ātman within be considered as the root-cause of creation. The process however is *ritualistic* and not *idealistic*. Now the Elements were seen to produce and nourish —and in fact form the essence or constituents of—plants, trees, and animals. They did the same for the human being, with this difference that they evolved a clearer and a fuller being in man. "For, in plants and trees sap only is seen, in animals (sap as well as) consciousness ...... The Self is more and more clear in man; for he is most endowed with intelligence, he says what he has known, he sees what he has known, he knows to-morrow, he knows the world and what is not the world: by the mortal he desires the immortal, being thus endowed." The cosmology in Bṛihad. Up. I. 2 is also similarly ritualistically conceived, and yet it leads to conclusions like—"The mind within the body is the essence of all vital functions." Chhāndogya works out the *Adhyātma* and the *Ādhidaivata* correlates of the Prāṇa conceived as 'Udgītha' in the clearest possible manner (compare especially I. 7), while the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa X. 3. 4 develops the conception of the Purusha as the Arka (Calotropis gigantia) with the ears for its leaves, eyes for its flowers, nostrils for its pod-leaves, lips for its coops, and teeth, tongue, and food

as its grains, bulge, and root respectively,—concluding with the assertion : *Sa esha Agnir Arko yat Purushaḥ.** —Finally, at the end of the Group, comes the 'gloriously theistic' passage in Śathapatha x. 6. 2 (=Śāṇḍilya-vidyā, earlier form) emphatically declaring the identity in essence of the Self within and the Self without. The passage seems to be an exotic, and is quite free of all ritualistic associations. It can then generally be said that in the majority of the texts assigned by us to Group One, all generalisations about the Ātman seem to follow merely in the wake of the "Bandhutā" philosophy of the Brāhmaṇas.—When we come to the texts belonging to Group Two, the process appears to be reversed, as we seem to *start* with the Ātman ("In the beginning all this was Ātman alone"—Ait. Up. i. 1); eventually however we arrive at the same series of correlations between the elements (Agni), the functions (speech), and the organs (mouth). There is nevertheless a difference. The Ātman is not now conceived as merely coterminus with the Prāṇa, the Mind, or the Intelligence, but transcends them all and exists prior to them and independently of them. Hence although the world as such had, prior to creation, no existence outside the Ātman—had so-to-say constituted one essence with him—yet once the creation is effected, the created world in some way or other constitutes a second entity, an ἕτερος, within which the Ātman deems it necessary to enter ; "for, how indeed would it endure without me ?" Nevertheless, having effected the entrance he looks around and merely realises his own nude self-hood pervading and immanent everywhere. It is in this way that the text plays fast and loose with a monistic and a dualistic view of the world, although the ultimate trend of the passage is unmistakably towards the former.—Like the Aitareya the Taittirīya ii, starts with the Ātman, from which it mentions in succession the creation of Ether–Wind–Fire–Water–Earth–Plants–Food, etc. ; but it seems to make a distinction between the Higher Ātman who is the root-cause and the Purusha, the lower Ātman or the individual soul, who is produced from food

* Compare also Ś. B., X. v. 4. 12, where Ātman is compared to the fire in the *chayana*.

and is enveloped within the five sheaths—each inside the other—of food, breath, mind, intellect, and bliss. Each one of these sheaths is called an Ātman. The text is here unfortunately not quite in order (see p. 98 above), and the interpolated sections 6–8 may have ousted an original section or sections; but so much seems quite evident that inasmuch as the Ātman which starts the cosmology in section 1 is not wholly coterminus with the *annamaya* and the other 'ātmans' which it produces, the distinction which Śaṅkarāchārya makes between the *Ānanda-maya* and the Highest Ātman in his Bhāshya on Brahmasūtra I. i. 19 is not without some justification. The Highest Ātman is thus made to transcend all the phenomenal sheaths, and it requires just one more step to invest him with the character of one who is the unknown knower, or the subject that is always the subject and never the object, as is done by the Kena i–ii. In a like spirit the Chhāgaleya calls the Ātman the driver of the car of the body, the source, in other words, of all impulse and movement, or the "Unmoved Mover." It is worth noting here that not a single passage in the first two Groups sets forth the "dream-approach" to the problem of the Ātman, as is the case with the great majority of the texts falling under Group Three.

15. REVIEW OF UPANISHADIC STATEMENTS ABOUT THE ĀTMAN : (B) LATER TEXTS.—Ātman forms the favoured theme of most of the texts belonging to Group Three. They thus discuss the size and habitat of the Ātman; his functions and characteristics in life and after; the various stages of his eschatological career; his liability to *karman*, *puṇya* and *pāpa*; his immortality; his relation to the bodily organism, to the world without and to the Absolute; his three states; his nature and knowability; as also his essentially negative and transcendent character. But, strange as it may appear, very few of these texts show any interest in cosmology as such. It would seem as though, with the introspective turn given to speculation and with the growing prominence of Yoga or meditation in the major part of the texts of this Group, the world without and the details of the process of its creation ceased to have any attraction to the people. They rather preferred to give up all hanker-

ings for wealth, progeny and the world, and seek solace in the solitudes of the forests, with the " Ātman " alone to occupy all their thoughts. The only cosmological passages belonging to Group Three are : (i) Kaṭha I. iii, where the series of categories: the Senses, the Sense-objects, the Mind, the Intellect (=Buddhi =sattva=jñana-Ātman), the Avyakta (or Non-manifest),* the Ātmā-mahān*, and the Highest Purusha (=Śānta-Ātman= Vishṇoḥ paramam padam), is not conceived from the point of view of cosmology proper, but from the point of view of the former being absorbed into the latter in a rising process of Yogic meditation. (ii) Muṇḍaka I. i, II. i, and III, ii which, despite differences in details, agree in thinking of the creation as an emanatory process similar to the springing forth of hair or nail from the body, sparks from fire, or web from the spider, so that from the point of view of created objects the First Cause might be conceived as the Avyakta, i. e., as their totality in an unmanifested form, while in itself it can be called the Akshara or the Immutable, which is identical with the Purusha inasmuch as the distinction between the subject and the object does not hold good prior to creation. (iii) Śvetāśvatara i, where the distinction between the Lord or the Controller, the individual sentient soul, and the world as a whole which is non-sentient, is most clearly enunciated and at the same time transcended in a " triune-unity " which is designated as the *Brahman.* (iv) Praśna i, which introduces the pair of Rayi and Prāṇa, both offsprings of Prajāpati, and sets forth the whole universe in terms of Rayi and Prāṇa, the universe eventually merging back into Prajāpati. And (v), as coming well towards the end of the period, Maitrā. ii, which draws out the distinction between the Eternal Self and his aṁśa (portion) which is within the individual and which is here designated as the Viśva (cf. Aṁśo'yaṁ yaś chetāmātraḥ† pratipurushaḥ Kshetrajñaḥ saṁkalpādhyavasāyābhimānaliṅgaḥ Prajāpatir Viśvākhyaḥ). In all these texts we notice a steady and unmistakable advance

* The 'Classical Sāṁkhya' differs in merely transposing the order of these two terms and in knocking off the last.

† *Chetā* for *cheto* is one of the mannerisms of the Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā.

towards a view of Reality which we find best represented in the Bhagavad-gītā and which perhaps comes nearest to the view of Rāmānuja. But these texts do not stand all alone. To obtain a correcter view of the cosmological speculations of the period we have in addition to take due note of passages also comprised under Group Three, like: (i) Praśna iv which, while describing the three states of man and how the man every-day is united with the Brahman without being aware of it (ahar-ahar Brahma gamayati), speaks of the total absorption and practical extinction of the whole universe in the Highest and Immutable Ātman (cf. Pṛithivī cha pṛithivīmātrā cha...... chakshuś cha drashṭavyaṁ cha...sarvam para ātmani sampratishṭhate). (ii) Chhā. vi, which insists upon the sole and unitary existence of the Sat or Being alone prior to creation, and which, while detailing the so-called "trivṛitkaraṇa" process, characterises all modifications as having their birth in the word, as being a mere name only, and goes on to say that the whole creation merges into the Sat, as do the individual juices from flowers into the totality we name honey, without retaining any consciousness of it (sati sampadya na viduḥ sati sampadyāmaha iti). And above all (iii) Bṛih. ii. 4 and (iv) Chh. viii. 11, where the funding back of the phenomenal multiplicity into the absolute unity designated as the Ātman comes perilously near what may be designated as 'Acosmism' or 'Negativism,' involving an utter extinction of individuality as such: cf. 'Na pretya saṁjñā'stīti (Bṛiḥ), or Vināśam evā'pīto bhavati (Chh.). These passages, which are the stronghold of Advaita Vedānta, prevent our being quite satisfied with the halting compromise between monism and dualism that is presented by the Viśishṭādvaita theory of a 'triune-unity.' We have then to suppose that both these tendencies were implicit in the speculations of the period: one, looking back to the earlier "Bandhutā" philosophy, the other, looking ahead to the ultimate idealism of the Upanishads. — Group Four offers little that is cosmologically distinctive. It is responsible for introducing a definite reference to the fourth state (Māṇḍūkya 7 and 12, which make explicit what was implied in Chh. Up. viii. 12. 3 ff.), and for the use of the word

'Māyā' (Śvet. iv. 9–10). It also introduces several terms which later became the technicalities of the Sāṁkhya, and shows a decided influence of Yoga and Mysticism. We can accordingly conclude that with the recognition of the Ātman as the ἀρχή there results a distinct waning of interest in cosmology as such, attention being concentrated upon an introspective ascertainment of the nature, powers and functions of the Ātman within and his absorption, in an ecstatic meditation, with the Great Ātman at the centre of the universe.

16. RELATION OF THE CREATOR TO THE CREATION.—The exact relation in which the creation is to stand to the First Principle from which it sprang forth would depend naturally upon the nature of the First Principle itself. The subject has been already considered by us on pp. 339–341 above. The tendency of primitive speculation is towards regarding creation as an actual physical process, whereby the Creater transfers a portion of his own qualities and powers to the object of his creation. This we see exemplified in those Elemental cosmologies (with Ākāśa or Water or Fire as the ἀρχή) where the Ākāśa is said to have 'dissipated' itself into the Wind and other Elements, the Water to have 'hardened' itself into the Earth, or the Fire to have 'perspired' itself into the Water. Attention was here naturally focussed upon such qualities as were common to the cause and its effect, as inhered from the one into the other, and as sufficed—following the "Bandhutā" philosophy of the Brāhmaṇas—to establish a relation of identity between the two. This was merely a ritualistic relation, the failure of which to hold the field for any length of time is illustrated by two subsequent tendencies that established themselves in the cosmological speculations of the next period: one, which advanced from a physical or a physiological First Principle (say, Ākāśa or Prāṇa) to an intellectual and even transcendental First Principle (say, Prajāpati, Brahman, or Ātman); and the other, which made the Creater himself enter into the creation (tat sṛishṭvā tad evānuprāviśat), so as to more readily establish the identity between himself and his own creation. There was however a difficulty inherent in the theory. In the earlier Elemental cos-

mologies each causative step could be conceived more or less as an evolutionary process—whether effected under sentient supervision or not being immaterial—so that the reverse process of involution offered no insuperable difficulties. When however the First Principle was assumed to be some Chetana or sentient Being which may or may not interpenetrate (anupraviś) the creation, the great difficulty arose as to how a sentient First Cause could produce a non-sentient effect, and having somehow produced it, how the effect could be re-absorbed into the cause.* To explain the difficulty we have offered before us, on the one hand, corroborative instances like that of the spider and the web, or the body and the hair or nails, which involve the assumption that the Brahman or the Ātman created the world from out of itself, and which naturally postulate the distinction between the manifect (vyākṛita) and the non-manifest (avyākṛita) — creation being viewed as an emanatory process of manifesting† the non-manifest; or, on the other hand, we have the idealistic assumption that the variety in the world is such a stuff as our dreams are made of, the only reality underlying it all being the sparks or drops or aṁśas which eventually gather together to constitute the First Principle. The logical carrying out of the latter alternative would lead to what came to be later designated as the "Māyāvāda" or even the "Ajātivāda." This is distinctly foreshadowed in the great Yājñavalkya texts (Bṛih. iv. 2. 4, iv. 4. 22, etc.). As another solution of the difficulty we have the absolute opposition of the sentient (jña = akshara = avyakta = bhoktṛi = Hara) with the non-sentient (ajña = kshara = vyakta = bhogya = Pradhāna)—the two extremities (both conceived of as unborn and eternal) being held together by a *tertium quid*, a controlling *Deus ex machina*, which the individual can attain through a theistic faith helped out by Yogic meditation. The inevitable logical outcome of this would be the (dualistic) Sāṁkhya, which, as we will see later, was theistic before it became atheistic.

* This is exactly the question raised by Brahmasūtra II. i. 4 ff.

† One may well ask—Manifesting to whom? Such a question may well become the starting point of the next alternative.

ii—UPANISHADIC DOCTRINES OF THE SOUL

17. EARLIER PSYCHOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS.—Occasional generalisations of a psychological nature, coming often in the wake of a ritualistic argument and mostly intended to complete some sort of a psycho-physical parallelism, have been already noted by us as characteristics of Brāhmaṇic ratiocination (p. 70 above). Texts falling under Group One, the Brāhmaṇic Upanishads, merely continue the same trait without undertaking any sustained psychological investigation for its own sake. These texts no doubt involve at times a somewhat careful observation of the facts of inner life, but not always on their own account, as when we are told (Ait. Ār. II. i. 8) that Breath, or Prāṇa is prosperity (bhūti), because when, as in sleep, the Breath alone is functioning, the sound produced (by the snoring person) is *bhū-bhū* (!) ; or when, anticipating the "Udgīthavedha" passages in Chh. i. 2 or Bṛih. i. 3, as also the "ratharūpaka" passages from Chhāgaleya and Kaṭha, the self is, in Ait. Ār. II. 3. 8, declared to be "the desire-destroying divine chariot with the speech for the seat (uddhi), the ears for the (two) sides, the eyes for the (two) yoked ones, the mind as the restrainer, the Prāṇa being the one who mounts upon it" ; or when the cessation of a separate process of breathing while one is reciting or speaking is declared to be a sacrifice of the one into the other (*prabhava*) and the reverse process, the *apyaya*, thereby anticipating a somewhat clearer statement in Kaush. Up. II. 5 regarding the observed fact of the suppression of the act of breathing in what may be called the process of attention. A thing to note in most of these spasmodic psychological reflections of Group One is the importance that they assign to Prāṇa in preference to the Self as such, Prāṇa being declared to be, like the Ākāśa, the support of all beings down to the ants ; or the most essential amongst the functions of the body, the very glory and vigour of it so to say ; and identified with Indra, the Sun, the Year, and the Sāma. It is elsewhere declared to be the beam (vaṁśa) of the body that is both the source and the stay of all beings, as the union (saṁhitā) of speech as well as mind, as the complete Divinity (pūrṇā Devatā) that comprises and transcends all other divini-

ties in the inner and the outer world. It was natural that the heart be regarded as the abode of this Prāṇa ; and later, when the mind was assigned a somewhat more prominent rôle than the Prāṇa, that the mind also should be located in the same place: Taittir. i. 6—Antarhṛidaya ākāśaḥ ; tasminnayam Purusho manomayaḥ. In the more advanced passages of Group One the Prāṇa comes to be gradually dissociated from its physiological characteristics by being spoken of as a Purusha (A. Ā. III, Jaim. Up. Br. I. 26), or as Indra the seven-rayed Bull, and as even Brahman. And since every organic function was supposed to have its own Prāṇa or vital-power associated with it, it became possible now to speak of Purusha (=Prāṇa) in the eye, etc., and eventually, in the Śāṇḍilyavidyā (Ś. B. x. 6. 3), of an Inner Purusha who is the soul of the Prāṇa (antarātman Purushaḥ ... sa Prāṇasya ātmā). The enumeration of the sense-organs and bodily functions as presented by the earlier texts of Group One is neither complete nor sequential (eye-ear-mind-speech-breath in Ait, Āraṇ. II. i. 4-8, Chh. ii. 7, etc., Bṛih. I. 3 adding nose or smell—read ghrāṇa for prāṇā—to the list), a function like touch or sparśa and taste or rasa not being at all recognised, probably because—in the case of the former—there is no specific bodily organ or orifice to which it can be appropriated.

18. EVOLUTION OF PRĀṆA AND THE RISE OF ĀTMAN PSYCHOLOGY.—In the majority of the texts of Group Two Prāṇa still occupies a place of prominence. Bṛih. i. 5, for example, enumerating the fivefold division into Prāṇa-Apāṇa-Vyāna-Udāna-Samāna, states that the form and character of Prāṇa is in itself inscrutable (avijñāta) and exhaustless (aśrānta), while Chhan. III. 14 and Bṛih. VI. 1. 3 introduce the well-known fable of the Dispute of the Faculties and the Pre-eminence of Prāṇa, Chh. III. 15 concluding with the statement—"Prāṇa indeed is all this that there is, no matter what." Nevertheless the idea of a still inner entity divested of all physical as well as physiological ssociations, which was mooted in a few late texts of the earlier Group, came to stay. Thus Bṛih. i. 4. 7 speaks of the formless Creator as having entered the body right upto the tips of the nails and assumed therein the name and the function of the

Prāṇa. The Ait. Up. designates this entity that enters by tearing out an aperture (vidṛiti) into the body (purusha) by the name Ātman alias Indra, and states further that a rebirth after death takes place only of this "Ātman" (sa itaḥ prayann eva punar jāyate). The same text also asserts that the essential characteristic of this "Ātman" is prajñāna or intelligence; and just as the earlier texts declared Prāṇa to be the source and support of everything, so Ait. Up. v. 3 speaks of *prajñāna* as being immanent in all the gods, elements, luminaries, beasts, birds, insects, and the whole movable and immovable universe. All our psychic life is in fact declared to have its basis in intellection : compare, *ibid.* v. 2—sarvāṇyevaitāni prajñānasya nāmadheyāni bhavanti. This is more explicitly stated in Kaush. iii. 6f.—"He, having first seized speech ... smell ... eye... ears ... etc. by the intellect, becomes able to utter the names, smell the smells, see the forms, hear the sounds, etc." Sense-knowledge in the absence of the primary intellective factor is impossible, and likewise the intellective factor by itself would be futile unless there are sense-data for its operation : yaddhi bhūtamātrā na syur na prajñāmātrāḥ syur, yadvā prajñāmātrā na syur na bhūtamātrāḥ syuḥ. From this point onwards Prāṇa assumes the position of only one—though the most vital one—of the several functions within the Purusha. Chh. iii. 13 for instance speaks of the five openings (sushayaḥ) of the heart each guarded over by each of the five prāṇas, while Bṛih. i. 5. 3 speaks of the "Ātman" as being constituted out of the triad of speech, mind, and breath (ayam Ātmā vāṅmayo manomayaḥ prāṇamayaḥ), Tait. ii. 2 completing this downward career of Prāṇa by making him merely one of the sheaths or envelopes of the Ātman. The Kena even denies to the Prāṇas power to exercise any functions independently of the Ātman, who is "the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind, the speech of the speech, and the prāṇa of the prāṇa"; and in the same spirit the Chhāgaleya designates the Ātman as the impeller of the cart in the shape of the body. Compare also Praśna iii. 3ff., where the Ātman is said to even produce the Prāṇa and its subdivisions, and control them. At the same time it is worth noting that Prāṇa now is assigned

a province and a duration longer than that of one life, inasmuch as the transmigrating Ātman is said to go from one body to another accompanied by the various Prāṇas (cp. Bṛih. i. 5—asmāl lokāt praiti, atha ebhir eva prāṇaiḥ saha putram āviśati). This is the beginning of the later doctrine of the so-called "liṅgaśarīra." In texts of the later Groups such as Praśna i—ii, Chh. iv with its distinctive "Saṁvarga-vidyā," or Kaushītaki ii–iii, if Prāṇa still continues to occupy the thoughts, it is quite evident that it has no longer its original physiological associations, but that it has become almost a synonym of the Highest Entity (cp. Prāṇo Brahma, or Prāṇo'smi prajñātmā).* We may also note here in passing that *sparśa* and *rasa* are now recognised amongst the organic functions of the body (Ait. Up., khaṇḍa 3), though the stereotyped classification into the organs of sense and the organs of action is still long in the coming.

19. INTROSPECTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ĀTMAN.—So long as one of the organic functions of the body—be it the vital-breath, consciousness (manas), or intellection (prajñāna)—was regarded as the essence of man, the question of how we come to have a knowledge of that function did not arise, seeing that we automatically become aware of the function in the very act of its exercise. But when the Self within was believed to transcend the normal organic functions as such—being that which makes the speech...the mind...the eye...the ear...the breath, respectively, speak and think and see and hear and breathe, but which in itself was beyond the comprehension of any of these organs (Kena i. 4-8)—the question as to the real nature of the Self and the posssibility or otherwise of its knowledge began to tax seriously the thinkers of the day, the more so as other lines of speculation led them to identify, as we saw, this unknown principle within with the similar principle at the core of the outer universe. The great Upanishadic texts of Group Three seriously set before themselves this problem of

* It may be noted that Prāṇa and Ātman, Life and Consciousness, represent two distinct stages in the evolution of the conception of the Self.

the " Ātmavidyā," and we can have nothing but admiration for the great seekers of those days who, dominated by the one insatiable desire —

" To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield,"

were prepared to give up all earthly joys, endure all hardships, and submit to every discipline or humiliation, if only they could thereby effect even an inch of advance towards the Truth. At the head of the series of texts in Group Three stands the great figure of Nachiketas who, for a solution of the dilemma of death : " Some say he exists, others, that he does not," spurns all earthly and even celestial enjoyments ; and we also meet a little later the no less noble and touching figure of Maitreyī (Bṛih ii. 4 and iv. 5) ; while Muṇḍaka II. ii. 5 peremtorily declares the futility of all search unless it be for the Ātman, the ' Bund of Immortality.' The enigmatic nature of the Ātman is the theme of almost all texts. Ratiocination is declared to be of no avail. To win it you have to sit at the feet of a *Guru*, and even then ' the Ātman is to be attained by him whom the Ātman chooses to reveal itself.' Yoga or meditation, a turning of the senses away from their natural objects and a directing of them upon the inner Self, is set forth as the only efficient method of Self-realisation ; and while some of our texts (like Chh. iv. 10 ff., Chh. v. 11 ff., Bṛih. ii. 1, Bṛih. iv. 1–2, Kaush. iii, etc.) present us with a number of partial and unsuccessful attempts at determining the real nature of the Ātman-Brahman, they may be said to generally agree in making the Ātman an all-pervading, infinite, immortal, immutable, all-powerful, all-embracing, inscrutable entity that consists of existence (or truth), consciousness and bliss. This of course is the description of the Ātman when freed from all limitations. As phenomenally encased within the body—within the heart, or the ākāśa within the heart that is shaped like a lotus—the Ātman is declared to be of a minute size, of the measure of the human thumb or of one-span (prādeśa) measure, illumined by a portion of the ' Divine spark ' but enveloped within the casement of the conative and the intellective functions, as also of his own karman, merit or demerit, which determines his next birth in

an unending series of transmigrations. Texts more than one* speak of the individual self as being accompanied by the Supreme Self who also dwells within the heart or perches upon the same tree, serene and unconcerned like a spectator, unaffected by the sweets and bitters of life and yet standing to the individual self as the source of all impulses and the goal of all aspirations. There are also texts describing the details of the process of transmigration or of the soul's pilgrimage after death which will occupy us presently. It is only the great Yājñavalkya passages that give a merely negative description of the Self, denying the possibility of any knowledge as ordinarily understood of one who is the permanent possibility and background of all knowledge as such. This is no more than the return of Reason upon itself.

20. THE STATES OF THE ĀTMAN.—The greatest contribution made by the texts falling under Group Three to the Upanishadic theory of the Ātman is their lucubrations on the wakeful, dreaming, sleeping, and other states of the Soul. The earliest passage to be noted in this connection is Praśna iv, where the functions of the sense-organs are compared to the rays of the sun and are said, during sleep, to become funded back into the Highest Deity within us, as do the rays into the solar orb at sunset. The various movements of breath alone continue, and they are compared to the sacrificial fires which are not permitted to become extinguished during the sacrificer's life. Sleep implies the complete overcoming of the light of the individual rays by the central source of light, while during dreams—where man only revives the already-experienced impressions of wakeful life—there is only a partial overcoming. The separate existence of the individual soul (vijñānātmā purushaḥ) belongs only to the wakeful and the dreaming states; in the state of deep sleep he is merged into the highest immutable Ātman which is the Brahman.—Chhān. vi. 8–10 amplifies the same doctrine by giving the similes of the juices of individual flowers merging into the totality known as honey or the

* Kaṭha I. iii. 1, Muṇḍaka iii. 1. 1–3, Śvet. I. 6, Praśna iv. 9, Bṛih. IV. iii. 35, Maitrā. ii. 5, etc.

different rivers pouring their waters into the ocean, and adds that, upon the return from sleep to wakeful life, the whole phantasmagoria of sense and outward things is once more presented exactly as it was before sleep, although as long as the sleep lasted there was no consciousness of any individual distinctions whatsoever.—That in sound sleep the Ātman rests within the ākāśa in the heart covered up by the 72,000 *nāḍīs* called "*hitās*" which stretch outwards from the heart to the "Purītat" is a detail supplied by Bṛih. II. i. 16–20, which is also confirmed by Kaushītaki iv. 19 and Bṛih. IV. iii. 20. The clearest exposition of the differences between the three states is of course afforded by the story of Indra and Virochana in Chh. viii. 7 ff., wherein the wakeful state of the Ātman is said to be susceptible to all the external and physical affectations of the body, the dream state to transcend these but yet remain liable to mental afflictions, while the state of sound-sleep is declared to be beyond the physical and the mental mishaps, but not yet completely realising one's ideal of the true Ātman inasmuch as it retains no consciousness as such and may as well be said to be not existing. It is here that the inadequacy of the earlier statements, whereby the individual is said to attain Brahman each day of his life without being aware of it, is fully brought to the fore. It is only when the Ātman entirely abandons the mortal coil that he attains the Highest Light and assumes his true form which is Brahman. Unhappily the description of this highest Self-realisation is somewhat spoilt by its being depicted in too sensuous a colouring (Chh. viii. 12. 3 end, and viii. 2. 1–10, both regarded by Deussen as interpolations). The other classical passage describing the three states is Bṛih. iv. 3. 9ff., where, characteristically enough, the main point of emphasis is the fact that in the dream state, for instance, the Self creates out of the fabric of his own mind chariots and horses and streets and all the rest and imagines himself to be liable to joys (and sorrows) of all kinds, although all that is a mere hallucination that does not keep him company in the next state of life (waking or sleeping) into which he is to plunge. The analogy with the dreams constitutes, as is well known, the

stock Vedāntic argument to prove this illusive character of the world. Another characteristic reflection which may be regarded as in some ways a solution of the difficulty raised severally by Indra and by Maitreyī as to the Self being, in sound-sleep, bereft of all consciousness as such is, that in that 'no-consciousness' condition the Self is not bereft of his *power* to know; only there is nothing other than his own self that can be known, and hence we say 'he does not know.' It is in the light of this *objectless knowledge,* probably, that we are to understand the statement in Bṛih. iv. 3. 15 that 'whatsoever joys and merit and demerit be experienced by the Self in the state of sound-sleep (samprasāda), the Self in reality remains altogether unaffected by them.'* This is the most far-reaching advaitic position reached in our texts.—Side by side with the description of the three states of the living man, a few passages (Chh. vi. 15, Bṛiḥ. II. iv. 13, IV. iv. 1–6, Kaush. ii. 13, iii. 3, etc.) also afford us a description of the process of death, which in their view resembles that of sleep, there being the same sequential absorption of the faculties into the mind, the Prāṇa, the Light, and the Highest Divinity (=Self or Brahman). The most complete description of the process is offered by Bṛih. IV. iv. I–6, which speaks of the blazing forth or illumination, at death-time of the 'tip of the heart', the beam of light issuing therefrom serving as the path-way for the Self's exit, accompanied by (the latent impression of) his knowledge and *karman*; and of the process of assuming a new body in another life as resembling that of the caterpillar which seizes the next blade of grass by its forepart before it releases by its hind-part the

* As is well known Śaṅkara tries to get over the difficulty involved in postulating possible joys etc. in the sound-sleep state by surreptitiously introducing a word like *svapnabhūmau* in the text; while Sureśvara, after rejecting the alteration of *ratvā* and *dṛishṭvā* to *aratvā* and *adṛishṭvā*, makes the desperate suggestion that sound-sleep itself has a stage which is like the dream-state in the beginning, and a state which is like the wakeful-state at the end, and that the experience in question belongs to the first and the last stages of the samprasāda. — The *Pañchadaśī* makes *tamas* (=darkness=ignorance=non-existence) the object of the Self's knowledge during sound-sleep.

blade upon which it may be standing.—The description of the states of the Ātman afforded by the texts of Group Three is only slightly improved upon by the texts of the next Group, where side by side with the three states of living life a fourth (turīya) also attainable by the living person when passing into Yogic trance and an ecstatic identification with the Brahman is clearly recognised (see Māṇḍūkya 7). This is the culmination of the *advaitic* teaching reached in a few of the latest texts of the period.

21. AFTER-DEATH PILGRIMAGE OF THE SOUL.—As we have already seen (pp. 25–27, 75, 81–83), Brāhmaṇic speculations as to eschatological matters had not made much progress beyond the recognition of the general distinction between a 'Region of the Blessed' where there is incessant light and to which all believing and pious householders leading a prescribed moral life (see Jaim. Br., Extracts 152 and 209) were assigned, and a 'Region of Torment' full of pitchy and 'Asura' darkness (Īśa 3) to which the faithless worshippers were condemned. The stages of the progress, and of the regress in the event of there being the possibility of a renewed life here below, are not detailed by any of our authorities in Groups One and Two beyond expressing the general belief that the most meritorious person here below would attain a life of unity or communion with the Highest Principle in the Universe (Chh. III. 14. 1ff.). It is the texts belonging to Group Three (and partly also Group Four) that afford us a bewildering variety of ideas on the topic—a circumstance which *may* indicate that the ideas themselves were novel and derived from several sources. Transmigration is here accepted as a definite fact, the *locus classicus* for the same being the "Five Fires" doctrine in Chhāndogya v. 3–10 as also Bṛihadāraṇyaka vi. 2, the latter being more detailed and consequential*

* E. g. in making the Moon (instead of Diśaḥ) and the Stars (instead of intermediate Diśaḥ) the embers and sparks of the third Agni and not of the first, the Agni itself being designated 'This world' in contrast to 'That world' which is the first Agni. In other places the Chh. account appears to be more elaborate, e. g. in Chh. v. 6-10. Brief references to the doctrine are contained in Praśna i. 9-10, v. 4-5; Chh. iv. 15. 5-6; etc.

than the former. The doctrine is said to have been cultivated exclusively amongst the Kshatriyas; yet it is interesting to discover therein so many affinities to Brāhmaṇic mode of thinking. The distinction between the two pathways: the one upwards to the realm of the Gods from whence there is no return, and the other belonging to the Manes which involves a continual round of births and deaths is, as Bṛihad. vi. 2.2 expressly states, an older idea. So also is the ritualistic form in which the doctrine is set forth, each step being viewed as a sort of a sacrifice. The fact that the itinerant soul abides within the sun, the moon, the stars, the ether, the wind, the plants, the seeds, etc. presupposes a belief in the all-pervading character of the Self; and in the fact that the pure God-ward wending soul is made to abide in the day, the bright-half of the month, and other abodes of light, and the other soul in abodes relatively dark, it is permissible to discover the influence of the "Bandhutā" philosophy of the Brāhmaṇas. That the ethical back-ground of the whole doctrine is a contribution of Brāhmaṇic ritualism is not disputed; but the *rationale* for excluding insects and other lower forms of life from the world of morality is not readily evident.—A somewhat differently formulated eschatology is offered us by the first chapter of the Kaushītaki Upanishad, which agrees with the "Pañchāgnividyā" in making the transmigrating souls begin the downward pilgrimage from the Moon, through the clouds to the semen virile, but which differs from it in making the Moon (instead of the Sun) the starting point of the upward pilgrimage* culminating in the Brahmaloka. The detailed and highly sensuous description of this upward pilgrimage (set forth by us on p. 272ff.) is without its parallel in Vedic literature†; and the curious circumstance‡ that the direction of the pilgrimage should

* The Sun is declared to be the gateway to Heaven even in Muṇḍaka I. ii. 11, Praśna i. 10 and v. 5, Chh. viii. 6. 5, and Bṛih. v. 10. 1.

† Chh. viii. 5-3 is only a belated echo of it.

‡ Of a like nature is the importance attached to the word utttered or muttered at death-time. Praśna v suggests that it should be the tri-mono-syllable *Om*, the difference between a round of transmigration and an eternal abode in the Brahmaloka being made to turn upon whether all the three moras of *Om* are completely uttered, or only two of them; compare also Kaṭha I. ii. 14ff.

have been made to depend upon the ability to answer correctly a riddle placed before the soul has its analogues in the beliefs of many other peoples. Another divergent eschatological view is briefly stated in Bṛihad. iii. 3 —

"This (inhabited) world's expanse is in measure thirty-two days' tour of the (Sun) god's chariot. It is surrounded by the (uninhabited) earth twice in expanse, and twice the expanse of that is the ocean which surrounds it on all sides. Across the ocean is an interspace not broader than the edge of a razor or the wing of a fly. Indra, assuming the form of an eagle, carries the souls of the pious performers of the Aśvamedha sacrifice over this dangerous pathway, and hands them over to the Wind-god, who ultimately takes them to their resting-place in the Abode of the Blessed."

Bṛihadāraṇyaka v. 10 affords us still another eschatological fragment which appears to have been quite independent of the doctrine of the two Paths and the Five Fires.* That from out of all these views contending for supremacy the stamp of orthodoxy and authoritativeness should have been given to the doctrine of the two Paths and the Five Fires† is to be explained, in our opinion, from the circumstance that the progress from fire (archis) to the Brahmaloka through the somewhat divergently arranged intervening stages of the moon, wind, sun etc. could be readily paralleled with the observed fact ‡ of the dying man losing first his power of speech, then his power of coherent thinking, then his power of free and regular breathing, and lastly the warmth of the body,—the process, in Brāhmaṇic terminology, being explained as the absorption or return of the speech (=fire) into mind (=moon), of mind into breath (=wind), of breath into the warmth (=sun), and finally of the warmth into the Highest Divinity to which all creatures return. We may also observe here in passing that a few late texts of Group Three (e. g., Tait. iii. 10, or Bṛih. iv. 4. 6–7) definitely imply the doctrine of the wise man forthwith attaining liberation by union with the

* The passage has been translated by us at the bottom of p. 208 above.

† As is well known, Brahmasūtra iv. 2 and Bhagavadgītā viii. 24ff. lend the weight of their sanction to these doctrines only.

‡ Compare Chh. vi. 8. 6, vi. 15, Bṛih. iii. 2. 13, Kaushī. iii. 3, etc. — Compare also Śatapatha Br. X. iii. 3.

Highest Brahman. This so-called doctrine of the "Sadyo-mukti" or liberation at the moment of Illumination, and the opposed doctrine of the "Krama-mukti" or liberation by fixed stages, will occupy us in the next sub-division of our Chapter.

iii — UPANISHADIC THEORIES OF THE ABSOLUTE

22. EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPTION OF THE ABSOLUTE.— In our discussion of the Upanishadic Cosmologies (§ 8, above) we noticed how there was in evidence there a steady advance from a concrete physical First Cause like Earth or Water or Fire to, on the one hand, an abstract cause like the Ākāśa or the Brahman, and, on the other, to a ritualistic and thence a theistic Principle like Prajāpati, or Īśa ; but ultimately to a physiological and a psychological First Principle like the Prāṇa and the Ātman — the last being the culminating point of the process. This shifting of the First Principle naturally involved a corresponding change in the conception of the Absolute, which was the ἀρχή of the creation. In the earlier elemental cosmologies what was demanded in the First Cause was the ability to produce the effect : e. g., water hardening itself into the earth. In a cosmological series of causes and effects the earlier in the list was qualitatively less evolved than the latter ; and pursuing this line of thinking we can understand how they ultimately reached an abstract First Principle like Ether or Ākāśa.* Although, however, this abstract Principle was qualitatively least evolved, it had the potentiality (Śakti) of making the qualities manifest (vyakta or vyākṛita) in the effect, so that from this point of view there ensued another line of evolution in the conception of the Absolute according to which the First Cause was regarded as being the abode† of "all movements, all desires, all smells, all tastes, etc." and yet at the same time devoid of any sound or touch or colour or taste or smell. ‡ In this same

* As in Chh. i. 9. 1, J. U. B. I. 25, Chh. iii. 18. 1, Bṛih. iii. 8. 7f., Chh. viii. 14. 1, etc. — In the series of Ether-Wind-Light-Water-Earth, according to the later Nyāya-Vaiśeshika doctrine, the first has one, the second two,......and the fifth all the five qualities of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell.

† Chh. iii. 14. 4; cp. Bṛih. iv. 4. 5, v. 6. 1, etc.

‡ Kaṭha I. iii. 15, Muṇḍaka I. i. 6, etc.

spirit are couched the several self-contradictory or enigmatic descriptions of the so-called *mūrta* or finite and the *amūrta* or infinite forms (Bṛih. ii. 3. 1) of the Absolute, which the Upanishadic seers of all periods delighted to indulge in. Compare :

> "It moves and does not move ; is far away and near; is within all this and is without all this"—(Īśa 5) ;
>
> "It is great and divine and of unthinkable form ; subtler than the subtle, it shines forth ; it is farther than the far-off and yet lies here close-at-hand : even as you are looking upon it here, it becomes concealed within the cave"—(Muṇḍaka III. i. 7) ;
>
> "This Ātman is the Brahman which consists of ... light and no-light, desire and no-desire, passion and no-passion, merit and no-merit."— (Bṛih. iv. 4.5);
>
> "He has feet and hands everywhere, everywhere also eyes and heads and mouths ; he has ears in all directions, and remains after enveloping everything within. ...... Fleet and able to grasp even though without feet and hands, he sees though eye-less, and hears though ear-less. He knows what there is to know, but there is no knower of him"—(Śvet. iii. 16ff.) ; etc.

Such a conception made the First Cause not only the one *from* which all this proceeds, but the one *unto* which all this is capable of returning when destroyed. In illustration of this latter idea we can cite texts like the "Prāṇajyeshṭhya" and the "Saṁvarga-vidyā" passages in Chhān. v. 1 or Bṛihad. vi. 1, and Chh. iv. 3 or Jaim. Up. Br. iii. 1–2, which eventually contained the notion already expressed in some of the later Brāhmaṇa texts like the "Brahmaṇaḥ Parimaraḥ" in Ait. Br. viii. 28, of which Kaushītaki Up. ii. 12 is a slightly varied replica, while Kaush. Up. ii. 13 works out the same theme in the psycho-physiological world, wherein Prāṇa—like the Wind—is spoken of as being the be-all and the end-all of the phenomenal manifold. — A third line in the evolution of the conception of the Absolute, while working out the ādhidaivata correlates *à la mode de* Brāhmaṇas, sought to emphasise the power or the potentiality of the Absolute, the thought here inevitably following a theistic trend of which,

amongst the Upanishadic texts, the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad affords us the most outstanding example,* although the Bāshkala-mantropanishad and the "Antaryāmi-Brāhmaṇa" (Bṛihad. iii. 7: cp. ibid. iv. 4. 22) are conceived in nearly the same spirit. That this theistic vein is, however, somewhat out of tune with the pervading monistic tendency of the Upanishads follows even from the circumstance that it is exactly in such contexts that the distinction between the lower and the higher Ātman obtains its pronounced expression: compare, Kaṭha I. iii. 1 and II. ii. 8 ff., Muṇḍaka III. i. 1, Śvetāśvatara i. 9 and iv. 6, Praśna iv. 9, etc. — Finally, we have to consider that conception of the Absolute which in a sense comprised all the others and transcended them, and which eventually came to be accepted as the canonical teaching of the Upanishads, although we find it unmistakably set forth only in some of the later texts of Group Three. This is the so-called "Dream-approach" to the problem of the Absolute. The Ātman creates the appearances in the dream from out of himself, and they merge back into their source without affecting or undoing its innate nature. The Ātman is the Lord and the Architect of his dream-creation, which does not however constitute a duality by his side—both the Creator and the creation being alike inexpressible and incomprehensible. Compare:

"From which the words turn back—as also the mind—without attaining it"—(Tait. iii. 9);

"Whoso thinks he knows not, knows it; whoso that he knows, knows it not"—(Kena ii. 3);

"Beyond the phenomenal and beyond the not-phenomenal; beyond the world of the effects and the not-effects; beyond what has been or what is to be"—(Kaṭha I. ii. 14);

"That which is incapable of being seen or grasped, devoid of relations or forms, eye-less and ear-less, lacking hands and feet, and withal eternal, all-pervading, all-penetrating, extremely subtle, beyond all mutations, and the source of all beings or things"—(Muṇḍaka I. i. 6);

"Where indeed something-like-duality exists, there the

* Compare also the "Sāṇḍilya-vidyā" in both the forms.

one smells...sees...hears...addresses... thinks-upon...knows the other ; but where everything has become one's own self, what other thing, and through what means, can one smell... hear...see...address...think-upon...know?"—(Bṛih. ii. 4. 14) ;

" He is that Ātman [describable as] ' not-so,' ' not-so ;' incomprehensible, because he cannot be comprehended ; integrate, because he cannot be disintegrated ; unattached, because he has no attachment ; indestructible,* because he is neither affected nor injured "—(Bṛih. iii. 9. 26) ; etc.

Such a purely negative conception of the Absolute amounts to the self-immolation of Reason expressed in the familiar dictum, silence is eloquence : Guros tu maunaṁ vyākhyānaṁ śishyās tu chchhinna-saṁsayāḥ. — This process of the evolution of the concept of the Absolute is well epitomised in the Ārsheya Upanishad (see pp. 297–300, above), where Viśvāmitra's definition of Brahman is objected to because it invests Brahman with mere spatial extension ; Jamadagni's, because it is too concretely or physically conceived ; Bharadvāja's, because it is manifest or within the reach of the senses ; and Gautama's, because he conceives of it as a wayward, unregulated phenomenon. What we have to do is to dive still deeper and inward in order to reach the Reality which is the source of everything and which transcends all the " thus-ness " of things :

"He is the Ātman, infinite, un-ageing, and shoreless. Neither, Sirs, is it outward nor inward ; knowing everything, luminous, devourer, all-spreading, possessed of inward light, enjoying everything, subduer of everything, master of everything, and in-dwelling everything : nothing can equal it."

That the full realisation of this conception involves giving an absolute go-by to all *prapañcha*, to all phenomenal manifold as such, is an idea most definitely announced by the description in the Māṇḍūkya of the fourth or the *Turīya* stage.

* The word "ásita" of the original is rendered by Śaṅkara by *abaddha* (=untied), and "from a sword (asi + tas)" by a modern translator, who seems not to have paid any attention to the accent. The real root in the word is *so*=to end, rather than *si*=to bind.

23. THE ABSOLUTE AS IMMANENT AND TRANSCENDENT.—So long as causation is regarded as a mechanical process, it is obvious that the effect can be regarded, and more usually is regarded, as a creation of existence out of non-existence; and it is in this spirit that texts from Group Two like Tait, Up. ii. 7, Chh. Up. iii. 19. 1, or Ś. B. vi. 1. 1, seem to have been conceived. But if existence is to spring out of non-existence, it must also, after living out its appointed period, pass away into non-existence; and the awkwardness of the latter part of the proposition is often readily realised. Consequently, the non-existence that is to be existence came to be regarded, in the style of the famous "Nāsadīya-sūkta", as both existence and non-existence; or else, as in Chh. vi. 2. 2, creation out of non-existence was roundly denied as a possibility. This implies that the world in an embryonic form exists in the First Cause, and conversely, that that Cause was immanent in the creation. Chhān. vi. 2-6, after trying to show how a portion (aṁśa), a form (rūpa), or a *bandhu* of each of the three cosmic principles — Tejas, Ap, Anna—permeates all grades of existence, and how these three principles also can be traced back (ibid. vi. 2. 3-4, vi. 8. 4. 6) to the First Principle, which is Sat or Existence, affords a number of telling illustrations concerning the immanence of the Absolute in the world, which deserve to be carefully studied. The first of the series is the seedkin and the banian tree (vi. 12); but we cannot watch the seed grow and may not tell what other factors besides the seedkin have contributed to the building up of the big banian. Not so the salt in water (vi. 13). You observe the little lump of salt disappear in water, and yet can prove it to be immanent (through its property) in every drop of it. And what is more, keep the water aside for a sufficiently long time without disturbance (abhi + pra + asya), and the salt reappears (saṁvartate) as a deposit at the bottom. This makes the assurance doubly sure.* The next illustration about the blind-folded man from

* This seems to us the only way in which both *abhiprāsya* (not °prāśya) and *saṁvartate* can be given their full natural interpretation. In the early morning when the liquid was brought forth, the salt may have settled down at the bottom, but the boy in his search for the lump made the mixture again even (avamṛiśya na viveda). Another equally good and possible interpretation can be obtained by reading *abhitāpya*. "Abhitap" regularly denotes heating or evaporation, and this process of manufacturing salt was probably long familiar in India.

Gandhāra is more subtle, but just as telling. The stranger has an idea about his own country. He may not be able to clearly express it, but there it is; and every bit of the landscape which he rejects as 'Not-Gandhāra' brings out the positive as well as the negative contents of that idea. The implicit becomes explicit; the undefined embryo spreads itself out; but every one of its developed features was present in the avyākṛita or undeveloped form. This illustration is a further advance over the earlier one inasmuch as the immanent entity is no longer a concrete physical entity, but an abstract and an ideal one. The illustration in section 15 shows how the manifold functions of life can be reduced to a mere tiny 'spark' which can barely make its presence felt, but which—assuming the moribund man revives by some herb of miraculous potency—can be made to blaze forth in all its wonted splendour. The last section illustrates the same fact in the sphere of ethics. The 'guilt' or 'no-guilt' is present or immanent in the man that is to undergo the 'fire-ordeal,' though you are hardly aware of its presence before its actual unfolding or manifesting in the burn or otherwise. — Other texts without number can also be cited in proof of the doctrine of immanence: Compare—

> "I remain in the world five-fold, ten-fold, one-fold, thousand-fold, and not-even-one-fold. Whoso knows that I have pervaded this, he attains it; were they to know it otherwise, they would become otherwise"—Bāshkala 19;*
>
> "Brahman, the immortal, is this that is in front, Brahman, this behind us, Brahman also this that is to the south and to the north; below and above it is Brahman that has spread forth: Brahman, the highest, is all this that there is" — Muṇḍaka II. ii. 11;
>
> "The all-pervading Ātman abiding like the ghee in the milk ... "—Śvetāśvatārat† i. 16;
>
> "This Brahminhood and Kshatriyahood, these worlds, these gods, these beings: all this that there is, is the Ātman" — Bṛih. ii. 4.6; etc.

* Cp. also p. 176 above.

† Cp. also, ibid. ii. 17, iii. 11, and iv. 10; also, Bṛih. III. vi. 1.

That the Absolute is transcendent, that there is a something of it that remains over and above the merely phenomenal world, that although the equation holds that the world = Brahman, it is not true that the Brahman = world : this is a thought which is implicit in the very notion that the world had a beginning in time, and that prior to the world-creation the Creator, who is the Absolute, existed all alone, one without a second, and enjoying his nude selfhood, until he took it into his head to become manifold. So too texts of the type of the "Vaiśvānara-vidyā" (Chh. v. 11ff., Ś. B. x. 6. 1, Bṛih. ii. 1, Kaush. iv, etc.), while they essay to parcel out the whole inner and outer, terrestrial and celestial world into just so many aspects of the Reality known as Brahman or Ātman, they are not content merely to say that the Reality is just the sum-total of these aspects,* but assert that it is a something over and above them all (abhi or ati-vimāna). Compare Kaṭha II. i. 9—

> "From whence the Sun rises and unto which it repairs at sunset : in him all divinities find their haven : nobody transcends it."

Also Śvetāśvatara iv. 10, which is quite explicit—

> "That illusive-power (māyā) one should understand as the Source [of the universe], while the Great Lord is the controller of that Power ; this whole world is pervaded by what are merely the portions of Him."

With the question of transcendence is connected the question of the reality or otherwise of the world of appearance. If the Ātman is believed to have an independent noumenal existence — and certain advanced speculations towards the end of our period clearly imply this—the *logical* conclusion would necessarily be the "Māyāvāda ;" but a *logical* conclusion is very often *not* the *actual* conclusion deduced by the majority of our texts, which seem to have been partly under the influence of another divergent line of speculation to which we must now turn.

* This view is often the final conclusion reached whenever the inquiry after the Absolute starts from an investigation into the phenomenal world. The Upanishadic inquiry started the other way round, and so it was inevitable that it should emphasise the transcendence.

24. THE ABSOLUTE AND THE INDIVIDUAL.—The problem discussed in the preceding section assumes a somewhat different aspect as we turn, from a consideration of the relation between the Absolute and the phenomenal world, to that of the relation between the Absolute and the individual soul. The proper formulation of the issue presupposes, in the first place, the assumption that the Individual is an entity or a spirit distinct from, and over and above, the totality of the physiological and the psychological functions which characterise the living man. This is a generalisation quite within the reach of primitive ratiocination; and we accordingly find it already familiar to the Rigveda and the Atharvaveda (compare Chapter I, §§ 31ff., above). That the essence of the Ātman or Self consists of *manas* (mind), or rather *prajñānam* (intelligence), is a definite advance made by texts like Tait i. 6, Ait. Up. iii. 3, Bṛih. i. 5. 8ff., Chh. iii. 14, etc., over the view which assigned that rôle to Prāṇa or the vital-breath; but the older view of the pre-eminence of the Prāṇa was too deeply rooted in the beliefs of the people—being in fact warranted by the observation of the process of death (Chh. vi. 15, Bṛih. iv. 2, Kaush. iii. 3, etc.) — to be entirely discarded (cp. Bṛih. iii. 9. 9). The belief of course involved the further consequence that there could be a coming into existence and a passing out of existence of the Prāṇa, and that therefore there must be an entity higher than Prāṇa — the Absolute Brahman—that can be spoken of as having *produced* the Prāṇa : cp. Muṇḍaka II. i. 3*—

> "From him is the Prāṇa born, as also the mind and other organic functions;"

Bṛihadāraṇyaka II. i. 20—

> "Thus also from this Ātman issue forth all the Prāṇas, all the worlds, all the gods, and all the beings;" etc.

When however, in the course of a further advance in speculation, the idea was reached, not only that the essence of the Individual was intelligence or consciousness, but that this same "essence" was also at the bottom of the whole creation—

* Cf. also *ibid.* II. ii. 5, Bṛih. iv. 3-7, etc.

"And that Light which shines down from beyond the highest heaven : shines here upon the surface of everything and all things ...... that indeed is the same Light that we feel here within us" (Chh. iii. 13. 7)*—

the way was opened for the theory either (i) that that transcendent Light penetrates the mortal encasement as does the razor the razor-case (Kaushītaki iv. 19), and abides there as a second or external entity.† In this dualistic sense are conceived most of the passages (like Muṇḍaka III. i. 1ff., etc.; comp. p. 372 and p. 380, above) which speak of a higher and a lower Self both simultaneously abiding within the body. Or else, following the Brāhmaṇic axiom that if two things contain a common property (rūpa or bandhu) they must be identical, (ii) that the individual Self is one with the Absolute: That thou art. It is this latter idea which eventually remained in possession of the field; and it reacted upon the other view and sought to modify it and bring it in a line with itself by putting forth the equation : Prāṇa = Prajñā = Ātman (Kaush. iii. 3, 8). On the other hand, the deistic trend of thought—backed as it was by the devotional or sectarian spirit which continued to be alive and active in some sections of the society—cast its own shadow on the rigorously monistic thought of the day by making the identity betwen the individual and the Absolute not a downright identity as such, but an extreme degree of proximity (paramaṁ sāmyam); or if an actual identity, at any rate one that is realised *not* here in this very life, but—*etam itaḥ pretyâbhisambhavitâsmi*— only after we have 'shuffled off this mortal coil.' It is, however, only fair to add that the highly developed Yājñavalkya texts (Bṛih. iv. 4. 6-7, etc.) are quite uncompromising in this respect:

"He who has no desires of any kind, having attained them all, because his own Self is the only object of his desire: of him the vital breaths do not depart. Being already one with Brahman he in fact merges into the Brahman"

—it being assumed of course that this is a description applicable only to the Jñānin : to the knowing Sage. The normal man weltering in ignorance (Kaṭha I. ii. 5) had of course his own

* Cp. also Tait. ii. 8. † Cf. Kaṭha II, ii. 3.

conventional views about life and an eternal round of existences, views which—so long as he is happy with them—it is absolutely futile to attempt to shatter by lifting the scales from off his eyes. Like the poor farmer who—not knowing that a valuable treasure lies buried in his field—carefully tills the ground, sows the seed, and anxiously awaits the belated favours of the rain-god Indra for the sake of a handful harvest of paddy, the normal man of the world shuts his eyes against the vistas into the Infinite which can be reached even in and through any normal act of knowledge (pratibodha-viditam, Kena 12), to say nothing of his daily life in Brahman during the period of samprasāda or deep-sleep. Our texts expound the relation between the Individual and the Absolute by several very apt illustrations. The Individual is only one of the manifold and and multi-coloured sparks issuing forth in all directions from the central blazing fire of the Absolute (Muṇḍaka II. i. 1.) ; it is like the drop of water which retains its distinct shape, colour and individuality only as long as it is not returned back to the source from which it was taken out : when once there, there is no more any distinction of name and form (ibid. III. ii. 8) ; or, in the language of the Śvetāśvatara (v. 9),—

> "The individual soul is a portion of the Absolute not greater than the hundredth part of the hundredth section of the fine hair-tip ; but it has *potentiality* to attain the Infinite."

So long however as the Individual retains his own individuality he constitutes, so to say, a distinct grade of reality as compared with the reality of the Absolute (compare our remarks on the "reality" of the creation, p. 341 above). From the point of view of the in-dwelling essence, the Individual is the Real ; from the point of view of the adventitous trappings, he is "as though" a second. So too, during this state of existence compounded of both the truth and the untruth (satyānṛite mithunīkṛitya, Ait. Ār. II. 3. 6), the individual's conception of the Absolute *approaches* the Absolute, being only a partial expression of that which is truly beyond expression. Hence the need, in a process of progressive realisation of the Absolute, of symbols, word-definitions, and meditations or *upāsanās*.

25. THE SYMBOLS OR PRATĪKAS OF THE ABSOLUTE. — Symbols constitute certain condensed, convenient and conventional expressions for the Absolute; and inasmuch they are supposed actually to contain a portion of that whole, they are believed, following the Brāhmaṇa mode of thinking, to be just as real and efficacious as the whole itself. It is in this sense that the older theologians glorified certain ritualistic sounds and formulas like *om, hiṅ, bhūr, svāhā, vashaṭ, gāyatrī, udgītha*, varieties of *sāmans*, and the like, which were often declared to be the sacrifice in miniature, or even Prajāpati, the presiding divinity of the sacrifice. The Upanishadic use of the symbols as expressions of the Absolute follows in the main the same line of thinking. There are, to begin with, the series of cryptic formulas such as: *tadvanam, tajjalān, saṁyadvāma, vāmanī, bhāmanī* etc., designed to contain much meaning in little compass, and the true interpretations of which seem to have been most jealously guarded. These were straightway identified with the Absolute, and meditation upon their inner meaning enjoined as a regular discipline. Next we have texts like the Kena (iv. 5) which speaks of the sudden flash of lightning or the dawn of a thought in the mind as the *ādeśa* or typic of the Brahman; or the Aitareya (iii. 3) which speaks of the Brahman as Prajñānam or sentiency. More detailed is Tait. i. 6 which speaks of the Brahman as "that immortal entity of which the Ākāśa or the [infinite] Ether is the body, Truth the soul, organic functions (Prāṇas) the source of diversion (through activity), and Mind the bliss, with Peace as its highest treasure." These texts mainly belong to Group One. Group Second seeks to combine these various *ādeśas* or aspects by suggesting a compound formula like "Satyaṁ jñānam anantam Brahma (Tait. Up. ii. 1)"—the truth, the knowledge, and the infinity being, as the text itself plainly avers, each by itself a complete expression of the Absolute, and not simply equal to a third part of the Absolute. At the same time there are offered also other partial descriptions of Brahman, as when it is equated with one of the Elements, or with an organic function, which then forms the Pratīka or substitute for the Absolute. Āditya, Vāyu, and Prāṇa are the most important of them. But really speaking,

the true Brahman cannot be wholly comprised within any one given set of words or symbols. This is declared in the Tait. itself (ii. 4)—"From whence speech turns back, as also the mind, without ever attaining it." Compare also Kena i. 3—"It is other than what is known, other than what is to be known." — This idea of the inscrutable character of the Absolute is more fully worked out in texts of Group Three. Compare Kaṭha I. ii. 14 — "Beyond the phenomenal and beyond the not-phenomenal, beyond what is effected and not-effected, beyond what has been and what is to be;" or, ibid. I. iii. 15 — "Soundless, touchless, and colourless; immutable, tasteless, eternal, odourless, beginningless, endless, unshaken, etc." So likewise, Muṇḍaka I. i. 6 — "Invisible, unseizable, without allies, colourless, without eye or ear, feet or hands, eternal, all-pervading, reaching everywhere, extremely subtle, etc.;" and Bṛihad. iii. 8. 8 — "Neither gross nor minute; neither short nor long; without blood and without fattiness; without a shadow, not filled by the wind, and not a vacuity; free from attachment, tasteless and odourless; eyeless, earless, speechless, mindless; without heat and without breath and without mouth; measureless and without an inside and an outside: it eats nothing and nothing eats it." These purely negative definitions or descriptions of the Brahman are epitomised in the "Neti–Neti" formula of Yājñavalkya, its most developed and all-comprehensive expression being given by the late Māṇḍūkya 7 — "Devoid alike of inward consciousness and outward consciousness, and both-inward-and-outward consciousness; not a mere mass of consciousness, nor also either consciousness or no-consciousness; not an entity to be seen, to be operated upon, to be seized, to be defined, to be thought of, to be designated; consisting merely of a self-contained unitary consciousness wherein all the phenomenal manifold is subdued; peaceful, blissful, and without a second: such is the Ātman." A few texts however, with a partly theistic or a mystic vein underlying them, seek to make the Absolute the abode of only all the *beneficient* qualities and activities; but these are not many and not always mutually consistent. Thus then, from a survey of the relevant texts, it will be apparent that while the earlier symbols or

definitions of the Brahman or Absolute sought to afford some positive characterisation of the Brahman by comparing it to light, lightning, thought, infinite space,* or infinite bliss, the later formulas are couched in a purely negative and suggestive language, so that while on the one hand we are urged on to try and know the Brahman, on the other hand we are told that the Brahman as such is really unknowable, and that we can realise it only in a kind of a supra-sensuous vision induced by meditation and other Yogic practices. And as preparatory to that vision the novice is called upon to undertake certain upāsanās, such as that of the tri-monosyllable *Om*, or of the Gāyatrī (Bṛih. v. 14), or of the four pādas of Brahman (Chh. iv. 4. 8). Śaṅkarāchārya and the other Bhāshyakāras raise the issue, aneant Brahmasūtra iv. i. 4–5, as to whether the Pratīka is to be viewed upon as distinct from the Absolute. The older Brāhmaṇa view, as we saw, would identify the two; and it is only thus that the meditation on the symbols or Pratīkas would derive its justification. That all these different upāsanās have their own subsidiary rewards is a detail that is philosophically of no consequence.

26. THE REALISATION OF THE ABSOLUTE. — This naturally leads us on to the consideration of the possibility and the methods of the Realisation the Absolute. We have already seen (p. 19, above) how even during the early Vedic period, knowledge was made the backbone of the ethical conception; and later, when this knowledge consisted mainly of the mystic formulae and technique of the omnipotent sacrifice, it was inevitable that knowlege should come to be equated not only with virtue, but also with power.† A few illustrations of this belief were already exhibited by us on page 60, above; and even after much had happened (see p. 69 above) to shake men's confidence in the efficacy of the specific priestly prescriptions, the belief in the supremacy of knowledge *qua* knowledge remained as unshaken as ever. The formula "ya evaṁ veda" is not, accordingly, less common in the Upanishads than what it was in the Brāhmaṇas, with this difference that the Upanishadic knowledge was not concerned with the small minutae of the sacrifice, but rather with the

* Cp. Chh. vii. 25.

† Cf. p. 177, above.

nature and reality of the Absolute ; and as this knowledge of the Absolute was a knowledge of realisation, (sākshātkāra) *to know* a thing became the same as *to be* the thing (compare Chap. 6, § 16, and especially Chap. 7, p. 249).—We have had already occasion to advert to the selfless devotion, sincerity and earnestness of the search after the Absolute that formed the one dominating philosophical impulse of the period. "What could be the nature of that Brahma-knowledge, whereby people hope to attain to each and everything ?"—wonderingly asks the Bṛihadāraṇyaka (i. 4. 9). "The Ātma-knowledge," declares the Īśa, "rids us of all sorrow and error ; and not to attempt to win it is tantamount to suicide, and a life of blind darkness for ever afterwards." "To know it is to attain all desires," asserts the Taittirīya (ii. 1, 5) ; and "No calamity could be greater than an absence of that knowledge," avers the Kena (ii. 5). "It is beyond the reach of sense-perception and yet implicit in each act of sense-perception (Kena i. 3, 12)." Furthermore, that Reality exists in all the "Bhūtas" or forms of existence ; and the wise can trace it, one after another, in all these forms (Bhūteshu bhūteshu vichitya, Kena i. 13). Of course it is not an easy thing to do so ; it presupposes subtle, one-pointed thinking for a prolonged period, preceded by a course of penance and discipline administered alike to the body and the mind (Kaṭha I iii. 12f ; cf. also Muṇḍaka III. i. 5, Śvet. i. 14f, etc.). In emphasising the difficulty of reaching the Ātma-knowledge our texts grow quite eloquent. Compare—

> "This Ātman cannot be won by exposition, by talent, by learning ...... not by one wanting strength or endurance, and liable to relax during the penance ... but by him alone whom the Ātman chooses to reveal himself"—Muṇḍaka III. ii. 2ff. ; or—

> "Not many can find an expositor of the Ātman, and amongst those unto whom the Ātman is expounded few indeed can know him. ...... Mere ratiocination will naught avail unless there be a qualified Guru to guide" — Kaṭha I. ii. 7ff. ; etc.

The true knowledge of the Ātman requires, as the condition precedent, a cessation from all impure or immoral conduct

(Katha I. ii. 23; cp. *ibid.* I. iii. 7, or Muṇḍaka III. i. 8), and a subdued, peaceful disposition (Muṇḍaka I. ii. 13), induced by certain prescribed Yogic disciplines. While in this way the earlier texts of the period (Groups I and II and the earlier sections of Group III) emphasise the great difficulty of the process, they yet are unanimous in the belief as to the possibility of it. Not so the more advanced texts of Groups III and IV, which emphasise the extreme difficulty of a real knowledge of the Absolute who is the unkown Knower, the one who is always the subject and never the object of any knowledge as such, the one therefore who is revealed to the inward vision in a flash of supra-sensuous intuition, which may be induced — but not always imperatively so — by sense-control, concentration, and other Yogic practices, especially if these are aided by divine grace (Dhātuḥ prasāda; bhāvagrāhya; etc.). Such an intuition places the man above and beyond the categories of the good and the evil (Chhā. iv. 14. 3, Bṛihad. iv. 3. 22, and iv. 4. 22–23, Chhā. viii. 13. 1, etc.). It is a unique experience of oneness which has analogues (e. g., Bṛih. iv. 3. 21) which can only imperfectly *suggest* its nature; and it places the experiencer beyond all earthly relations ("Here the father becomes no-father...... the Chāṇḍāla, no-Chāṇḍāla," etc.—Bṛihad. iv. 3. 22), and in full enjoyment of a transcendent, self-contained Bliss which passes all measures and all descriptions (Tait. ii. 8). Indeed certain texts, like Chhā. viii. 12. 7, go to the length of denying the possibility of such unique experience as long as the body and its consciousness endure, that "disembodied" consciousness being attainable only in an ecstatic Yogic vision* or in the "dis-individualised" state that the Brahma-knower attains after death, and of which no embodied being can have anything but a vague and imperfect idea. This then was the goal and the ideal which, naturally, not all seekers of Ātman-knowledge could view with complaisance; and it is probably to suit their tastes that we have certain highly sensuous descriptions of the highest state introduced in some of the presumably later additions made towards the end of the period (see p. 373,

* This led to an intensive cultivation of the Yoga and other mystic practices, to which we will turn presently.

above). In spite therefore of the declarations made at the outset as to the supreme and eternal Bliss attainable exclusively by a knowledge and realisation of the Ātman — not to endeavour to reach which was as though 'killing one's own self'—it ultimately turns out that even to know the Ātman was tantamount to 'killing' it—although in quite a different sense. The carrying out to their extreme conclusions the assumptions underlying the Upanishadic 'search for the Ātman,' such as the denial of all freedom of action and of moral responsibility, etc. was reserved for the post-Upanishadic period, which was to pave the way for the incoming of Buddhism and the other 'heterodox' schools and philosophies.

iv—UPANISHADIC VIEWS ON DUTY AND MORALITY

27. THE STARTING-POINT FOR UPANISHADIC ETHICS.—Towards the end of Chapter II we have shown how the ethical ideal of the Brāhmaṇa period was shaped by two dominating conceptions : viz., the omnipotence of the Sacrifice and the conflict between the Deva and the Asura rituals. The first of these had obtained its pronounced expression even in the well-known Purusha-sūkta. The conception that the entire cosmic process is a Sacrifice spread at large, and that man's duty here below is to play out his own part in that Sacrifice correct to the minutest details is no doubt capable of instilling and promoting a spirit of obedience and orderliness, and even of contentment and self-sacrifice in the society, *provided* no poisonous breath of unfaith (aśraddhā) has wafted over the land and disturbed men's peace of mind. The heroic efforts made by the Brāhmaṇa theologians to fight down the ritualistic traditions and prescriptions of the Asuras (see pp. 53–56 and p. 69 above) and establish those of the Devas clearly indicate—even though there had not been (as there are) actual declarations to that effect—that they placed Śraddhā or faith in the very first rank amongst the virtues—quite as important, if not more, than a correct knowledge of the ritualistic secrets. We also saw (pp. 77–78 and 86) how this very insistence upon knowledge and faith brought forth its own nemesis in the shape of agnosticism, ridi-

cule and revolt, which it was perhaps the great merit of the Araṇyaka and the early Upanishadic philosophy to have checked and controlled albeit only for a time. The way this was achieved we have already exhibited on pages 84–86 above. — In view of this ethical legacy, it was to be expected that the earlier of our Upanishadic texts would insist upon the importance of virtues like charity, conformity, Vedic study, celibacy, self-control, asceticism, truthfulness, faith, and the like. Compare in this connection Jaim. Brāh., Extracts 152 and 209, Chhān. ii. 23. 1, Kena iv. 8, Tait. Up. i. 1, i. 9, and i. 11, Śat. Brāh. xi. 6. 1, etc.— which all belong to Group One. — It is when we come to Group Two that we hear the first sounds of a rift in the lute. The Īśa, for instance, enjoins upon us the duty of performing our own assigned part in life, together with the social and religious duties attendant upon the same, not with an eye to any ulterior benefit (which may not ensue), but in faith: with the assured belief that there is a Lord to rule over the destinies of the world. Between the lines it is easy to discern herein a spirit of restlessness and despondency. The Upanishad, in fact, proclaims Ātmic knowledge as a goal higher than ritualism, and urges upon all the duty to win a real knowledge of the Ātman, which alone can lead them beyond infatuation and misery.* Compare also Bṛihad. i. 4. 15, Tait. ii. 9, etc. All these texts are not yet prepared to teach a complete renunciation of all Karman. The Karman however need not be exclusively ritualistic. The spirit in which the work is done is the more important thing. And from this point of view the Chhāndogya (iii. 16.1 ff.) gives us a carefully worked out metaphor of the human life as a sacrifice (see Chapter VI, § 14). This insistence on the true knowledge of the Ātman, who is and ought to be dearer than everything else in the world (Bṛh. i. 4.8, 15), and beyond all fear and all accidents of death and decay, gives us the real starting point for the ethical speculations in the Upanishads. This presupposes of course an admission of the failure of the Way of Works, which may at most lead us to the joys of heaven, which themselves are transient (Muṇḍaka I. ii. 10). And it involves us in the

* Compare Chap. IV, p. 169, and p. 174 note.

snares of passions and desires (Kaṭha I. i. 28, Muṇḍaka III. ii. 2, etc.) and condemns us all to an unending round of existences high and low (as taught in the well-known doctrine of the Five Fires), being driven onwards and onwards by the ruthless Law of Karman, whose dominance was the secret communication of Yājñavalkya to Ārtabhāga (Bṛih. iii. 2. 13). The much-tried Upanishadic philosopher, with his belief already shaken in the efficacy of the Scriptures,* which were condemned as the lower or *aparā vidyā*, was naturally tired (nirviṇṇa) of this incessant whirl on the wheels: " there is no hope of immortality through wealth "—Bṛihad. ii. 4. 2: and longed for a " repose that was ever the same " and wherein he should be for ever free from the thought: " why did I not do the good: why did I fall into the evil way " and the like. Such a long longed-for heaven did seem to dawn upon the vision of the seer in the shape of the new philosophy of the Ātman, in which connection it was already mentioned by us (pp. 80f.) that the great "urge" that came upon the people of the Upanishadic period for a life of renunciation and of meditation upon the mystery of the Ātman in the recesses of the mountains and the solitute of the forests—presupposing as it does a dissatisfaction with the current code of ethics and religion — is more cogently to be explained as the result of the contact of the Brāhmaṇic Āryans following their "Deva" mode of worship with some nomadic peoples following their own weird religious practices, whom the advancing Āryans must have encountered in the course of their cultural extension along the Gangetic plains. And although it may be true — here, as indeed in the case of every blending of cultures — that the one accepts and assimilates from the other only that which can be construed as the extreme working out of the tendencies already apparent and of the premises already inherent in its own data (see Chapter III, § 6), nevertheless it cannot be denied that the setting up of the "Ātmavidyā" at the apex of the system, as its

* The Scriptures, in individual cases, would denote their authoritative interpreter, the elderly *guru*, whose precept and example the young initiate in Tait. Up. i. 11 is asked to follow. From this point of view the Scriptures might be said to embody " the capitalised experience of humanity."

final goal so to say, changed men's conceptions of the values of things. Conformity to established ritualistic prescriptions may be a good thing; but there was a something better; and as usual, the better cannot very often help being subversive of the already achieved good. Hence we notice, in texts like the Muṇḍaka, an open condemnation of the older view of things. It was obvious that the stop-gap compromise on the basis of the theory of the Āśramas could not be trusted by itself to endure for any length of time. It is nevertheless interesting to come across the view that, *pace* all that the 'seekers of the Ātman' may have to urge to the contrary, it is the believing and self-less performance of one's own duties in life—such as the Śāstras declare them to be—which is the safest and truest way to reach the summum bonum. This is the view advocated by Īśa (stanza 2), by Bṛihad. i. 4 with its insistence upon Dharma, and above all by Chhāndogya iii. 17, where, in view of the similar teaching of the Bhagavadgītā, it is interesting to find the name of Krishṇa the son of Devakī and the pupil of Ghora Āṅgirasa mentioned as its advocate. Let us now, however, review more closely the ethical postulates and consequences of this new doctrine of the Ātman.

28. THE ETHICAL CORROLARIES OF THE ĀTMAVIDYĀ.—The first direct consequence of the belittling of the value of the older "Way of Works" was to loosen the society's hold on the individual aspirant after the knowledge of the Ātman. Man's only goal and guide for conduct, his only unfailing source of bliss and beatitude, was henceforth his own Self, understood not in the way in which Virochana the King of the Asuras understood it (Chhān. viii. 8. 4–5), but in which Indra subsequently comprehended it. Our texts do indeed enjoin upon the aspirant an antecedent period of penance and meditation ; but, in the case of the specially qualified, that could be, and often was, dispensed with. This left the way open for all kinds of fads, self-impositions and hypocracy, of which we will hear much in the period to follow. The Vedas were long condemned as "lower" knowledge. Texts like the Kaṭha emphasise the need of a spiritual teacher ; but even his guidance was of avail only upto the threshold. The rest of the journey the aspirant must achieve by

his own native strength and guided by the light of his own Reason. This no doubt involved certain risks ; but it had the great merit of bringing philosophy, from the smoke-surcharged atmosphere of the sacrificial mandap, out into the open market. —In the second place, the new philosophy inspired amongst its votaries a feeling of self-confidence and of equality or *samatva.* Every individual participated in the Divine in the same manner and to the same extent — neither more less. Each therefore had a right to salvation, be he a king or a beggar, man or woman, Brahmin or Śūdra, — provided he was true to his own self. This last requirement was not a light thing. It presupposed a subdual of passions and prejudices, a life of contentment and earnest endeavour, and a willingness to recognise the equal rights of one's own fellow-mortals. This meant obviously that if a few or perhaps one in a million managed, after years of patient toil (and after lives of antecedent preparations), to reach and realise in this life the highest bliss that comes of Self-knowledge, the others who were walking the ordinary walk of life, performing their own assigned duties therein cheerfully and without complaint, had an equal right to their own theory of life and its own attendant bliss. In fact we have to acknowledge grades of reality and degrees of bliss : the difference being not one of quality but of quantity only. The Absolute is not a something that has, once after innumerable eons, to create the world, and once more again, after another such incalculable stretch of time, to reabsorb it within itself : the Absolute has also to vitalize by its in-dwelling presence and to supervise, every moment of its existence in time, the whole order and process of the Universe and its mutations, as the "Antaryāmin" text (Bṛih. iii. 7) so graphically tells us. This was a truly noble ideal, which however the weight of the earlier ritual-ridden inheritance made it well-nigh impossible to be fully realised and lived up to in all its religious and social implications. — In the next place, since the realisation of the Ātman was a supra-sensuous experience to be had only in a state of ecstatic trance, the new philosophy naturally led to a systematic cultivation of the various Yogic practices, the first beginnings of which some have even traced as far back

as the Veda, and which in any case must have led to the study what we now call "abnormal" psychology, with an interesting tabulation and description of the recorded experiences of the mystic. The Kaṭha, Muṇḍaka, and the Śvetāśvatara, and especially the last, contain the most detailed and specific prescriptions on the theme, which is set forth with an array of its own technical terms in the later portions of the Maitrāyaṇī Upanishad. Most eloquent descriptions of the state and experience of the mystic " Seer " are preserved for us by a large number of our sources—compare Chapter VI, § 38, Chapter VII, §§ 6, 11, 26, and 36, and Chapter VIII, § 28—the poetry of the language not rarely finding vent in what has come to be regarded as almost a classical pronouncement concerning the subject, as when the Chhāndogya viii. 4 tells us—

> " Now this Ātman is the bund that props the worlds asunder and prevents their being jammed together. Neither day nor night, neither old-age nor death nor sorrow, neither merit nor demerit nor any sins whatsoever are able to get to the other-side of this " Bund ": they turn away from it; for the World of Brahman is divested of all sins. Hence it is that having crossed this " Bund " the blind becomes not-blind, the wounded becomes not-wounded, the moribund becomes whole. Hence too, having crossed this "Bund," even night becomes day; for, the World of Brahman is one mass of illumination."

Compare with this Tait. Āraṇ. i. 11. 5*—

> " The blind man found (v. l., pierced) the jewel; the fingerless one passed a string through it; the neckless one put it on; and the tongueless one praised it."

Finally, we have to note that while expatiating upon the extreme value and significance of the state of the highest identity with the Absolute, our texts come very near defeating their own ends by declaring that the bliss of that state not only transcends, and so can make no room for, sensuous pleasures and secular aspirations howsoever eminent, but actually comprehends them and condescends to an occasional participation in them, as

* Quoted in the Yogabhāshya on IV. 31; cp. Śvet. ii i.19.

when we are gravely told (Chhān. viii. 2. 1–10)* that the wise seer, were he to feel any yearning for the company of his parents, brothers, sisters, friends, women, etc. or any longing for fragrances, music, and delicacies of food and drink, he has them brought to him for the mere wishing. So likewise, while no doubt carrying to their utmost length the logical implications of the transcendent state of ecstatic bliss, our authorities tell us that merit and demerit no longer cling to the wise Seer any more than does water the surface of a lotus-leaf (Chhā. iv. 4. 3), the same being consumed into his fire of knowledge as though they were mere silk-cotton thrown into the fire (*ibid.*, v. 24. 3), the seer shaking them off from himself, as would the horse the little specks of dust upon his body by shaking them off by means of his hairy tail (*ibid.*, viii. 13. 1).† In that beatific condition the wise Seer is wearied of all parade of learning, and prefers the simple and innocent life of a child ; but even that palls, and the Seer adopts silence and solitude as the sole panacea (Bṛih. III. 5.1). All differentiation whatsoever is now at an end, so that, in the telling language of the Kaushītakī—

> " Whoso were to know me, not by any action of his whatsoever can the world be injured : not by murdering his mother or his father ; not by stealing, or by killing the embryo. Nor can anybody observe any pallor or darkening of his face even though he were to do what is ordinarily regarded as sin or crime."

Here indeed is touched what may be called the danger line of Upanishadic ethics. To say that the Ātman dies not is legitimate. To say that weapons cannot cut him nor fire burn him is also a legitimate varying of the phrase. But to argue that therefore the murderer is no murderer, and there is nobody really responsible for his action is to carry this " Śāśvata " or " Akriyā " doctrine to a point which, if seriously preached, would be subversive of all established social institutions and religious sacraments. As we will see in the next Chapter, this is exactly what the things were drifting to. Only we must guard against condemn-

* Compare also *ibid.* viii. 4. 1 and viii. 12. 3 ; and Muṇḍaka III. i. 10.

† Compare also Bṛihad. iv. 3. 22, and iv. 4. 22–23.

ing a school or a system for the faults of its extremely one-sided followers and exponents. Thus it will be seen that the Upanishadic ethics, starting from the "heteronomous" position which made the Scriptures and the experienced interpreters of them the sole guide to conduct, became for a while "autonomous;" but the latter view so much emphasised the liberty and the innate purity of the Ātman *qua* Ātman, that it roundly denied that the Ātman needed any ethical prescriptions to secure his perfection, and to that extent it tended to deny all freedom and moral responsibility as such. What this ultimately led to would be briefly indicated in our next Chapter.

v—ORIGINS OF SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY

29. WARRING CREEDS AND WANDERING PHILOSOPHERS.—Wandering from place to place and teacher to teacher in search of knowledge, and that too not only during the period of "Brahmacharya" or Vedic study, but long thereafter—whenever in fact a good chance to listen to a discourse from some celebrated man of learning upon some favoured theme and capable of resolving one's doubts and affording a new point of view presented itself—was an old Brāhmaṇic institution and practice which is amply illustrated in the many stories and incidents recorded in the several Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas, and Upanishads. After the conclusion of one's studies to wander even to distant lands in search of opponents and to defeat them in an intellectual tourney became a point of honour with most students (compare the story of Uddālaka Āruṇi mentioned by us on p. 58 above); and the presence of royal patrons of learning like Janaka, or Ajātaśatru of Kāśī, affording through occasional sacrificial sessions opportunities for such a display of learning by the learned of the land, no doubt served as a great inspiration and encouragement. Every settlement (samiti) had its own council of elders (parishad) as well as the specific Vedic Charaṇas or schools, whose duty it was to award decisions on points of dispute and to do whatever may be deemed necessary to maintain the rank and the reputation of the settlement and the district in matters of secular as well as sacerdotal learning.

We have had occasions more than once to allude to the keen zest for learning that was in evidence all through the period. That in such an intellectually sensitive atmosphere there was ample scope afforded for all sorts of bickerings, jealousies, and even open quarrels, not only in matters ritualistic (of which an instance was given by us on p. 69 above), but also in matters metaphysical or transcendental, goes without saying. The narrative back-grounds of most of the Upanishadic " vidyās " amply testify to this pugnacious spirit. Furthermore, there is evidence to suppose that the philosophical speculations of the Upanishadic period were very largely influenced by a set of wandering asectics and teachers following their own quaint and mystic practices of which we shall hear more and more in the post-Upanishadic period. As already mentioned (p. 81), the Upanishadic impulse to give up all worldly ties and take to a life of homeless wanderings can be satisfactorily explained only by postulating an extraneous influence of this nature. Asceticism on so liberal a scale could not have been, as Rhys Davids has imagined, constituted out of the ranks of such of the Brahmachārins or Vedic students as preferred not to enter upon the life of the householder, but to lead a sort of a wandering mendicant life ; still less can it have come, as Deussen thought,* merely as the result of an attempt to give an external or practical clothing to the metaphysical doctrine of the knowledge of the Ātman, which was designed to lead to (1) the removal of all desire and hence the possibility of all immoral conduct, for which Saṁnyāsa or renunciation was the readiest means available, and (2) the removal of the consciousness of plurality by cultivating Yogic concentration through the prescribed disciplines of Prāṇāyāma and the rest. A sweeping change in the habits and ideals of a people as is implied by the institution of Pravrajyā (homeless wandering) and asceticism as a regular Āśrama or recognised mode of life does not normally take place merely as the corollary or the inevitable logical consequence of the metaphysical teaching that may be in

* Philosophy of the Upanishads, Eng. Translation, pp. 363 and 411f.

vogue for the time. At the same time, seeing that definite and frequent references to swarms of religious mendicants—"Sambahulā nānātitthiyā......nānādiṭṭhikā nānākhantikā nānāruchikā nānādiṭṭhinissayanissitā (in large crowds, acknowledging different teachers ...... entertaining different views, following different [Yogic] practices, possessing different tastes, and firmly believing in different metaphysical beliefs)"—abound in the literature of the period, one would be justified in thinking that this phenomenon owes its sudden appearance to some assignable *external* causes, such as the contact of the eastward advancing vanguard of the torch-bearers of the Aryan culture with some other races or peoples in a different stage of cultural evolution. The institution of itinerant asceticism borrowed from this other source may have been, as is quite natural, slightly modified with a view to its assimilation with the rest of the Aryan code of conduct and discipline; but the inherent tendency of the newer institution, even while leading a life of abstraction from society in the recesses of the forests or mountain-caves, to come down once in a while to preach philosophy from door to door, and no longer in learned hieretic conclaves, involving as it of course did a corresponding change in the intellectual calibre of the various arguments and appeals, was bound in the long run to be subversive of the established order of things. The texts that we regard as our sources for the post-Upanishadic period, viz. the Jain and Buddhistic scriptures, and portions of the Mahābhārata, are full of eloquent descriptions of the various resorts of hermits, recluses and ascetics engaged in intellectual discussions and spiritual research on all sorts of subjects, each master-teacher or Gaṇāchārya* as he was called attracting a large following of Gaṇas or disciples, whose number was often regarded as an index to the worth of the teacher. For orthodoxy therefore the only chance that remained now was in the circumstance that the very extreme freedom of thinking and

* The teaching of a Gaṇāchārya concerned itself either with the nature and destiny of the soul and the character and value of the world, or else with the body of rules and course of discipline affecting the outward life of the followers, these being the equivalents of the Buddhistic Dhamma and Vinaya respectively.

preaching ushered in by the new age would run into all manner of devious and self-contradictory forms and dogmas, which might presumably be trusted to end by swallowing each other, and so leaving orthodoxy, which was already in possession of the field, in a somewhat stronger position for the very shaking administered to it. For the present however let us briefly examine some of the newer schools and systems of thought whose existence we can probably legitimately infer from the data—scanty as they are—that are available to us in our own Upanishadic texts.

30. THE INCHOATE PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS: (1) MATERIALISM.—"Materialism" metaphysically denotes that system of thought which refuses to recognise, as the source of the created manifold, a First Cause other and higher than the mere working out of the forces and tendencies inherent in the non-sentient matter *qua* matter, unsupervised by any non-material power or principle like the Ātman or the Deity. And as a consequence it recognises for the human being no ethical goal higher than a life of pleasure or happiness to the end of his period. Materialism is accordingly a tendency of thinking which can appear almost at any stage of social or religio-philosophical evolution; and as we saw (p. 78 above), even the Rigveda is not without it. But from a mere tendency it can develop into a regular system of thought, as it apparently seems to have done towards the end of the Upanishadic period. As forerunners of it we already meet in the earlier Upanishads those Elemental Cosmologies with Water or Ether as the First Principle, from which, the texts* tell us, all the creation was produced; and that this First Principle might not be a sort of an eternal self-subsistent entity, it was actually conceived of as the Asat or non-existing. Chhāndogya vi. 2. 1 mentions (and controverts) a definite set of thinkers who made the world evolve from Non-existence; while at the other end of the process we have, in texts like Chhā. viii. 11–12 and Bṛihad. ii. 4.12, the negativistic conclusions about everything knowable and namable being reduced to non-existence, from the clutches of which

* Compare Chhā. i. 9. 1 and viii. 14. 1, Bṛihad. v. 5. 1, etc.

Yājñavalkya is almost frantically endeavouring to exclude the "Ātman" in those darkly enigmatic stanzas with which he drops the curtain down upon the great "symposium" at the court of Janaka in the third Chapter of the Bṛihadāraṇyaka, — stanzas which distinctly foreshadow the "Ajāti-vāda" or the acosmic absolutism of Gauḍapāda. — For an Upanishadic expression of "Materialism" on the ethical side we have to turn to Chhā. viii. 8. 4, where a powerful body of Epicurean non-believers is introduced under the opprobious nickname of the "Asuras." The Upanishads of course were not by themselves expected to go out of their way and detail the tenets of these "Materialistic" systems, which later claimed as their founder no less a name than that of Bṛihaspati, the Teacher of the Gods.* But the animus which the Bhagavadgītā shows towards them in Chapter xvi of the poem, as also the several "heretic" doctrines strongly tinged with "Atheism" and "Materialism" that came to be preached in the pre-Buddhistic period, may be safely taken as evidence for the existence, outside the "orthodox" circle of Upanishadic speculation, of a definite school of philosophy for the apostles of which the Maitrāyaṇī Up. uses such select epithets as "unheavenly," "robbers," and the like. It is also worth noting here that certain tendencies of Upanishadic speculation such as (1) the denial of Ātman's liability and power of doing or suffering anything (p. 399), and (2) insistence upon the inexorable character of the Law of Karman as revealed by Yājñavalkya to Ārtabhāga (Bṛihad. iii. 13, and elsewhere)—which are both jointly capable of a one-sided development towards passive fatalism—as also (3) belief in the impermanence and mutability of things of which Bṛihadratha in Maitrā. i. 3–4 gives perhaps, if not the earliest,† at any rate the most pathetic, expression on the Brāhmaṇic side, together with (4) the doctrine of the unknowability of the Real in which Upanishadic philosophy in its most transcendent flights culminated, may have conceivably accentuated the move towards philosophical Materialism and Agnosticism, of which the next age is to afford us such a bewildering array of illustrations.

* Cp, Maitrā. viii. 9-10.

† Cp. Kaṭha I. i. 26.

31. THE INCHOATE PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS: (2) YOGA AND MYSTICISM.—The word "Yoga" generally denotes close application or constant practice, and specifically it signifies the ceaseless exercise of the powers of the mind and of the body along prescribed methods with the object of attaining not only a facility and perfection in the exercise of that particular physical or psychic function but, through it, also a control over other organic functions, and even over the specific powers and forces of Nature. That an acquisition of such "supernatural" powers is feasible is the underlying postulate of Yoga; and it can, within limits, be probably borne out by accredited testimony. Now, we have already seen (page 62, above) how a number practices and prescriptions belonging to the Vedic ritual of the sacrifice could be quite cogently explained by the theory that the sacrifice—at any rate in its out of the common aspects—was an act of sympathetic magic which was aimed primarily at the attainment of control over certain powers and potences conducive to the benefit of the sacrificer and his family. A comparison with similar practices of other primitive races and peoples goes to show that there is an element of sympathetic magic even in some of the preliminary purificatory disciplines in the form of the Dīkshā or Initiation which the sacrificer has to undergo and which involves a number of queer dietetic regulations, abnegations, and penances. The real origins of the systematised theory of Yoga are accordingly to be traced in this early Vedic ritual, which, as we saw, was a blend of certain simpler forms of Nature-worship with certain animistic or totemic ideas borrowed from the practices of the neighbouring non-Aryan peoples. That breath-control and other physical exercises possess the power to form and expand the mind, and that, contrariwise, concentration and other 'spiritual' exercises powerfully influence the organic functions of the body is, with the followers of the Yoga, almost an unquestioned axiomatic truth. Primitive religious life and practice is largely swayed by this axiom; and no wonder that long before the word "Yoga" acquired its technical meaning, the fact was familiarly recognised, and it in fact formed the basis for the cur-

rent ritualistic prescriptions.* A well thought-out metaphysical back-ground is not always the essential pre-requisite for the cultivation of these exercises and practices, although it cannot naturally lag much behind with the advance of speculation. 'Mysticism' supplies such a metaphysical background by virtue of which the practical prescriptions of the Yoga† gain quite a new significance. The cardinal tenet of mysticism is the possibility, nay, the urgent duty of the individual attaining to an un-individualised, ecstatic, or transcendent state through the recognised methods of purification, abnegation, concentration, and the like. The magical element underlying the old Vedic ritual did not of course aim at this object. The aim of the Vedic sacrifice was rather the attainment of mundane fruits; and even when the sacrificer at times looked up to some supra-mundane fruits, his conceptions of them were mostly coloured by his mundane needs and cravings. When however, as contrasted with the finite or impermanent results to be reached by sacerdotalism, there opened up before the vision of the Upanishadic seer the prospect of a transcendent life of union in the Ātman, for the attainment of which he saw men all around him taking to a life of homelessness and meditation and asceticism, he was not slow in observing and experimenting, and so in building up what came to be known as the "system of Yoga."† Here too what deserves to be emphasised is the circumstance that the sudden impulse towards the contemplative life of a recluse which comes upon us towards the end of the Upanishadic period, while on the one hand it was the carrying to its utmost consequences the philosophical postulates underlying the magic-swayed practices of Vedic ritualism, it could not have been invested with the glory and glamour that we see it being done in the absence of that fusion of cultures and philosophies that, as

* The earliest definitely, "Yogic" text is Rigveda x. 136.

† The Upanishadic Yoga has been properly designated "adhyātma" Yoga (Kaṭha I. ii. 12), which was designed to attain an intuitive realisation of the Self, to distinguish it from the pre-Upanishadic Yoga, which may be said to have aimed at what came to be styled later as the "siddhis" or supernatural powers and perfections

we saw, probably took place in the course of the Aryan advance along the Ganges. —The actual Upanishadic texts testifying to a recognition and prevalence of the Yoga as a system of philosophy have been often enough singled out and commented upon. These are :—Kaṭha I. ii. 12, 17, 20, 24 and I. iii. 13 ; Chhān. v. 10. 1 ; Muṇḍaka I. ii. 11, 13, II. ii. 3-7, III. i. 5, 8, 10 and III. ii. 1, 6 ; and Śvet. i. 5, 10, 14 and 15 — from the early section of Group Three ; Praśna i. 10, iii. 6-7 and v. 1 ; Bṛih. iii. 3 (or ibid, iii. 7, with its reference to one possessed by spirit) and iii. 5 — from the middle section of Group Three; Kaṭha II. i. 1, 15, II. ii. 3, II. iii. 9-10, 16 and 18 ; Chhān. viii. 6 ; Bṛih. iv. 3. 20, iv. 4. 23, iv. 5.6 ; Kaushītaki iv. 19 ; and Maitrā. i. 2 and ii. 3 — from the late section of Group Three ; as also Chhān. vii. 6 and Śvetāśvatara ii* from the early section of Group Four ; and a series of passages from the later parts of the Maitrāyaṇī Upanishad, which introduce a number of advanced technical terms of the Yoga. † But besides these, there occur a number of earlier texts which refer to meditations (upāsīta) such as that of the Sun as the Udgītha or the mind as Brahman, as also to *dhyāna* and *kratu* (will power) and *tapas*, which imply that concentrating the mind upon a given object for some specific end was for long quite a familiar phenomenon. The process involved a purification of the body (kshīṇadosha, or viśuddha-sattva), a control of the breath and the senses,‡ faith, a moral or well-disciplined life (Praśna i. 10 — "Tapasā brahmacharyeṇa śraddhayā) and close application and knowlege (Muṇḍaka II. ii. 7—"Vijñānena§

* The whole chapter in fact contains Yoga of a most developed type

† Refer to pp. 380, 383 ff., 421, 423f., 425f., 430, and 435 of the Ānandāshram ed. of Thirty-two Upanishads. Apart from the technical terminology used, the Maitrā. may be said to have merely gathered together in one place the Yogic teachings scattered in the Upanishads, even as regards the so-called "six aṅgas" (Maitrā., p. 142).

‡ Cp. Bṛihad. iv. 5. 22—"Śānto dānta uparatas titikshus samāhito bhūtvā."

§ This "vijñana" or knowledge is intuitive and suprasensuous, and not of the nature of sense-perception. The mind as the instrument of sense-perception is incapable of visualising the Absolute ; but as a power of a different order implicit in intuition it can realise the true nature of the Absolute. Hence the apparent contradiction between "Yan manasā na

paripaśyanti") and steady practice; and our texts introduce in the discussion references to the "Nāḍis" or mystic tubes,* to prescriptions about the necessity of repairing to a silent solitary place, assuming specific bodily postures, regulating the diet and the process of breathing, etc.—besides giving brief glimpses into the visual and auditory experience of the mystic Yogin (see especially Śvetāśvatara ii). The word "Yoga" as a technical term is defined in Katha II. iii. 10f. as "a steady holding down of the senses" or a process of "causing emergence and absorption." That Yoga always postulates the existence of a something higher and more perfect which it is the aspiration of the soul to eventually know and attain, goes without saying; and seeing that the practice of Yoga can be traced to a period long anterior to the one in which the "Sāṁkhya" as the name of a philosophical system came into vogue, and in view of the fact that in the Upanishadic texts † where Sāṁkhya and Yoga are mentioned together, both are 'theistic,' it is a question whether we can any longer aquiesce in the time-honoured view that it is the Yoga which made the original 'atheistic' Sāṁkhya 'theistic'. But of this more anon.

32. THE INCHOATE PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS: (3) BHAKTI. —" Bhakti " or the loving devotion to the "Deity" conceived as a person is evidently a form of " Mysticism", which involves, as we have seen, the constant endeavour on the part of the individual to rise above the bonds of individuality and seek communion with the Infinite. If this ecstatic vision is obtained by pursuing the more activistic or intellectualistic methods such as fixed postures, penances, and meditation, it becomes the way of the "Yoga." If that vision or experience is realised in a more or less ethical or rather emotional frame of the mind, the result is "Bhakti." The word "Bhakti" implies a *participation* in the life divine, which can become possible only when the individual has clearly dawned upon him his basic unity with the

manute (what the mind cannot think of — Kena i. 5)" and "Manasaivedam āptavyam (it is to be reached by the mind alone— Kaṭha II. i. 11)," and other similar texts.

* Viz. Praśna iii. 6f., Kāṭha II. iii. 16, Chhān. viii. 6, Bṛih. iv. 3. 20, Kaush. iv. 19, etc.

† Viz., Svetāśvatara vi. 13, etc.

Divine. Accordingly, those tendencies inherent in primitive speculation such as ritualistic magic (or magical ritualism), animism, totemism, asceticism and the rest, wherein we generally look for the beginnings of the "Yoga" philosophy, are also to be considered as the germs from out of which the later full-fledged philosophy of "Bhakti" may be said to have been evolved. A passionate yearning of the soul, harassed by the woes and worries of the Saṁsāra, to fly beyond the present and seek rest and solace in rapt contemplation and communion with some Power above, howsoever inadequately and divergently conceived, may be said to be the root-principle of Bhakti; and it is not essential that that Power be felt and believed in from the point of view of rigorous monism. Accordingly, we need not doubt that even the polytheistic "Nature" worship of the Vedic period, as also the primitive non-Aryan "Spirit" worship, afforded enough scope for such a fervent, passionate longing after the "Divine." It is impossible to read some of the soul-stirring Vedic hymns to Varuṇa, Savitṛi, and Ushas and not to feel therein the presence of true "Bhakti," however inadequate may have been its philosophical background. The merit of Bhakti as a popular, plebian religion consists in just this that it needs no metaphysical preparation in its devotees. From the point of view of those who believe in an eternal and infinitely merciful God it is absurd to suppose that that God would wait until mankind had reached a particular metaphysical evolution and learned to clothe the prayer in a grammatically and philosophically accurate form before He actually revealed Himself in answer to man's fervent and sincere appeals for help and guidance. Whether this Bhakti in its earliest stages has everywhere* started as a Hero-worship, as a sort of a deification of the spirit of some great ancestor or tribal chieftain, may very well be debated. That in some cases it has had just such a starting

* The worship of the Sun has played a very large part in the evolution of monotheism. A similar part was also played by the Rudra-Śiva worship although herein some have suspected ancestor-worship. The connection of the Kshatriya house of the Sātvatas with Kṛishṇa worship is sufficiently well known to need any specific comment here.

point can be as little doubted as the fact that philosophical Monism, where it is reached, elevates and purifies the spirit of Bhakti by raising it far above the dross of worldliness. — We have already referred above (pp. 78-79) to the several racial and social factors that were probably responsible for the origins of Bhakti. The Upanishadic passages that have a bearing on the question are: the Bāshkalamantropanishad, wherein Indra describes himself as the All-God,* by whose side Medhātithi appears as the humble and loving devotee ; and the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā (Chhān. iii. 14 ; Cp. Ś. B. x. 6. 3), wherein the yearning of the Individual to attain the Absolute finds the most philosophically passionate expression. These texts belong to Group Two. In Group Three we have passages like Kaṭha I. ii. 20, 22 ; Śvetāś. i. 3, 6 ; Chhān. v. 11–24 † ; Bṛih. iii. 7 (with its glorious description of the In-dwelling Lord or Antaryāmin) ; Bṛih. iii. 8 (with its equally famous description of the Immutable Lord or Akshara who gives the Law to the Universe) ; Kaṭha II. ii. 12 ; Bṛih. iv. 4. 22 ; and Śvetāśvatara v and vi, which afford the most pronounced expression of theism and devotionalism that we get in any Upanishadic passage. From Group Four we have the two famous middle adhyāyas, iii and iv, of the Śvetāśvatara, where the Lord is described as—

> The all-creating, omniform guardian of the universe, beyond whom there is nothing higher or subtler ; the one immutable and beneficient Purusha who dwells within the hearts of all beings and controls their activities, also dispensing unto them rewards and punishments according to their karman ; and the unconcerned Seer and Master of Nature (pradhāna) and of Individual Souls (Kshetrajña), who has sent forth the Vedas, being endowed with supreme cos-

* Compare also Kaush. iii. 9, and Bṛih. ii. 1, where Indra, like Kṛishṇa in the Bhagavadgītā, proclaims himself as the true object of knowledge and worship.

† The Ātman-Vaiśvānara upāsanā herein detailed reaches in its culmination the conception of the Ātman as the Virāṭ-purusha or World-soul. A similar conception also underlies the Yājñavalkya-Maitreyī dialogue in Bṛih. ii. 4 and iv. 5.

mogenic power, and yet, in reality, action-less and absolute and perfect—His saving grace somehow leading the believing devotees to rectitude, sinlessness and salvation.

The Maitrāyaṇī passages from Group Four bring in an influx of sectarian ideas, particularly the conception of the three aspects of the Deity, viz., Brahmā, Rudra, and Vishṇu (see pp. 383–385, Anand. ed.). This is as far as the pre-Buddhistic Upanishads* lead us in the path of the Bhakti. — In this connection it is perhaps worth noting that as a *practical* religion Bhakti does not necessarily imply either a dualistic view of the world, or a monistic view of the world, or even a pluralistic view of it, the doctrine being consistent with *any one* of them. Bhakti, at any rate in its early and more or less ritualistic stages, presupposes a distinction between the devotee and the Deity, and it is never divorced from the consciousness that there are in the world people who recognise other gods, and not the "true" God, as the follower of a given sect conceives Him to be. From this point of view Bhakti and dualism (if not also pluralism) naturally go together. But if Bhakti involves — as it invariably does — a mystic approach of the individual towards the Deity and his enrapt communion with It, to the extent that this communion is real, the conception of the individual has to disappear in the ensuing ecstatic absorption into the Absolute. It is of course possible that many a devotee would be cowed down by the dizzy heights of an absolute and eternal union with the Most High without any trace of a consciousness of difference, and so would prefer the lower and perhaps less responsible stage of *paramaṁ sāmyaṁ* (Muṇḍaka III. i. 3), in reference to whom probably the author of the Brahmasūtras has written the concluding Topic of his work beginning with the Sūtra "Jagadvyāpāravarjam (iv. 4. 17)." But so far as the Upanishadic data are concerned, even the very texts which introduce a reference to the dualistic aspect of things by speaking of the "Two Birds" and the like, invariably lead to a unitary conclusion, as when the Muṇḍaka (III. ii. 7) speaks of

* It must be remembered however that some of the later Maitrāyaṇī texts are very probably post-Buddhistic.

all things "*Pare'vyaye sarva ekībhavanti* (uniting in the Highest Immutable)," or the Śvetāśvatara (i. 12) speaks of a "Triune-unity, *trividham Brahma-m-etat*"—the more advanced texts even countenancing the doctrine* of "Jīvan-mukti" in passages like *Brahmaiva san Brahmâpyeti* (Bṛih. iv. 4. 6), or in *Atra Brahma samaśnute* (Kaṭha II. iii. 14). — Finally, it is interesting to observe how, notwithstanding the fact that the various Bhakti schools probably arose outside the Brāhmaṇic school of Ritualism, the Upanishads succeeded in giving them a common philosophical platform in the shape of the doctrine of the "One without a second," so that the Śaivism of the Īśa and the Śvetāśvatara could join hands with the Vaishṇavism of Kaṭha† and of the later Mahānārāyaṇa—such sectarian differences in apparel and worship as the followers of the different schools probably persisted in maintaining being deemed philosophically as of no great consequence. We shall have to comment more at length upon this deliberately planned closing-in of the so-called "orthodox" ranks in our treatment of the Bhagavadgītā in the next Volume of this History.

33. THE INCHOATE PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS : (4) SĀṀKHYA : DIVERGENT VIEWS AS TO ITS ORIGIN.— One of the most baffling of problems on which competent scholars have held, not without some degree of cogency, diametrically opposite views concerns the origins of the philosophy known by the name "Sāṁkhya." Sāṁkhya is usually derived from *Saṁkhyā* = number, and in the beginning the philosophical system going by this name was wrongly identified with, and was even declared to be the source of, the Pythagorean "Philosophy of numbers." In the Pythagorean system, as is well known, "Number" constitutes in a peculiar way the very essence of things. Of that doctrine Indian Sāṁkhya is altogether innocent. It was however taken to be a system in which *saṁkhyā* or enumeration of categories played the chief rôle. And although there

* Rāmānuja is consistent enough to reject this doctrine, which the other Vaishṇava Bhāshyakāras found too tempting to forego.

† Cp.—Tad Vishṇoḥ paramam padam—I. iii. 9.

are other systems, notably Jainism and Buddhism, which exhibit this *penchant* for enumeration to a far greater degree, Sāṁkhya, as being the earliest system that affected this tendency, may well have received this nickname. In view of the technical use of the term *pari-saṁkhyā* or "exclusive determination" it is likely, as Jacobi has observed, that the normal Sāṁkhya practice of determining the significance of a term by attempting an exhaustive enumeration of the things denoted by it came to be contra-distinguished from the normal Vaiśeshika practice of ascertaining the nature of a thing by noting the *viśeshas* or "specific qualities" connoted by it. The commentators derive Sāṁkhya from *saṁkhyā=buddhi* or "knowledge," with special reference to the emphasis which the followers of the system seem to have laid upon the acquisition of the true knowledge of the Reality. On a review of the various statements concerning the Sāṁkhya that are found scattered in the Mahābhārata (especially the Śāntiparvan)—which is "admittedly the earliest text, barring the late Upanishads, where the word Sāṁkhya at all occurs," Professor Edgerton* indeed comes to the conclusion that "Sāṁkhya" originally denoted not any metaphysical system as such with direct or remote, real or fancied, resemblances to the Sāṁkhya of the Kārikās, but merely and simply *any* doctrine of salvation through knowledge (and saṁnyāsa or renunciation), as opposed to the doctrine of salvation through action, devotion, Yoga, etc.—But, surely, a "doctrine of salvation through knowledge" must at least believe in the possibility of knowledge as well as of salvation. Presumably too it is expected to admit the existence of the Ātman who normally welters in ignorance even to the point of forgetting his real innate nature, which his ignorance can only obscure but never modify. It is therefore merely an idling with words to assert that Sāṁkhya denotes a method of salvation through knowledge but no clear-cut metaphysical system : it may not be 'clear-cut' all at once, but the Mahābhārata seems to have in

* On the Meaning of Sāṁkhya and Yoga, American Journal of Philology, 1922, pp. 1-46.

mind hardly a variety of systems agreeing merely in the possibility of salvation through knowledge, but rather one specific doctrine sufficiently distinctive and individualised. So that it does not necessarily constitute a "methodological error" to first study the Sāṁkhya Kārikās and then to start an inquiry into the "early forms" (or "distortions") of the Sāṁkhya system. On this question of the pre-Kārikā Sāṁkhya the following divergent views are held.

(i) — The view of Garbe as expressed in his "Die Sāṃkhya Philosophie," first edition 1894, second edition 1917. Garbe regards the Sāṁkhya as pre-Buddhistic, and as having been thought out as a complete and well-knit system in the non-Brahmanic circles belonging geographically to the same region* where Buddhism subsequently origiated and evolved, and coming chronologically between the first group† of "Ancient Prose" Upanishads and the next group of "Early Metrical" Upanishads (including Kaṭha and Śvetāśvatara). Consequently those well-known texts from Kaṭha (I. iii. 10–11, II iii. 7–8), Śvetāśvatara (i. 8, 10; iii. 12; iv. 5, 10; v. 2, 7, 8; vi. 10, 13, 16), Praśna (iv. 8), and Maitrāyaṇī (ii. 5; iii. 2–5; iv. 3; v. 2; vi. 5, 10, 19, 28, 30, 34; vii. 1) wherein—with the possible exception of the later parts of the Maitrā.—it is usual to see the "beginnings" of Sāṁkhya, Garbe treats as affording a deliberate "contamination" of genuine Sāṁkhya ideas with Upanishadic Vedānta. It is just such a contamination--this time presumably of the already contaminated Sāṁkhya with Bhakti—which Garbe advocates as having taken place in the philosophical portions of the Mahābhārata, and, as the philosophically most representative episode therein, in the Bhagavadgītā. The problem mooted in the present paragraph is, accordingly, no problem for Garbe,—the inspired originator of the Sāṁkhya system having, according to him, conceived it as a full-fledged philosophy with its absolute separation of the material and the spiritual prin-

* Garbe in fact assumes a connection between Kapila the founder of Sāṁkhya philosophy and Kapila-vastu, the city of the Buddha's birth.

† As made out by Deussen : for its criticism see p. 89, above.

ciple ; with the independence and indestructibility which it assigns to the material principle called Prakṛiti or Pradhāna, possessing the three constituents of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas; with its ordered process and sequence of the evolution of the world from the Prakṛiti through the three-fold psychic organs of Buddhi, Ahaṁkāra and Manas, the five Tanmātrās, the Gross Elements and the rest ; its doctrine of the liṅgaśarīra or the subtle transmigrating body ; its pecular epistemological doctrine of knowledge as a merely mechanical process illumined by the spiritual power of the Soul ; its denial of God ; and its belief in salvation through *viveka* or the discrimination between Prakṛiti and Purusha : in fact the system as it is preserved to us in the Sāṁkhya-kārikās of Īśvarakṛishṇa.* These essentials of the system, according to Garbe, are the consolidated creation of the founder of the system ; and it would therefore be futile to look for any anticipations or earlier forms of them in the Brāhmaṇic literature, except in the solitary instance of the doctrine of the three guṇas, which, in a very crude form, seems to be foreshadowed in the Chhāndogya Upanishad doctrine (vi. 2–4) of the three forms—red, white, and black—of Light, Water and Earth, and possibly also in the Atharva Veda text (x. 8. 43) with its specific reference to "the lotus-flower (i. e. human body) of nine doors and three strands (guṇas=temperaments)." The original Sāṁkhya came indeed to be perverted in the Śvetāśvatara, the Epic, and the Bhagavadgītā and, later still, in the theistic Yoga and the several sectarian and Vedānta-coloured Purāṇas ; but, in spite of such deliberate attempts outside, in its own school the doctrine was maintained singularly unalloyed—with nothing that was vital to the system either taken out or added—practically all through its long career extending over more than a dozen centuries. It is true that in seeking to enlist the support of the Brāhmaṇic Scriptures by foisting its own interpretations upon isolated texts; in endeavouring to placate ortho-

* On p. 230 of his book, second edition, Garbe gives also a list of peculiarly Sāṁkhya technical terms, which presumably are the contributions of the Founder of the system.

doxy by subscribing to certain "Vedāntic" doctrines like the value of prescribed religious practices as a preparation towards the *summum bonum*, or the "nitya-śuddha-mukta" nature of the Ātman ; in attempting to postulate, on the analogy of the Yoga doctrine, three grades in Viveka or discrimination : the lowest, the middlemost, and the highest—the middlemost, and *not* the highest, being assigned to the Jīvanmukta ; in recognising the Mīmāṁsā doctrine of the objective reality of Tamas or darkness, and in conceding the all-pervading character of the Ātman, the Sāṁkhya of the school has suffered doctrinal modifications. But these are mere excrescences on the system, and do not in any way affect its basic philosophical dogmas, which, once formulated by the genius of Kapila, have endured all through the ages.

(ii) — The next to be mentioned is the view of Jacobi* who has devoted several papers to the discussion of the subject : viz, his two reviews of the two editions of Garbe's book in Göttin. Geleh. Anz., 1895, pp. 202-211 and 1919, pp. 1-30 ; his thought-provoking paper on the relation between Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Buddhism (Nach. G. G. W., 1896 pp. 43ff.) and its continuation in ZDMG, vol. lii, pp. 1-15 ; and several other smaller papers contributed to *Kuhn Festschrift*, *Licht des Ostens*, etc. besides his "Entwicklung der Gottesidee by den Indern," 1923. Jacobi agrees with Garbe in regarding the Sāṁkhya as pre-Buddhistic, and he has even assigned for the proposition weightier grounds than those marshalled out by Garbe in the Introduction to his German Translation of the Sāṁkhyatattva-Kaumudī, and to the English Translation of Aniruddha's Commentary on the Sāṁkhyasūtras, viz , the conceptual parallelisms between the Sāṁkhya theory of cosmic evolution and the Buddhistic explanation of sorrow and suffering by the doctrine of the *Paṭichcha-samuppāda* or the " Dependent Origination" through the twelve Nidānas or causal concatenation.† Jacobi

* Also endorsed by Pischel in his *Leben und Lehre des Buddha*, 1917.

† In spite of Oldenberg's rejoinder in ZDMG, Vol. lii, we believe that Jacobi has succeded in establishing the central part of his theis. That the one theory is not a slavish copy of the other Jacobi has himself admitted in so many words.

also agrees with Garbe in regarding the "Epic Sāṁkhya" as a hybrid combination of the classical* Sāṁkhya and Vedānta— although, somewhat inconsistently, he stoutly opposes Garbe's contention that the Bhagavadgītā, as the best representative of the philosophical stand-point of the Epic, contains an original theism "worked over" in the interest of pantheistic Vedānta. Where Jacobi principally differs from Garbe is however in his assumption of an incipient "pre-classical" form of the Sāṁkhya, the existence of which Garbe altogether denies. This "pre-classical" Sāṁkhya, Jacobi nevertheless avers, did not differ from the classical Sāṁkhya in its *essential* metaphysical dogmas such as those which Garbe enumerates (pp. 414f., above), but in several other not quite unimportant details. Jacobi, after a good deal of discursive argumentation†, concludes (i) that the "pre-classical" Sāṁkhya, as differing from the later system which has only a metaphysical interest, had a didactic and practical purpose, being addressed to the masses rather than to trained dialecticians ; (ii) that its original dogma of "satkāryavāda" or the continual reality of the products *sub specie æternitatis* was more allied to the contemporary Jain doctrine of the indestructibility but qualitative indefiniteness of matter, rather than to the Vedāntic "*satkāraṇavāda*" with which it came to be later identified; (iii) that it did not fully develop the doctrine of the three-fold Pramāṇas or means-of-knowledge right from the very start ; (iv) that its relation to the Yoga was not exactly that of the classical period, when Yoga could properly be styled merely a "daughter-philosophy" of the Sāṁkhya. Yoga itself had more than one earlier form before it became stereotyped in the Yogasūtras, and there is no reason to doubt the same in the case of the Sāṁkhya ; (v) that the similarity between the Sāṁkhya and the Jain views as regards the nature

* By this term is denoted the systematised form of the Sāṁkhya which came to be so evolved at about the same time as the other "classical" systems of philosophy, and which, in a very abridged form, is preserved in the Kārikās of Īśvarakṛishṇa.

† Gött. Geleh. Anzeigen, 1919, pp. 1-30 ; the same arguments recur in a revised form in his "Entwicklung der Gottesidee."

of matter, the size of the individual souls,* belief in karman and transmigration, the doctrine of *ahiṁsā*, etc. suggests an origin of both these systems, by degrees, from out of a common cultural and philosophical heritage ; and (vi) that pre-classical Sāṁkhya, so far from making a tirade against the Śrutis, endeavoured to interpret them to support its own views, as seems clear from the data in the Brahma-sūtras. Jacobi further points out that the Chhāndogya text (vi. 2ff.) about the origin of the universe from the "Sat" through its tripartite division into Light-Water-Food is the closest anticipation of the Sāṁkhya doctrine of the real and eternal Pradhāna, and that Kapila is to be regarded not so much the inspired founder of a new philosophical system *ab ovo*, as a systematizer who gave the earlier speculation a temporarily settled character. Assigning approximately B. C. 800 for the origin of the Sāṁkhya, before B. C. 500 it became, according to Jacobi, on the one hand fixed up in a systematised form now preserved for us in the Kārikās, and on the other hand mixed up with the Theism and Vedānta of the Kaṭha, Śvetāśvatara and other allied texts of the period. — According to this view of Jacobi, Sāṁkhya did have an inchoate form; but it is not to be looked for in the Kaṭha and the Śvetāśvatara Upanishads, where it is usual to discover it, but in the "Tejobanna" text of the Chhāndogya just referred to, as also in the general philosophical back ground of the period, which, although dominated by the desire to know and realise the Absolute, did nevertheless recognise the reality of the material principle, which latter engaged the exclusive attention of the Sāṁkhya.

(iii)—The third is the view of Oldenberg, as set forth in his *Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus*, 1915, in his *Buddha* 1921 [8-9], and in his special monogram entitled "Zur Geschichte der Sāṁkhya-Philosophie" in NGGW, 1917, pp. 218–253. Oldenberg is not prepared to make an exception

* Jacobi concludes, on the ground of the conflict between Pañchaśikha who gives the soul an atomic form, and the classical Sāṁkhya, which makes the soul all-pervading, that probably the original view regarded the soul as of the "middle" size, coterminus with the body. This does not follow.

in the case of the Sāṁkhya philosophy and to assert that the system was conceived full-fledged by the inspired brain of some one Seer—we may call him Kapila for the sake of convenience—and then handed down for centuries and centuries practically intact and unaltered. What normally takes place in the case of most thought-systems is that some man of genius puts forth one or two original and brilliant ideas which constitute the "beginnings" of the system, which the disciples and successors of that great Founder attempt to work out in details. But then "Die Anfänge verfangen sich noch leicht in den Hindernissen, die das Vorgefundene der vorwärts strebenden Bewegung entgegenstellt." * This leads to a retracing of the steps and a partial modification of the earlier premises in the light of the difficulties suggested, which at times leads even to a bifurcation of the original system into two or more schools. Accordingly, rather than placing the beginnings of the full-fledged Sāṁkhya system at about 800 B. C. and then allowing it to continue practically unaltered in its essentials for one thousand and more years, Oldenberg, agreeing with F. Otto Schrader,† sees the "beginnings" of the Sāṁkhya in the Kaṭha and especially the Śvetāśvatara Upanishads, and concludes that if the Sāṁkhya has influenced Buddhism (as it undoubtedly seems to have), it is not the full-fledged "classical" Sāṁkhya, but rather an earlier, formative, "pre-classical" form of it that must have exerted the influence in question, howsoever we may understand its *modus operandi.* The pre-classical form of the Sāṁkhya postulated by Jacobi is a dualistic system with its inveterate opposition of spirit and matter. Oldenberg's pre-classical Sāṁkhya is a triune-unity as set forth in the first Chapter of the Śvetāśvatara. And since the beginnings of the Sāṁkhya are traceable in the Upanishads, it follows that neither Jacobi nor Oldenberg is so very keen, like Garbe, in emphasising the non-Brāhmaṇic

* "The beginnings get themselves easily entangled into the difficulties which the discoveries already achieved place in the way of the forward-striving movement of thought."

† Das Ṣaṣṭitantra, ZDMG, lxviii, pp. 101–110.

origin* of the Sāṁkhya philosophy, or in believing implicitly in the exaggerated claims of Kapila as the Founder of a new system of philosophy. Lastly, seeing that the Sāṁkhya of the Kaṭha and Śvetāśvatara Upanishads affords a close similarity to the Sāṁkhya of the Bhagavadgītā and the Epic generally, Oldenberg—while on the one hand he is not ready to regard the "Epic Sāṁkhya" as belonging yet to the formative, pre-classical stage (because the Epic invariably speaks of the Sāṁkhya as well as the Yoga as two systems of long standing, *sanātana*)—he nevertheless goes so far as to regard the Epic form of the system as one self-consistent line of development taken by the "original" Sāṁkhya, just as its classical form with its pronounced dualism and its negation of the Absolute may very well have been another independent line of development. It would seem that Oldenberg, accordingly, is not prepared to regard the Epic Sāṁkhya as the hybrid hotchpotch that Hopkins makes it out to be.

(iv)—The fourth and the last view that deserves a mention in a discussion of the problem of the origins of the Sāṁkhya is that of J. Dahlmann, who wrote in quick succession half a dozen books more or less dealing with the subject: viz., Das Mahābhārata als Epos and Rechtsbuch (1895), Nirvāṇa, eine Studie zur Vorgeschichte des Buddhismus (1896), Buddha, ein Culturbild des Ostens (1898), Genesis des Mahābhārata (1899), Der Idealismus der indischen Religionsphilosophie (1901), and Die Sāṁkhya-Philosophie (1902). The last is the most important of his works bearing on the subject before us. Dahlmann's general view-point is the direct contrary of that of Garbe. According to Garbe the original Sāṁkhya was dualistic, the Sāṁkhya of the Upanishads and of the Mahābhārata being a conscious later "distortion." According to Dahlmann the

* According to Garbe, the Upanishadic philosophy was of Kshatriya origin and so opposed to Brahmanism. And now it would seem that the Sāṁkhya philosophy which is opposed to the earlier Upanishadic philosophy is also to be credited to Kshatriya (non-Brahmanic) origin! For our criticism of the view see p. 137 and p. 376 above.

original Sāṁkhya is the "triune-unity" of Kaṭha and Śvetāś-vatara as well as of the Bhagavadgītā and the other philosophical sections of the Epic. It is the dualistic Sāṁkhya which is a later modification, the philosophical motive of which Dahlmann tries to explain. Dahlmann takes what is styled as the "synthetic" view of the genesis of the Mahābhārata as opposed to the "analytic" view of scholars like Holtzmann, Hopkins, and Winternitz, who regard the Great Epic as a conglomerate of successive and chronologically disparate additions and interpolations hailing from more than one hand and more than one literary circle, as is proved by a systematic inventory of the divergent lexical, grammatical, metrical, juridical, ethical, technical, sectarian and religio-philosophical material that is afforded to the full by the different portions of the Epic. The usual dates assigned by these scholars to different parts of the poem range from B. C. 200 to A. D. 200. Dahlmann totally contests the validity of this analytical, "inventorizing" method, and urges that the apparently inconsistent and contradictory parts of the Epic can be easily unified and harmonised in a "higher synthesis." Dahlmann conceives of the whole Epic as the product of one person of towering genius actuated by a single self-consistent motive and teaching a uniform ethical and philosophical view.* Dahlmann places the Epic in its present form in the pre-Buddhistic period (B. C. 700), and has little difficulty in proving that the Sāṁkhya (which is the dominant philosophy of the Mahābhārata) has considerably influenced the formation of the philosophical view-point of Buddhism. From the Upanishads, through the "original" Sāṁkhya of the later Upanishads and the Mahābhārata, on to Buddhism on the one hand and the "classical" Sāṁkhya on the other, the line of thought-evolution as set forth by Dahlmann may be briefly summarised as follows. The central impulse of the Upanishads was a search for freedom from the ills of life and the bonds of *karman* and *saṁsāra*; and the very eagerness of the quest im-

* It is unnecessary to discuss here the pros and cons of this view, as it is going to engage us in the next Volume of this History.

plied the excruciating reality of the chains which the Upanishadic knowledge of the Ātman or the Absolute was expected to snap asunder. But even after the realisation of the "Thou" as "That"—of the Ātman as Brahman—so long as the world (and consequently the cosmogenic activity of the Absolute) was conceived as really existent — and the majority of the Upanishads do not subscribe to the doctrine of the world as illusion—the so-called salvation cannot be regarded as very satisfactory. Here then was a problem the solution of which was attempted along at least three parallel lines. One of these, and probably the latest, was that of the "classical" Vedānta with its theory of the Māyā or illusion, which attempted to cut the Gordian knot by roundly denying the real existence of the bondage altogether. The earliest of the three was however the line followed by the "original" Sāṁkhya as set forth by the Śvetāśvatara and the Bhagavadgītā (which are chronologically also most proximate). This is the doctrine of the "Triune-unity" according to which the highest Absolute or Brahman sends forth two parallel and eternal manifestations consisting of the World-soul (=Hiraṇyagarbha=Qualified or "Lower" Brahman) and the Matter (=Prakṛiti or Pradhāna), which are diametrically opposed to each other in qualities and functions. Bondage ensues from the World-soul's failure to realise his true nature which is of one essence with the Absolute and altogether detached from and independent of the Prakṛiti. All activity (including that of knowledge) was believed to be due to Prakṛiti, the World-soul or the Purusha being merely the "unconcerned Seer," whatever that may mean. This gave rise to a further difficulty. If the Purusha neither does nor knows anything, there can be no real bondage of him, and consequently no freedom from bondage. These must properly be conceived as belonging to the Prakṛiti.* It is this inherent difficulty of the "original" Sāṁkhya system which, in the opinion of Dahlmann, was sought to be remedied on the one hand by the "classical" Sāṁkhya which did away with the World-soul and the Abso-

* Cf. Sāṁkhyakārikā 62, where exactly this position is advocated.

lute and postulated in their stead a multiplicity of individual souls (purushabahutva), which was vaguely hinted even in the "Ajāmantra" of Śvetāśvatara iv. 5; and on the other hand by Buddhism which assigned only a phenomenal reality to the Ātman. In the "classical" Sāṁkhya, there was real bondage of the individual soul so long as he remained, through non-discrimination (aviveka), associated with his psychic and transmigrating apparatus in the form of the Liṅgaśarīra or the subtle body. After the rise of discriminating knowledge (through Yoga and other means) the individual soul became free or Kevala, there being an infinite number of such (Kevala) spirits of whose nature and function we can have nothing but the vaguest and most negative knowledge: for aught we know, they may as well not exist. Since then bondage, the Buddhists on the other side argued, belonged in any case to the phenomenal Ātman, what can be the good of assuming the existence of an eternal noumenal Self and then of asserting that his real nature as such was beyond the power of words? If there be any logical difficulty in postulating a mere phenomenon without its proper noumenal back-ground, why not leave the question to take care of itself* (as an avyākṛita or unexplained one) and concentrate effort on the social, ethical, and Yogic side of the problem ? Yogic discipline was the *sine qua non* of salvation in Buddhism no less than in Vedānta, as well as in the "original" and the "classical" Sāṁkhya. Yoga as a system of practical discipline, says Dahlmann, was prior to all these schools of philosophy, and its essential teaching has not undergone any change. The Upanishadic and the Epic Sāṁkhya came nearest to the Yoga (particularly in its belief in the Supreme Self or Īśvara), and hence the Bhagavadgītā could say that the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga constituted but one system. The "classical" Sāṁkhya with its denial of the Absolute was a deliberate modification of the "original" Sāṁkhya, and then the

* Or believe in the conditional truth of both the alternatives of the problem, as did Jainism, and philosophers like Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta who paved the way for Jainism.

Sāṁkhya and the Yoya parted company. But it is a travesty of facts to say that the Yoga is merely the Sāṁkhya with the Lord superadded : rather the "classical" Sāṁkhya is the "original" Sāṁkhya with the Absolute (and the World-soul) abstracted. Such is the main line of argumentation adopted by Dahlmann, whose writings are full of references to appropriate Upanishadic, Epic and Buddhistic sources.

34.—CRITICISM OF THESE VIEWS.—As to Garbe's view, while it may be conceded to him that the earliest occurrence of the word Kapila, and in close juxta-position with it the name Sāṁkhya, is properly regarded as confirmation of the traditional ascription of the foundation of the Sāṁkhya system of philosophy to the seer Kapila, it is too much to assume that the system of thought as unfolded in that same source—the Śvetāśvatara—is not the original Sāṁkhya but a contamination of it, the true features of the original Sāṁkhya being preserved for us by the relatively very late Sāṁkhya-kārikā. Further, it has been pointed out not only by European scholars but even by Indian commentators like Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and others* that the Sāṁkhya of the Kārikās, so far from being a closely-knit system, contains many inherent contradictions. One such has been already referred to (p. 422 above). It seems also evident that the original Sāṁkhya, like the Upanishads in general, had an idealistic trend in it; for, it is on such an assumption alone that we can adequately account for the presence of categories like Buddhi and Ahaṁkāra in what purports to be an account of world-evolution in accordance with the Sāṁkhya. Again, the Sāṁkhyas explain the initial starting of the process of cosmogenesis by the Prakṛiti's being "seen" by the Purusha, on the analogy of the flowing of the milk from the udder of the cow at the mere sight of the calf. This doctrine necessarily implies that the exact line of evolution taken by the Prakṛiti will depend upon the nature of the "sympathetic current" established between the Prakṛiti and the Purusha : it may have a dominance of the quality of "Sattva" in one case, of "Rajas" in another, and of

* Compare the Brahmasūtra-bhāshya on II. ii. 10.

"Tamas" in the third. This means that there can be as many lines of evolution — as many worlds — as there are Purushas (assuming the Purushas to be many); or if the world of sense is the same always, we must negate the doctrine of the multiplicity of Purushas.* An "idealistic" system believing also in a multiplicity of subjects is perforce compelled to postulate the existence of a Supreme Being that can co-ordinate and control them all. This is the case in the Upanishadic Sāṁkhya which, there is no valid reason to doubt, was the original form of the Sāṁkhya. If this is granted, then the "Epic" Sāṁkhya comes naturally in a line with the Upanishadic Sāṁkhya, and will have to be assigned a chronologically accordant position.

(ii)—Next, as to the view of Jacobi, to admit a pre-classical form of the Sāṁkhya agreeing with the classical form in being dualistic and atheistic, and yet differing from it in quite a number of essential particulars, and furthermore, to regard the form of the Sāṁkhya as preserved by the Kaṭha and the Śvetāśvatara as a third "perverted" form—all hailing from the Pre-Buddhistic period — appears at first sight to be a needless multiplication of entities.† If the "pre-classical" Sāṁkhya, according to Jacobi, was not a purely "rational" system, but was wont to quote Scriptures in support, this is likely to have happened with a theistic system of Sāṁkhya as revealed in the Śvetāśvatara, rather than with an atheistic system. The Upanishads do include within their pale, and put their own stamp upon, a number of thoughts and dogmas that had originated outside Brāhmaṇism; but except in the solitary instance of the pre-classical Sāṁkhya alleged by Jacobi, the Upanishadic transformation has rarely been so violent as to change an original dualism and atheism into a downright monism and theism.

* We learn from independent source also that the original Sāṁkhyas believed in the existence of a separate Pradhāna for each Purusha.

† It is also to be noted that while Jacobi avers the influence of the Sāṁkhya in building up Buddhistic metaphysics, he is led in the course of his argument (*Entwicklung*, p. 25) to assert that the Buddhistic "anattā" theory of the negation of the soul was indebted to the pre-Sāṁkhya conception of the soul as a "Psyche."

(iii)—We are inclined to agree, on the whole, with Oldenberg who traces the beginnings of the Sāṁkhya in the Kaṭha and the Śvetāśvatara Upanishads. It is conceivable that an original theistic system, possessing a sanction in the Scriptures, may, through the logical carrying out of certain innate tendencies, develop into a dualistic system of thought which the followers of the Scriptures may think it worth their while to denounce as non-scriptural and heterodox ; but the reverse process by which an original heretic system comes to be admitted and preached through the Scriptures (with certain modifications it is true, but yet parading under the same old name) is quite abnormal, and can be admitted as historical only under the stress of peculiar circumstances which there are no valid grounds to postulate.—Having argued for an Upanishadic origin of the Sāṁkhya, Oldenberg is consistent enough in upholding, with several reservations it is true, Dahlmann's view of the organic and self-consistent character of the apparently divergent philosophical speculations in the Epic, which however, herein differing from Dahlmann, he assigns to the post-Buddhistic period.

(iv)—Dahlmann's view has had the great misfortune of being dismissed with scant courtesy by most European scholars; and it has of course to be admitted that his extreme view as to the authorship of the Great Epic which, just in its present form, he regarded, in faithful adherence to Indian tradition, as the inspired work of one man of towering genius, has created a prejudice against his line of argumentation, which is quite undeserved. Some of the additions and interpolations in the present form of the Mahābhārata are so very obvious that it would be absurd to refuse to recognise them as such.* In fact such a recognition would not have vitally affected Dahlmann's conclusion. The

* Many of these indeed can be got rid of by a systematic collation of the Mss. of the Epic, with a view to arrive at a reliable text. None of the existing editions of the Epic attempts this. The Bhandarkar Institute is now engaged on this task, and has already reached some valuable conclusions.

main point that Dahlmann sought to make out was that, with the obvious interpolations ignored or excepted, the bulk of the Epic, including most of its episodes and didactic excursions, was pervaded by the single self-conscious purpose of making the poem the living vehicle of moral political and philosophical instruction. As such, the genuine parts of the Epic set forth a synthetic and self-consistent but broad-bottomed religio-philosophical view-point, of which the Bhagavadgītā affords us the readiest and most representative illustration. And we feel no hesitation in assigning the Bhagavadgītā and the bulk of the "genuine" portions of the Mahābhārata to the pre-Buddhistic period. This point will be further amplified in the next Chapter.

35. EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPTION OF PURUSHA.—This is perhaps the most fitting place for discussing the origin and evolution of the conception of Purusha, which forms the corner stone of Sāṁkhya philosophy. The usual etymologies given for the word are *: *asyām puri śete, tasmāt purushaḥ*, referring to the eleven-gated citadel (Kaṭha II. ii. 1) in the form of the human body wherein the Purusha is lodged; or †, *pūrvo'smāt sarvasmāt, sarvān pāpmana aushat, tasmāt purushaḥ* (i. e., being prior to everything else in the creation, he burns away all sins). These etymologies do not inform us as to the original meaning of the term, which is more clearly brought out by certain ritualistic and other statements made about him in the Brāhmaṇas like Śatapatha vi. 2. 2. 9 (seventeen is the Purusha, as consisting of 10 Prāṇas, 4 limbs—the hands and the feet—the trunk the 15th, the [joints like] neck the 16th, and the head the 17th); Aitareya ii. 14 (quintuple is the Purusha as constituted from out of hair, skin, flesh (variant, brain, Gopatha, Later half, vi. 6. 8) bone and marrow (variant, muscle, T. B. i. 5. 9. 7); Tāṇḍya xxiii. 14. 5 (Purusha is twenty, for there are ten fingers to the hands and ten to the feet); or Tait. Saṁ. vi. 4. 5. 7 (three amongst the beasts grasp by the hand (hasta), namely, man (purusha), elephant and

* Śatapatha xiii. 6. 2.1, and elsewhere.

† Bṛihad. i. 4. 1.

monkey). This clearly shows that Purusha originally denoted the human-being with his peculiar bodily structure,* and not any inner or "spiritual" entity indwelling therein, as the first etymology given to the word would seem to imply. And as the breath which is the sign of life appeared to fill the whole human body and be even co-terminus with it, that (as Prāṇa) and the Wind were amongst the earliest entities to be identified with the Purusha (cf. Śatapatha xiii. 6. 2. 1). Subsequently, when personality was believed to endure longer than the duration of one life and was even supposed to be subject to transmigration, the Purusha was endowed with a subtle corporeal appanage of the size of the thumb (Kaṭha II. i. 12-13, II. iii. 17, Śvet. iii. 13, v.8), from which he was never conceived of as having a separated existence. Purusha, in other words, seems to have been regarded as an organic welding together of the Ātman and the subtle body or liṅgaśarīra,† that is to say, an independent and self-subsistent entity. It was on this very account that the term Purusha was preferred by the Sāṁkhyas to designate the individual soul who, according to that philosophy, had no real and implicit reference to the body, as was the case with the term Ātman. Further, following the "bandhutā" philosophy in the Brāhmaṇas, corresponding to the Purusha in the microcosm, the idea of a World-soul or Virāṭ-Purusha in the macrocosm came to be very early formulated, the individual existences in the world being looked upon as issuing from the dismembered limbs of that Purusha in the act of primordial sacrificial immolation.‡ Muṇḍaka II. i. 4 and Chhāndogya v. 18 bring out the same idea only divested of its ritualistic associations, while Bṛih. II. i

* In the First and Second Groups of our Upanishadic texts this is almost the exclusive sense in which the term is used.

† This is sometimes figured forth as constituting the sixteen kalās or digits of the Purusha, as in the Chhāndogya vi. 7. 1, Praśna vi, and other analogous passages.

‡ Cf. the Purusha-sūkta, Rigveda x. 90, as well as the conception of the Purusha as a sacrifice in Chhān. iii. 16. 1. We may compare also the Jain cosmography which conceived the universe as naturally constituting a giant human figure.

and Kaush. iv. 1 ff. are based upon the same idea with this difference that, whereas the earlier passages equated the cosmic elements such as fire, sun, etc. with the head, eye, and other members of the Virāṭ–Purusha, the later passages turned each "member" into a "Purusha," and attempted to rise to the higher and more inward conception * of the soul or the Ātman dwelling within all these "Purushas" and controlling them all like the "Antaryāmin" in Bṛih. iii. 7. Compare also Bṛih. ii. 5. This transition from the category of Purusha to that of Ātman is definitely effected in the later texts of Group Three, the Ātman being there designated as the "Upanishadic" Purusha (Bṛihad. iii. 9. 26) or the "immortal Purusha constituted of light, which is within the sun," and the equally "immortal Purusha-in-the-eye constituted of light, which dwells within the body"—both being alike declared to be "no other than this immortal Ātman or Brahman which is all this (Bṛih, ii. 5. 1 ff.)." — In this connection it will have been noticed of course that the conception of the Purusha involved no necessary reference to a body or anything external to it, because that something external already constituted an organic part of the conception.† As a consequence the same grade of reality had to be assigned to the external world as the Purusha claimed for himself, a third entity in the form of the Absolute being inevitably invoked to secure a unity to the reality bifurcated into Purusha and Prakṛiti. On the other hand, the conception of the Ātman—while it logically implies a reference to the encasement within which it abides—equally logically emphasises the non-material or spiritual nature of the Ātman. Ātman has a reality which is not on a par with that of the world without—nay, the world without may turn out to be no reality at all, but a mere illusion; although by thus endeavouring to destroy the very abode within which the Ātman dwells, we come very near annihilating the Ātman itself. The history of the Vedāntic "Māyāvāda'

* Cf. "Eteshām Purushāṇāṁ kartā," or "Uttamaḥ Purushaḥ."

† This alone can account for the "īkshaṇa" or seeing of the Purusha, which of course must be a supra-sensuous act, and which is declared to be necessary to start the cosmic evolution.

and the Buddhistic "Nairātmyavāda" will amply bear out this statement. It will thus be seen that Purusha does not necessarily lead to dualism any more than Ātman to monism. It can more cogently be even said that Purusha initially implies the transcendence of the opposition of matter to spirit in a triune-unity, just as it can be plausibly argued that the process of abstraction started by the conception of the Ātman can have no half-way resting-house short of downright acosmism and nihilism.

36. EXAMINATION OF JACOBI'S THEORY CONCERNING THE "ORIGIN OF THE SOUL-DOCTRINE."—In his contribution to the *Licht des Ostens* (pp. 142–166) and in his *Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei der Indern* already referred to, Jacobi has put forward a theory as to the origin of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul considered as a "monad," i. e. to say, as a simple and therefore eternal, immaterial substance, which deserves to be examined at this stage, as it has led him into conclusions somewhat at variance with our statements in the preceding paragraph. In primitive speculation the soul's post-mortem existence is generally conceived as a somewhat shadowy replica of his existence during life. Hence the need of the *śrāddha* and other obsequies. Hence too the doctrine of the subtle and transmigratory body known as the *liṅgaśarīra*, popularly believed to be of the measure of the thumb. The conception of the soul as a permanent and immaterial substance bereft of all physiological and psychological apparatus and endowed with a personalistic immortality was not definitely reached in the Vedic and the Brāhmaṇic period, and, according to Jacobi, not even in the period of the earlier Upanishads, by which, following Deussen's scheme, he understands the Bṛihadāraṇyaka, the Chhāndogya, the Taittirīya, the Aitareya, and the Kaushītaki Upanishads.* And as a consequence of this, we are told, these texts have not clearly formulated the distinction between matter and spirit, non-sentiency and sentiency. It is only the next group

* To denote the earlier conception of the soul Jacobi proposes the use of the term "Psyche."

of Upanishads — the Kaṭha, Īśa, Śvetāśvatara and Muṇḍaka — where, with the formulation of the above distinction, there is enunciated also the doctrine of the personal immortality of the soul — both these dogmas (along, presumably, with that of the infinite number and atomic size of the soul) having been initiated, in the opinion of Jacobi, in that probably non-Brahmaṇic circle of thought which gave rise to Sāṁkhya and Jainism, which, both of them, are imbued with these important doctrines. In proof of the assertion that the distinction between matter and consciousness is unknown to the earliest Upanishads, Jacobi points out that the words *chetanā*, *chetana*, *chaitanya*, *chit*, *chetas*, *buddhi*, etc. are unknown to them and occur for the first time in the second (Early Poetic) group of Upanishads. And that this is not a mere accident follows also from the circumstance that it is just these Upanishads that are full of certain current technical terms of philosophy like *avyakta*, *ahaṁkāra*, *karaṇa*, *kāraṇa*, *kārya*, *dravya*, *nivṛitti*, *pariṇāma*, *prakṛiti*, *pratyaya*, *pramāda*, *moksha*, *śakti*, *sarvaga*, *sarvajña*, *sūkshma*, *hetu*, etc. and the verbs *ud* + *bhū*, *chint*, *ni* + *yam*, *pari* + *nam*, *vy* + *añj*, and *vy* + *āp*. — To take the objective part of the argument first, it needs scarcely to be proved that the words *chitta*, *chitti*, *chetanā*, and their cognates are familiar enough to the Vedas and Brāhmaṇas in the sense of knowledge and consciousness.* When the Taittirīya Upanishad, furthermore, speaks (ii. 6) of the division of the universe into Sat and Tyat...Vijñāna and Avijñāna, it seems to us evident that the text implies this very distinction between *chetana* and *achetana*. The Vijñānaghana (Bṛih. ii. 4. 12) and Vijñānamaya (as used several times in the Bṛih. and the Taitt. Upanishads) appear also to mean the same as *chidghana* or *chinmaya*, inasmuch as vijñāna or knowledge without chaitanya or consciousness is hardly conceivable.† We do not think therefore that it has been

* To prove that the distinction between the conscious and unconscious was already made and familiar it is enough perhaps to refer here to the most explicit statement in the Ait. Āraṇ. ii. 2.

† This is partly conceded by Jacobi (*Entwicklung* p. 15) who regards Bṛih. ii. 4 as taking the first decisive step in separating matter from spirit. But it is neither the first nor a solitary occurrence. The dream-speculations in the Upanishads in fact must have exercised considerable influence in the formulation of the distinction in question.

successfully proved that so philosophically evolved a text as the Bṛihadāraṇyaka (or the Chhāndogya) had yet to reach the notion of a clear distinction between matter and spirit,* seeing that Jacobi credits even the very crude animistic conception of the Jīva as believed in by the Jainas as having already achieved the distinction in question. And as to the probative force of the study of the mere vocabulary, it is perhaps worth noting that so important a word as *ānanda* occurs only once or twice incidently in the very late "Bhūman" doctrine of Chhāndogya (vii. 10. 1 and vii. 25.2), but nowhere else in any vital relation to the Absolute in the rest of that Upanishad. Such a negative datum will hardly permit the building of any theoretical superstructure upon it. In the next place, as regards the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, we fail to see what else it can be if not such a doctrine which is implied in texts like Chhāndogya iii. 14, where Śāṇḍilya identifies the atomic Ātman within the heart with the infinite Ātman in the Universe ; or Chhāndogya v. 10 (and Bṛih. vi 2. 15) where the souls taking to the Devayāna path are said to attain Brahman ; or the famous " Tat tvam asi" passages in Chhān. vi. 8-16; or the passage in Chhān. viii. 1, viii. 3, viii. 12, etc. where, after an explicit reference to the finite character of even the joys of heaven acquired by meritorious deeds, the true Ātman is declared to be beyond light and darkness, age and death and grief, etc., when he—assuming his real noumenal form—becomes one with the Highest Absolute. Nor are the Bṛihadāraṇyaka texts less convincing. When, for instance, in the famous dialogue between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī (Bṛih. ii. 4, iv. 5) Ātman, the great Being, infinite and boundless, or the Ātman in its entirety, with nothing that can be said to be more inward or more outward to itself, and consisting of a mere mass of intelligence, is declared to come to an end with the end of the Bhūtas or physical and physiological constituents of the body, it does not follow that Yājñavalkya really

* That the "Sat" cosmology in Chhān. vi. 2ff. does not prove Jacobi's contention is already shown by Oldenberg in his paper above referred to, NGGW, 1917, Heft 2, pp. 248f. See also § 38 below.

wants thereby to deny even the very noumenal existence of the Ātman.* Words which belong to the region of dualism may fail to describe what is in itself beyond dualism; but that something beyond is not therefore to be absolutely negated. Other texts like *ibid.*, ii. 5. 7 ff. expressly declare the Ātman within as being immortal and as one with the Brahman, in contrast with everything else which is declared (iii, 4) to be transient or *ārta.* Compare also iv. 2. 4, iv. 4. 7, iv. 4. 22, etc. Finally as to *personal* immortality expressed in the formula *muktāvapi ahambhāvaḥ* and its corollary in the form of the doctrine of Ātma-bahutva or an infinite number of souls (usually of an atomic size), a clear formulation of such a doctrine *in all its essential aspects* is not to be found even in the Kaṭha and the Muṇḍaka, and to some extent in the Śvetāśvatara Upanishads. We may conclude therefore that Jacobi's contention that during the period intervening between the earliest and the middle group of Upanishadic texts there was evolved a new and important theory of the soul—presumably outside the pale of Brahmanism—which had such a decisive influence in the origin and evolution of Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Buddhism, Jainism, and later Vedānta is, as far as we can see, unproven.

37. ULTIMATE VEDĀNTIC POSITION OF THE UPANISHADS : (1) YĀJÑAVALKYA'S DOCTRINE OF THE ĀTMAN.—In the preceding paragraphs of this Chapter we have made it abundantly clear that the Upanishadic texts do not all teach one and the same philosophical doctrine, but that there has been a steady evolution therein which we can still trace from one Group of Upanishadic texts to another. It however behoves us in this place to consider what may be regarded as the *most advanced* teaching of the Upanishads on the three ultimate questions of Philosophy, namely, the relation between Man and God, between God and the World, and between Man and the World. The first of these questions is best tackled by a consideration of

* The juice of the individual flower (Chhāndogya vi. 9), even though wanting any consciousness of its distinct individual existence, is not utterly annihilated. For, then there would be no honey at all.

Yājñavalkya's teaching concerning the Self. In his criticism of the earlier philosophers in Bṛihad. iv. 1 Yājñavalkya argues that the Ātman is the metaphysical back-ground and support of the entire outer and inner world. In Bṛihad. iv. 2 the Ātman is declared to be the spring of all actions and functions. In his discussion with Maitreyī Yājñavalkya proves that the Ātman is and should be the final end and goal of all efforts and aspirations. In Bṛih. iv. 3 Ātman is stated to be the unfailing and self-illuminating light (physical and intellectual), as also the source of all sensuous and supra-sensuous* knowledge. In iv. 3. 32 and iv. 4 the Ātman is asserted to be the source of infinite and transcendent joy unto itself. In the oft-repeated formula—*Yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati* etc.—the epistemological doctrine as to the Ātman being for ever the subject or the ground of the possibility of knowledge, and never the object of knowledge, is emphasised, whereas the sister formula —*sa esha "neti nety" ātmā* etc.— brings out the purely negative but withal real and immortal aspect of the Ātman. In the great Symposium in Bṛih. iii, Yājñavalkya comes down from his higher metaphysical altitude, and in almost a deistic vein endows the Ātman (iii 6, 7, 8) with the character of the omnipotent Lord that indwells and controls all cosmic operations, and even dispenses rewards and punishments.—The outermost point of Yājñavalkya's philosophy is reached, first, in his teaching that the (phenomenal) Ātman (Psyche) issues from the phenomenal mainfold and is lost therein at the time of "departure," so that no specific consciousness of any kind remains behind — a teaching which proved a hard nut for Maitreyī; secondly, in the instruction conveyed to Ārtabhāga (iii. 2), which apparently suffers no direct assertion of any kind being made about the Ātman as such, but permits only an allusion to the phenomenal bonds of *karman* which seem to entangle the Ātman within themselves and from out of which, presumably, a way of escape exists; and finally, in those enigmatic stanzas with which the curtain drops on the tragic happenings at Janaka's court, stanzas

* That is, "objectless" knowledge, because *na hi vijñātur vijñāter viparilopo vidyate.*

which probably no one understood or dared to question anything about. The point which Yājñavalkya desires to make in them appears to us as follows : a tree with trunk cut off grows again, because the roots of it are intact. Remove the roots altogether and there is an end to the life of the tree as tree. In the same way the Ātman, with the dissolution of one body, takes to another because, in spite of the dissolution of the material body, the Ātman leaves behind a subtle potency in the form of his *karman* and the *vāsanās* (latent impressions) which possess the power to produce a new body, just as seeds have the power to produce the tree. Hence life upon death in continuous succession. Once however the roots are all uprooted life and phenomenal existence both come to an end : *na pretya saṁjñā 'sti.* The Ātman—as being already an existential reality—cannot be born again and cannot therefore die. It is beyond the reach of time and phenomena, being a mere mass of consciousness and bliss. So interpreted Yājñavalkya's ultimate doctrine turns out to be a consistent Negativism and Absolutism in regard to which 'silence is eloquence.' There is of course open a mystic way of approach and realisation, requiring specific preparedness and discipline, for which see below. The position of Buddhism, at any rate as interpreted by one set of its followers, did not materially differ from this.

38. ULTIMATE VEDĀNTIC POSITION OF THE UPANISHADS: (2) ĀRUṆI'S DOCTRINE OF THE WORLD.—The second of our three philosophical problems is mainly a cosmological problem. We have already reviewed the various Upanishadic cosmologies. Space however may be found here for a brief philosophical discussion of one of the most advanced of them, namely, that communicated by Āruṇi to his son Śvetaketu in Chhāndogya vi. The text seems to have attracted the attention quite early in India itself. The Sāṁkhyas claimed to see therein the roots* of their own theory of the three 'Guṇas' and of

* The main difference of course is that whereas the three guṇas are the co-existent aspects of the Sāṁkhya Pradhāna, here their prototypes form a causal sequence.

the "Pariṇāmavāda" or the doctrine of evolution starting from a material, i. e. non-sentient, First Principle designated as to the Sat or Being in the Upanishadic passage in question. To the obvious objection that this Sat was credited in the particular text with the sentient activity of *īkshaṇa* or reflection, the Sāṁkhyas replied by arguing that, inasmuch as the same sentient activity was also predicated of Tejas, Ap and Anna, which are obviously physical elements, the word *īkshaṇa* has to be understood in the whole context as being used in a *gauṇa* or figurative sense. Jacobi (who seems to have recently developed somewhat of a partiality for the Sāṁkhya interpretation of certain Upanishadic texts)* argues just in this same fashion : only, where the Indian Pūrvapakshin was content to plead the plea of a secondary use of words, Jacobi, taking the modern historical standpoint, tries to establish the theory that the Chhāndogya section before us was written at a time when the distinction between matter and spirit was not clearly formulated, and that consequently the passage in question appears to be conceived more in a 'materialistic' or 'rationalistic' spirit. Against Jacobi's rendering of the passage goes of course the clear statement in the text that the 'divine' Sat, after having created the triad of Light-Water-Food, *entered within it as its Soul.* This difficulty has been urged by Oldenberg (NGGW, 1917, Heft 2, p. 249), as indeed by even the author of the Brahmasūtra (I. i. 6ff.), together with the improbability of a text having such a merely 'materialistic' beginning ending with the famous eventual identification of the 'That' with the 'Thou.' We believe that the text before us, provided we want to take it literally and not twist it after the fashion of a commentator, preaches a monistic doctrine in conjunction with the doctrine of the 'reality' of the creation and the theory of *Pariṇāma* or evolution. And as these different doctrines can be brought into an organic combination only according to what is known as the "Śuddhā-

* Compare Kuhn Festschrift, p. 36, where, against the concurrent testimony of all Indian commentators, he understands the sūtra *Jamnâdyasya yataḥ* as putting forth the Sāṁkhya Pradhāna. Cp. *Entwicklung*, pp. 11ff.

dvaita" interpretation (divested of course of its sectarian excrescences), which endows the original Sentient First Principle — without violating its unitary character — with the real Śakti or potence from which the world springs forth in an evolutionary sequence, we have to concede the palm of superiority to that interpretation here, just as in some of the Yājñavalkya passages we have had to acknowledge the priority of the "Māyāvāda" interpretation, or in the Śvetāśvatara text that of the "Viśishṭādvaita" rendering. Of course all these are as yet mere tendencies that show themselves here, and it is only when particular aspects of the teaching were more emphasised by one set of thinkers than another that they became nurtured along specific directions at some later stage of speculation.

39. ULTIMATE VEDĀNTIC POSITION OF THE UPANISHADS : (3) THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DOCTRINE OF THE KENA AND OTHER TEXTS.—The problem of the relation between Man and Man and between Man and the World is partly an ethical question and partly an epistemological question. The former we have already discussed at sufficient length in section iv. of this Chapter and elsewhere. The actual Upanishadic data bearing on Ethics are of course not very copious; but they are sufficient and varied to disabuse one of the notion that the Upanishadic philosophy, as being merely a system of pantheism, can leave no scope for moral conduct as such. — As to the Upanishadic theory of knowledge, a few generalisations may here be permitted. (1) The ordinary knowledge of sense streams in through the usual gateways of knowledge, whereof the exact *modus operandi* the Upanishads are not anxious to scrutinize beyond enunciating the principle that the mind forms the essential background of sense-perception (Bṛih i. 5. 3) and that its clearness and accuracy depend in some way upon the healthy organic condition of the body (Chhān. vi. 7), to maintain which certain purificatory disciplines are prescribed. (2) Each sense-perception and each act of the mind reflecting upon the presentations of the sense presuppose the existence and the direct awareness of Self that is the subject or agent in perception, and that can never be, as such, the object of perception, because every such object implies an-

other subject at the back of it. The Self or the Ātman is the permanent possibility of knowledge and we can never have a sensuous knowledge of it, but only the knowledge of direct and immediate intuition, which cannot be expressed in the language of sense (*pratibodhaviditam matam*, Kena I. ii. 2). To attempt to do it is like standing upon one's own shoulders, and betrays only the fact of your own ignorance of the real nature of the Ātman. This is clearly expressed time and again by the Kena I. ii. 3, and most explicitly by Yājñavalkya (Bṛih. iv. 3. 21–31). (3) This intuitiv knowledge is the knowledge of the direct supra-sensuous realisation or Sākshātkāra, and it is possible to reach it not only furtively in the act of ordinary sense-perception, but deliberately and continuously through ecstatic vision or Yogic trance, for which special practical prescriptions are forthcoming. The mystic visionary may utterly fail to translate his experience into the ordinary language of sense or dualism; but it is there, a positive something which, in some subtle manner, confers an altogether new value upon things when, shaking off his mystic trance, he looks upon them with the ordinary eyes of sense. We may go even further. The realisation of the Absolute, if and when reached, can leave no room in it for even the least shred of one's own limited and individual or personalistic experience. The finite may amplify its dimensions all round to such an extent that eventually it becomes one with the Infinite, and what is more, may not even retain any memory or consciousness of its earlier finite status. The distinction between the subject and the object is transcended to such an extent that the subject becomes its own object and the object its own subject — if we needs must persist in using our inadequate language of dualism to convey even a vague notion of that inexpressible entity. *Guros tu maunaṁ vyākhyānam.* It is thus that knowledge returns upon itself and ends in Mysticism. This is the phase of thought definitely presented by the most advanced of the Upanishadic texts; and as will be readily seen, it was somewhat of a risky speculation which was ever within sight of Scepticism and Agnosticism, and

never at any considerable distance from downright Materialism, Atheism and Nihilism. We do not have to wait very long to see the storm burst.

40. SUMMARY OF RESULTS.—At the end of a somewhat long Chapter it is necessary to concentrate attention upon the main results that have been achieved.—Having arrived, on the basis of certain more or less objective proofs, at a chronological grouping of the several Upanishadic "units" (page 135 above), the task that we had set before ourselves in this Chapter was to examine the statements found in these texts concerning the main philosophical topics, and to ascertain if these statements as sequentially arranged by us gave evidence of any idealogical evolution in the manner and matter of the problems treated. We have done this in the case of the Upanishadic ideas of World-creation (§§4—8,16); the Psychological and Eschatalogical reflections from the Upanishads (§§17–21); the Upanishadic theories of the Absolute and its relation to the Individual (§§ 22-26); and the Upanishadic notions on Ethics (§§ 27-28); besides reviewing sequentially the growth in the Upanishadic conceptions of Prajāpati (§9), Brahman (§§ 11–12), Ātman (§§ 13–15), Prāṇa (§ 18), and Purusha (§ 36), as also the growth of systematic philosophising in the Upanishads by tracing the rise therein of Materialism (§ 30), of Yoga and Mysticism (§ 31), Bhakti (§ 32), and Sāṁkhya (§ 34). We hope that it will have been evident to the attentive reader, who has kept the chronological sequence of these sources steadily in view, that there is a definite and natural evolution of thought and method as one passes on from the earlier texts to the later—logic and chronology having in fact become one. It is not necessary here to repeat the results so far as the sub-sections within each of the Four Groups into which we have arranged our texts are concerned. But, even at the cost of a little repetition, the broad features of these Four Groups (Brāhmaṇic, Brāhmaṇo-Upanishadic, Upanishadic, and Neo-Upanishadic) may be here advantageously indicated.— In Groups One and Two we saw that the main interest was centerd upon Cosmology. This distinctly occupies a subordinate place in Group Three, where we notice

an idealistic trend of thought making itself felt through attention being directed, almost for the first time, to a consideration of the states of man, and especially the "dream approach" to the problem of Reality. Further, as between Groups One and Two by themselves, the cosmologies — unsystematic as they all along are — tend to rid themselves of the earlier ritualistic colouring along the path of the "Bandhutā" equations, and assume a deeper symbolical and psychological and even intellectualistic interest. Then as to the assumed ἀρχή of creation, there is a shift from the ritualistic Prajāpati to the absolutistic Brahman, and eventally, to the idealistic Ātman ; just as in the matter of the conception of the creative process as such, from the cruder common-sense notion of creation out of nothing there has been an advance to the notion that creation is a reduction of the chaotic to the orderly, or a manifesting of the unmanifest—a conception which is, inconsistently enough, placed side by side with the conception of the "anupraveśa" or the entrance of the Creator into his creation, which synchronises with the beginnings of Bhakti. It is in Group Three that we are presented with some formal definitions of the ἀρχή whereby the First Principle comes to be endowed with a living interest in not only the origin and the end but the normal carrying on of the Saṁsāra. In Group Four, with the introduction of the fourth or the Turīya state, there is a marked tendency towards Negativism and Māyāvāda, whereby the problem of Cosmology ceases to be a problem any more. —Secondly, in the domain of Psychology, while in Group One such generalisations on the nature and operations of the Soul as are presented by our sources seem to follow mainly in the wake of Ritualism — the lucubrations centering round Prāṇa rather than Ātman—in Group Two we discover an increasing emphasis on the conception of the Ātman to whom a "liṅgaśarīra" or subtle body is assigned for purposes of transmigration. Also Group Two (and more so even, Group Three) brings quite prominently to the fore the intellectualistic aspect of ordinary psychic and conative processes, introspection and meditation being declared and recommended as the best means to the knowledge of the nature and functions of the

Ātman.—Thirdly, Groups One and Two offer very little by way of Eschatological reflections, which seem to crowd in from all sides with a bewildering variety in Group Three: the doctrine of the Five Fires and Two Paths, of the Paryaṅka-vidyā and others being readily citable as the illustrations. Our texts—even the latest—appear to hesitate between the doctrines of immediate or graded liberation. — Fourthly, while throughout the period the conception of the Absolute as transcendent is ever present before the Upanishadic philosopher, its immanence comes to be more emphasised perhaps in Group One and transcendence in Group Two, where we also meet with the formulation of the distinction between the "Higher" and the "Lower" Ātman. In Group Three the conception tends to become more idealistic and negative (nirguṇa), the latest texts denying even the possibility of any kind of conception at all, either positive or negative. At the same time, however, there is present a side-track which ushers in a positive (saguṇa) conception of it, paving eventually the way for Theism.—Fifthly, for the realisation of the Absolute there are symbols of it mentioned, those in the earlier Groups being mainly ritualistic, those in the later being frequently negative, and—even when positive—being in so many words, declared to be inadequate and at best only suggestive, but never truly representative. The difficulty of the process of realisation is throughout emphasised, submission to the Guru, self-discipline, etc. being duly prescribed as the means. In the most advanced texts, however, this knowledge is stated to be almost impossible of attainment by the individual at least so long as he retains his individuality; and, perhaps in a more trusting and less despondent mood, it is declared to be dependent upon the sheer grace of the "Most High."—Sixthly, the Ethics of the First Group is ritual-ridden and heteronomous, the list of virtues drawn up placing Faith and Charity at its head. That in Group Two evidences the failure of the Way of Works and glorifies the attainment of Ātmic knowledge, the virtue of *samatva* or equanimity being ranked higher* than bare conformity to the duties

* Thereby frustrating the "Compromise of the Āraṇyakas." (See page 84 above).

of castes (varṇa) and stages (āśrama). In Group Three there are evident traces of "a-moralism"—corresponding to the metaphysical "a-cosmism" of the time—Ethics being thereby banished out of court altogether, except from the lower point of view of the world or Vyavahāra. In Group Four the theistic or sectarian tendencies make themselves distinctly felt, thus placing the problem of Ethics upon a different footing altogether. — Lastly, the argument becomes more sustained and systematic and technically worded in the later Groups — especially Group Three — than is the case in the earlier Groups. This accords well with the ascertained origins of Sāṁkhya, Yoga, and the other Darśanas or "Classical" Systems of Philosophy somewhere in the period covered by Group Three.* All these facts, taken in conjuction with the stylistic and other differences discussed by us on pp. 139-145 above, should have the result of eventually justifying the stratification of the Upanishadic texts made by us on p. 135 above. — It is time now that we pass on to a brief consideration of the immediate consequences of the meeting together of the various speculative and other forces that have been gathering to a head towards the end of the Upanishadic period.

* That the thought was nevertheless in a plastic stage and gave opportunity for—at times—even contrary opinions (such as the Advaita, the Viśishṭādvaita, and the Suddhādvaita being implicitly contained therein is borne out by the whole history of Early Indian thought.

CHAPTER TENTH

POST-UPANISHADIC THOUGHT-FERMENT

1. Necessity for Postulating a Period of Thought-Ferment Between the Upanishads and Buddhism.—In the general review of the Upanishadic philosophy that we gave in the last Chapter we tried to bring out the main lines of thought pursued by the "Vedāntic" thinkers of the period in the several domains of philosophy, pointing out at the same time how, by a relative shifting of the emphasis, the tendencies inherent in the speculations were likely to lead, in the fulness of time, to the formulation of the several divergent Systems of Philosophy such as we generally know them. These are going to engage our attention at length in the subsequent Volumes of this History. But there still remains a very large proportion of the thought-activity of the period before us which, unhappily, has not been adequately preserved for us in any important and independent documents of its own, like the Upanishads, and which we have therefore to study only in such fragmentary extracts or notices of them as have, by sheer chance, managed to survive as fossilized remains in some other works, *not* written primarily in their interests. The value and variety of these fragments, coupled with such scanty information as is available to us regarding the individual thinkers, teachers and system-builders who probably were responsible for them, and who flourished during the couple of centuries intervening between the end of the Upanishadic movement and the commencement of the Jain-Buddhistic movements, makes our regret all the more keen for what we have, probably irrevocably, lost. But the evidence, which we shall presently set forth, would go quite a long way to confirm, in the first place, what we have said above (Chapter III, pages 75ff.) about the existence in the Upanishadic period of a large mass of

'heretic' or 'heterodox' philosophy outside the pale of Brāhmanism, but perceptibly influencing the tone and trend of its speculation in ways more than one ; in the second place, since most of this 'heretic' philosophy owed no allegiance in any form to the Vedic religion of the Sacrifice and was, if anything, even pronouncedly antagonistic to the dominance of priest-craft, we can now place ourselves in a position to appreciate the grave danger that had really menaced Brāhmaṇism at this time, and to meet which alone it was driven to make that compromise with the less obdurate free-thinkers of the Upanishadic age which we have described above (page 84). Furthermore, if—as we have reasons to suppose—the disruptive forces of the time proved ultimately too great for Brāhmaṇism, one is tempted to ask whether Brāhmaṇism succumbed without a struggle : without in fact a further concerted attempt at self-defence, counter-attack, compromise, and reconstruction. After having already studied the lengths to which Brāhmaṇism permitted itself to be carried with a view to achieve its hard-won victory over the "Asuras," one naturally expects that Brāhmaṇism would not be remiss in putting forth another stubborn defence to save the established Śrauta religion, with its due and definite assignment of duties to the various Varṇas (castes) and Āśramas (life-stages), before it succumbed to the onslaughts of the Newer Philosophy. And if such an attempt did take place, where else can the evidence for it be found except in the Great Epic—the so called "Fifth Veda," at least two-thirds of which appears to us to belong to the pre-Buddhistic period, including its older reflective and philosophical portions like the Bhagavadgītā ? Lastly, it is only by postulating such a philosophically active and even stormy period of about a couple of centuries in between the Upanishads on the one hand and the rise of Jain-Buddhistic religions on the other that we are enabled to give unto the teachings of Mahāvīra and Gautama their true value and perspective as being not themselves directly at the crest of a wave of revolt against Brāhmaṇism (as is commonly taken for granted), but rather as constituting the forces of order and steadiness in the midst of the

prevailing confused and chaotic welter, for the ushering in of which others were principally responsible. Taking the "Akriyāvāda" with its formula — *Natthi kammaṁ, natthi kiriyaṁ, natthi viriyaṁ**—as typical of this bellicose philosophy, it is to be noted that, as against this, Jainism asserts its own conviction in the following words : *Atthi utthāneti vā, kammeti vā, baleti vā, virieti vā, purisakāre parakkameti vā,*† in exactly the same fashion as Buddhism claimed to be a Kammavāda, Kiriyāvāda and Viriyavāda. It is thus that the claim of Buddhism that it is the "Majjhimā Paṭipadā" or the Middle Way can be adequately justified. We propose to designate this period that intevenes between the Upanishadic speculation on the one hand and the advent of Jainism and Buddhism on the other as the Age of "Post-Upanishadic Thought-ferment."

2. THE AVAILABLE SOURCES FOR THE PERIOD : (A) JAIN AND BUDDHISTIC.—Our authorities for this very important and interesting but usually neglected chapter in the evolution of Early Indian Philosophy are the following : (1) The various scattered statemenst in the Jain Canonical works like the Sūtrakṛitāṅga, Sthānāṅga, Āchāra, Bhagavatī, Nandī, etc., as also texts like Gommaṭasāra, where, under the four principal heads‡ of the Kriyāvāda, Akriyāvāda, Ajñānavāda and Vinayavāda, as many as (180 + 84 + 67 + 32 =) 363 different philosophical views or Darśanas are enumerated as being known to Mahāvīra, and therefore presumably, as being current in his day. (2) As an independent and more or less contemporaneous confirmation of this data from the Jain Canon, we have the many analogous statements in the Buddhistic Scriptures, as typical of which may be mentioned the "Brahmajāla" Sutta from the Dīgha Nikāya, where, although

* "There can be no activity, no obligation, no effort."

† "There does exist such a thing as striving, as activity, as power, as effort, as manliness, or as exploit"—Bhagavatī i. 3. 5.

‡ Known as Vādi samavasaraṇas. The commentators define them thus Jīvājīvādir artho 'stītyevaṁrūpāṁ vadanti-iti Kriyāvādinaḥ, āstikā ityarthaḥ. Tannishedhāt Akriyāvādino nāstikā ityarthaḥ. Ajñānam abhyupagamadvāreṇa yeshām asti te Ajñānikāḥ. Vinaya eva Vainayikaṁ ; tadeva niśśreyasāyetyevaṁvādino Vainayikavādinaḥ.

only 62 'heretic,' i. e. non-Buddhistic, views are mentioned as current at the time of Gautama the Buddha, the details given in the descriptions of these views, and, in not a few cases, even the names of the individual teachers propagating those views, so remarkably agree with those furnished by the Jain sources— the explanation of the different figures reached in these two enumerations being the circumstance that both the Jain and the Buddhistic statements were made from specific points of view, the one ethical, and the other metaphysical. Both try to give schematically a series of views upon a particular question that could be held, rather than those that were actually held. This probably led to the invention of hypothetical systems and the counting of one and the same Darśana in more than one group. For instance, under the Buddhistic Akriyāvāda are included systems of thought that deny the freedom of the will and moral responsibility ; that deny the existence of the soul as a substance and his consequent transmigration ; that declare that neither knowledge nor action, severally or conjointly, is capable of securing the so-called Nirvāṇa or Moksha or Salvation ; and that, in fact, go to the length of denying the law of causation itself. The Jain account elaborates this Akriyāvāda into 84 varieties, according as there is a denial of the existence of Jīva, Ajīva, Āsrava, Bandha, Saṁvara, Nirjara, and Moksha (the Jain categories), each severally, and according as they deny the causal activity of Kāla, Īśvara, Ātman, Niyati, Svabhāva, or Yadṛichchhā, in succession, conceiving these First Principles of the schools, further, as each acting of its own free impulse, or depending upon something else for its activity. These several denials, taken each in combination with each one of the other denials, give rise to ($7 \times 2 \times 6 =$) 84 varieties,— which is logic or mathematics, but not history. The Buddha, in an allied fashion, divided all systems into the two major classes of (i) those that speculate on the first beginnings of things (the Pubbanta-kappika), twenty varieties, and (ii) those that speculate about the future goal of creation (Aparanta-kappika), forty-four varieties. Here too the procedure is logical; and since a number of systems hold-

ing certain views about the first beginnings must have also held views about the final end of the world, they must naturally have been counted twice over in the scheme. For example, the Buddha gives the following four classes of the Ekachchasassatavādins or the Semi-eternalists (Rhys Davids, Buddhism p. 31):

> There are some other Recluses and Brahmins who are Eternalists with regard to some things, and in regard to others Non-eternalists. (1) Some hold that God alone is eternal, but not the individual souls; (2) some hold that all the gods are eternal, but not the individual souls; (3) some others hold that certain illustrious gods are eternal, and of the individual souls only such as are not 'debauched by pleasure,' all the rest being non-eternal; while (4) some others hold that this which is called eye and ear and nose and tongue and body is a self which is impermanent, unstable, not eternal, subject to change; but this which is called heart, or mind, or consciousness is a self which is permanent, steadfast, eternal, and knows no change, and it will remain for ever and ever.

So too, the Buddha's account of the Diṭṭhadhammanibbāṇavādins is as follows:—

> There are also Recluses and Brahmins who hold the doctrine of happiness in this life and who in five ways maintain the complete salvation, in this visible world, of a living being either by a full, complete and perfect enjoyment of the pleasures of the senses; or by an inquiring mental abstraction, or intellectual pleasures and pursuits; or by a still higher state of elevation of mind and internal calm of heart; or by a mental state higher still and free alike from joy and pain and inquisitiveness and such other factors disturbing its serenity; or, finally, by the highest mental calm attainable, which knows not even the distinction of subject and object.

The names under which the several Darśanas appear in this Brahmajāla Sutta (compare 'Amara-vikkhepika, Wriggling-eel') are likewise special designations given from a philosophical view-point, rather than the current names of the systems.

such as they might be presumed to have actually existed once. In spite of this circumstance, we need not brush aside these accounts as altogether unhistorical. For, at least some of the designations of the individual systems in both these sources, it is satisfactory to note, do agree, as also the descriptions they give of the special doctrines cultivated by individual teachers, which enables us to assign at least a few of these Diṭṭhis or views to specific owners, and so clothe them in flesh and blood. Some of the doctrines enumerated are, of course, those of the Brāhmaṇas and the Upanishads (including some Sectarian views then just coming into vogue); but the views designated by the Buddha under the names of the Antānantikas and Amara-vikkhepikas— the Subtle-logicians and Equivocationists — will probably have to be held as having sprung into prominence during the post-Upanishadic period only; and some of the great " heretic " opponents whom the Jain and the Buddhistic Canons name were probably followers of such Diṭṭhis, the seeds of which were, as we saw, already sown in the later Upanishads themselves.

3. THE AVAILABLE SOURCES FOR THE PERIOD: (B) BRĀHMAṆIC.—On the Brāhmaṇic side, as partly confirming the Jain and Buddhistic data, we have to mention (1) the Upanishads themselves, and particularly, the Śvetāśvatara (i. 2, vi. 1f.) and the Maitrāyaṇī (vi. 14ff., vi. 20, vii. 8ff.), as also the Māṇḍūkya Kārikās (i. 7-9, ii. 20-28). These mention — besides Atheists Pseudo-ascetics, Kāpālikas, and followers of Bṛihaspati — those doctrinaires who proclaim Kāla or Time, Svabhāva or Nature, Niyati or Fate, Yadṛichchhā or Chance, the Bhūtas or the Elements, as also the Prāṇa, the Guṇas, the Space (diśaḥ), the Mind, the Intellect, and so forth as their " First Principles." Some of these views, notably the "Time philosophy," is as old as the Atharva-Veda, Sūktas xix. 53-54, the contents of which can be thus summarised—

> "Time drives as a horse with seven reins, thousand-eyed, unageing, possessing much seed. Him the inspired poets mount. His wheels are all beings. He brought the beings together, and duly encompasses them. Being the father, He

became the son of them all. Than His, verily, there is no other brilliance that is higher. Time generated the yonder sky, Time also these earths. What is and what is to be stand out sent forth by Time. Time created the earth ; in Time burns the sun; in Time are all existences. In Time the eye looks abroad. Time generated progeny. Time in the beginning [is] Prajāpati. The self-existent Kaśyapa from Time, the fervour, *tapas*, from Time were produced. From Time came into being the waters; from Time [came] the *brahman*, fervour, the quarters. By Time the sun rises ; in Time he goes to rest again. Time generated of old what is, and what is to be. From Time the *rics* came into being; the *Yajus* also was born from Time. Time set in motion the sacrifice. Having conquered all the worlds by *brahman*, this Time moves on as the Highest God."

(2) Secondly, there is fortunately preserved for us the evidence of the famous Sāṁkhya work no longer extant: the Shashṭitantra, a synopsis of the contents of which, as preserved in a text of the Pāñcharātra school known as the *Ahirbudhnya Saṁhitā*, was a few years ago brought to light by Dr. F. Otto Schrader in his edition of that Saṁhitā (Adyar, 1916 ; cp. also ZDMG, lxviii, pp. 101ff.). In this synopsis are mentioned some 32 "Tantras" (presumably, metaphysical systems) opposed to the Sāṁkhya school—with a few sub-divisions under each—which are as follows—

1	Brahma-tantram	10	Prāṇa-tantram
2	Purusha-tantram	11	Kartṛi-tantram
3	Śakti-tantram	12	Sāmi(?)-tantram
4	Niyati-tantram	13-17	Jñāna-tantrāṇi
5	Kāla-tantram	18-22	Kriyā-tantrāṇi
6-8	Guṇa-tantrāṇi	23-27	Mātrā-tantrāṇi
9	Akshara-tantram	28-32	Bhūta-tantrāṇi.

In the above list it is easy to recognise some Brāhmaṇic systems, some deistic sects, some pre-Brāhmaṇic speculations, as also at least a few that rose into prominence subsequently to the period of the Upanishads. It is a pity that the Saṁhitā gives no particulars about these systems beyond the mere names, which,

fortunately, happen to be common with those preserved by our other authorities. (3) The most important of the Brāhmaṇic sources, however, is the Mahābhārata, which has preserved for us—in not a few places scattered all over the poem—accounts of certain schools of philosophy and certain religious and sectarian bodies and their doctrines and practices, which afford us rich and excellent material—could we but chronologically place it and properly evaluate it—for building up the thought-history of a period of which practically no direct first-hand documentary evidence has come down to us. But here we are confronted with an initial difficulty. Is the Mahābhārata to be placed *before* Buddhism (500 B. C.) or *after* Buddhism ? The question is a complex one, and cannot be answered by a simple 'yes' or 'no.' We will presently deal with the problem in brief. But even if our view were to fail to secure universal acceptance, so much should be evident that (i) inasmuch as the Epic generally prefaces its accounts of most philosophical systems by claiming that they had been current in the world for generations together, and also (ii) inasmuch as the actual accounts of certain philosophical systems as preserved in the Epic (especially in that philosophical encylopædia of the Śāntiparvan)—namely, those which claimed Kāla (Time), Dishṭa (Destiny), or Daiva (Fate), as the supreme principle in life, as also of certain other what-we-may-call Materialistic, Sceptic, and Agnostic systems—so remarkably agree with what the rest of our sources have to give us as the picture of the philosophical outlook of the age just preceding the rise of Jainism and Buddhism, we would not be far wrong in invoking the testimony of the Great Epic — in so far as it confirms our findings from other independent sources — for formulating our own conclusions regarding the nature and objective of what we have designated as the period of the Post-Upanishadic (but Pre-Buddhistic) Thought-ferment. — Two other more or less contemporary testimonies it might have been possible to invoke, viz., the writings belonging to the well-known Lokāyata school and to the Pāñcharātra and the other Bhakti schools. But their original records have not survived, and such accounts of them as we still possess are very late and, as a rule, violently prejudiced.

4. DOCTRINES OF INDIVIDUAL PHILOSOPHERS : (1) PŪRAṆA KASSAPA.— Perhaps the best method of estimating and visualising the nature of the disruptive forces at work during the Post–Upanishadic period—to which the Age of the Sophists in Greek Philosophy perhaps affords the closest parallel—is to describe the doctrines of some of the famous teachers of the age, who presumably were either the predecessors or older contemporaries of Mahāvīra and Gautama, and who therefore can be legitimately assigned to the period with which we are dealing. In the Sāmaññaphala Sutta (Rhys Davids, Dialogues, II. 69f.) the following is the view ascribed to Pūraṇa Kassapa —

> " To him who acts or causes another to act ; to him who mutilates or causes another to mutilate ; to him who punishes or causes another to punish ; to him who causes grief or torment ; to him who trembles or causes another to tremble ; to him who kills a living creature, who takes what is not given, who breaks into houses, who commits dacoity, or robbery, or highway-robbery, or adultery, or who speaks lies : to him thus acting there is no guilt. If with a discus with an edge sharp as a razor he should make all the living creatures on the earth one heap, one mass of flesh, there would be no guilt thence resulting, no increase of guilt would ensue. Were he to go along the south bank of the Ganges striking and slaying, mutilating and having men mutilated, oppressing and having men oppressed, there would be no guilt thence resulting, no increase of guilt would ensue. Were he to go along the north bank of the Ganges giving alms and ordering gifts to be given, offering sacrifices or causing them to be offered, there would be no merit thence resulting, no increase of merit. In generosity, in self-mastery, in control of the senses, in speaking truth, there is neither merit nor increase of merit."

This view has been designated as the "Akāraka-vāda," and the author of it is usually supposed to have preceded by some fifty years Gautama the Buddha, who distinguishes his own view of Dependent-Causation or "Paṭichcha-samuppāda" from Kassapa's

view of Fortuitous-Causation, "Adhichcha-samuppāda," or Non-causation, "Ahetu-vāda." The view is no doubt somewhat exaggerated; but it is the carrying out to its extremes the dogmas of the passivity of the soul and the a-moralism of the summum bonum, which are both Upanishadic teachings.

5. DOCTRINES OF INDIVIDUAL PHILOSOPHERS : (2) AJITA KESA-KAMBALIN.—In the Sāmaññaphala Sutta and elsewhere the following doctrine is ascribed to the philosopher Ajita, nick-named* "of the Hair-garment," very probably because he and his followers affected that mode of dress —

> "There is no such thing as alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next. There is neither father nor mother, nor beings springing into life without them (opapātika). There are in the world no Recluses or Brahmins who have reached the highest point, who walk perfectly, and who, having understood and realised, by themselves alone, both this world and the next, make their wisdom known to others. A human being is built up of the four Elements. When he dies, the earthy in him returns and relapses to the earth, the fluid to the water, the heat to the fire, the windy to the air, and his indriyas or faculties pass into space. The four bearers, he on the bier as a fifth, take his dead body away. Till they reach the burning ground men utter forth eulogies: but *there* his bones are bleached, and his offerings end in ashes ! It is a doctrine of fools, this talk of gifts. It is an empty lie, mere idle talk, when men say there is profit therein. Fools and wise alike, on the dissolution of the body, are cut off, are annihilated; and after death they are not."

As is evident, this doctrine of Kesa-kambalin is a violent denunciation of both the Brāhmaṇic ritualism and the Upanishadic doctrine of the Ātman. With evident allusion to texts like

*His opponents characterised his teaching also—like a hair-garment—as amongst the most disagreeable of things : cold in the cold weather, hot in the hot, and always unpleasant to touch.

Kaush. Up. iv. 19, or the *anupraveśa* texts from the Aitareya or Chhāndogya Upanishads, Ajita declares that nothing is real that is not corporeal: "As a man drawing a sword from the scabbard can say, 'This is the sword and that is the scabbard,' not so are we able to separate the soul from the body, pointing out, 'this is the soul and that is the body.'" Ajita's view comes nearest to the view of the Materialists like Chārvāka, whose (or whose teacher's) *obiter dicta* are familiar to us in the opening pages of the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha.*

6. DOCTRINES OF INDIVIDUAL PHILOSOPHERS: (3) PAKUDHA KACHCHĀYANA.— The Sāmaññaphala Sutta ascribes the following view to Pakudha (or Kakudha) Kachchāyana*—

> "The following seven things are neither made nor commanded to be created; they are barren (and so nothing is produced out of them), stead-fast as a mountain-peak (kūṭa), as a pillar firmly fixed. They move not, neither do they vary; they trench not one upon the other, nor avail aught as to ease or pain or both. And what are the seven? The four Elements — earth, water, fire, air — and pleasure and pain, and the soul as the seventh. So there is neither slayer nor causer of slaying, hearer or speaker, knower or explainer. When one with a sharp sword cleaves a head in twain, no one thereby deprives any one of life; a sword has only penetrated into the interval between seven Elementary substances!"

This view is characterised as a Sassata-vāda or Eternalism and as an Aṇikka-vāda or Pluralism. In the former aspect it endorses the Upanishadic view of the indestructibility of the Ātman, as it in fact seems to borrow the very phraseology from the same. In the latter aspect, as preaching the existence of six permanent and uninterchangeable categories, it anticipates the later Vaiśeshika doctrine. In Ethics it was an Akriyā-vāda inasmuch as it denied any becoming or the passing of one of the seven Elements into another.

* The proposed identification of this philosopher with Kabandhin Kātyāyana of Praśna Up. i, seems to us to be doubtful.

7. DOCTRINES OF INDIVIDUAL PHILOSOPHERS: (4) SAÑJAYA BELAṬṬHAPUTTA.—A somewhat dubious tradition speaks of a Sañjaya as the former preceptor of Sāriputta and Moggallāna, the chief disciples of the Buddha. The tendency of Sañjaya's teaching was sceptical or agnostic; but it seems to have been not a morose but a healthy agnosticism, which called upon the people to studiously withold judgment when face to face with certain thorny metaphysical questions which are beyond the ken of human understanding to solve, and to cultivate a sort of a mental repose and equanimity. This latter trait, it will be seen, is present in the teaching of both Mahāvīra and Gautama;* and the latter seems to have counted the school of Sañjaya amongst the Aviruddhakas or "non-hostile" systems. Sañjaya is the father of Indian Dialectics. He invented a four-membered formula of prevarication which is illustrated in the following teaching put into his mouth in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta—

> "If you ask me whether there is another world—well, if I thought there were, I would say so. But I do not say so. And I do not think it is thus or thus. And I do not think it is otherwise. And I do not deny it. And I do not say there neither is, nor is not, another world. And if you ask me about the beings produced by chance; or whether there is any fruit, any result, of good or bad actions; or whether a man who has won the truth continues, or not after death—to each or any of these questions do I give the same reply."

It is thinkers of the type of Sañjaya of the Belaṭṭha clan whom the Buddha dubs with the nickname of Amaravikkhepikas† and thus characterises their teaching—

> There are some Recluses and Brahmins who wriggle like the eels; and who, when a question is put to them, resort to

* Jacobi thus expresses himself on the point:—"The similarity between some of these 'heretical' doctrines on the one side, and Jain and Buddhistic ideas on the other, is very suggestive, and favours the assumption that the Buddha as well as Mahāvīra owed some of his conceptions to these very 'heretics,' and formulated others under the influence of the controversies which were continually going on with them."

† Amara is a variety of fish difficult to catch. Max Müller rendered the name by "wriggling eels."

equivocation, because they fear and abhor being wrong in an expressed opinion, or are afraid of the consequences, or are shy of meeting disputants—being too clever, subtle, experienced in controversy, hair-splitters (vālavedhirūpa) who move about breaking to pieces by their wisdom the speculations of others, or who are either too dull or stupid to maintain any view, but have always a number of propositions, such as the reality of the world, the rule of chance or fatality, the fruit of Karma, and the permanence of the enlightened soul, open for discussion.

The Mahābhārata (Śāntiparvan, 244. 6) also seems to have just such disputants in view when it says—

"This is neither so nor not-so; nor is it both (so-and-not-so), as also neither (so-nor-not-so): so would the followers of the Karma theory explain (away) the objects. Those that believe in the Truth (Sattva) look upon everything with an even eye."

It is of course obvious that dialectics of the type above illustrated can spring only out of the débris of subtle and over-wrought systems of thought, including the thread-bare remains of problems having an antiquity to be measured by centuries, as also the newer problems suggested from the same, but presented with a show of logical acumen and hair-splitting distinctions altogether beyond the reach of the primitive mind. And when agnostic unbelief enters the arena of controversy, the interests of orthodoxy are sure to suffer incalculable harm just because this new spirit of doubt is able to work its way, like a cancer, through established systems, even under the cover of professed outward conformity. And the matter becomes worse still when Scepticism and Agnosticism become militant and start a campaign of destruction. Sañjaya Belaṭṭhaputta's teaching was mainly negative. The teaching of Mahāvīra and Gautama — like the Vedānta of Yājñavalkya — had a positive aspect which was kept steadily in the back-ground. Thus, for instance, Mahāvīra changed Sañjaya's formula — "I cannot say if A is B; I cannot say if A is not-B; I cannot say if A is both B

and not–B; and I cannot say if A is neither B nor not-B" — into "I *can* say that A in-a-sense is B; that A in-a-sense is not-B; that A in-a-sense is both B and not-B;" and so on through the rest of the seven-membered Dialectics of the "Syād-vāda."—The change was not really very great, but it was probably enough to satisfy the subtle and high-strung logical acumen of the day, and probably did save his system from the charge of unmitigated agnosticism, although it must be confessed that the system ran a great risk of being so misunderstood.

8. DOCTRINES OF INDIVIDUAL PHILOSOPHERS: (5) MAKKHALI GOSĀLA.—One of the most interesting figures of the period, however, is that of Makkhali Gosāla, around whose life and philosophy both myth-mongering hero-worship and theological animus * have played their worst pranks. Gosāla is reputed to be the third (and the last) Tīrthakara (or Inspired-teacher) of the venerable sect of the Ājīvikas, which forms the object of a special gift of piety by Daśaratha, the grandson of the Emperor Aśoka. The name Gosāla is taken to denote the humble origin of the Teacher who was born in a cowshed. The first part of the name is variously explained. It is either taken to have a reference to the *maṅkhas* or pictures which his mendicant father (and, for a few years, Gosāla himself) exhibited from house to house for earning a beggar's livelihood; or to the *maskara* or bamboo-staff which the followers of Gosāla carried about them as much as an enblem of the order as a means of protection from the boisterous and persecuting laymen; or to the special watchword of Gosāla's teaching, namely, "*mā khali* — stumble not!" or, in the words of Patañjali's Mahābhāshya (vol. iii, p. 96), "*Mā kṛita karmāṇi, mā kṛita karmāṇi; śāntir vaḥ śreyasī* — Perform no actions: quiescence is the summum bonum." While Sañjaya's dialectics was mainly negative, Gosāla by his "Terāsiya" or three-membered dialectics of 'It may be,' 'It may not be,' 'It may both be and not be,' had already paved the way for

* We will not touch here the complicated question concerning the relation between Gosāla and Mahāvīra. For details see Hoernle's article on the Ājīvikas in ERE, and Barua's paper on the same subject in the Journal of Letters, Calcutta, vol. ii, 1920.

Mahāvīra's seven-membered "Syād-vāda." While therefore Gosāla's teaching had no leanings towards either Scepticism or Agnosticism, it went to the other extreme by preaching a downright Determinism and Akriyā-vāda, as is clear from the following specimen of his teaching —

> There is no cause either ultimate or remote for the depravity of beings; they become depraved without reason and without cause. There is no cause either proximate or remote for the rectitude of beings; they become pure without reason and without cause. The attainment of any given condition, of any character, does not depend either on one's own acts, or on acts of another, or on human effort. There is no such thing as power or energy or human strength or human vigour. All animals, all creatures, all beings, all souls, are without force and power and energy of their own. They are bent this way and that by their fate, by the necessary conditions of the class to which they belong, by their individual nature: and it is according to their position in the one or the other of the six classes that they experience ease or pain. And it is only at the appointed period—after one has passed through the eighty-four hundred thousand periods of wandering in transmigration — that there shall be an end of pain.

It will be readily recognised that some of the every-day beliefs of modern Hinduism, such as that in eighty-four lacs of *yonis* or modes of existences, find expression here for the first time. Some of Gosāla's teachings in Biology and Physics are also very curious, e. g., that of re-animation (Pravṛitta-parihāra), of natural and inevitable perfection through continuous transmigrations (Saṁsāra-śuddhi), or of the six main types (Abhijātis) of mankind based upon the different colours of their (subtle ?) body : blue, yellow, etc., white being the most dominant colour of them all. In these special doctrines as also in his general Deterministic attitude how far Gosāla was logically carrying out the tendencies, some of which had already made their appearance in the Upanishadic period, and how far they were

the borrowings from certain animistic and other traits beyond the pales of Brāhmaṇism—if not indeed the results of Gosāla's own excogitations—we have very scanty records to determine. Gosāla's teaching, like that of some of the other systems that acknowledged Svabhāva*, or Niyati†, or Yadṛichchhā‡ as their First Principle, was aimed at demonstrating the futility of human endeavour, and incidently, that of the Scriptural prescriptions as to gifts, piety, and sacrifice; and it was, as such, more or less opposed to orthodox Brāhmaṇism.

9. THE LOKĀYATA SCHOOL.—The Lokāyata is a school with a very venerable ancestry,§ Bṛihaspati the preceptor of the gods being regarded as its first Founder. The doctrine is sometimes styled the Bhūtavāda, as well as the Lokāyata, and from the numerous references to it in orthodox as well as non-orthodox works, it would seem that the doctrine was more than mere tendency : that it had, in other words, early developed into

* The Svabhāva theory is brought out in the Mahābhārata passage (xii. 229. 2 ff.) ondorsing sentiments like—"Through Nature (Svabhāva) they are impelled to activity, and in the very same mannor they desist therefrom : all these beings as well as non-beings. Human endeavour exists not." Compare also Bhagavadgītā xiii. 27.

† The Niyati-vāda is summarised in the following Prākrit verse from the Gommaṭasāra :—

"*Jat tu jadā jena jahā jassa ya niyameṇa hodi tat tu tadā* ।
Tena tahā tassa have idi vādo Niyadi-vādo nu ॥

(Whatever thing, whenever, by whomsoever, in whatsoever manner, and through the working of whosesoever power is to be, that, by that one, in that manner, and through that same power shall be : this view is the Niyati-vāda)."—The view may be said to constitute the ultimate consolation of man, his philosophy of despair after defeat ; and as a tendency, it may be said to mark the utter dissatisfaction of man with his social and intellectual surroundings.

‡ The Yadṛichchhā or Chance theory, which is the *ultima ratio* of Scepticism when confronted with the argument from *rachanā* or design, is popularly illustrated by the familiar "*Kākatālīya*" maxim : "The crow had no idea that its perch would cause the palm-branch to break, and the palm-branch had no idea that it would be broken by the crow's perch : but it all happened by pure Chance." Unhappily we do not possess any more definite information as to the ethical and metaphysical basis on which this and the preceding two theories were reared up.

§ See Chapter ix, pp. 403f.

an orderly system of thinking. It, for instance, accepted direct perception (Pratyaksha) as the only valid source of knowledge, denied Causality, and preached prudential Hedonism. And its constructive programme probably included an earnest effort, by cultivating the social and physical sciences such as they were known at the time, to ameliorate human suffering and augment the sum-total of human happiness. The School has had the misfortune of being known to us only through the versions of its opponents; but its great seductive charm and extensive vogue cannot be readily explained on the usual assumptions regarding the purely negative and destructive character of its tenets. The Kauṭilīya, as is well known, assigns it quite a prominent place as a system of philosophy, and it is likely that the teacher mentioned in the Mahābhārata as the friend and contemporary of Duryodhana, viz. Chārvāka, must have exercised considerable influence in giving unto what was merely the natural tendency of the human mind—presenting itself at specific periods of its social evolution—a metaphysical basis and back-ground. The teaching of Ajita Kesa-kambalin, as we saw, agreed with the Lokāyata in quite a number of details ; and the Bhagavadgītā, it may be recalled, selected this very school for a particularly virulent frontal attack (Chap. xvi). We can understand of course how it did happen that at a time when no two prophets or philosophers seemed quite to agree even on the most elementary of questions ; and when there was no authority living or dead that dared to prove that a thing was so-and-so, or was not so-and-so, a voice which—acting on the famous dictum that where ignorance was bliss it was folly to be wise—advised men to turn away from the giddy heights of speculation and descend to the plain normal life of sense and sensibility, was most likely to secure the readiest response. Its attacks on the Śrauta religion and on all established institutions in fact were marked by a trenchancy of style, wealth of illustrations and, a perspicacity of argumentation which rarely failed to hit where it aimed and achieved the victory, as indeed the few preserved specimens of it abudantly testify.

10. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PERIOD AS A WHOLE.—It has to be remembered of course that this free thinking proceeded *pari passu* with the other lines of speculative activity pursued by Brāhmaṇism and the several "Orthodox" or Upanishadic schools, as also the distinctive practices and lucubrations of the diverse sects and cults, with a living mutual contact and interaction between them all. And it is evident that it could not have been an ordinary period in the literary and religious history of a people that rendered a career such as that of Makkhali Gosāla possible, or that permitted theorists like Ajita Kesa-kambalin or Sañjaya Balaṭṭhaputta to indulge in such unbridled discussions on the ultimate issues of philosophy. If, as already observed, the Brāhmaṇas can be said to have shifted the centre of speculation from the visionary tracks of cosmology to the comparatively soberer channels of sacerdotalism, it must be put to the credit of these 'heretic' free-thinkers that they brought philosophy into the open and compelled it to concern itself with the daily life and conduct of the people. Philosophy, in other words, is now meant for the masses, is addressed to the masses, and has a befitting popular style. Here is an example. One of our popular philosophers wants to prove the heinousness of killing animals even at sacrifices. By an iron pair of tongs he takes hold of a pot full of burning coals, and showing it to the people, thus addresses them: "Heigh ho! ye philosophers, founders of systems of your own, differing in intellect, will, character, opinions, taste, undertakings and plans! Take this pot full of burning coals and hold it for a minute in your hands." But the philosophers hold back for fear their hands would be burnt and they would suffer pain. "So are all creatures averse to pain," so the moral goes, "and these Śramaṇas and Brahmins who say that all sorts of living beings may be beaten or treated with violence or abused or tormented or deprived of life will, in time to come, suffer a variety of pains." When the Buddha later took to itinerant preaching, he was only perfecting what had already been a recognised mode of promulgat-

ing philosophy. — In the next place it has to be noted that the general nature and the astonishing variety of the views held and of the systems propounded are not of a kind which mark a people fresh to speculation. They presuppose a long antecedent training in subtle thinking and also a general dissatisfaction with the current modes of thought and a readiness to open the armoury of logic and dialectics upon any new theory that would presume to rear up its proud head above the seething sea of speculation. — Lastly, we must emphasise the fact that Philosophy in this period not only ceased to be a purely academic or ritualistic affair divorced from life and conduct; it further made it incumbent upon the philosopher to live up-to his teaching for fear of being otherwise hooted as an impostor. It accordingly developed strong and even eccentric personalities and introduced all manner of strange practices and penances. Thus of the sect of the Ājīvikas to which Makkhali Gosāla belonged we read—"They discard all clothing; they dispense with all decent habits; they lick their food out of their hands... ...They will not eat fish or flesh, nor drink liquor or gruel. Some of them beg at one house and accept but one handful of food, others at two or seven. Some take food only once a day, others once in two days, others once in seven days, others once in every half-month." — And this was by no means an isolated or exceptional case. It would seem as if a sort of premium was set upon boldness and originality of conception and independence and eccentricity of practice. Beyond their own limited coteries, the older dogmas of sacrifice, it is evident, commanded little respect; and if the mass of the people, in spite of the prevailing unbelief and the distraction of divided counsel, kept up a semblance of the old Śrauta religion, it was partly because they probably had not acquired enough strength of character and conviction to discard it altogether, and partly too because the generality of the people prefer to follow a religion which gives detailed directions and prescriptions for all manner of occasions and situations, which the Brāhmaṇic Codes, Sūtras, or manuals always did. At every turn you took, these texts

were capable of becoming your unfailing monitor who told you exactly *what* to do and also *how* to do it. They saved you the trouble of thinking and the responsibility of making a choice. True, in time it made life mechanical ; but is not three-fourths of our life mere mechanical routine, whatever the Church to which we might be professing allegiance? As long as the spirit is there to animate our actions and raise them above the dead level of commonsense, we fail to feel the drudgery. But there was a staying power in these codes and Sūtras that came in good stead even *after* the spirit had flown away. It helped to secure a continuity of life and practice within the Church, and so managed to bridge the gulf between the out-going of one inspired teacher and the in-coming of another. Spirit may be induced to return and animate the skeleton ; but the skeleton must be *there.*

11. THE MAHĀBHĀRATA AS THE RALLYING POINT FOR "ORTHODOXY."—The exact historical position and purpose of the Mahābhārata has given rise to divergent theories and estimates which it would be futile to attempt to harmonise by bare argumentation. The essential requisite for the satisfactory solution of the problem is a critical edition of the Great Epic, of which, fortunately, we have just seen the beginning ; but it would be some time yet before the enterprize can reach its conclusion. It is hoped that a careful collation of representative manuscript material will enable us to get rid of a number of very late and puerile interpolations, the existence of which in the corpus of the Epic comes in the way of an unbiassed evaluation of the poem. It is too early to say how many of what pass now as the genuine parts of the Epic would be pruned off in the process.* That will depend upon the nature of the Ms. material that can be availed of. But it may not be far wrong to assume that the Epic in its eventual "critical" edition will come to deserve less and less the harsher judgment of "analy-

* The well-known "Gaṇeśa" episode (Ādiparvan i. 109-119) has been already proved to be a later interpolation. See the First Fascicule of the critical edition of the Mahābhārata, published (1926) by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute of Poona.

tical" students of the type of Hopkins or Winternitz. The critically edited Mahābhārata will all the same contain a large number of Ākhyānas and Upākhyānas, as also the other ethico-social and religio-philosophical excursions and digressions, including such pieces as the Bhagavadgītā. Premising so much, and assuming also that the Mahābhārata is a deliberately expanded version of the original Bhārata (which may not have contained the majority of the episodes and the didactic pieces), the question naturally arises, what must have been the underlying motive of the elaboration ? We must note here also the position of respect which the Mahābhārata has secured for itself as the "Fifth Veda ;" its general leaning on the side of the Vedic religion of the sacrifice, and of the Brahmaṇic regulation of the society on the basis of the due assignment of duties to Varṇas and Āśramas, which is the normal tenor of the Poem in spite of the occasional attempts at curbing the abuses and excesses of Brāhmaṇism; and, finally, the circumstance that—except in those few obviously interpolated passages such as the one (iii. 193. 65, 67) containing references to *Eḍūkas* or Buddhist Dāgobās, and which probably would be got rid of by the normal operation of the principles of textual criticism—the bulk of the Epic offers very little indeed that must be regarded as definitely post-Buddhistic. Observe also the attitude of alliance and compromise which the older philosophical pieces like the Bhagavadgītā exhibit towards such more or less " orthodox " systems as the Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṅsa, Vedānta, Vaishṇavism and the rest, correcting their one-sidedness but withal urging them, and finding ways and means for making them, to meet on a common platform, with a view the more effectively to wage war against the growing Scepticism and Materialism of the age,* which it condemns in unmitigated language in

* Some of the attacks against the 'heretics' which the Mahābhārata delivers, the commentators like Nīlakaṇṭha understand as though directed against Buddhism. This is due to the commentator's failing to distinguish between Buddhism proper and some of the pre-Buddhistic 'heresies' like the ones treated of in the present Chapter. It is well known that the technical terms of the 'heresies' mentioned in the Epic do not tally with those of Classical Buddhism.

Chapter xvi of the poem. Further objective proofs for the conclusion will be offered in the next Volume of our History, where the eminent constructive work of the Mahābhārata will be set forth and appraised in fuller details. Here it should perhaps suffice to say that against the hypothesis (so at any rate let us call it) of a pre-Buddhistic form of the Great Epic we know of no valid arguments that can be convincingly urged. The Epic, on the other hand, acquires a satisfactory status and life-purpose if viewed as almost the last effort on a great scale on the part of the older Śrauta religion to hold its ranks together and to stem the steadily encroaching tide of 'heretic' and agnostic speculation, which was destined, however, to eventually overpower it on all sides.

12. CONCLUSION.—In this Volume we began our study of the History of Early Indian speculation in a period of transition, when the primitive religion of " Nature-worship " and the older cult of the sacrifice, together with the whole social fabric of an earlier age, were undergoing large inner and outer adjustments by reason of contact with the ideas and practices of a people having a different culture and different outlook. Face to face with what was no less than a war of cultures, the onerous task of selection and organic assimilation as well as that of social and religious reconstruction as a whole, fell to the lot of the Brāhmaṇas : and we have already seen how these theological tracts—barring a few inevitable lapses into puerility and fussiness—discharged their duty with no small measure of success by bringing into existence, from out of the combination of two heterogenous elements, a third that sought to preserve the best elements in each. It was in the course of this noble work that the Literature of the World came to be enriched by those mighty products of the creative and speculative genius of India—the Upanishads—on account mainly of the inclusion of which we have designated the whole Age which has been philosophically chronicled in these pages " The Creative Period."—But in the History of Thought it is invariably the case that the attainment of a satisfactory solution of certain pressing problems of

one age synchronises with the emergence of certain other derivative problems, that continue to press upon the in-coming age with equal insistence for speedy solution. And hence it is, as we have seen, that the spirit of ratiocination raised by the Brāhmaṇas and the Upanishads—coupled of course with certain facts of social history—summoned up in the arena forces far more powerful than those which it had succeeded in laying at rest. That these newer opponents were not mere men of straw, the few samples of their dogmas and dialectics that we could afford in this Chapter ought to be sufficient to bear out. And it is no wonder that for a time they even threatened to crowd the older systems almost off the stage. One after another their citadels were being captured or undermined, and in every walk and corner of life one seemed to hear the crash of the older order of things crumbling to pieces. The doughty and well-tried "orthodoxy," naturally, is expected under these circumstances to put forth one last stubborn defence, and then—if it must needs be—succumb to the inevitable. And yet our Religion, like the King so-to-say, never dies. For, out of the very ashes of the older Dharma, phœnix-like, is to arise a newer Dharma,* which, endowed with fresher vigour, is to burn its effete and out-worn wings, and—taught by the experience of the past—to take on newer plumage for higher and more extensive flights, refusing all the while to call itself new, and proud in the assiduously cultivated belief in its being ever the same deathless "Sanātana Dharma."

* The Defence, the Fall, and the Rebirth are to be the themes, respectively, of the Third, the Fourth, and the Fifth Volumes of this History.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

PAGE 2—Our statements regarding the age of the Veda, the people by whom and the locality where the Vedic hymns were composed, and the starting-point and the course of the Āryan migration are deliberately non-commital, because we do not want to anticipate here the conclusions of our first Volume on "The Origins." If the Upanishadic period in Four Groups (p. 135) is to be tentatively assigned to the period between B. C. 1250 to 600, the six or seven groups into which the Brāhmaṇas seem to fall (p. 36) can easily carry us to about 1800 or 2000. And if no interval, or break in tradition, or migrations be allowed between the Vedic period and that of the Brāhmaṇas (which is extremely improbable), the former naturally falls within, and extends over the major part of, the third millenium before Christ.

PAGE 3[15]—The reference of course is to Bloomfield's *Rigveda Repetitions* (H. O. S., vols. 20 and 24).

PAGE 5[27]—See Arnold's *Historical Vedic Grammar* (JAOS, 1897) for the details of his scheme of Rigvedic stratification.

PAGE 6[n]—The paper referred to is now published in the *Proceedings and Transactions* of the Conference (1924), pp. 11-34. It should be consulted for further explanation.

PAGE 7[1]—See *Indogermanische Forschungen*, xxv, pp. 190ff.

PAGE 8[23]— See Bloomfield's American Lectures on the *Religion of the Veda*, 1908, pp. 64, 71, etc.— We think it necessary to add that the accretions to which the *Aikapadika* bears testimony may not be the very last of their kind. This leaves room for some very late liturgic or even Ātharvaṇic matter not represented by the *Aikapadika* being subsequently introduced into the present Saṁhitā.

PAGE 9[14-17]—Yāska's knowledge of many recensions of the Nighaṇṭu follows from his statements at the end of Nirukta vii. 13, although it is possible that these may merely refer to the Devatā lists. That he is not the earliest expositor of the Nirukta follows from the nearly 20 predecessors whom he mentions, some of them being regular schools of Vedic interpreters. Amongst instances of Nighaṇṭu words which he was not able to identify in the Rigveda may be cited the word *Śitāma*. Yāska could quote the form only from Yajurveda.

PAGE 9[23-24]—The word *bhakti* seems to have been used here however in a more or less technical sense also, as when Yāska

speaks (vii. 8) of the morning libation, the season Vasanta, etc. as being the *bhaktis* (or bandhus) of Agni. That Yāska did not prize the Brāhmaṇic exegesis very highly is, however, otherwise evident.

PAGE 10[1]—Compare Winternitz, *Geschichte der indischen Litteratur*, Band iii, p. 383. To doubt the bonafides of Patañjali's references under iii. 2. 111 to events which, although contemporaneous with the speaker, the speaker was unable to witness in person, and to suggest that these may have been stock instances current before his time, appears to us to be hypercritical.

PAGE 10[6]—Pāṇini iv. 3. 105, *purāṇaprokteshu Brāhmaṇa-kalpeshu.*

PAGE 10[28]—Cp. Brunnhofer : *Urgeschichte der Arier*, parts i—iii, (Leipzig, 1893), as also *Arische Urzeit*, Bern, 1910. The conclusions of Brunnhofer are likely to be confirmed by the recent finds in Harappa, Mohenjo Daro, and other places. —We do not consider the attempt of A. C. Das to carry the date of the Rigveda back to a geological epoch when the Indian Sarasvatī could fall into the "Rājputānā Sea," and to make the Aryans autochthonous to the Panjab to be successful, if only for the reason that his avowed "desire to keep strictly to the letter of the text" of the Rigveda forsakes him in his explanation of the "flat-nosed Dāsas" as a figurative expression for the degenerated Aryans.

PAGE 11[3f]—See Alberuni's *India*, Translation by Sachau, Vol, i. page, 260.

PAGE 11[9f]—While Waddell's wild etymologies have generally received the scant courtesy that they deserve, it is worth noting than even Sir John Marshall is now definitely inclined to associate the new finds in Sind with a people and a civilisation dating from at least B. C. 3,000. The Dravidian affinities of these are tentatively suggested.

PAGE 11[11ff]—The following names of the patron princes deserve to be noted: Tugrya, Turvaśa, Tiriṁdira Pāraśava, etc.

PAGE 11[25]—In August 1927 Dr. S. K. Belvalkar presented a paper on the "*Devas and Asuras*" before the Literary and Philosophical Club of Poona, and Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar who presided, agreeing with the lecturer, gave his own views on the subject which have been published in the JBBRAS, xv, No. 1, p. 76ff.

PAGE 11[33]—The Phœnician legend of Adonis, the Phrygian legend of Athys, and the Egyptian legend of Osiris (or possibly of Khem), amongst others, are supposed to bear testimony to the wide prevalence of Phallus-worship practically throughout the Old World. The worship of Śakti or Female

'nergy was equally wide-spread : see Oppert : *Original Inhabitants of India* (1893), pp, 371ff.

PAGE 12[18]—See Havell, *History of Aryan Rule*, p. 11f.

PAGE 12[20f]—Cp. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, pp. 131ff. If demonolatry be an earlier phase of evolution than nature-worship, the latter which is chronologically posterior cannot degenerate into the former which is chronologically prior. Bloomfield assumes the contemporaneous existence of both the phases, one being confined to the upper and the other to the lower strata of the society. But it would seem that the latter was steadily gaining in power and prestige ; and this circumstance is better explained by the hypothesis of a race-fusion.

PAGE 12[32]—If the late Vedic period is placed roughly between 2500 to 2000 before Christ, the "Asura" evidence has to be placed in the neighbourhood of B.C. 3000, to which the recent finds in Sind also seem to point. Compare B. G. Tilak's paper on the "Chaldean and Indian Vedas," *Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume*, pp. 29ff. If an "Asura" civilisation existed so very near India, the question as to whether the traces of mutual influence are due to mere commercial intercourse or to an actual and prolonged residence in one neighbourhood loses its real cogency.

PAGE 13[28]—Our treatment is here based on the conclusions of Havell : Cp. *History of Aryan Rule*, p. 17.

PAGE 14, § 14—While reserving a detailed treatment of the subject to our Volume on "The Origins," here it may perhaps suffice to refer to the conclusions of Jayaswal (*Hindu Polity*, Calcutta, 1924) and of Sham Sastri (*Evolution of Indian Polity*, 1921), to which however we do not subscribe wholesale.

PAGE 14[25]—Compare Bradke : *Dyaus Asura*, Halle (1885), pages 110ff.

PAGE 15[1]—Compare Rv. iii. 53. 9, iv. 18. 2, vii. 33. 11, etc.

PAGE 15[6]—The examples are the Aṅgirasas, Manu, Kutsa, Nahusha, etc.

PAGE 15[18ff]—See *Die Religion des Veda*, 2nd edition (1917), pp. 187ff. and pp. 117f.

PAGE 15[26]—The full evidence is set forth in B. G. Tilak's paper on the " Chaldean and Indian Vedas " in the *Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume*, pp. 29ff. The "Chaldean" form of the Ātharvaṇic Taimāta (v. 13. 6) is " Tiamāt."

PAGE 16[21ff]—See Oldenberg, *Op. cit*, pp. 456f.

PAGE 17[4]—Such a conscious reproduction is observable in some of the Ātharvaṇic love-charms or spells against the enemy, where certain things are done or spoken to a symbolical or

miniature representation of the person against whom the charm is directed. Compare Av. iii. 25, vi. 127, etc.

PAGE 18[6]—Cp. "Yé agnidagdhá yé ánagnidagdhāḥ." The commentators understand the latter to refer to those who died as infants or were drowned in the sea, etc. Compare also Rv. x. 18. 9—úpa sarpa mātáram bhúmim etám."

PAGE 18[7]—Compare *Kauśika Sūtra*, 80ff.

PAGE 18[24]—It is thus that *Āśvalāyana Grihya Sūtra* (IV. iii. 1-26) prescribes the burning of the sacrificial utensils with the body of the Agnihotrin.

PAGE 20[10]—Compare generally Bloomfield : *Religion of the Veda*, New York, 1908.

PAGE 20[17ff]—Havell : *History of Aryan Rule*, p. 11ff.

PAGE 20[28]—Compare p. 77 ff. below.

PAGE 20, §§ 24f.—Our treatment is based upon Oldenberg's essay, on "Vedische Schöhheitsgefühl,"NGGW, 1918, i, pp. 35ff

PAGE 22[2]—Both the words signify a strange or a weird appearance. For a full discussion of their significance see Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, ii. 126-143, Hertel, *Die Arische Feuerlehre* i, pp. 11ff, Boyer, *Journal Asiatique*, 1906, i. 393 ff.

PAGE 22[12] —Compare Rv. x. 31. 7 and 81. 4—Yáto Dyávā-Prithivī nishṭataksúḥ ; Rv. x. 72. 2—Sáṁ karmára ivâdhamat; etc.

PAGE 22[19f.]—Compare Rv. x. 31. 7.

PAGE 23[5ff]—The explanation of Yāska (*Nirukta*, xi. 23) is —"Samānajanmānau syātām ity api vā, Devadharmeṇetaretara-janmānau syātām itaretaraprakritī."

PAGE 23[12]—The fact that even while transferring all the highest attributes to a god like Indra, the poet made Mitra or Varuṇa an equal participator in the divinity of Indra, or that he was otherwise aware of the existence of other claimants to the honour of the highest divinity, need not be taken to vitiate the general soundness of the line of thought-evolution which Max Müller's theory of Vedic "Henotheism" postulates. See Macdonell's *Vedic Mythology*, p. 16.

PAGE 24[11]—Compare Rv. x. 10. 8—"Ná tishṭhanti ná ní mishanty eté, Devānāṁ spáśa ihá yé cháranti," as also Rv. i. 25. 7ff. ii. 28. 6, etc.

PAGE 24[19]—Compare Geldner, *Zur Cosmogonie des Rigveda* (1908). That Geldner reads somewhat too much into the hymn may be conceded. See Garbe, *Sāṁkhya Philosophie*, 2nd ed. p. 22.

PAGE 24[27]—For the problem of the origin of the doctrine of Transmigration, compare below, pp. 81ff.

PAGE 25[8]—See p. 65f., below.

PAGE 26[22ff.]—Some scholars believe that the more primitive conception of this realm was analogous to the Greek conception of the Hades as an underground world of shadowy beings. Compare also Ehni, *Die ursprüngliche Gottheit des vedischen Yama*, pp. 38ff.

PAGE 26[32f.]—Compare Rv. x. 14. 8.

PAGE 27 —The fear of a "punar-mṛityu" subsequent to one's reaching the Heaven was raised somewhat later, and tackled in the Brāhmaṇas and the Upanishads. The idea marked the first step towards the doctrine of Transmigration.

PAGE 27[29]—See p. 81 below.

PAGE 27[33]–Compare Rv. x. 14. 2–"Yamó no gātúm prathamó viveda."

PAGE 28[3f.]—Compare stories from the Brāhmaṇas such as that of Śrautarshi Devabhāga quoted later on page 72, or of Udvanta on p. 150f.

PAGE 28[31]—Compare Oldenberg, *Weltanschauung*, p. 9.

PAGE 31[19ff.]–Max Müller, *Ancient Sanskrit Literature* (p. 349), for instance notes, in connection with the relation between the Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā and the Śatapatha : "It is not at all unlikely that in this, the most modern of all Vedas, the final arrangement of the Saṁhitā may have been contemporaneous with, or even later than, the composition of the Brāhmaṇa."

PAGE 31[23f.]—Thus *Śāṅkhāyana Śrauta Sūtra* xiv–xvi has a quasi-Brāhmaṇa character, while the concluding portion of the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* even Sāyaṇa declares to be "sūtram eva."

CHAPTER II

PAGE 35[8]—We have generally followed here the treatment of Eggeling, Keith, and others.

PAGE 37 —When a passage cited by Yāska is to be actually found in the *Gopatha* alone amongst the Brāhmaṇas, there is no reason why, on the plea that passages more or less identical with the one cited by Yāska occur in the other Brāhmaṇas also, we must regard the priority of *Gopatha* to Yāska as unproved.

PAGE 37[12]—As a recent authoritative pronouncement on the chronological question involved, compare Hillebrandt in ZDMG, 1927, pp. 46–77.

PAGE 37[15]—A word like " sarvāvataḥ, " (Pāli "sabbāvato") occurring in Bṛih. iv. 3. 9 cannot prove the posteriority of the whole of the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad, and still less that of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, to Buddhism. According to our showing, Bṛih. iv. 3 belongs to a very late Upanishadic period. Also

it must be noted that the language which we now designate as Pāli was in some modified form current long before the rise of Buddhism.

PAGE 38[15]—Compare Oldenberg's characterisation of the work of the Brāhmaṇas as consisting of the "trumping up of an older contradiction with a newer and yet more eccentric contradiction"—*Die Weltanschauung der Brāhmaṇa Texte*, Göttigen, 1919, page 2.

PAGE 39[15]—Compare Sāyaṇa's introduction to the Rigveda-Bhāshya (BSS, No. XLI, p. 36).

PAGE 46, §§ 11ff.—The treatment is based on the writings of well-known authorities like Henry and Caland (*L'Agnistoma*, Paris, 1906); Hillebrandt (*Neu und Vollmondsopfer*, Jena, 1880 ; *Ritual-Litteratur, Vedische Opfer und Zauber*, Strassburg, 1897); Schwab (*Das altindische Tieropfer*, Erlangen, 1886); A.B. Keith (Introduction to *Tait, Saṁhitā* H. O. S. No. 18 ; to *Rigveda Brāhmaṇas*, H. O. S. 25); etc.

PAGE 48[28]—Amongst the earlier texts may be mentioned Taittirīya Saṁ. v. 6. 2. 1, Tait. Br. ii. 7. 6. 1, Prauḍha Brāhmaṇa xvii. 11. 5–6, etc.

PAGE 49[7]—See Keith, "*Rigveda Brāhmaṇas*," H. O. S., No. 25, pp. 62f.

PAGE 50[3ff]—The table is reproduced from Hillebrandt's *Ritual-Litteratur*, p. 156.

PAGE 50[82]—Compare Tait. Saṁ., v. 3. 6. 3, etc.

PAGE 55[20ff]—See above, p. 11.

PAGE 56[27]—The best illustration in point is the Avestic attitude towards the Indian Devas. Read Haug's *Essays on the Religion of the Parsis*, 1884.

PAGE 57[2ff]—The purposeful mis-translation of the simple line—" Kásmai devāya havíshā vidhema " as if it read " Kāya devāya," and Pāṇini's special rule (iv. 2. 25) explaining the pronominal form *kasmai* as irregular dative of the *noun* " ka " are probably familiar enough to most readers. So too the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa finds itself almost at its wit's end to explain the order in which the deities occur in Rv. i. 24. 1 to i. 30. 22, and especially the gift of a golden chariot in Rv. i. 30. 16 to the poor Brahmin boy, Śunaśśepa, about to be immolated.

PAGE 59[27]—That there must have existed a large mass of floating legends about gods and sages only very few of which happen to be preserved in works like the *Bṛihad-devatā* is proved by the persistent references to Ākhyānas and Itihāsas in the Brāhmaṇas and the Upanishads.

PAGE 59[29]—It is well known that Mahāyāna Buddhism, and to a certain extent the Hīnayāna also, drafted practically

the whole of the Hindu Pantheon headed by Indra or Śakra (Pāli, Sakka) to serve as attendants upon the Buddha.

PAGE 61[13ff.]—Viśvakarman (Rv. x. 81. 22) and Hiraṇyagarbha (Rv. x. 121) who would have been serious rivals to Prajāpati got their individuality merged into that of Prajāpati : compare S. B. vii. 4. 2. 5, and elsewhere.

PAGE 61, § 23—The idea of the " Bandhus " already makes its appearance in some of the very late Rigvedic hymns such as Rv. i. 163. 4—" Tríṇi ta āhur diví bándhanāni " etc.

PAGE 62[14]—For a similiar subterfuge on the part of Indra compare *Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa* vii. 2. 1.

PAGE 63[34]—" *Vorwissenschaftliche Wissenschaft.*" This is the secondary title of Oldenberg's book, "*Die Weltanschauung der Brāhmaṇa Texte,*" which has been of great use here.

PAGE 65[25ff]—Compare the *nirīśvara* Mīmāṅsakas of later times.

PAGE 65[29]—Compare texts such as T. S. vii. 5. 1, Tāṇḍya Brāh. iv. 1. 1f, or Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā xxxiii. 1.

PAGE 66—Comp. Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa viii. 6. 5—"Asureshu vai sarvo yajña āsīt," etc. Similarly, T. S. iii. 3. 7.

PAGE 68[5]—The whole first adhyāya of this Kāṇḍa is devoted to Cosmology, as also the early portions of Kāṇḍa xi.

PAGE 73[34]—For example, the famous discoveries of Sir Jagadīśa Chandra Bose about the sentiency of plants.

PAGE 75[1]—Compare Lévi : *La Doctrine du Sacrifice dans les Brāhmaṇas*, Paris, 1898, pp. 152ff.

PAGE 76[9]—Compare also Ait. Āraṇ. iii. 2. 6.

CHAPTER III

PAGE 78[19]—Compare the stories such as that of Videgha Māthava in Ś. B., I. iv. 1. 10, etc.

PAGE 79[5ff]—Compare Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā, xvi. 1ff. The problem connected with the origin of Śiva and Vishṇu cults will be fully dealt with in the first Volume of this History. There also will be treated the questions relating to the rise during the Early Vedic period of an " ethical monism " connected with the name of Varuṇa.

PAGE 80[6ff]—We feel that Hauer's attempt (*Die Anfänge der Yogapraxis*, Leipzig, 1922) does a little over-emphasise the magical or mystic significance of the simpler Vedic ritualism.

PAGE 81[2]—Several orders such as the Ājivikas, Nigganthas, Muṇḍa-sāvakas, Jaṭilakas, Paribbājakas, Megaṇḍikas, Tedaṇḍikas, Aviruddhakas, Gotamakas, Devadhammikas, etc.

are mentioned frequently in the Pāli texts. See, *Dialogues of Buddha*, vol. i., pp 220ff. Pāṇini's reference to the *Bhikshu-sūtras* (IV. iii. 110) is well known. Buddhism of course did not invent "Pabbajjā."

PAGE 81 —*Journal Asiatique*, 1901, II, p. 464.

PAGE 87[24]—The evidence from the other *genuine* works of Śaṅkarāchārya on the point has not been taken into account.

PAGE 88[6ff]—Some of the older Upanishads named from their initial words are the *Īśa* and *Kena*; from the nature of the form or contents, *Praśna* and *Ārsheya*; and from the deity, *Mahānārāyaṇa.*

PAGE 88[10ff]—The language of the older Upanishads has been critically studied in such special monographs as Wecker, *Gebrauch der Kasus in der älteren Up.*, Tübingen, 1905; Kirfel, *Nominal-komposition in den Up.*, Bonn, 1908; etc.

PAGE 88[13ff]—Illustrations of (3) and (4) will be found amongst the structural and critical notes which follow.

PAGE 88[25ff]—See "*Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus*," (Göttingen, 1915), p. 37, 41, 155ff, etc,

PAGE 88[33ff]—A specific attempt along these lines is a desideratum of our studies.

PAGE 89[1ff]—Illustrations in the sequel, esp. at the conclusion of each structural and critical note. The subjective character of this test is acknowledged and allowed for.

PAGE 89[23ff]—The English translation—"Begins with a bold and blunt Idealism, and from thence through the phases of Pantheism, Cosmogonism, and Theism, it finally leads to the Atheism of the later Sāṁkhya and eventually to the Apsychism of the early Buddhism."

PAGE 89[27f]—See *Transactions of the International Congress for the History of Religions*, Vol. 2, pp. 19–24, Oxford, 1908, where Deussen has contributed a paper on Upanishadic chronology.

PAGE 89[32]—See *Descriptive Catalogue of Adyar Mss.*, Vol. I, Upanishads, pp. 144, 187, 224, 282.

PAGE 91[23]—Hertel's contention that in *nedam yad idam upāsate* (i. 4–8) the *Kena* wants to fight against the doctrine of the identity of the World-soul and the Individual-soul (Brahman), its object being to assert the doctrine of the personal immortality of the individual in a beatific existence in heaven (*Die Weisheit der Upanishaden*, München, 1921, pages 23, 32ff.) goes against the clear intention of the text—*Bhūteshu bhūteshu vichitya dhīrāḥ* (ii. 5), which, even according to Hertel, means that "the wise discover It (=Reality) in all Beings."

PAGE 91[32f]—For example, II. i. 3[cd]=I. ii. 22[cd].

PAGE 92[17]—The Brāhmaṇa identifies *na-chiketa* with *na-kshīyate*, what is not destroyed. Other Brāhmaṇa-wise etymologies are *na-jīyate*, what is not conquered, and *na-chikyate*, what is not known.

PAGE 92[33]—For example, Kaṭha I. i. 3 and Bṛih. iv. 4. 11. both traceable to Īśa 3; Kaṭha II. i. 9 and Bṛih. i. 5. 23; etc.

PAGE 94[20ff]—After he had exposed (p. 14) in no ambiguous terms the ignorance of Deussen concerning the rudiments of the science of Vedic metre, and asserted that—except in a few cases where the text has suffered in being orally transmitted from teacher to pupil—the metre of the Muṇḍaka is normal even to the point of observing a specific rule about the cæsura (pp. 50ff.), it is somewhat disconcerting to find that the changes which Hertel in his critical restoration of the Muṇḍaka Upanishad (*Indo-iranische Quellen und Forschungen*, III, Leipzig, 1924) proposes to make involve such cases as the following : the addition of a *cha* (II. i. 3[c]), of *ime* (II. 2. 2[b]), of a *hi* (II. i. 8[a]), of an *astu* (II 2. 6[c]), or of a *tad eva* (II. 2. 11[c]) ; the omission of the word *prithivī* (II. i. 4[d]), of *rathanābhau* and *charate* (II. ii. 6), *amṛitam* (II. ii. 11[b]), and the whole clause *tad u vāṅmanaḥ, tad etat satyam*, supposed to be a gloss that has found its way (can it do so when the tradition was oral ?) into the text ! Nor is Hertel (p.48) quite fair to Deussen who had already commented upon (*Allgemeine Geschichte*, vol. i., p. 312) the use of *brāhman* as masculine in the Skambha Sūkta (x. 7. 36) of the Atharvaveda. Although therefore we cannot agree with Hertel in all his contentions, we must admit that in quite a number of places he has decidedly improved the text and our understanding of the same.

PAGE 96[21]—Namely, Madhva, Kūranārāyaṇa, and Purushottama.

PAGE 96[28ff]—On the whole problem of the Gauḍapāda Kārikās, see M. Walleser, *Der ältere Vedānta* (Heidelberg, 1910). We do not think that any final solution of the problem has yet been reached. Walleser's idea that the Gauḍapāda Karikās are even earlier than the Brahmasūtras has not obtained the assent of scholars.

PAGE 98[1]—Deussen, trying to explain the recurrence of the same stanza at the beginning of the 4th or Manomaya section and of the 9th section of the Chapter, says (*Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda*, p. 226)—" (3) The *Manomaya* Ātman, the Self consisting of *manas* (thought, will, desire), i. e. man and nature as personified in gods like Agni, Vāyu, Indra, etc.—in so far as they can be said to possess a will power or a striving for personal happi-

ness, which finds its expression in the cult of the Vedic Gods which consists in a 'trafficking in the goods.' Hence it is that the four Vedas along with Brāhmaṇas form the *ādeśas* or constituents of this Purusha. The inadequacy of this stand-point is *indicated in a delicate manner* through the last verse [of the section] which gets its full significance only in a later context, where, for this reason, it is repeated; here, however, it is given in order to point out that neither speech (meaning the Vedic word) nor mind (meaning the wishes entertained by it) is in a position to comprehend the Highest."

PAGE 99[7]—Instead of "of five sections each" read "of six and four sections."

PAGE 99[11]– "Like the continuation of the motion of the potter's wheel even after the staff which set it rotating has becomes inoperative"—to explain the point by a stock Vedāntic image.

PAGE 100[n]—This is Max Müller's note on the passage in question : see, S. B. E., Vol. 1, p. 205.

PAGE 106[5]—The line "*Kurūn aśvā'bhirakshati*" is translated by Deussen as "protects the sacrificers (*kurūn*) like a dog (*a*= somewhat resembling + *śvā* = dog)," following the suggestion of Böhtlingk given on the opening page of the *Petersberg Lexikon* under the word *A*. Deussen complains that Böhtlingk's suggestion, because occurring under a word where one would not normally look for it, has remained unnoticed by later translators. Hume has misunderstood the point, and has not been able to detect the passage in the *Lexikon*, as is clear from his footnote at the bottom of page 226 of his *Translation of Thirteen Upanishads*, where he makes both Deussen and Böhtlingk read *śvā* instead of *aśvā* !

PAGE 108[11]—We have nevertheless made an independent attempt of our own in that direction : see p. 382 below.

PAGE 108[32]— Compare the Rigvedic use of *ati* + *skad* in x. 108. 2.

PAGE 109[24f.]—The passage, as occurring in a very late Upanishadic text, can be brought in a line with other passages with an "a-moralistic" tendency : see p. 399 below.

PAGE 112--See, *Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda*, Leipzig, 1921[3], pages 377f. and 426.

PAGE 119[5ff]—Compare on the subject a paper entitled "The Śvetāśvatara Upanishad and the Bhagavadgītā" contributed by Dr. Belvalkar to the *Commemoration Volume* presented to Prof. A. B. Dhruva.

PAGE 123[4]—The chapter on the Neo-Upanishads which was partly in type, has been withheld, as this Volume had al-

ready grown considerably in extent. The chapter will now be incorporated in another Volume of this History.

PAGE 124[31ff]—Compare the Katha Up. I. i. 26—" Śvobhāvā martyasya, " and other similar sentiments in that Upanishad.

PAGE 125[8]—The priority of the Sāṁkhya to Buddhism is dealt with in Chapter ix. Sāṁkhya was a doctrine of salvation, and as such it necessarily implied a dissatisfaction with the world.

PAGE 126[22]—The conception of the Bhūtātman has its analogues in the ordinary Chārvāka conception of the non-spirituality of the living self; in the doctrine of the "Ālambana pratyaya" of the Vijñānavādin Buddhist; as also in Ajita Kesa-kambalin's doctrine as set forth on page 452 below.

PAGE 127 —On the question of the pre-classical form of the Sāṁkhya see Chapter ix, §§ 33-34.

PAGE 131[2]—Dr. Belvalkar had an opportunity since to compare these copies with their originals at Adyar, and to edit and translate the four Upanishads in question: see *Proceedings of the Oriental Conference at Madras*, 1924, pp. 17-40.

PAGE 132[31ff]—Compare on this point *Ait. Brāh.* viii. 18.

PAGE 135—To the four Groups we tentatively assign the following dates : 1250-1100 ; 1100-900 ; 900-750 ; and 750-600 B. C. respectively. What we have designated as the period of "Thought ferment" will, in our view, extend from the middle of the Third Group to the end of the Fourth.

PAGE 137[8]—Comp. Deussen's *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, pp. 19ff ; Garbe : *Beiträge zur indischen Kulturgeschichte*, pp. 1ff.

PAGE 137[17]—We must not ignore however its Brāhmaṇic precursors like Chhāndogya i. 8-9. Cp. also p. 376 below.

PAGE 140[24]—Since published : See Note to page 131[2].

PAGE 144[30]—We have however attempted a tentative explanation : see below, p. 382f.

CHAPTER IV

PAGE 152, § 8—For a discussion of the whole story compare *Indische Streifen*, I., p. 20ff., and "*Die indische Visionslitteratur*" by L. Scherman, Leipzig, 1892, p. 5ff.

PAGE 152[30ff]—The difficult sentence beginning the third section we construe thus : Purushaiḥ [sahitān] eshām parvāṇi parvaśaḥ parvaśaḥ sáṁvraścham 'idaṁ tavedam mameti' vibhajamānān purushān ait."

PAGE 154[16]—Śaṅkarāchārya appears to have written a Bhāshya on the whole of the Bahvṛicha-brāhmaṇa or Mahā-

Aitareya Upanishad. Sāyaṇa's commentary follows the Bhāshya in the main. But while a large number of spurious works are fathered upon Saṅkarāchārya and published in several costly editions, this work of the Great Master seems not to have attracted the attention it deserves.

PAGE 176[27ff]—See above, note to p. 19[23].

CHAPTER V

PAGE 191[8]—It is worth noting that for *anuvinaśyati* (vanishes) there is the variant *anuviśati* (re-enters), which fundamentally alters the sense.

PAGE 195[12ff]—The problem comes to be partly dealt with in Chapter IX, para. 4. Its further treatment will be followed in Volumes 1 and 4 of this History.

PAGE 203[7]—For 'ears' in line 8 read 'hair'; and for 'muscles' in line 10 read 'bones'. The whole passage can be thus more accurately translated :—"The Purusha verily is like the lord of the forest, the tree. His hairs are the leaves, his skin the outer bark (that is flayed). 1. From his skin indeed oozes out blood as from the bark the exudation (*utpata*). Hence when pierced [blood] issues forth as does the sap from the injured tree. 2. His flesh is like the [tree's] underfibres (*śakarāṇi*), and the strong sinew is the inner cuticle (*kināta* ?). The bones are the interior fibres, while the marrow of the one is like the marrow (rather pith) of the other. 3. Now, when the tree is lopped off it grows again from the root, a newer tree. When however a mortal is cut off by Death, out of what root does he rise again ? 4. Do not reply (or, You reply to me)—'From the semen'; that is produced out of the living. Like a tree then that germinates from seed, there is a straight resurrection of him without dying (*apretya*). 5. If they were to pull up the tree with its roots, it will not grow again. So, when the mortal is cut off by Death, out of what root does he rise again ? 6. [To this question the proper reply now is, it would seem, that the mortal is *not* absolutely cut off by his death.] For, being already an existential reality (*jāta*), it is not born as such : who can indeed make him be born again ? [He is one with] Brahman which is intelligence and bliss. Hence the gift (of 1000 cows) offered by the Donor (=Janaka) accrues to (*parāyaṇam*) him(=Yājñavalkya) who stands proof in his knowledge of it (Brahman)." 7. — Compare also p. 432f., below.

PAGE 204[n]—The note should be cancelled in the light of the note on p. 381 below.

CHAPTER VI

PAGE 221 —See also p. 396 below.

PAGE 236[18]—See however page 398f., below.

PAGE 239[26]—See page 404, below.

CHAPTER VII

PAGE 252[28ff.]—The Greek quotation may be thus translated : " Through which indeed exist all the beings, and from which they are in the beginning generated, and into which they are at the end dissolved : that is the stay and the source, they say, of all beings."

PAGE 259[9ff.]—Compare the Mahābhārata xii. 129. 10f., xiii. 106. 1ff., etc. Also Varāhapurāṇa, Chapters 193-212.

PAGE 260[24]—See the commentary of Raṅga-Rāmānuja on the Kaṭhopanishad passage in question.

PAGE 265[17f]—The Upanishad speaks about three Ātmans : Jñāna, Mahat, and Śānta. As the first two taste the fruits of the karman, they must have been here intended. See p. 283.

PAGE 271[17]—If the clause is read as—*mā aloke dhāsyasīti*, the meaning would be " for fear lest you might put me into the wrong world." For the whole passage consult now Dr. S. K. Belvalkar's paper on " The Paryaṅka-vidyā " published in the *Proceedings of the Madras Oriental Conference*, 1924, pp. 25-34.

PAGE 278[11]—See above, note to p. 94[20ff.]

PAGE 279[13ff]—The Bhagavadgītā problem is to occupy us fully in the next Volume of this History. Consult in the meanwhile Dr. Belvalkar's *Śrī Gopal Basumallika Lectures* on the Vedānta, delivered at Calcutta, Dec. 1925, Lecture III.

PAGE 284[13ff]—We do not however think that the doctrinal inconsistencies—if thus they are to be called—of the Muṇḍaka are so great as to justify Hertel's dichotomy.

CHAPTER VIII

PAGE 294[31ff]—Nevertheless, the dream-approach to the problem of the Absolute must be regarded as a great methodological advance.

PAGE 297, §§ 8-12—For a critical evaluation of these definitions see page 381 below.

CHAPTER IX

PAGE 329[16ff]—See Keith, *Aitareya Āraṇ.*, Introduction, pp. 41ff., 47ff.

PAGE 329[24]—For example, T. W. Rhys Davids: *The Soul Theory in the Upanishads* (JRAS, 1899), *Die Tiefschlafspeculation der alten Upaniṣaden*, B. Heimann (*Zeitschrift für Buddhismus*,

1922); *Zur Lehre von den Āśramas,* M. Winternitz (*Festschrift Jacobi,* pages 215–227); and *The Doctrine of Māyā*, Prabhu Dutt Shāstri (1911); etc.

PAGE 337[22]—See above, page 313ff.

PAGE 338[12]—The absence of symbolical cosmologies in Group Three came upon us as an unexpected confirmation of our chronological arrangement.

PAGE 340[8]—Jacobi would designate it as the " Psyche " or the phenomenal soul.

PAGE 343, § 9—The treatment of Prajāpati's career largely draws upon Deussen's treatment in *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie,* I, i. pp. 181ff.

PAGE 344[28]—Herein it is easy to see the germs of the later conception of the Boar (Varāha) Incarnation.

PAGE 346[26]—Geldner, *Glossar*, pp. 122f.

PAGE 347[2]—See, *Allgemeine Geschichte*, I. i. p. 241f ; *System des Vedānta*, p. 128.

PAGE 347[6ff] —See Bergaigne's *La Religion Védique*, Vol. i, p. 273 ; Lanman's *Vedic Reader*, p. 202; Haug's *Brahma und Brahmanen* (München, 1871), and *Ursprüngliche Bedeutung des Brahma* (München 1868); Pischel *Gottingen, Geleh. Anzeigen*, 6, (1894), pp. 419ff. ; Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, Kleine Ausgabe, p. 61 ; see also ERE under *Brahman*; Söderblom's *Werden des Gottesglaubens*, page 270ff.; Osthoff : *Bezzenberger's Beiträge*, Vol. xiv, p. 113ff.; Oldenberg *Die Lehre der Upanishaden*, p. 461ff. ; and Strauss, *Brihaspati im Veda*, p. 20, note 4.

PAGE 347[14]—Compare Griswold, *Brahman, a Study in the History of Indian Philosophy* (New York, 1900).

PAGE 347, last note—Compare Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, pp. 404ff.

PAGE 348[2]—See NGGW, 1916, pp. 715ff,

PAGE 349[15]—Hertel's view has been adversely criticised by Keith, by Charpentier, by Hillebrandt, and by several other scholars.

PAGE 351, § 11—Our treatment is in part based upon that of Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte*, I, pp. 239ff.

PAGE 355[19]—See page 104, above.

PAGE 357[16]—For example, Rv. i. 34. 7, x. 97. 4, 8, etc.

PAGE 357[21]—See his *Allgemeine Geschichte*, I, i, p, 285.

PAGE 358[1ff]—See page 427 ff,

PAGE 359[3]—The reference is to stanzas 3ff,

PAGE 359[29]—See below, page 372 note,

PAGE 360[11]—The same word occurs in the Kaush. Up. i. 4, where it is to be similarly interpreted. See, Dr. Belvalkar's paper, *Proceedings of the Madras Conference*, p. 26.

PAGE 362[19f]—That no "dream-approach" passages should have been found in the first two Groups was another welcome but unexpected result of the stratification adopted by us.

PAGE 363[32f]—"This is a part which is imbued with consciousness, residing within each Purusha, the Knower of the Field, possessing the characteristics of wishing, determination, and egoism, (and which is one with) Prajāpati and is entitled Viśva"—Eng. Translation.

PAGE 364[3]—For a short statement of Rāmānuja's philosophical view-point compare Ghate, *Le Vedānta*, p. 31-33, (Eng. Transl. p. 26–28).

PAGE 364[11ff]—"The earth and its subdivisions, ...the eye and the object of sight......all this stands grounded upon the highest Ātman"—Eng. Translation.

PAGE 364[15]—Trivṛitkaraṇa or "triplicate division" divides an original substance composed of three constituents of equal measure into three parts each including ½ of the total quantity of one constituent, and a quarter of each of the other two. It is somewhat uncertain if the Upanishadic text actually means this rather technical process of division.

PAGE 364[32f]—"One," i. e., the dualistic tendency; "the other," i. e., the monistic tendency.

PAGE 366[11]—Cp. Muṇḍaka I. i. 7.

PAGE 366[33]—Ajātivāda is the view that there is no world ever produced at all. Its best and earliest exponent is Gauḍapāda (see Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā, Chapter iv, stanzas 22, 70 etc.).

PAGE 366[26f]—See Śvetāśvatara, Chapter I.

PAGE 366[33]—See below, p. 424ff.

PAGE 367[30ff]—Compare Ait. Ār. ii. 6, ii. 1. 4, ii. 2-4, iii.1-6; Bṛihad. i. 2.3, etc.

PAGE 371[18f]—Kaṭha I. ii. 23 = Muṇḍaka III. ii. 3.

PAGE 372[10ff]—Cp. the oft-repeated passage "*Yatra hi dvaitam iva bhavati.........tat kena kam paśyet*, etc. (II. 5-14, iv. 3.31, iv. 5, 15).

PAGE 374[1]—The argument is also used by the Vijñānavādins or idealistic Buddhists, although their arguments come for refutation in the Brahmasūtras II. ii. 28ff.

PAGE 374, note—See Sureśvara's *Bṛihadāraṇyaka-Vārttika* on the passage (Ānand. edition. pp., 1565ff., Kārika iv. 1046-1062). The reference is to the *Pañchadaśī* i. 5.

PAGE 376[3ff]—See above, p. 137.

PAGE 376[22]—For a full discussion of the passage compare Hertel, *Weisheit der Upanischaden*, p. 148ff, Oertel, JAOS, xix. 115ff, Böhtlingk (BKSGW, 42, 193ff), Windisch (*ibid.* 59, 111ff.), and Belvalkar (Madras Or. Conference, Proceedings, p 43).

PAGE 381[12f]—"While silence constituted the exposition of the Teacher, the pupils had their doubts removed!"—Eng. Translation.

PAGE 381, note—Compare Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. p. 45 note.

PAGE 396[14]—We may add a reference, to Chhān. Up. viii. 15. For the question of the relation of this Upanishad to the Bhagavadgītā, see p. 220, before.

PAGE 397[37]—See especially Hauer's *Die Anfänge der Yoga-praxis*, 1922.

PAGE 401[19]—*Buddhist India*, p. 159.

PAGE 402[11]—See note to p. 81, above.

PAGE 404[6]—See Gauḍapāda's *Māṇḍūkya Upanishad Kārikās* iv. 5ff.

PAGE 411[7]—We have not considered in this place the evidence of the Minor and Sectarian Upanishads, including the Mahānārāyaṇa. They do not in fact chronologically belong to this place,

PAGE 412[16]—See below, p. 422.

PAGE 413[6]—See G. G. A., 1916, p, 28.

PAGE 414[29]—See Garbe's German translation of the Bhagavadgītā, 2nd edition.

PAGE 421[8]—Compare Winternitz: *Geschichte der indischen Literatur*, Vol. 1, p. 403.

PAGE 425, First note—See p, 303, above, for the reference.

PAGE 426[15]—See his criticism of Garbe's treatment of the Bhagavadgītā in NGGW, 1919, Heft 3, pp. 321–339.

PAGE 428, Second note—See p, 296, above.

PAGE 428, Third note—Compare the picture of the Jain universe in Kirfel's *Cosmographie der Inder*.

PAGE 430[1]—Nairātmyavāda is the view which denies the existence of the soul as a noumenal or spiritual entity.

PAGE 435[22]—The tradition of the Mahāyāna Buddhism generally maintains that Buddha only denied the existence of the "phenomenal" soul, while he maintained a discreet silence regarding the "noumenal" soul. Compare de la Vallée Poussin, *Nirvāṇa* (1917), pp. 132ff, as also Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamaka Kārikās* (ed. *Bibliotheca Buddhica*), Chapter xxiv.

PAGE 437[23]—The view in an outrageous form is expressed in Farquhar's *Pantheism and Value of Life*.

CHAPTER X

PAGE 447[6ff.]—In giving the account of the Semi-Eternalists we have followed Rhys Davids' *American Lectures* on Buddhism; but on comparison with the original Pāli text (Dīgha-nikāya Volume I page 17ff.) we find that Rhys Davids has somewhat freely summarised the original. The four classes of the Semi-Eternalists, more accurately described, would be as under :—

(i) Some hold that Brahmā, i. e., Mahā-brahmā (the personal God who creates the world) is eternal (*sassata*);

(ii) Some hold that only those gods who are not given to lust and pleasures are eternal, others mortal ;

(iii) Some hold that only those who are above hatred and enmity are eternal, others mortal ; while

(iv) Some logicians, given to speculation, think that the senses are impermanent, but what is called mind, reason or consciousness is eternal.

PAGE 453, note—The reference is to Barua's *Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, Calcutta, 1921, page 281.

PAGE 454, First note—See *Sacred Books of the East*, Volume XLV, Part II, Intro., p. xxvii.

PAGE 457[30]—The Buddhistic view that every man is destined to be sometime the Bodhisattva or the future Buddha differs from Gosāla's dogma of *Saṁsāraśuddhi* inasmuch as the Buddha did not deny man's freedom of the will as also his power to quicken the process of perfection, if he so willed it.

PAGE 459[12]—See Sham Shastri's edition (1924), p. 6 as also Jacobi's paper entitled *Zur Frühgeschihte der indischen Philosophie*, SKPAW, 1911, p. 732ff.

PAGE 463, note—Thus, one of the passages from the Mahābhārata (xii, 220.33–40, Kumbhakonam ed,) which is generally cited, on the authority of Nīlakaṇṭha, to prove that the Epic refutes Buddhism, contains words like *Sattvasaṅkshaya* (= Nirvāṇa) which probably belong to pre-Buddhistic speculation. The whole problem will however be dealt with in the next Volume of this History.

INDEX

CORRIGENDA

Page	*line*	*Instead of*	*Read*
xxix	23	anxiousth ought	anxious thought
19	15	adolscent	adolescent
25	35	x. 50	x. 59
70	30	rom	from
73	3	**30**	**31**
74	3	**31**	**32**
75	3	**32**	**33**
79	33	*śrāmyanaś*	*śrāmyantaś*
82	36	Jaiminīya	Jaim. Up.
87	5	tests	texts
101	20	ealier	earlier
111	16 from below	Sit	St.
133	10	Śataparṇeya	Śātaparṇeya
135	Group Four Second Column	Mait. iv. 4–12	Mait. iv. 4–v. 12
143	17	keps	keeps
145	27	unfrequently	infrequently
195	15	relation of	relation to
195	32	Aśvameda	Aśvamedha
222	15	maste	master
246	17	sacrcely	scarcely
249	23	as	us
264	20	meanings	meaning
264	20	expression	expressions
264	23	the Ātman	the Mahat Ātman
300	12	subdued	subduer
324	13	unfrequently	infrequently
336	36	*abhibhautika*	*ādhibhautika*
336	36	*adhidaivika*	*ādhidaivika*
337	10	(kārman)	(karman)
345	4	are	were
350	25f.	of Rudra-Śiva and other luminaries	other luminaries and of Rudra-Śiva

Page	*line*	*Instead of*	*Read*
351	5	to be the	to the
366	15	manifect	manifest
368	34	ssociations	associations
371	13	peremtorily	peremptorily
386	22	betwen	between
392	9	unkown	unknown
395	20	solitute	solitude
396	33	hypocracy	hypocrisy
397	8	more less	more nor less
399	9	water the	water to the
401	12	asectics	ascetics
414	14	origiated	originated
416	27	aumudī	Kaumudī
418	30	monogram	monograph
424	1	Yoya	Yoga
433	35	consciousncss	consciousness
436	2	as to the	as the
438	10	intuitiv	intuitive
445	11	intevenes	intervenes
445	19	statemenst	statements
462	23	enterprize	enterprise

ADDITIONAL NOTE.

Page 10[32]—See McCrindle, Ancient India as described by Ptolemy, 1885, pp. 267f.

We crave the indulgence of the reader for the followi additional misprints discovered in a second reading :—

Page	*line*	*Instead of*	*Read*
xxi	4	1908	1918
20	4	fusiness	fussiness
35	20	geneological	genealogical
37	13	regading	regarding
39	2	sweaing	swearing
41	6	sacrificeal	sacrificial
61	22	a specified	specified
62	17	Him	To him
66	13	laid	lay
69	14	minutæ	minutiæ
73	25	horses)	horses);
96	35	fouth	fourth
112	30	Prāṇayāmā	Prāṇāyāma
114	1	reason by	by reason
116	15	Maiteyī	Maitreyī
124	15	Śaṅkhāyana	Śaṅkāyana
133	18	Adhidaivika	Ādhidaivika
133	22	indentification	identification
151	9	occassions	occasions
154	27	Vesrses	Verses
180	10	Adhidaivata	Ādhidaivata
198	22	intermundane	the intermundane
230	20	Atman's	Ātman's
230	23	the know	to know
231	32	as far	as far as
248	32	special	spatial
300	8	away	way
350	7	text	texts
356	5	declared be	declared to be
390	22	Realisation	Realisation of
398	2	what	of what
422	28	may	might
459	33	illustrations and,	illustrations, and
470	22	nishṭataksúḥ	nishṭatakshúḥ
473	32	Siva	Śiva

Page	*line*	*Instead of*	*Read*
480	30	pp. 404 ff.	Band i, pp. 404 ff.
483	29	*Frühgeschihte*	*Frühgeschichte*
485, col. B	4	Brahmaṇa	Brāhmaṇa
486, col. B	30	of the	of
487, col. A	1	specculations	speculations
487, col. A	23	404 ; atheism in	in the Up. 404 ;
488, col. A	8	Avestā	Avesta
489, col. B	8	equated to	equated with
491, col. A	2	481	480
492, col. A	4	ἀρχὴ	ἀρχή
492, col. A	33	Δἀσαι	Δάσαι
492, col. B	10	origin	origin of
493, col. A	6	εῖδος	εἶδος
493, col. A	12	ἀταραξὶα	ἀταραξία
493, col. B	17	correlates	corrolaries
494, col. B	1	Go	God
495, col. B	45	ont he	on the
496, col. A	1	sunl 34 ;	sun 134 ;
497, col. B	14	Mādhyamikasquote	Mādhyamikas quote
498, col. A	13	crititical	critical
498, col. A	38	Gauḍapād	Gauḍapāda
498, col. B	16	440 ;	437, 440 ;
499, col. B	40	uegativism	negativism
500, col. A	44	Fgyptian	Egyptian
503, col A	7	Pythogoras	Pythagoras
503, col. B	4	seet ransmigration ;	see transmigration,
504, col. B	1	absolute	absolute,
507, col. A	26	literary in,	literary, in
507, col. A	34	442n.	437, 442n.
507, col. B	9	Sūtrakritāṅga	Sūtrakṛitāṅga
508, col. B	8	charactesistics	characteristics
508, col. B	10	Tiamāta	Tiamāt
508, col. B	41	Tvashtri	Tvashṭṛi
511, col. A	2	364,	364, 437,
511, col. A	20	conciousness	consciousness

OUTLINE SCHEME

FOR THE

HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

FOREWORD

There has been a continuous stream of philosophic or religio-philosophic thought, flowing among the Indian Aryans from the earliest times, before they migrated to India and settled in the country, up to the present day. As it flowed on, it received tributaries and became a mighty river, and afterwards threw out a number of branches. All along its course Indian speculation has developed ideas which, in combination with those elicited in the thought of Europe, are likely to render the world's philosophic knowledge truer, more accurate and fructifying. This subject in its vast extent has not yet attracted the attention of European scholars. What is known in Europe about Indian thought is something gathered from Buddhism, the Upanishads, and the Bhagavadgītā. But even this has had the effect of giving a liberalising turn to European religious thought. If, therefore, the richness of Indian ideas is plainly brought out and explained, it cannot fail to produce a healthy effect on the world's philosophic or religio-philosophic thought.

This is a very laborious task requiring extensive knowledge and keen critical judgment and skill. Professors S. K. Belvalkar and R. D. Ranade have now undertaken it, and I believe they are fully competent to execute it. They are not only critical Sanskrit scholars acquainted with the modes and methods of fruitful research, but have studied European philosophy and are M. A.s of our University in that subject and have acquired the knowledge necessary for a correct estimate of philosophic ideas generally. The following programme, which

I have carefully considered and which I approve, fully explains the scope of the work they intend to do, and I believe it leaves no important subject untouched. The first seven volumes will contain a complete history of the course of speculation already traversed; and the eighth gives an estimate of what may be reasonably expected in the near future.

The work undertaken by these scholars is important and promises to be very interesting at the same time that it advances the world's knowledge of philosophy. I therefore believe that it deserves the attention and support of all who are interested in knowing fully what humanity has been thinking regarding the purpose and goal of its existence.

SANGAMASHRAM, POONA,
5th December, 1918.

R. G. BHANDARKAR

First printed for private circulation, 1919

Reprinted, with slight variations, 1927

OUTLINE SCHEME

FOR THE

History of Indian Philosophy

I

Volume First: The Origins:—(i) An attempt will be made in this volume to raise a philosophical superstructure on the data supplied by

(*a*) Ethnology, and by Comparative Philology and Stylometry as applied to the Veda;

(*b*) Assyriology, including the latest finds in Sind and Asia Minor;

(*c*) the Central Asian, Scandinavian, and Arctic Home theories; and

(*d*) studies in Avestic and Persian religions.

(ii) In regard to the Rigveda an attempt will be made to trace the inner development of its thought by classifying portions of the Veda into sufficiently distinct strata, and to adjudge the value of this thought from the point of view of Comparative Religion, Mythology, and Anthropology.

(iii) In the treatment of the post-Rigvedic period will be offered

(*a*) a new theory about the degeneration (as exemplified in the Atharva-veda) of the old Vedic religion by its contact with Chaldean magic and superstition; and

(*b*) a new *raison d'être* for the Sāman and Yajus collections, and for the ritualistic practices of the exegetical texts known as the Brāhmaṇas.

(iv) The volume is expected to afford many new points of view and new solutions of old problems, and in it an attempt will be made throughout to evaluate the contributions made by the Vedic period to the general problem of thought.

II

Volume Second:* **The Creative Period**:—(i) The early part of this volume will trace the progress of thought from the Vedic through the Brāhmaṇic to the Upanishadic period by showing how, for example, it proceeds *pari passu* with the development in the meaning of a word such as *bráhman* which, originally signifying a hymn, later denoted sacrificial worship, and finally came to be identical with the Essence of the Universe.

(ii) The major part of the volume will however be devoted to the Upanishads. In it an attempt will be made

(*a*) to set forth the conditions that called into existence the varied and extraordinarily fruitful thought-activity of the period, affording, along with it, a general and succinct characterisation of the Upanishadic method of philosophising ;

(*b*) to reduce, wherever possible, with the help of the recognised objective tests such as those of stylometry, the contents of each Upanishad into sufficiently distinct strata ;

(*c*) to afford a general survey of the various Upanishads one after another by a dovetailing of these strata, wherever possible, with a view to trace their thought-development ; and

(*d*) to rear up a philosophy of the Upanishads upon these foundations, setting forth in bold relief the keen zest for knowledge and the fervent spirituality of the period.

(iii) The concluding chapters of the volume will be devoted to a brief account of the post-Upanishadic thought-ferment as gathered from references in Jain and Buddhistic literatures. This is a phase in the intellectual life of the people about which practically nothing has been written ; but its recognition and adequate evaluation would give a new significance to the doctrine of Bhakti and to the great dissenting systems of Jainism and Buddhism.

* Issued, December 1927.

III

Volume Third : The Synthetic period :—(i) An attempt will be made in this volume, at first,

(*a*) to set forth the sociological and philosophical significance of the earliest phases of the domestic, ritualistic, and other forms of the Sūtra literature; and

(*b*) to indicate the various lines along which, from its first nebulous beginnings, the philosophic thought of the period progressed, giving rise to the earliest and inchoate forms of Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṅsā, Bhakti, and other systems, all these different tendencies finding their illustration and synthesis in the philosophic thought of the Mahābhārata.

(ii) Then will follow a critical exposition of the Mahābhārata from all points of view : textual, social, ethical, political, historical, and religious. Particular attention will be given to the forces of discontent and disruption that were gathering together at the time, and to which the Mahābhārata, on a purely autonomous moralistic basis, supplies an answer, which, only in the Bhagavadgītā and allied episodes, assumes a definitely theonomous aspect.

(iii) Finally, there would be given an adequate and unbiassed account of the theism and the 'activism' of the Bhagavadgītā and the philosophical synthesis it attempts and carries out, full justice being done to the very vast literature on the subject including some of the most recent pronouncements on it.

IV

Volume Fourth : The Voice of Dissent :—(i) This volume will be mainly taken up by Jainism, Buddhism, and the other protestant systems of Ancient India, which will be studied and expounded afresh in the light of original sources such as (*α*) the canonical texts, (*β*) their interpretations by latter day commentators, (*γ*) the accounts of foreign pilgrims to India, and (*δ*) the latest finds from excavations all over India and from the expeditions in Turkestan and Central Asia; as well as in the light of (*ϵ*) the modern Indian, Ceylonese, European, and other expositions of these systems.

(ii) The treatment of each system will include

(*a*) a preliminary survey of the conditions that brought it into existence, and an estimate of its indebtedness to its predecessors ;

(*b*) a detailed and critical account of the cosmology, physics, ethics, psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics, and in general, an estimate of the permanent contribution of it to the problem of thought ; and, finally,

(*c*) a brief review of the later history of all its diverging sects in the different parts of India itself as also in outlying countries like Ceylon, Tibet, China, Japan etc., bringing out clearly the doctrinal development of the system caused by reaction from and assimilation with the other sister-systems from which it had seceded.

(iii) Room will also be made in this volume for interesting monographs on topics such as (*α*) the great Buddhistic Universities of Ancient India and their contribution to learning and education, (*β*) the organised work of preserving literature carried on by the great Jain Bhāṇḍāras, (*γ*) the extraordinary artistic and architectural development of the period as evidenced by images, frescos, and paintings on the one hand, and temples, stūpas, and vihāras on the other, (*δ*) the evangelic propaganda of Jainism no less than that of Buddhism in times ancient as well as those nearer to our own, and—just because it comes in here chronologically—(*ε*) the Greco-Indian problem of priority or parallelism, which will be discussed in the light of the latest researches of specialists in the field.

V

Volume Fifth : The Period of Reconstruction :—(i) In its early pages this volume will set forth in its full significance (*a*) the great re-organising work, especially in Ethics and Jurisprudence, of the Smṛitis and Nibandhas generally, and (*b*) the valuable broadening and syncretic work of the Purāṇas, with an appraisal of their contribution to thought, as also a similar treatment of the more or less synchronous Neo-Upani-

shadic movement, which has failed hitherto to adequately, engage the attention of scholars.

(ii) The main part of the volume will however be devoted to a historical and critical exposition of the various 'orthodox' Darśanas or Schools of Philosophy. The volume will thus deal with the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika systems from their dimmest beginnings through their Buddhistic and anti-Buddhistic or mediæval phases and their relations to theistic schools like those of Śaivism and Pāñcharātra, on to their latest activities in Mithilā and their eclectic and manual-making phases. Or, to take another instance, it will treat of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga systems in all their vicissitudes and even aberrations through all the centuries; and it will similarly deal with the great system of Mīmāṅsā, pointing out on the one hand its relation to the ritualistic speculations of the Brāhmaṇas, and on the other, its influence in the making of the science of Logic with its closely defined criteria of truth.

(iii) All these systems will be set forth and evaluated from the point of view of Western Philosophy, and many interesting parallels will be drawn between, for instance, the Indian and Aristotelian Logic, or the Kaṇādian and Leucippian Atomism. With the sole exception of the Vedānta-darśana, which will be reserved in its entirety for the next volume, this volume will thus devote itself to the very cream of systematised Indian thought.

VI

Volume Sixth : The Crowning Phase :—(i) This volume will be exclusively devoted to a study of the Vedānta in all its forms. The early chapters will contain

(*a*) an exposition of the relation of the Vedānta Sūtras to the Upanishads ;

(*b*) a discussion as to the probable accretions made in the course of time to the text of the original Sūtras ;

(*c*) a presentation, in the light of the latest pronouncements on the subject, of the probable original doctrine of the Sūtrakāra ; and

(*d*) a brief account of the Vedānta doctrine prior to the advent of Śaṅkarāchārya, as gathered from stray notices in different works.

(ii) A general survey of the philosophical position at the time of Śaṅkarāchārya will prepare the ground for an exposition of his philosophy as seen not only in the Bhāshyas alone, but also in his other genuine religious and philosophical works.

(iii) The history of the school of Śaṅkarāchārya will next be pursued through the writings of the Master's immediate pupils and later followers such as Padmapāda, Sureśvara, Sarvajña-muni, Chitsukha, Vāchaspati, Śrīharsha, Śaṅkarānanda, Vidyāraṇya, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Appayya Dīkshita, Dharmarājādhvarīndra, and others.

(iv) There will then be given a similar treatment in the case of the other allied Vedāntic schools such as those of Viśishṭādvaita, Dvaita, Dvaitādvaita, and Śuddhādvaita, setting forth their peculiar doctrines and practices down to their latest developments.

(v) Throughout the volume an attempt will be made to set forth the philosophical background of each of these schools and to show how it was necessitated by the peculiar circumstances of the time and the particular temperaments to which it addressed itself. On an impartial consideration of all these types of thought, an attempt will finally be made to see if they could not all be subsumed under a single larger synthesis.

VII

Volume Seventh: Mysticism:—(i) An attempt will be made in this volume to accurately define and analyse and evaluate that peculiar mental attitude to reality known as 'Mysticism,' which is observable in the people of all lands and ages, and which is especially observable in the Mediæval mystics of India scattered through its various Provinces.

(ii) The roots of Mysticism, it will already have been seen, reach even so far back as the days of the Upaniṣhads, and this peculiar attitude was practically never extinct from Indian soil. It received a most systematic form in the Nārada and Śāṇḍilya Sūtras, and we also meet it in the Śaiva and Pāñcharātra and

other Bhakti schools, as well as in the Bhāgavata and the other Purāṇas. Its aberrations are exemplified in one form or another in Tāntrism or Occultism, as also in some of the more pronounced Yogic practices. An account will be given in this volume of all these manifold phases of Mysticism in the order of their occurrence.

(iii) The major part of this volume will however be devoted to a discussion of the spiritual leaven introduced into Indian thought by writers such as Rāmānanda and Kabīra, Gaurāṅga and Tulasīdāsa, Narasi Mehtā and Mirābāi, Mukundarāja and Jñāneśvara, Nāmadeva and Ekanātha, Rāmadāsa and Tukārāma, Purandaradāsa and Mahīpati, Māṇikkavāśagar and Sarvajña. These names are merely representative of many others that might easily be enumerated, and they practically exhaust all the types of Mysticism that are known to exist. These Prākrit Saints attempt a synthesis of Bhakti and Advaita which altogether distinguishes them from the Sanskrit writers of the preceding period, and in setting forth their thought in appropriate local colour and in adjudging its great spiritual value, reliance will be mainly placed on the original writings of these mystical authors in the several languages in which they addressed the people, account being also taken of the Mahomedan and the alleged Christain influence on Indian Mysticism.

VIII

Volume Eighth : Modern Tendencies :—(i) This volume will attempt the task of making an exhaustive survey of the most recent tendencies of Indian thought in their chronological order. The survey will include almost every modern system of thought such as the Brahmo Samāj, the Ārya Samāj, the Prārthanā Samāj, Theosophy, Rāmakrishna Mission, and Indian Christianity, as well as every organised attempt on similar lines made by the orthodox adherents of the several existing religions of India. The thought of the times in which we are living and in which the poet-philosopher Rabīndranāth and the scientist Bose are playing such a large part cannot fail to afford valuable suggestions to reflecting minds.

(ii) Although contemporary thought is always difficult to evaluate in true perspective, an endeavour will yet be made in every case to make the presentation as fair and as objective as possible. Thus, in regard to Christianity, an attempt will be made, by a succinct preparatory study of the development of the Christian doctrine in Europe, and by an examination of it in the search-light of the progress of modern science, to assign to that peculiar phase of it—the Indian militant Christianity—its proper place and value in the general scheme of things. And a similar treatment will be given of the modern Parsee, Jain, and Mahomedan thought.

(iii) Lastly, an endeavour will be made to apply the tests of modern science to Hinduism itself, and, if possible, to place it on a firm rationalistic foundation. Room will also be made in this last volume, by way of a fitting conclusion to the entire History, for a picture of the possibilities of Hindu thought in the days to come.

"Works, in moments of insight willed,
Through years of labour are fulfilled."